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ABSTRACT 
The second World War had a great impact on the black American 
population. The issues of military participation and the aims 
expressed in Allied propaganda were seized upon by Afro-Americans 
in order to press their claims for equality at home. This war on 
two fronts, as it was called, found expression in black newspapers, 
in literature, and in song and the common theme was that service 
in the armed forces or in defence industries would, or at least 
should, be rewarded with equal citizenship rights. 
The militant campaigns launched by blacks at this time, 
particularly the March on Washington Movement, resulted in 'guided' 
changes : changes resulting from government actions to reduce 
discrimination in industry and the armed forces. More important, 
however, were the 'unguided, changes which came about as a result of 
the war itself. Manpower shortages in industry after 1942 led to 
increased employment of blacks and in a greater variety of jobs 
than previously experienced. Similar shortages in the Army in 19! ili 
led to a successful experiment in integration which undermined the 
basis of segregation in the forces. 
Such changes did not go unresisted and the massive migration 
of Afro-Americans to centres of war production, and their own 
belligerence, led to conflict with whites over employment and 
housing. In 1943 a number of cities were disrupted by race riots, 
the largest of which took place in Detroit. More sympathetic whites 
urged their countrymen to practice what they preached abroad in their 
own country, a message which was taken up by President Truman when he 
acted in the field of civil rights after the war. The riots and 
iv 
race conflict of the 1940s demonstrated the importance race relations 
had achieved during, and because of the war: they"%wereýalso'a fore- 
taste of the things to come when black hopes`and`expectätions were 
crushed in the 1950s. 
V 
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Chapter I 
War, Society, and the Afro-American 
Attitudes toward war and toward studies of war change with the 
times. The long American involvement in Viet Nam has produced an 
antipathy not only towards militaristic involvements, but also towards 
research concerning such activities. This return to what has aptly 
been called the 'liberal' view of war inhibits valuable historical 
and sociological examinations of the causes and effects of armed 
aggression. 
Historians, by the very nature of their profession, must, 
while deploring all acts of violence whether past or present, continue 
to examine previous conflicts and discuss their effects on society. 
The value of such work has been demonstrated in a variety of 
publications dealing with the history of several countries. 
2 
out 
of this body of scholarship can be drawn several ideas relevant to 
the examination of Afro-American history. One in particular is the 
the concept of a military participation ratio, first suggested by 
the sociologist Andreski, and later refined and applied to history by 
1. Alan S. Milward, The Economic Effects of the World Wars on 
Britain, London 1970, page 11. Those historians who neglected 
war because they saw in it nothing but death, disaster, and 
the rise of totalitarianism, were first referred to by Arthur 
Marwick as 1whigs1, their opposites, those who saw war solely 
in terms of political and military history, he called 'tortes', 
in 'The Impact of the First World War on British Society', 
Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 3, no. 1, January 1968. 
2. Richard M. Titmuss, Essays on 'the Welfare State', London 1958; 
Philip Abrams, 'The Failure of Social Reform 1917-19201, Past 
and Present, April 1963; Marwick, Britain in the Century, f 
Total War: War Peace, and Social Change , London 19 ; Angus Calder, The People's War: Britain 1939- 5, London 1971; 
Gordon Wright, The Ordeal of Total War, 1939-1915, New York 
1968; Richard Polenberg, editor, America at War: The Home 
Front 1941-1945 Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1968j Richard It. 
ngeman, Don't You Know There's a War On? The American Home 
Front, 1941-1945 , New York 1970; Stanislaw Andreski; Military Organization and Society, London 19514. 
2 
Titmusy Abrams, and Marwick. In its simplified form, the theory 
states that as the proportion of the total population in the aaaed 
forces increases, that is, the larger the military participation 
ratio, the greater is the extent of social levelling. 
3 
In times 
of total war, involving civilian populations as well as the military, 
the theory applies to all who take part in the defence effort, 
whether in the armed forces, government, or industry: 'war needs 
someone to do. the fighting, and someone to furnish the weapons and 
food: those who participate in the war effort have, to be rewarded.... ' 
Thus the extension of the franchise to women, both in Britain and 
the United, States, after the first World War can be seen in part 
as a 'reward' for their services during the war. 
A second theory relevant to this particular study was 
enunciated by Arthur Marwick, who suggested that total war provides 
a test or challenge to existing institutions. 
5 
These institutions 
either prove able to meet the threat or adapt to do so: those that 
do not suffer defeat and, like Russia in 1917, some times collapse. 
Segregation and discrimination have always been a part of America's 
institutions, and as such were subject to the test of war. . 
The 
response to war, and the effects of war, need not, as Marwick 
pointed out, be the result of definite government actions,. but 
could also be spontaneous or 'unguided'. 
6 
More basic, to the study of Afro-American history, is the 
3. Andreski, Military Organization and Society, 33. 
4. Marwick, Britain in the Century of Total War, 12. 
5. Ibid., 13. 
6. Ibid., 13. 
3 
relationship between citizenship and the defence of the state. 
In the modem democratic body politic, it is taken for granted 
that it is the duty of the citizen to defend his (and in more recent 
times, her) country, if need be, with his life.? Nowhere has 
this been more clearly demonstrated than in the United States, 
where it was taken to some extremes. In 1863, during the Civil 
War, U. S. officials required that any alien who had formally 
declared his intention of becoming a citizen and had exercized 
political rights under state law, was subject to ccnscription. 
Those that claimed exemption as foreigners had to leave the country 
within sixty-five days. In 1941, no resident alien was excluded, 
and although exemption could be requested, to do so meant forswearing 
American citizenship. In return for armed service, the individual 
is guaranteed the rights of citizenship; a say in government, 
protection of the laws, and so on. The military service of those 
under the age of consent, both in Britain and America, was one 
of the arguments for the recent lowering of the voting age to 
eighteen. It follows that members of a minority group called upon 
to serve their country in time of war can expect the rights and 
status of first-class citizens as a result. This is no less true 
for the Afro-American than it is for members of a particular social 
class, women, or those under the age of twenty-one, a fact long 
recognized yet never clearly defined or accepted in the United 
States. 
This issue arose in every war which America fought, and 
7. The obligations of the citizen are discussed in depth and 
more philosophically in Michael Walzer, Obligations: Essays 
on Disobedience, War, and Citizenship, New York 1970. 
14 
black service in those wars challenged institutionalized racial 
prejudice but rarely received much reward. The war for 
independence was just such a war although the situation was 
further complicated by the revolutionary philosophies of the time. 
8 
The position of the colonists as oppressed subjects and slaveholders 
created a considerable dilemma. While some argued that the 
'inalienable rights of man' applied equally to blacks and whites, 
others avoided the issue and laid fill. responsibility for slavery 
at the door of king George III. The question of black participation 
in the armed forces was solved by George Washington when he took 
command of the Continental Army in 1775: ignoring the active part 
already played by blacks at Lexington, Concord, and Bunker Hill, 
he forbad the enlistment of black soldiers. 
The situation would probably have remained unchanged but for 
the proclamation issued by the deposed governor of Virginia, Lord 
Dunmore, and the necessities of war. Dunmore offered freedom to 
'all indentured servants, Negroes, or others'9, that took up arms 
with the loyalists. Here was an invitation to the slaves to rise 
against their masters, the very thing the colonists feared. To 
counter this offer, they liberalized their own policies to allow 
first free blacks and later slaves, to enlist in the army, on the 
understanding that slaves would be freed after their service. 
This change in policy was further encouraged by the increasing 
8. The Afro-American and the Revolutionary period is dealt with 
fully in Benjamin Quarles, The Negro in the American 
Revolution, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 19 , and in Winthrop D. Jordan, White Over Black: American Attitudes 
Toward the Negro, , -l 
0- 2, Balt ore, Maryland . 
9. Quoted in John Hope Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom: 
A History of Negro Americans, New York ,. 
S 
shortage of men due to the reluctance of many colonists to serve 
outside of their own state, or to serve at all in a war which, 
after the disastrous winter spent in Valley Forge, seemed without 
end or victory. While Georgia and South Carolina refused to 
countenance the use of black soldiers, the other states were glad 
to do so: of the 300,000 men who fought the British, approximately 
5,000 were black, and several thousand of these received their 
freedom as a result. 
Those who secured their liberty in that way were fortunate 
for, despite the loyalty of the blacks and the pleas of anti-slavery 
campaigners, slavery was firmly entrenched in the South and 
recognized in the constitution of the newly independent states, 
and any ruling on the slave trade prior to 1808 was prohibited. 
Although the war, the rights of man, and economic circumstances 
led to the end of slavery in the North, even there participation in 
the war did not win egtial membership in society for blacks. Once 
the emergency was over, blacks were not only excluded from the 
militias, but also gradually separated from the white community by 
law and custom. The troublesome contradiction between the 
revolutionary philosophies and the subordination of the Africans 
was solved by the commonly accepted view that the black. was less 
than a man. 
Not until the Civil War did the question of black participation 
again reach any serious proportions. In the war of 1812 with 
Britain, both sides offered freedom to slaves who joined their 
forces, and many fought in both armies and navies. 
10 
However, 
10. See Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom, 168-71. 
6 
the active part played by Afro-Americans in the defence of the 
republic did not deter the growth of slavery.. Although the Civil 
War was fought to prevent the disintegration of the Union, slavery 
and the position of the Afro-American was a central issue. Lincoln 
attempted to prevent it from becoming the issue, firstly by refusing 
to speak out against the institution, and secondly, by declining to 
use free, black volunteers in the Union forces, for fear of 
jeopardizing the loyalty of the border states. He was supported 
in this by many white Northerners, including military officials, 
who felt besides that Afro-Americans would make poor soldiers. 
Again it was military necessity and outside pressure that 
led to a change in policy. Union defeats, heavy casualties, and 
the campaign of black and white abolitionists led to the authoriz- 
ation by Congress in July 1862, of the use of black troops. A 
year later the national call for black volunteers came with the 
Emancipation Proclamation, itself declared as a war necessity, and 
from then on Afro-Americans, both free and former slaves, served 
in the Union armies. 
Patterns of service which were established for black troops 
during the war were to remain intact until the 191i0s. 
3.1 The 
178,975 black soldiers saw service in segregated regiments, were 
led largely by white officers, and subjected to discrimination at 
the hands of the government and white fellow soldiers. The worst 
example of this treatment was the difference in pay scales for 
11. Black participation in the Civil war is dealt with in Dudley 
Cornish, The Sable Arm: Negro Troops in the Union Army, 
1861-1865, New Yor 1 56; Thomas Wentworth Aigginson, Army 
Life in a Black Regiment, New York 1969; Lerone Bennett, Jnr, 
Before the Mayflower: A Histo of Black America, Chicago 
19693 160-163; and From Slavery to Freedom, 271-296. 
7 
whites and blacks which continued until 1861. The war did, 
though, guarantee future black participation in the military: the 
Army Reorganization Act of 1866 established four segregated, 
regular army units, the 9th and 10th Cavalry, and the 214th and 
25th Infantry. The war, and more especially the period of 
Reconstruction which followed, also resulted in the end of slavery, 
the extension of the rights of citizenship to all persons born or 
naturalized in the United States, and the extension of voting rights 
to blacks. Unfortunately, in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century, these rights were ignored, set aside by states' laws, and 
overruled by violence and terrorism. When America entered the 
first World War in'1917, the Afro-American was no more than a 
second-class citizen. 
In many ways, World War I was a repeat of the Civil War 
and a prelude to the second. Black volunteers for armed service 
were again at first turned away, and when finally accepted were 
put into segregated regiments where their duties were largely of a 
menial and labouring nature: of the 1400,000 black soldiers, 
12 380,000 were in the services of supply branches of the army. 
The majority of their officers were white, and the question of 
training for black officers aroused some controversy. Finally, a 
segregated camp at Fort Des Moines, Iowa was set up which the 
Afro-Americans accepted as better than nothing. In all, only 1,400 
blacks served as commissioned officers. 
12. Black military service during World War I is described in, - 
Florette Henri, Bitter Victory: A History of Black Soldiers 
in World War I, Garden City, New York 1970; Chester D. 
Heywood, Negro Combat Troops in the World War: The Story 
of the 37 st Infantry, New York 192d; Arthur W. Little, 
From Harlem to the Rhine: The Story of New York's Colored 
Volunteers, New York 1936. 
8 
The few black combat regiments that saw action-in Europe 
fought beside French rather than American troops and although they 
performed well and earned ccasiderable distinction, they were still 
subject to the pie judices of their white countrymen. 
13 
The now 
infamous official order from the headquarters of General Pershing 
summed up the attitudes, and the fears, of white soldiers and 
officers . 
14 
Not only were the whites alarmed by the fraternization 
which took place between Afro-Americans and French male and female 
civilians, they also resented the attitudes of French military 
officials and soldiers towards Iles enfants perdus'. 
15 
These 
prejudices resulted in a lack of rest areas for Afro-Americans, 
their exclusion from the Paris victory parades, and their hasty 
return home once the war had ended. 
If the war brought little change in terms of military service, 
it did affect black life in the United States. The pressures of 
war forced the federal government to recognize the importance of 
the black population. The appointment of Emmett J. Scott as 
special assistant to the Secretary of War, and of George E. Haynes 
as Director of Negro Economics, was a considerable departure from 
the Wilson administration's previous lily-white policy. 
16 
Although 
13. The'369th Infantry Regiment of the Ninety Third Division, 
served 191 days at the front, was the first American regiment 
to reach the Rhine, was, as a unit, awarded the Croix de Guerre, 
and several of its members were decorated for valour. 
1 4. See W. E. B. Du Bois, 'Documents of the War', Crisis, XVIII, 
May 1919. 
15. Quoted in Bennett, Before the Mayflower, 292-293. 
16. Jane Lang Scheiber and Harry N. Scheiber argue unconvincingly 
that a far greater change in government attitudes than this 
took place during the war, in 'The Wilson Administration 
and the Wartime Mobilization of Black Americans, 1917-18', 
Labor History, X, 3,1969. 
9 
a break with past practices, both positions were entirely war- 
oriented, designed to ease the 'Negro problem', boost black morale, 
and aid mobilization. The changes that took place during the 
war were almost entirely 'unguided', that is, not'the result of 
government action.. 
The increased industrial activity in the North, at a time 
when European Immigration was cut off, opened enough economic 
opportunities for black men and women to leave the South. 
Encouraged by friends and relatives, helped by the Chicago 
Defender and northern industrial labour agents, between 300,000 and 
1 million blacks left the South in search of employment in Northern 
war industries. 
17 
This 'mass exodus' led to a large increase in 
black urban populations: in Chicago the number rose from 44,103 in 
1910 to 109,5914 in 1920; in New York from 91,709 to 152, L67; and 
in Detroit from 5,741 to 10,838.18 These increases in population 
did not result in any great expansion of black housing areas, but 
instead the new immigrants were forced to find accommodation in 
the existing black sections. Thus urbanization meant overcrowding, 
insanitary conditions, disease and ill-health. It also led to 
friction with neighbouring whites as Afro-Americans tried to escape 
the confines of the ghetto. Conflicts over housing and competition 
17. The history of the migrations is the subject of U. S. 
Department of Labor, Division of Negro Economics, Negro 
Migration in 1916-17, Washington, D. C., 1915 Emmett J. 
Scott, Negro Migration During the War, New York 1920; the 
pages of the Chicago Defender, and Reynolds Farley, 'The 
Urbanization of Negroes in the United States', Journal of 
Social History, Vol. I, Spring 1968. 
18. Figures taken from U. S. Bureau of the Census, Negroes in 
the United States, 1920-1932, Washington, D. C., 1935. 
10 
in employment caused racial violence like the bombings in Chicago 
and the riot in East St. Louis, Illinois, in 1917.19 Despite 
these considerable drawbacks, the move North did bring certain 
benefits. Wages were much higher than those paid in the South, 
even in the unskilled jobs to which Afro-Americans were largely 
restricted. Life in the North also presented better educational 
opportunities, and a slightly greater degree of freedom. More 
important was the sense of conuminity and increased sophistication 
which was the natural result of urbanization. 
Perhaps the most important change which resulted from the 
war was the change in black attitudes. When America entered the 
war the Afro-American view was expressed by W. E. B. DuBois's 
famous 'Close Ranks' editorial in The Crisis, the organ of the 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, (NAACP). 
DuBois felt that if the Afro-Americans put aside their grievances 
and served loyally, their contribution would be recognized by 
white America. 
20 
Although some members of the NAACP disagreed 
with him, other blacks, including the editor of the Chicago 
Defender, Robert S. Abbott, agreed: 'If we again demonstrate our 
loyalty and devotion to our country in the face of injustices..., 
those injustices will disappear and the grounds for complaint will 
no longer exist., 
21 
That these sentiments were shared by the 
19. See map in J. G. St. Clair Drake and Horace R. Cayton, 
Black Metropolis: A Study of Negro Life in a Northern City, 
New York 1970 ed., . 
20. The Crisis, XVI, 3, July 1918. DuBois wrote in The Crisis 
XVI, 2, June 1918, 'Out of this war will rise, too, an 
American Negro, with the right to vote and the right to work 
and the right to live without insult. ' 
21. Chicago Defender, April 27,1918. 
11 
majority of black people was demonstrated by their eagerness to 
participate in the war effort. 
However, once the war had ended, it became apparent that 
the expected rewards would not be forthcoming. In fact the 
situation of the Afro-American was positively threatened by the 
wave of violence directed against members of ethnic groups in the 
post-war years. The xenophobia always present below the surface 
of American life was revealed during the war in the persecution 
suffered by German-Americans despite their evident loyalty. Once 
hostilities had ceased however, the attack became a more general 
one on all minority groups. In 1920 the Ku Klux Klan was revived 
and it attacked all foreign born sections of the population, 
including blacks, Japanese, Jews and Catholics. In part this was 
no more than an attack on foreigners, but it was also aimed at 
real and imaginary Bolsheviks. The Russian Revolution, the wave 
of post-war strikes, and a number of bomb scares and explosions led 
to a 'red scare', which was further encouraged by the alarmist 
statements and actions of the Attorney-General, A. Mitchell Palmer. 
Palmer embarked upon a campaign which resulted in the arrest and 
deportation of many persons, few of whom had committed any crime. 
He also labelled several black publications as subversive, and 
accused Afro-American leaders of stirring-up racial strife. 
22. 
22. A. Mitchell Palmer, Radicalism and Sedition Among the Negroes 
as Reflected in Their Publications, Exhibit Number 10, 
Senate Documents, Vol. 12,66th Congress, 1st Session, 1919, 
Washington D. c., 1919. See also, Langston Hughes, F, i ht_ 
For Freedom: The Story of the NAACP, New York 1962,38-b8. 
One black leader, the young A. Philip Randolph, was arrested 
in 1918 for his seditious speeches. He was released after 
a few days. His paper, The Messenger, was among those 
condemned by Palmer. 
12 
His own actions contributed to the racial violence of 1919 
when more than 70 blacks, including ten soldiers, some still in 
uniform, were lynched. In the saner of that year twenty-five 
race riots of varying proportions disrupted American towns and 
cities as white Americans turned on their black countrymen. The 
worst of these took place in Chicago where, during thirteen days 
of fighting, 23 blacks and 15 whites were killed and a total of 537 
persons injured. Well might a young Afro-American veteran ask: 
23 
Had the ten months I spent in France been all in vain? 
Were those white crosses over the dead bodies of those 
dark skinned boys lying in Flanders fields for naught? 
Was democracy merely a hollow sentiment2 
It was not surprising, therefore, that the tone of DuBois's 
later editorials should change, nor that many blacks should share his 
militance. The man who had urged black participation in the war 
effort now encouraged his readers to fight for democracy at homei4 
But by the God of Heaven, we are cowards and jackasses 
if now that the war is over, we do not marshall every 
ounce of our brain and brawn to fight a sterner, more 
unbending battle against the forces of hell in our own 
land. 
The new mood of the Afro-Americans was revealed in the number of 
white casualties in the riots. In Chicago 15 were killed, and 
178 injured: in Washington, D. C., during the riot in which black 
23. Chicago Commission on Race Relations, The Negro in Chicago: 
A Study of Race Relations and a Race Riot, Chicago 1923,83. 
Other descriptions of the Chicago riot are in Carl Sandburg, 
The Chicago Race Riots, July 1919, New York 1919. 
2L. The Crisis, XVIII, I. May 1919. 
13 
veterans were conspicuously active, 11 whites were killed compared 
to five blacks. 
25 
In many cases, the Afro-Americans were not 
merely prepared to defend themselves but also to retaliate. The 
attitude of the. Afro-Americans, so different from that before 1917, 
was expressed in many writings of the time, but none so well as in 
the well-known poem by Claude Mckay, 'If We Mist Die'. 
26 Despite 
this militancy, the underlying feeling was of despair and disillusion- 
ment, and it was this which enabled Marcus Garvey to gain support 
for his nationalist-separatist movement, the Universal Negro 
Improvement Association. 27 Sadly, financial ineptitude, corruption, 
and harassment from the government led to his downfall in 1925 and 
deportation in 1927. Although Garvey's movement effectively collapsed 
without him, some of his former supporters were to re-emerge in the 
"1940s. In that period too, black militance was also to reappear 
on a scale never seen before, but which was to lay the foundation 
for the . 'Negro Revolt' of the 1960s. 
Clearly, black participation in the military was long a 
cause for concern in American society. When black military 
service was accepted it was for the duration of a particular 
emergency only and; although those past wars challenged institution- 
alized racial prejudice, the challenge had always been temporary 
25. Arthur I. Waskow, From Race Riot to Sit-In: 1919 and the 
1960s, New York 19673 21-26. 
26. See The Negro in Chicago, 481,489, the Chicago Defender, 
February 22, , August 2,1919, and the letter room 
Stanley B. Norvell to Victor Lawson in William M. Tuttle jr., 
'Views of A Negro During "The Red Summer" of 19191, 
Journal of Negro History, Vol. 51,1966. 
27. E. David Cronon, Black Moses: The Sto of Marcus Gar-Vey 
and the Universal Negro Improvement Association, Madison and 
London 1969,3 and 21-22. 
14 
and seldom was it sufficient to produce permanent gains or 
recognition. The first World War obviously affected black life, 
but brought little acknowledgement for active service. The second 
World War was to have a much more substantial impact and brought 
direct government action on behalf of the Afro-American. 
If World War II did bring greater benefits for blacks than 
any other previous conflict, it was because it, more than any 
other, was a total war which-had a greater effect on the whole of 
American society. 
28 Although not subject to direct attack by 
enemies, apart from Pearl Harbor and a few harmless bombing raids 
on the mainland, the people of America still felt the impact of 
the war. This was largely due to the scale of the war which cost 
330 billion dollars compared to the 32 billion of World War I. 
By 19b5, a total of ]1&, 1. L93,300 persons had served in the armed 
forces including women who entered the new auxiliary branches, the 
WACs, WAVES, and SPARRS, and thus freed men for combat duty. 
29 
Just as important was the total mobilization of the industrial 
strength of the country. 
Almost the entire productive capacity became geared to the 
war effort, and even before America joined the conflict, large 
28. The impact of the second World War is dealt with fully in 
the following books: Jack Goodman, editor, While You were 
Gone: A Report on Wartime Life in the United States, New 
York 1946; Francis E. Merril-I., Social Problems on the Home 
Front: A Study of Wartime Influences, , New York and London 
19 ; Richard Polenberg, editor, America at War: The Home 
Front 1914-1945, Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 196U., Richard R. 
ngeman, Don't You Know There's a War On? The American 
Home Front 1941-1945, New York 1970. 
29. Harvey Wish, Contemporary America: The National Scene Since 
1900. New York 1955., -5-70-596. 
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sections of her industry acted as the 'Arsenal of Democracy'. 
0 
The urgent demand for armaments, machinery and supplies which grew 
as the war spread, came at a particularly crucial period in American 
affairs. The Depression which had hit industry in 1929, -and 
agriculture even earlier, had made 13 million men jobless, and even 
after the ameliorative action of the New Deal, this figure was still 
nine and a half million, or 17 per cent of the labour force. - 
The wartime effort provided the necessary cure. By 1943 only 
800,000 were without work, and those employed were earning wages 
substantially higher than they had before. To meet the manpower 
shortages which arose as more and more men joined the forces, 
approximately three million women who would otherwise have stayed 
at home joined the work force. 
31 
The demands for labour also 
encouraged the movement from the country to the city as 5,500,000 
people moved into urban areas in search of employment. The 
greatest proportion of these went to the shipyards and aeroplane 
and munitions factories on the West coast and far West. 
This growth of industry did not go unchecked or unaided by 
the government. The necessity for efficient production led to 
increased federal intervention in the economy. The Depression 
had already brought about the formation of various agencies to, 
meet the crisis, but not the number of committees and boards which 
were introduced in the 1940s. The War Production Board, War Labor 
30. 'We must be the great arsenal of democracy', F. D. Roosevelt, 
Fireside chat December'29,1940. 
31. Margaret Mead, 'The Women in the War', in Goodman, While 
You Were Gone, 274-281. 
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Board, Manpower Commission, Office of Price Administration, Office 
of War Information: these were the most important amid a list of 
others which governed American life throughout the period. Bodies 
such as these not only did their utmost to bring about full and 
efficient employment, they also acted on behalf of the workers, 
especially as the unions had agreed to, and on the whole did, hold 
their right to strike in abeyance. 
32 
The'labour force increased 
from 54 million to 64 million during the war and the average 
individual's annual income rose by more than fifty per cent. 
33 
The 
War Labor Board also insisted that women who did the work of men 
should get the pay of men. The trade union movement benefited from 
these actions and from the rise in employment: its membership rose 
from 8,900,000 to 14,800,000 during the war.. It was also 
represented at the highest level of government concerned with 
labour policy making, and wartime necessities encouraged consultation 
between employers and employees which led to the growth of labor- 
management committees and further strengthened the negotiating 
position of the working man. 
The war caused considerable disruption of established 
patterns of life. The effect of the 1,066,938 dead and wounded 
cannot be gauged, but the results of parental absence due to armed 
service or. war work, or both, can. It was surely no coincidence 
32. Department of Labor, Bureau of Iabor Statistics, Monthly 
Labor. Review, March 1945. 
33. Wish, Contemporary America, 619, and Harold Underwood 
Faulkner, American Economic History, New York 1966,706. 
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that the rates of juvenile crime rose during the 'S0s or that there 
was a relaxation of moral standards among young people. 
34 
The 
departures of young men, drafted and sent overseas, may have had 
some connection with the increase in the number of marriages and 
births, both of which had been in decline since the 1920s. 
35 
Material life was also disrupted by wartime shortages and rationing 
of petrol, rubber, coffee, sugar, and other food stuffs; 
It can be seen from the above that the war did have many 
immediate effects on America as the whole population was mobilized 
in the war effort. It remains to ask what were the rewards to 
be for this exertion and sacrifice? What were the inducements to 
fight and to die in the Pacific, in Asia, in Africa, and eventually, 
in Europe? 
Of course, the greatest spur was the Japanese attack on 
Pearl Harbor and the desire for revenge, but more than this was 
involved. As early as January 6,1941, in his 'Four Freedoms' 
speech before Congress, Roosevelt had indicated that the second 
World War was a war for democracy in which America was directly 
concerned. The conservative nature of this appeal to defend 
existing institutions against totalitarianism was coupled with a 
vision of the future founded on the four freedoms of which he spoke. 
36 
34. Merrill, Social Problems on the Home Front- Katherine F. 
Lenroot, 'Juvenile Delinquency', in Polenberg, America 
at War. and Lingeman, Don't You Know There's a War On?, 
90-92. 
35. Lingeman, 93-96. Similar developments took place in 
Britain during the war. See Calder, The People's War, 
360, Marwick, Britain in the Century of Total War, 358-59. 
36. Freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from want, 
and freedom from fear. 
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Such high sounding statements of principle were not new to 
Americans. They had heard similar pronouncements in 1917 and 
1918 which had not prevented the Depression. Clearly people were 
sceptical of such idealistic declarations, and rightly so. 
However, there was apparent a feeling that the war effort would be 
wasted if the situation of the 1930s returned once the fighting 
had ceased. What was hoped for was a period of peace, security, 
and comfort. Thus plans for the future were more than welcomed. 
Forty thousand copies of the British Beveridge Report were sold in 
America and Wendell Willkie's One World was bought by two million 
over a two year period. A more comprehensive and specific blueprint 
for the future was laid down by the National Resources Planning 
Board in 1943.37 The 'New Bill of Rights' it formulated contained 
precisely the provisions people wanted: full employment, fair pay, 
medical care, security in old age and sickness, equality before 
the law, and educational opportunities. Many of these same 
principles were detailed in Roosevelt's Economic Bill of Rights 
which was part of his State of the Union Message in January 1944. 
Unfortunately the plan of the National Resources Planning Board 
was given a cold reception in Congress, southern Democrats and 
Republicans blocked F. D. R. 's measures, 'and the end of the war 
37. National Resources Planning Board, Report for 1912 Part I: 
Post-war Plan and Program , Washington, D. C., 1943. Other 
writings on this subject are: Evans Clark, Wartime Facts 
and Postwar Problems: A Study and Discussion Manual, New 
York ; and Stuart Chase, For This We Fought, New York 
1916, which contains polls on people's attitudes to these 
various plans. 
t 
"Jill 
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would unleash powerful pressures for laissez-faire long repressed 
by the New Deal and the war. 
38 
The majority of gains were made due to indirect action and 
the war; full employment, high wages, and off-shoots of war- 
oriented scientific research and innovation. Although minimum 
hourly wages were raised, a 'national Housing Act passed in 1949, 
and Social Security extended in 1950, further reforms were thwarted 
by the conservative, Republican-dominated Congress. Only those 
in the armed forces received any specific reward for their service 
in the Serviceman's Readjustment Act or G. I. Bill of 19143. It 
made provision for loans for houses, funds for education, and financial 
support while the veteran found new employment. 
Minority groups also felt the effects of the war on America, 
and shared some of the benefits, no matter how small. 
Unlike the first World War, there was no hysterical attack 
on Germans during the 1940s. Neither they nor Italian-Americans 
suffered persecution and only 3,000 German and 85 Italian aliens 
were considered dangerous enough to warrant detention. If anything, 
the war served to integrate them further into American society. 
Participation in the forces demonstrated their. loyalty and work 
in war industries brought financial security and middle-class 
respectability. Despite the activities of the German Bund, a 
fascist organization, the majority of Germans desired to 
disassociate themselves from the government of their former country. 
They were aided by the war which cut off foreign news and advertizing 
38. Wish, Contemporary America, 583. 
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which led to a decline in foreign language newspapers . 
39 
Much less fortunate than the German and Italian Americans 
were those of Japanese origin who were concentrated on the West 
coast. Rumours of espionage, prejudice, and economic envy led to 
pressure from the people and local authorities of California on 
the federal government to remove their Japanese neighbours. On 
February 19,1912, President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066 
which authorized the army to designate military areas from which 
any person might be excluded. Thereafter, more than 110,000 
persons of Japanese ancestry were transferred under Arny supervision 
to relocation centres in deserted parts of the country. The fact 
that two-thirds of these were American citizens, or that 12,000 
fought in American combat units, did nothing to alter official 
policy. Finally, in December l91jh the government declared the 
West coast to be no longer a war zone and the Japanese were free to 
return. Several thousand did so, to face open hostility and 
prejudice which only began to diminish later in the 1940s. 
40 
Mexican-Americans had long suffered discrimination on the 
West coast and in the South-west. Like the Afro-Americans, they 
were segregated, insulted, and kept in menial jobs. Also like the 
Afro-American, the war affected their situation. 
41 
Primarily, 
39. Maidwyn Allen Jones, American Immigration, Chicago 1960, 
299-306, and Lingeman, Don't You Know There's a War On?; 317-U8. 
110. See, Dorton Grodzins, Americans Betrayed: Politics and the 
Japanese Evacuation, Chicago 19493 Harry H. L. Kitano, 
Japanese Amer cans, Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1969. 
141. Stan Steiner, La Raza: Mexican Americans, New York 1969; 
Manuel P. Serv n, e tor, The Mexican Americans: An Awakening 
Minority, Beverly Hills, California, 1970; John H. ýBurma, 
editor., Mexican Americans in the United States, Cambridge, 
Mass., 1970. 
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this was due to the need for labour in war industries. Job 
opportunities were opened up and the Fair IInployment Practices 
Committee set up in 1941 did its best to ensure that there was no 
discrimination against those of Mexican extraction: by 1944 there 
were 17,000 Mexican workers in the shipyards of Los Angeles; in 
1941 there had been none. The Mexican-Americans also benefited from 
the importation of workers from their former country by agreement 
between the governments of America and Mexico, which enabled the 
federal government to regulate wages and conditions, and guarantee 
the Mexican minimum American standards. 
42 
Armed service by members of the Mexican community also 
13 
secured some recognition from the government and people of America. 
More important, it gave the Mexican some self-confidence and respect, 
and made him reluctant to accept discrimination at home. The G. I. 
Bill enabled many to secure an education after the war, - and many 
of the post-war leaders in the Mexican community were veterans. 
Although these various changes and increased social and 
geographic mobility tended to break caste barriers, discrimination 
against people of Mexican origin did not vanish either during or 
after the war. Indeed, the riot of 191.3 in Los Angeles was 
largely an attack by white sailors and civilians on Mexican youths. 
These children, caught between an old way of life and a new, 
subject to prejudice and yet aware of their Americanness, adopted 
an outlandish mode of dress and behaviour which antagonized many 
42. Files of Fair Employment Practices Committee, 'Mexican 
Americans', National Archives, Record Group. 228. 
1,13. Office of Co-ordinator of Inter-American Affairs, S anish 
Speaking Americans in the War, n. d., n. p., in files of 
F. E. P. C., National Archives Record Group 228. 
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white people. The phenomenon of the 'toot suit' (also worn by 
black teenagers), which distracted attention frag military perfor- 
mances, was partially a result of the wartime breakdown of 
established Mexican-American communities and a loosening of family 
ties as parents moved to find employment in war industries or 
left to serve in the armed forces. It was also the reaction of 
underprivileged children to a society which, by and large, continued 
to discriminate against them. 
44 
The impact of the war was also felt by the 13 million black 
Americans. So much so that when asked by a white reporter 
whether he felt any white man had ever done anything for the Afro- 
American, the late Malcolm X replied, 
45 
Yes, I can think of two. Hitler and Stalin. 
The black man in America couldn't get a decent 
factory job until Hitler put so much pressure 
on the white man. And then Stalin kept up the 
pressure. 
This is, in effect, a simplified version of the Military Participation 
Ratio theory as it applies to modem total war. The pressures of 
World War II forced white Americans to accept the participation of 
their black countrymen in both the military and industrial aspects 
of the war effort. But as well as these direct economic and social 
gains, the war also brought the Afro-American gains in self- 
W. Kenneth-B. Clark and James Barker, 'The Zoot Effect in 
Personality: A Race Riot Participant', Journal of Abnormal 
and Social Psychology, Vol. 40,1915, deals with a New York 
black, but is equally applicable to Mexican-Americans. See 
Fritz Redl, 'Zoot Suits: An Interpretation', in Polenberg, 
America at War, 148-152. 
)15. The Autobiography of Malcolm X, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1968, 
37R7-. 
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consciousness and political awareness, for the black American 
recognized that the war provided a crisis in which rights could be 
fought for and won. As the author Chester Hirnes expressed it, 
'Now is the Time! Here is the Place. 146 
Just as British women had demanded 'the right to serve' 
in World War I, so Afro-Americans in the 191L0s fought for 'the 
Right to Fight for Democracy., 
47 
While black newspapers and 
organizations campaigned for equal treatment in the segregated 
forces, a number of black men refused to serve until they were 
integrated. They, and the more disillusioned group who refused 
to participate altogether in the white man's war, were jailed as a 
result. A. Philip Randolph, the black trade union leader, planned 
a March on Washington to protest about discrimination in the 
defence industries. Together with the forces of war, these 
demands succeeded in bringing at least partial changes in both the 
military and industrial institutions of America. 
By 19145, of the 13 million Afro-Americans, approximately one 
million had served in the armed forces and another one million had 
worked in the defence factories. Shortages of manpower led to the 
disruption of traditional patterns. The Marine Corps accepted 
black servicemen for the first time in its history in 1942 and 
black participation in the Navy, other than as messmen, was 
accepted at the same time. The first Afro-American Air Corps 
I6. Opportunity, %%, 9, September 1942. 
47. The suffragettes are referred to in A. J. P. Taylor, English 
History 1914-1945, Oxford, 1965,38. The black slogan was 
the theme of the 913 NAACP Conference, see The Crisis, 
May and July 19113. A. Philip Randolph had urged Afro- 
Americans to 'Demand the Right to Work and Fight for Our 
Country' in 19! 41, Pittsburgh Courier, January 25,19111. 
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training camp was established in 1911 and the 99th Pursuit Squadron 
became the first all-black fighter group. Protest and racial 
violence led to the desegregation of Army recreational facilities 
and bus services and forced the Army to consider the morale of 
black troops. Crucial shortages of men during the Battle of the 
Bulge in Europe led to the temporary integration of black volunteer 
platoons in larger white units. The success of that experiment 
strengthened arguments in favour of full integration of the forces. 
Moves in that direction begun during the war were hastened after 
President Truman ordered the equality of opportunity and treatment 
of men in the. axmed forces in 1948. The Executive Order was the 
result of another threat from A. Philip Randolph of a militant 
protest campaign, this time in the fo nn of civil disobedience 
)8 
Randolph's March on Washington Movement of 1941 had forced 
President Roosevelt to issue Executive Order 8802 forbidding 
discrimination in defence industries. Although a 'Fair Employment 
Practices Committee was established to see that the Order was 
carried out, the integration of blacks in industry was due as much, 
if not more, to the exigencies of war. Despite the publicity 
attached to FEPC hearings, manufacturers and trade unions persisted 
in refusing to accept black workers. In 191i3,16 railroad companies 
and three unions successfully ignored the Committee's demands to 
cease and desist in acts of discrimination. 
49 
There were also 
several strikes in a number of different industries after the 
18. The history of the desegregation of the U. S. armed forces 
is dealt with by Richard M. Dilfiune,, Desegregation of the 
U. S. Armed Forces, Columbia, Missouri, 19 9. 
49. Louis Ruchames, Race Jobs, and Politics: The Story of FEPC, 
New York 1953,69. 
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employment or upgrading of Afro-American workers. In 1944 the 
Philadelphia Transport Company was disrupted by a strike over the 
up-grading of eight Afro-Americans. The strike ended only after 
the Axt had intervened and Roosevelt had threatened to draft the 
strikers. 
50 
In, Mobile, Alabama, a strike for similar reasons 
turned into a riot. Gains in employment made by Afro-Americans 
came largely after 191L2, and were generally in areas of acute 
labour shortage. Even so, the number of blacks unemployed dropped 
from approximately one million in 1940, to 151,000 in 19W4.51 The 
war had succeeded where the New Deal had failed. 
The quality, as well as the quantity, of jobs open to Afro- 
Americans improved during the war. As Robert C. Weaver, a black 
official in the War Production Board, said in 19112, 'janitors and 
laborers yesterday - skilled workers in war production today. t52 
His statement was borne oit by the statistics which showed an 
increase in the number of Afro-Americans in skilled and semi-skilled 
employment. More and better jobs meant higher and better pay, 
and Afro-Americans benefited from the general rise in real wages. 
One survey of black families in two housing projects in Atlanta, 
Georgia, found that their incomes had increased by as much as 65 
per cent during the war. 
53 
Although by 1945 black incomes were 
50. American Council on Race Relations, Negro Platform Workers, 
Chicago 1915. 
51. Florence Murray, Negro Handbook, 1942, New York 1912,117, 
and President's Committee on Fair Employment Practice, 
First Report: July 1943-December 1944, Washington, D. C., 
1504.5., " 
52. Quoted in Opportunity, XX, 3, March 1942. 
53. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 'Annual 
Family and Occupational Earnings of Residents of Two Negro 
Housing Projects in Atlanta, 1937-U. ', Monthly Labor Review, 
Vol. 61, No. 6, December 1945. 
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higher than ever before, they were still far below those of 
whites. Because of their concentration in war-related jobs, 
blacks also feared that may jobs would be lost once the war 
had ended. -However, although there were some losses in the 
immediate, post-war period, the economic buoyancy continued during 
the Cold War. It was not until the 1950s that the recessions 
anticipated in the 40s became a reality, providing the economic 
background for the 'Negro Revolt'. 
The increased opportunities for employment encouraged one 
of the most important 'unguided, or spontaneous changes of the 
191i0s - the migration of large numbers of Afro-Americans from 
rural to urban areas. Despite the mass movements during and 
following World War I, in 1910 only 18.6 per cent of Afro-Americans 
lived in urban areas; by 1950 this had increased to 62.4 per cent. 
54 
The wartime black migrations followed the patterns of white migrants 
and was mainly to the smaller cities of the North and mid West, and 
to the Pacific coast. Those cities which experienced the greatest 
increases in black population were all major centres for war 
production. In San Francisco, Los Angeles, San Diego, Denver, 
Milwaukee, Detroit, Pontiac, Buffalo, Syracuse, and Rochester, 
those increases were over 100 per cent. 
55 
Although 68 per cent 
of all Afro-Americans still lived in the South in 1950s the 
'Negro problem, was no longer peculiar to that area, but had become 
a national one. 
54. Reynolds Farley, 'The Urbanization of Negroes in the United 
States', Journal of Social History, Vol. I, ' Spring 1968. 
55. Department of Labor, Negroes in the United States: Their 
Employment and Econo cm c Status, Bulletin , Washington, D. C., 1952. 
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The migration of people of both races must, I think, be 
regarded as one of the disruptive consequences of the war. The 
influx of large numbers of Afro-Americans into already over-crowded 
ghettos intensified many existing problems, but especially that of 
housing. The war ended almost all building developments apart 
from temporary projects for war workers. The prejudices of 
white populations not only prevented the expansion of existing 
black areas, but also limited the'number of government-built homes 
available to Afro-Americans. In Buffalo, New York, the Catholic 
priests encouraged their white congregations to oppose black 
housing projects; in Detroit, black families moved into new homes 
only under the protection-of the National Guard. 
56 
Poor and over- 
crowded accommodation added to the anger of Afro-Americans, many 
of whom could now afford better homes, and conflicts over housing 
increased racial tensions. It was not surprising that Detroit, 
which experienced a large increase in its black population and 
which suffered a chronic shortage of houses, was the scene of a 
major riot in 1943. 
Racial tensions were especially high in Detroit during the 
war. Symptomatic was the clash in 1942 over the Sojourner Truth 
Housing project, where the entry of black families was only made 
possible by the intervention of the National Guard. In June 1943, 
a riot broke out which was only quelled after Federal troops had 
moved in. By that time 31. people, 25 of them black, were dead, 
56. William L. Evans, Race Fear and Housing in a ical American 
Community, Nation Urban League, New York 1946p deals with Buffalo. Detroit is described in Walter White, A Man Called 
White, New York 191i. 8,224-32. 
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800 injured, and considerable damage done 
57 
The following 
August, another riot disrupted New York city. Unlike the clash 
in Detroit, the riot-in Harlem was an implosion rather than an 
explosion, and was largely an indication of black anger and 
frustration. The only whites involved were those trying to put a 
stop to the-disorder. In Detroit, as the death toll shows, whites 
were engaged in attack on Afro-Americans. 
The attitudes of Afro-Americans during the war were expressed 
in literature and in song. John Oliver Killens, himself a soldier 
during the 40s, described exactly the feelings of black soldiers 
in his book published in 1962.58 Other books dealt with the 
Poetry too, described the emotions situation on the home front 
59 
of black soldiers and civilians and the many-poems of Langston 
Hughes captured all the moods of Afro-Americans as well as the 
misery and sadness which war could bring regardless of race. 
Popular songs such as Defense Blues, Win the War Blues, and Pearl 
Harbor Blues, caught the irony of fighting for democracy abroad 
while being denied it at home. Their message was summed up by 
Josh White when he sang, 
6o 
My father died, died fighting 'cross the sea, 
Mama said his dying never helped her or me, 
I will tell you, brother, well it shot don' 
make no sense, 
When a Negro can't work in the National Defense. 
57. Harvard Sitkoff, 'The Detroit Riot of 19143v, Michigan 
History, LIII, 3,1969. 
58. And Then We Heard the Thunder, New York 1962. 
59. For example, Chester Hirnes, If He Hollers Let Him Go, New 
York 191x5. 
60. 'Defense Factory Blues', quoted in Opportunity, MIO., 
July-September, 1944. 
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White Americans were well aware of the black anger and 
besides could hardly ignore it after the riots of 19113" Government 
surveys, newspaper and magazine articles, and publications of all 
types, dealt with black morale and militancy. Indeed there was a 
plethora of writing on the subject, ranging from I{yrdal's survey of 
the 'American Dilemma', to Lillian Smith's best-selling story of an 
interracial love affair. 
61 
While blacks demanded their just 
rewards for their participation in the war effort, many whites too 
spoke of the contradiction between fighting fascism abroad and 
denying equal citizenship rights to 10 per cent of the American 
population. Chief among these were Wendell Willkie, the Republican 
presidential candidate of 1910, Henry Wallace, the vice-president, 
and Pearl S. Buck, the newspaper columnist and writer. The 200 
or so national, regional, state, and local race relations committees 
and organizations formed after the riots of 1943) although concerned 
primarily with the prevention of further rioting, also drew attention 
to the problem of racial discrimination. 
Some progress was made during the war as a result of guided 
as well as unguided change. Executive Order 8802 was the first 
such presidential action on behalf of blacks since Reconstruction 
and although The Fair Employment Practices Committee may have had 
little effect, it did set an example. A number of cities and 
states passed laws against discrimination in employment and in 
education and housing. The Supreme Court outlawed white primaries 
and poll taxes, both of which had been designed to disenfranchise 
the Afro-American. It also ruled against discrimination in 
61. Gunnar Irrdal, An American Dilemma; The Negro Problem and 
Modern Democracy, New York , and Li an Smith, Strange Fruit, New York 1914. 
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inter-state travel and forced several southern colleges to admit 
black students. Horrified by the lynching of a black soldier 
after the war, and conscious of black mi? itancy, President Truman 
did what his predecessor had steadfastly refused to do, and 
established a-Commission on Civil Rights in 1916. In 1917 that 
body recommended wide-sweeping legislation to eliminate discrimination 
in American life and Truman included most of them in his Civil Rights 
Message to Congress in February 1948.62 For the first time since 
the end of the. Civil War federal policy was clearly stated as being 
opposed to racial discrimination. Together with the definite 
economic and social gains made during the war, these policy 
statements marked a considerable advance and encouraged black 
expectations of further progress. 
However the war also intensified the opposition to changes 
in the racial status quo. Riots and violence during the war, 
and the outbreak of lynching, particularly of black servicemen, 
in the immediate post-war years, seemed designed to keep the Afro- 
Aznerican 'in his place'. Despite attacks upon it by the federal 
government, the Ku Klux Klan reappeared in the 19140s in opposition 
to FEPC and later to intimidate would-be black voters. The Fair 
Employment Practices Committee had been subject to attacks in 
government during its operation and was finally starved of funds 
in 1946 by southern Democrats and extreme Republicans. In 1948 
the southern wing of the Democratic Party broke away in opposition 
62. President's Committee on Civil Rights, To Secure These 
Rights, Washington, D. C., 19147. Civil Rights Message, 
Fe ruary 2,1948,80th Congress, 2nd Session, House Document 516. 
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to its civil rights platform. The Dixiecrats as they were called 
formed a States Rights Party which stood 'for the segregation of 
the races and the racial integrity of each race., 
63 
In the 
election, they received 22 per cent of the popular vote in the 
South. Together with the right wing of the Republican party, 
this group delayed the passing of any civil rights legislation 
until 1957. Their stance on race relations, the frustrated 
expectations of Afro-Americans, and the economic recession of the 
1950s, made a clash of interests inevitable. It came in 1954 
following the Supreme Court's ruling on segregated schooling. It 
was only in the crisis which followed that the blacks' hopes of the 
19140s were realized. 
63. Kirk H. Porter and Donald B. Johnson, National Party 
Platfozms, 1840-1964, London 1966,468. 
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Chapter 2 
The Black Response to the American War. Effort 
Afro-Americans in the 1940s were not as prepared to 
accept limitations on their service as they had been. in the 1917-18 
war. The exclusion of black people from the industrial 'Arsenal 
of Democracy' and the likelihood of similar treatment in the armed 
forces aroused them to a new militancy even before America officially 
entered the war. The traditional civil rights organizations, the 
NAACP and the National Urban League, were joined in a vigorous 
campaign for equal participation by bodies formed early in the 
period, and this campaign was kept up, in various ways, throughout 
the war. Participation in the war effort and more especially 
equal participation, was important not merely for the economic 
gains to be made from the increased industrial activity, but 
because it would buttress demands for civil rights with proof of 
black patriotism and loyalty. Moreover, it would effectively 
demonstrate that Afro-Americans performed all the duties of 
first-class citizens and so were entitled to the same rights as 
their white compatriots. 
The Committee for Participation of Negroes in National 
Defense was one of the first organizations created specifically to 
ensure black participation in the war effort. Founded in 
Washington, D. C., in May 1939, largely at the instigation of the 
Pittsburgh Courier, the Committee was led by the historian, and 
veteran of World War I, Rayford W. Logan. 
l Aiming to co-ordinate 
1. Pittsburgh Courier, December 7 1910. There seems to be 
some confus oý about the date of the Committee's formation: 
Dalfiume puts it at 1938, Desegregation of the U. S. Armed 
Forces, 26; Garfinkel, When Negroes March, 33, says 1940.9 the. 
ad. for the Committee in the Courier clearly says May 1939.. 
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the efforts of all individuals and organizations in the fight for a 
place in the national defence, the Committee organized local 
branches, held conferences and meetings, and lobbied the relevant 
government departments. It supported measures designed to ensure 
an end to discrimination both in industry and the armed forces, 
but the latter was. the more emotional and vital subject. As an 
appeal for the Committee pointed out, 
2 
The War Department and the Navy Department plans for 
the ccening war DEGRADE you. They would make war 
without you if they could. They would challenge your 
right to citizenship. 
Similar opinions were voiced by the Committee on Negro 
Americans in Defense Industries, whose members included the mayor 
of New York, La Guardia, and the governor of the state, Lehman. 
3 
A later organization, the National Negro Defense Program, combined 
demands for equal participation openly with demands for civil 
rights legislation 
.' 
On the very same day that the views of 
these pressure groups were heard at a government-sponsored 
conference in. Washington, D. C., President Roosevelt issued 
Executive order 8802 which authorized a Fair Employment Practices 
Committee to see that discrimination in defence industries was 
ended. 
This presidential action was the result of the threat of 
dramatic protest made by A. Philip Randolph, the founder and leader 
2. Pittsburgh Courier, December 14,1940. See Chapter III. 
3. Statement of the Committee to the Special Committee of the 
Senate, May 7,1941, National Archives Record Group 46. 
! t. Chicago Defender, March LL , 21, and 28,191i2. 
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of the March on Washington Movement. His call for a march of 
10,000 black people cn the national capital was taken up by other 
Afro-Americans and a March on Washington Committee was formed. 
It was still Randolph who originated the idea, supplied the drive, 
and kept the MOWM in being after 19Ljl. 
5 
The national campaign 
was received with enthusiasm amongst Afro-Americans, and by June 
the number of marchers called for was 50,000. The date of the 
demonstration was set for July 1,19111. After heated consultations 
with Roosevelt and his advisors, which resulted in the Executive 
Order, the leaders called the march off. 
6 
Despite the fact that not all their demands had been met, 
Randolph and the MOM, plus its results, were given considerable 
acclaim. The Chicago Defender, hailed the Executive Order as 'one 
of the most significant pronouncements that has been made in the 
interests of the Negro for more than a century, '7 and according to 
some, Randolph had revealed himself 'as the man to lead the masses 
toward the new freedom. '8 Doubt remains about the turn-out the 
MOWN would have achieved in the event of the protest taking place, 
but rallies in Chicago, New York, and St. Louis during 1942 
attracted crowds of over 10,000,9 and the organization continued 
5. Pittsburgh Courier, January 25 1911; The Black Worker, 
March 1911, May 1911; Garfinkel, When Negroes March,,, 
6. Walter White, A Man Called White, 186-192. The MOWM is 
treated in more detail caper IV. 
7. Chicago Defender, July 12,1941. 
8. Baltimore Afro-American, July 25,1942. The Defender called 
Randolph 'Our New Leader'., July 11,1912. The Pittsburgh 
Courier was less enthusiastic, see June 27,1942, October 17, 1972-. 
9. Pittsburgh Courier, June 27,19)42, July It, 1912, and Garfinkel, When Negroes March, 95. 
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in existence, without the support of the NAACP and National 
Urban League, until 1946. Although its membership declined as 
economic opportunities for blacks increased and as wartime 
necessities ruled out the feasibility of a March ever taking place, 
the MOWM had shown that, 'effective protest during emergency is 
infinitely more productive of results than ten times the effort 
10 during periods of comparative normalcy. ' The logic of this 
governed black attitudes during the war, for, when the Japanese 
attacked Pearl Harbor in December 19hl, the dilemma of whether or 
not to fight abroad under existing conditions or to fight at home 
for equality, still remained. 
For most Afro-Americans, that dilemma was resolved, as the 
sociologist Charles S. Johnson pointed out, in the slogans of the 
popular black newspapers. 
11 
While the Chicago Defender urged, 
'Remember Pearl Harbor and Sikeston, too., ' 
12 
a reference to 
Sikeston, Missouri, where ayoung Afro-American was lynched in 
January 1941, the Pittsburgh Courier adopted the 'Double V' 
campaign suggested by one of its readers. 
13 
The 'Double V' - 
for victory at home and abroad - was immensely popular. The 
symbol was displayed throughout the newspaper, in texts, in 
photographs, and even in advertisements for the NAACP, and the 
10. Chicago Defender, July 19,1911. 
11. Charles S. Johnson, 'The Impact of the War Upon Negro White 
Relations in the United States, ' Johnson Papers, 164, Fli., 
Fisk University. The line taken by black newspapers during 
the war is dealt with in Ralph N. Davis, 'The Negro Newspapers and 
the War', Sociology and Social Research, XXVII, May-June 1943, 
and Lester M. Jones, 'The Editorial Policy of Negro Newspapers 
of 1917-18 as Compared with That of 1941-42.1 Journal of Negro 
History, XXII, January 1944. 
12. Chicago Defender, February 28,1942, and March 14,1942. 
13. Pittsburgh Courier, February 7,1942, and April 18,1942. 
I. . .. 
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public requested 'Double V' buttons, stickers, and pins. 
14 
According to Roi Ottley, the black journalist and writer, the 
campaign had the support of 'nearly every newspaper and pulpit-115 
The statement of the Negro Newspaper Publishers Association 
seemed to bear Ottley out. They declared that, while deploring 
'any and all forms of disunity that threaten the winning of victory 
for Democracy', it was their 'duty and obligation to. fight for 
every right guaranteed by the Constitution to all people, for to 
refrain from doing so would impair our Democracy at home and abroad 
by weakening the principles on which it is founded. '16 
The attitude of the NAACP was not dissimilar to that of 
the press: Walter White had previously declared, 'We will fight 
for our country, but at the same time, demand the right to fight as 
equals in every branch of our country's military, naval, and aviation 
service. 117 The NAACP publication, The Crisis, editorialized, 
'With our country at war for little more than a month, the CRISIS 
would emphasize with all its strength that now is the time not to 
be silent about the breaches of democracy here in our own land., 
18 
]1 . Pittsburgh Courier, March 28,19b2, August 8,1912. 
15. Ottley, New World A'Coming, New York, 1969 ed., 287. 
16. Statement of Negro War Aims, submitted by Negro Newspaper 
Publishers Association, undated, Official file 93, box 9, 
Franklin D. Roosevelt Library. See too, Chicago Defender, 
December 20,1941 and Pittsburgh Courier, December 13,19 . (The Statement of Negro War Aims was probably- presented to 
Roosevelt at a meeting held on February 5,. 19üä, reported in 
the Pittsburgh Courier, February 12,1944). 
17. Pittsburgh Courier, December 13,1941. 
18. The Crisis, January, 1942. See too, OpportunitY, Xl, 1, 
January 1942 for the view of the more conservative National 
Urban League. 
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This was far removed from the position of W. E. B. DuBois who, as 
editor of The Crisis. during the first World War, had urged black 
people to close ranks and forget their their special grievances. 
19 
These unusually belligerent attitudes were not peculiar to 
the black leadership alone: a variety of surveys found a new 
militancy amongst blacks in general on questions of civil rights. 
One commentator said, 'The war has brought about a new stage in the 
Negro psychology where aggressiveness in behalf of rights and 
privileges is given full-hearted support by the masses while 
compromise is scorned'20 Litalics hia7. A poll reported in the 
Courier found that 88.7 per cent of those asked felt that the Negro 
should 'not soft pedal his demands for complete freedom and citizenship 
and await the-development of the educational processes. ' 
21 
Government efforts to test the temper of Afro-Americans also reported 
considerable militancy. Of 1,008 blacks interviewed in New York, 
42 per cent felt that it was more important to make democracy work 
at home than'to defeat Germany and Japan when questioned by a black 
interviewer. This figure dropped to 34 per cent when the 
interviewer was. a white man. 
22 The degree of aggressiveness also 
19. The Crisis, July 1918. See Horace R. C ayton, 'Negro, 
Morale 2 Opportunity, 111,12, December 19L11. 
20. R. A. Schermerhorn, These Our People, Boston, Mass., 1919,167. 
21. Pittsburgh Courier, October 24,1942. Among the other 
black writers who spoke of a new militancy-were, Ellen Tarry, 
The Third Door, London 1956,176; H. C. Brearley, 'The 
Negro's New Belligerency', Phylon, V, 1,19W4; Horace R. 
Cayton, 'The Negro's Challenge', The Nation, July 3,1943; 
Kenneth B. Clark, 'Morale of the Negro on the Home Front: 
World Wars I and II', Journal of Negro Education, %II, 3, Summer 
1943. 
22. Office of Facts and Figures, The Negro Looks at the War: Attitudes of New York Negroes Toward Discrimination Against 
Negroes and a Comparison of Negro and Poor White Attitudes 
Toward War-related Issues, n. p., 1942j, in-Schomburg Co ection. 
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varied from one-locality to another. A survey requested by 
William Hastie, the Civilian Aide to the Secretary of War, found 
that.,, 23 
The militance which was widespread in Harlem was 
conspicuously absent in Memphis. Memphis Negroes 
were fearful of expressing their views, and were more 
ignorant about war issues and more apathetic about 
them than New York respondents. 
In view of these attitudes, it is not surprizing that 
Afro-Americans resisted attempts to relegate them to a second- 
class role in the war effort. Nor is it remarkable that they 
should object to any abuse either at the hands of the government 
or of white individuals. White oppression against black troops 
led to reta]iation. 
24 News of such incidents added to the anger 
of black civilians who were themselves subject to prejudice in the 
cities. The increased urbanization which occurred during the war 
led to conflicts with whites over housing, employment, and 
recreational facilities. Added to this were the day-to-day 
humiliations and insults which contributed enormously to wartime 
racial tensions. These tensions finally exploded in 1913 in the 
riots which disrupted Harlem, Detroit, Los Angeles, and other 
places. 
25 As Sitkoff has pointed out, these clashes were directly 
23. Office of War Information, Survey of Intelligence Materials, 
Supplement to Survey No. 2S, 'Negrqa in. a. Democracy at War, ' 
19L2, OASW, 226, National Archives Record Group 107. 
24. Lee, The loyment of Negro Troops, 318-79; Chicago Defender, 
June 19,1 3; Pittsburgh Co er, June 19,19b3. 
25., New York Times, August 2,8,1913; Baltimore Afro-American, 
June 267 1943; Pittsburgh Courier, June 26, July 3, 
August 7,1913; Harvard Sitko 'Racial Militancy and Interracial Violence in the Second World War', Journal of American History, LVIII, 3, December 1971. 
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related to the war and the issue of black participation in the war 
effort. 
26 
Equal involvement in all avenues of the war effort was 
imperative to the black struggle for civil rights. It was both 
means and end. Not only did Afro-Americans 'see in war an 
opportunity to prove their patriotism and thus lay the nation 
under obligation to them, 
27: the war also provided a chance to 
demonstrate that blacks were in fact first-class citizens. The 
situation was aptly summed-up by Lester Granger of the National 
Urban League. 'The quest of the Negro for full partnership in 
the war is', he said 'an expression of his desire to assume full 
citizenship responsibilities.? 
28 
In this, of course, military 
service was of paramount importance, and any restriction in the 
armed forces was seen as a denial of the black's citizenship. 
29 
Because of this, segregation in the forces was abhorrent to Afro- 
Americans as the men who refused to serve in a racially divided 
army made clear. 
Not surprizingly, this small group of brave men won 
considerable support from their fellow Afro-Americans, for their 
argument, that segregation contradicted the democratic tenets of 
the country and its war aims, denied them their rights as American 
citizens, and was contrary to the Selective Service and Training 
Act of 1940, was one which was being voiced by prominent blacks 
26 Sitkoff, 'Racial Militancy... ', 669-671. 
27. Cayton and Drake, Black Metropolis, 7118. 
28. Opportunity, %%I, 2, April 19L3. 
29. See above, page 2. 
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throughout the country. 
The first case of this nature arose in January 19111 when 
]rnest Calloway, the educational director of the Chicago local of 
the Transport Employees of America, wrote to his draft board, 'I 
cannot accept the responsibility of taking the oath upon induction 
into military service under the present anti-democratic structure 
of the United States Army and ask to be exempted from military 
training until such time that my contribution and participation in 
the defense of country be made on a basis of ccmplete equality. '30 
Calloway was a member of Conscientious Objectors Against Jim Crow, 
a small-Chicago group, led by J. G. St. Clair Drake, which planned 
to 'establish'the right of Negroes to claim exemption from military 
service on the grounds of conscientious objections because of the 
Jim crow policy of the armed forces. '31 When Calloway failed to 
win his case and was sentenced to jail, the movement evidently 
collapsed. However, he had won the support of the local NAACP 
and from the black press. The usually conservative columnist 
George Schuyler, wrote, 'A11 praise to young Mr. Calloway', and he 
urged others to follow the young man's example. 
32 The Chicago 
Defender suggested that Calloway expressed the feeling ? of a 
.? substantial number of Negroes 
33 
The stance of Lewis Jones of New York also won much 
approval. Like Calloway, Jones objected to the racial practices 
30. Pittsburgh Courier, January 11,1941.. 
31. Chicago Defender, January 11,1941. See too, January 18 
and 25,19I1. 
32. Pittsburgh Courier, January 18,19L1. 
33. Chicago Defender,, January 18,1911. 
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of the armed forces: 'I am not a pacifist, nor a conscientious 
objector on any religious grounds, ' he wrote in 1912. tI am 
simply a colored American who insists on his constitutional rights 
to serve his country as a citizen unsegregated and unhuiailiated in 
a Jim, crow ar y. '34 Jones was hopeful that his action would 
result in his assignment to a mixed unit, but it was not to be. 
He. refused to change his plea, despite the arguments of the judge 
and of John P. Lewis, editor of P. M. 
35 
As a result, he was 
sentenced by a'! reluctant' court to three years imprisonment, with 
the proviso that he could be released after three months if he 
would submit to the draft: he remained in prison until 1945.36 
As the editorial in the Baltimore Afro=American pointed out, 
jailing Jones did not answer the questions he raised. 
37 
Equally firm in their stand, despite the powers of persuasion 
of the courts, were Donald W. Sullivan of New Jersey, and George L. 
Haney of Chicago. Sullivan was sentenced, again by a 'reluctant' 
judge, to three years, and Haney to one year and a day. 
38 Bayard 
Rustin, a Quaker and one of the founding members of the Congress of 
Racial Equality, objected to military service on both religious and 
34. Baltimore Afro-American, October 10,1942. 
35. Baltimore Afro-American, October 31 and November 7,1942. 
The October 10 issue reprinted the editorial from P. M. 
'Why Colored Men Should Serve in the U. S. Army', in which John Lewis argued that the military front was more urgent than the fight for equality at home. 
36. Florence Murray, 'The Negro and Civil Liberties during World 
War II', Social Forces, December 1915. 
37. Baltimore Afro-American, November Ili, 1942. 
38. Florence Murray, editor, The Negro Handbook, -1916-I. 7, New York 1917,359-60. 
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racial grounds and he, too, received a three-year sentence. 
39 
(Information on other blacks who objected to service on purely 
religious grounds is scarce. At least one, a Jehovah's Witness, 
was jailed during the war and it is reasonable to suppose that 
there were more 
1O) 
By far the most tragic method of escaping 
the draft was that taken by Willie Harris, of Gary, Indiana. He 
committed suicide in 1942, a few hours before he was due to appear 
for induction, because he felt 'there was no future for Negro 
soldiers., 
41 
The Director of Selective Service recognized the 
connection between Harris's death and induction and reported that 
there was an. attempted suicide for the same reason. 
42 
The most important and the longest legal battle against 
service in segregated forces was put up by Winfred William t nn, 
a 36 year-old market gardener from New York. Lynn contended that 
his induction 'as a member of a "Negro quota" was in violation of 
the Selective Training and Service Act of 19401, which had stated 
that there should be no discrimination in the selection and 
training of men for armed service. 
43 
In June 191L2, the federal 
judge of the district court refused to hear the case until Lynn 
submitted for induction, which he did, entering the any in 
December that year. His brother, Conrad, and Arthur Garfield Hays, 
of the American Civil Liberties Thion, supported by A. Philip 
39. Chicago Defender, March 4,1944- 
40. Chicago Defender, November 13,1943. 
41. Chicago Defender, January 24,1942. 
42. Selective Service in Wartime: Second Reports Washington, 
D. C., 1943p 292. 
t3. Social Service Review, XVIII, 3, September 1944,369-70; 
Baltimore Afro-American, December 5,1912, January 2,1943. 
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Randolph and by the NAACP, then applied for a writ of habeas corpus 
and named Lynn's commanding officer, Colonel Downer, as respondent 
. 
Their motion was denied in February 1944 by the U. S. Circuit Court 
of Appeals in New York. That court ruled, in a two-to-one verdict, 
that section i. i(a) of the Selective Service Act prohibited 
discrimination but not necessarily segregation. Moreover, the 
court said, Lynn was inducted separately as a delinquent and 
therefore not as part of the 'Negro quota' 
45 
Randolph and the March on Washington Movement, which despite 
its decline in support and prestige, lingered on, mobilized backing 
for Lynn and were responsible for the formation of the National 
Committee for Winfred Iynn. 
46 
The one major publication of the 
NOWM was a pamphlet attacking Jim crow in the forces and they saw 
Lynn's fight as the '20th Century Dred Scott Case. '47 They 
evidently succeeded in securing moral and financial aid; for Lynn 
was defended before the Supreme Court in 1944 by Hays, with the 
NAACP lawyers Hastie, Marshall, and Kotwitz appearing as amici 
curiae. 
48 
lth. See letter appealing for funds in The Nationj December 18., 
1943 and report of the NAACP Detroit convention in The Crisis, 
July 1913. 
45. Murray, editor, The Negro Handbook, 191114, New York, 1944j, 
131-32; Selective Service System; Special Groups: Special 
Monograph No. 10, Washington, D. C., 19 3,9-50. 
L6. 'The Story of Winfred Iynnt, File on ? ynn, Schomburg Collection. 
L17. Nancy MacDonald and Dwight MacDonald, The War's Greatest 
Scandal: The Story of Jim Crow in Uniform, New York, n. d.; 
press release, National Coimlittee for Winfred Lynn, Lynn file, 
Schomburg collection. 
48" U. S. ex rel Iynn vs. Downer, U. S. Supreme Court Reports, 
Law Ed., 88 1585, and papers in Lynn file. 
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The Supreme Court ruled that, 'since the soldier was 
serving in the South Pacific, no one in the Eastern District of 
New York, where the case arose, nor any War Department official, 
could prodnice him in court or order his release. ' The case was 
therefore declared moot and a later appeal was also denied. 
49 
The whole process was seen by many blacks as a legal trick to avoid 
ruling on military racial practices in a case 'too hot to handle. 
50 
The Inn Committee felt that had the court ruled, it would have 
been in the defendant's favour, an opinion shared by some members 
of the Selective Service System and the Judge Advocatets Office. 
51 
The attack on segregation in the armed forces continued 
despite this legal set-back. The Committee for Winfred Lynn 
became the Lynn Committee to Abolish Segregation in the Armed 
Forces and was joined by Lynn after his honourable discharge in 
19145 
52 
It was not until after the war, however, that any 
progress was made, and again it was the result of a threat of 
dramatic action from A. Philip Randolph. In 19117$ he and former 
army chaplain, Grant Reynolds, suggested and then-prepared to lead, 
a civil disobedience campaign against Jim crow in the forces. 
The support the campaign received and Randolph's evident determin- 
ation to carry out his threat helped to persuade President Truman 
1L9. Murray, Negro Handbook, 19b6-I7,359. 
50. The Nation, July 1,19442 13; release, National Committee 
for ff` Winfred Iynn, June 1,1944; and Jean Byers, A Study of 
the Negro in Military Service, Dept. of Defense, Washington, 
D. C., 1947s mimeographed, in Moorland Collection, Howard 
University, 10-11. 
51. Special Groups: Special Monograph No. 10,50. 
52. Releases of the Lynn Committee to Abolish Segregation in 
the Armed Forces, Lynn file, Schomburg Collection. 
45 
to issue Executive Order 9981 which began the process of military 
desegregation. 
53 
Along with this overwhelming desire to fight for equal 
rights was the feeling that participation in the war effort would 
be rewarded: in fact the two ideas were inextricably interwoven. 
George Rouzeau, one of the Courier's war correspondents, urged 
black soldiers to 'insist on combat duty', and asked, 'is'it not 
true that only those who spill their blood are in a position to 
demand rights? '54 A black soldier, in a letter to the Baltimore 
Afro-American, said that black soldiers 'fight because of the 
opportunities it will make possible for them after the war. 155 
The mutual obligations of the citizen and the state were also spelt 
out. For a man to enter the forces, risk life and limb was 'just 
and reasonable, if the nation was 'fighting for the purpose of 
56 
providing a better life for the people who compose the citizenry. ' 
Forty-six per cent of the blacks polled in the New York survey 
felt that they would be treated better once the war was won. Of 
that number, 14 per cent expected better treatment because of the 
part they played in the war effort, while another ten per cent 
thought it would be due to black initiative in demanding rights. 
57 
53. New York Times, April 1-, June 27,19148; Pittsburgh Courier, 
April , Ju 3,1948; and Dalfiume, Desegregation oo`t e 
U. S. Armed Forces, 163-66, see chpt. 3. 
5)4. Pittsburgh Courier, January 1,1944. The same point was 
made in the editorial, Pittsburgh Courier, June 10,1944. 
55. Afro-American, May 20,1944. 
56. Dwight Holmes, Baltimore Afro-American, July 8,1944. 
57. Office of Facts and Figures, The Negro Looks at the War, III. 
Other indications of black expectations are apparent in, 
Chicago Defender, February 27,1913; Pittsburgh Courier, 
December fencer Logan, A Ne roes Faith in America, New York, 1916,72. See Sitkoff, ca Militancy', . 
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Another important reason for rising expectations was the 
feeling that the war was a revolutionary force capable of 
transforming society. 'War', said Robert C. Weaver, '- and a 
global war in particular - is a social revolution. ' 
58 
His opinion, 
that unsolved social issues would come to the fore and demand 
attention was shared by other people. Gunnar Myrdal, -the Swedish 
sociologist, spoke of a 'revitalization of the American Creed of 
Democracy. 'S9 Some Afro-Americans even went as far as to say 
that the longer the war, the more blacks would benefit. George 
Schuyler was one of these as was Joseph D. Bibbs who said, 'war 
may be hell for some, but it bids fair to open up the portals of 
heaven for us., 
6o 
There were arguments against this point of view: 
Benjamin Mays, the president of Morehouse College, argued that 'a 
world crisis does not destroy customs, mores, and prejudices, that 
have their roots anchored in centuries. '61 A similar case, based 
on historical precedents, was put by the historian, Benjamin Quarles, 
who saw the possibility of economic gains, but no reason to expect 
that participation and valour would be rewarded. Moreover, he 
reminded Afro-Americans that the war might 'create a national 
psychosis which would indefinitely delay a solution to the American 
58. Weaver, Negro Labor, vii. 
59. Njyrdal, An American Dileirina, xliii. 
60. Bibbs, Pittsburgh Courier, October 10,19142. Schuyler 
argued, very much as I have, that previous wars had not 
provided a sufficient test to American institutions to bring 
dramatic changes, in Courier, September 14,19140, and The 
Crisis, November 1913. 
61. Mays, 'The Negro and the Present War', The Crisis, May 1912. 
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race problem. ' 
62 
While the editors of Crisis, and others, disagreed with this 
view, Quarles' pessimism was shared by some Afro-Americans. 
63 
Thirty-eight per cent of the respondents in the New York survey 
expected to be treated just the same after the war as before and 
five per cent actually thought they would be worse off. 
64 
Only a 
third of those asked in Memphis felt that a United Nations' victory 
would bring any improvement-in their lot- 
65 
The continued 
maltreatment of black soldiers and civilians throughout the country 
encouraged this mood of despair. The sociologist Horace R. Cayton, 
the journalist Roi Ottley, and the politician Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., 
all asked their fellow Afro-Americans if they were 'Fighting for 
White Folks? t and the now well-known epitaph for black soldiers, 
'Here lies a black man killed fighting a yellow man for the 
protection of a white man', originated during this period. 
66 
More extreme reactions have generally been ignored by 
historians who have concentrated on the positive role black people 
67 
played in the American war effort. Perhaps this was due to an 
62. Quarles, 'Will a Long War Aid the Negro? ', The Crisis, 
September 1943. 
63. The editors printed their own view with Quarles', The Crisis, 
September 19L3,268. 
614. Office of Facts and Figures, The Negro Looks at the War, III. 
65. Supplement to Survey No. 25, 'Negroes in a Democracy at War',. 
66. Cayton, The Nation, September 26,19142; Ottley, Cozrmion 
Ground, Spring 1942; Powell, Co rson Sense, April-11"94-2. 
The epitaph is quoted by Myrdal, An American Dilemma, 1006-7. 
67. John Hope Franklin, for example, wrote that 'As a matter of 
course, [italics minQ7 Negroes gave generous support to the 
war effort on the home front. ' From Slavery to Freedom, 595. 
Even Sitkoff skips over the subject . ight , . 
'Racial 
Militancy', 664-65. 
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unconscious desire to prove Afro- American patriotism and loyalty 
and thus buttress demands for civil rights: a point of view which 
might-eschew discussion of conscientious objection and draft 
evasion amongst blacks in the 19140x. However, in the present time 
when draft evasion in America is quite common, and black opposition 
to participation in the U. S. armed forces not uncommon and included 
in the programmes of two prominent movements, the Black Muslims 
and the Black Panthers, it is of interest and value to examine 
some of their antecedents. 
Although important as representatives of the extremist view 
among Afro-Americans, the number of blacks who openly and actively 
opposed participation in the war effort was very small. In 1941 
there were only 33 black conscientious objectors or 2.6 per cent of 
the total number of C. O. s. 
68 
In the period 191&1-1.6, there were 
2,208 black violators of the Selective Service and Training Act. 
Of these, 166'were classed as conscientious objectors, the remainder 
were people who failed to appear before their draft boards either 
deliberately or because of mis-information, lack of knowledge, or 
carelessness. 
69 
One group which initially encouraged opposition to the war 
and American entry into it was the Communist Party of the United 
States and its black socialist sympathisers. One prominent 
socialist, A. Philip Randolph, was, as we have seen, intent on 
68. Selective Service System, Selective Service in Peace Time: 
First Re gort of the Director of Selective Service, Wa gton, 
D. C., 2,259. 
69. Selective Service System, Special Groups: ecial Monograph 
No. 10,83, and press release, Department of justice 
FEPC file 113, National Archives Record Group 228. 
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ensuring a black role in the war effort. His view, that America 
had more to offer to the black man than Hitler did, was shared by 
his friend and forcer fellow editor of the old socialist publication, 
the Messenger, Chandler Owen. 
70 In the 1940s Owen wrote the text 
of the morale-boosting Office of War Information paznghlet., Negroes 
and the War. 
71 Their activities were opposed by the C. P. U. S. A... 
which was following the Moscow line and therefore, after the Nazi- 
Soviet Pact of August 1939, opposed to American support for the 
Allies. 
72 
The Coaamxnists urged Afro-Americans to concentrate on the 
struggle at home and said, 'you cant defend Negro rights without 
fighting against this war. 
73 , Wien Hitler attacked the Soviet 
Union in June 1941) American Conuiunists and socialist sympathisers 
performed a volte face and called for complete support for the war 
effort and a halt to protests which might hinder it. Thus, the 
author Richard Wright, a former opponent of the war, could in 
December 1941 offer his literary services to the government for 'the 
national democratic cause. ' No doubt because his political 
70. Randolph quoted in Pittsburgh Courier, December. 20,191i1, 
from 'The Negro and the War?, The Black Worker, November 1941. 
71. Negroes and the War, Washington, D. C., nd. 
72. J. R. Johnson, Why Negroes Should Oppose the War, New York 
1939 (? ); John Henry Wi ams, A Negro Looks at War, New 
York 19110; and Wilson Record, Race and Radicalism: The 
NAACP and the Communist Party in Conflict, New York 1964,118- 
73. Daily Worker, May 16,1911. 
74. Letter Wright to MacLeish, December 21,1914, Office of 
Facts and Figures, National Archives Record Group 208" 
William A. Nolan, Communism Vs the Negro, Chicago 1951, ]J3. 
Other examples of is ange in tune are James W. Ford, The 
War and the Negro People, New York 1942, and Pettis Perry, 
Te Negro Stake this War, San Fransisco, 1942 (? ). 
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affiliations were known, his offer was not accepted. 
7 
It does not appear that these political adversaries of the 
war supported or encouraged draft evasion. The groups which did 
so were almost entirely nationalist-separatist sects which had 
their origins in the period of disillusionment following World War I 
and during the Depression. To them America was a white man's 
country in which they had no stake and therefore no obligations. 
The war was a white man's war from which nothing could be gained 
for blacks. Although Frederick Douglass wrote of similar 
sentiments being expressed during the Civil War, these attitudes 
were a comparatively new expression of black aespair. 
76 
To the majority of their fellow black Americans, these 
people were no more than, 'Foolish Fanatics', 'crackpots and 
starryeyed cultists', or members of 'obscure religious sects., 
77 
If not foolish, they were, like the black conscientious objectors, 
certainly brave, for the F. B. I. attempted to prove that most of 
those concerned were, if not the tools of enemy agents, at least 
pro-Axis. As such they would be liable to a maximum of forty 
years in prison. Luckily for them, these charges were hard to 
75. Memo from Milton Starr to Ulric Bell, Ass. Director, Office 
of Facts and Figures, February 12 1912, National Archives 
Record Group 208. Wright wrote Twelve Million Black Voices 
London 1947, as his contribution to the war effort. 
76. Frederick Douglass, 'Men of Color, To Arms: ', in Herbert 
Aptheker, editor, A Documentary History of The Negro People 
in the United States, New York 19, Vol. I, 47d. 
77. Joseph D. Bibbs, Pittsburgh Courier, October 3,19112; 
Louis Martin, 'Fifth Column Among Negroes', ortunity, 
December 1912; and Murray, 'The Negro. and Civil Liberties during World War III, Social Forces, December 1945; A. 
Philip Randolph, 'Pro-Japanese Activities Among Negroes', 
The Black Worker, September 1942. 
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substantiate, and the majority of people accused of sedition were 
instead convicted of draft evasion. 
The largest group charged with sedition were the followers 
of the Temple of Islam, (Black Muslims), 63 of whom, including their 
leader Elijah Muhammad, were arrested in the Chicago round-up of 
September 19142.78 Although the Muslims were sympathetic to the 
Japanese (because they were also coloured), no acts of sedition 
were proven. Indeed, 'observers felt that the charges of draft 
evasion cleared the defendants... of any connection with Japanese 
espionage. The government's case of sedition against them 
evidently'collapsed. 179 On the convictions of draft evasion the 
Muslims were jailed for three years and their leader for five. 
Muhammad was released from Milan, Michigan, in 19b6, and returned to 
a movement which had grown during, perhaps because of, his 
imprisonment. 
80 
Gulam Bogans, (Elijah Mohamed), the leader of 
another sect of Muslims which had temples and universities in 
Washington, D. C., Detroit, and Milwaukee, and 'several hundreds, of 
his followers, also refused to register for the draft: fifty of 
them were given three-year prison sentences. 
81 
A sole Muslim, 
James Barnes was jailed in Mississippi - but for breaking the Jim 
crow laws of the state rather than for evading the draft. He was, 
78. Baltimore Afro-American, September 26,1912; Chicago 
Defender, October 3,1 Li2; C. Eric Lincoln, The Black 
Muslims in America, Boston, Mass., 1969,188. 
79. Defender, October 10,1942. 
80. Lincoln, The Black Muslims in America, 188. In view of the 
now known recruiting success of the Muslims in prisons, 
this is not surprizing. There was, too, the element of 
martyrdom. 
81. Chicago Defender, December 5,1942; and Ottley, New World 
A'Coming, 332. 
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however, sentenced to ten years or for the duration of the war. 
82 
The remainder of those arrested in the Chicago round-up of 
1942 were members of the Peace Movement. of Ethiopia, (formed in 
1932, an off-shoot of Garvey's U. N. I. A. supporting massive 
resettlement in Africa), and the Brotherhood of Liberty for Black 
People in America. The members of the Peace Movement of Ethiopia 
were treated fairly leniently, perhaps because they were led by a 
woman, Mrs. M. L. Gordon. While she was sentenced to two years 
in prison, her followers were released on probation. 
83 
A tiny number of Afro-Americans were found guilty of sedition. 
Five supporters of the Ethiopian Pacific Movement in New York, led 
by a former Garveyite, Robert 0. Jordan, were indicted for sedition 
in 1912. Known in the black, and the white, press as the 'Black 
Hitler', Jordan's pro-Axis sympathies were coinnon knowledge. 
84 
He and his followers were accused of 'urging soldiers and others to 
resist service in the armed forces of the United States and to 
support Japan, holding that Japan was going to liberate the darker 
85 races., The Chicago Defender referred to them as 'agents of 
fascism' and urged 'convict them all. '86 Although convicted they 
were not given the maximum forty-year sentence - the court held 
that their activities had been ineffective - but were jailed for 
82. Baltimore Afro-American, May 23,1942. 
83. Baltimore Afro-American, September 26,19112; Murray, Negro 
Handbook , 133; E. David Cronon, Black Moses: The 
Story of Marcus Garvey, Madison, Wisconsin, and 
Harry Haywood, Negro Liberation, New York 1918,203. 
8Z. Baltimore Afro-American and Chicago Defender September 19, 
1942y New York es, January 15,1943- .. 
85. Murray, Negro Handbook, 1944,13!. 
86. Chicago Defender, January 16,1913. 
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periods of four to ten years, with an additional $10,000 fine for 
Jordan 
87 
Still another off-shoot of Garveyism, the Pacific Movement 
of the Eastern World, was supposed to be 'sponsored by Japanese 
agents ... to spread confusion and dissension and disrupt America's 
war effort. 188 Only two of its members, in St. Louis, were found 
guilty of both sedition and draft evasion: one was given four year 
sentences on both charges, the terms to run concurrently, and the 
other two two-year sentences. 
89 
Seven followers of the House of 
Israel from Newark, New Jersey, were sentenced to three years in 
jail for evading the draft, although they had 'been inciting other 
Negroes ... not to fight the Japanese because they are another 
colored race. ' 
90 
The local F. B. I. director said that their violations 
of the Selective Service Act were not based on their religion but 
on 'an almost fanatical conviction that they had nothing to fight for 
in this war., 
91 
A variety of other groups throughout the country faced 
similar charges to these after refusing to participate in the war 
for a mixture of 'racial and religious reasons. Twenty-one members 
of the International Reassembly of the Church of Freedom League who 
87. New York Times, January 15,1913, Chicago Defender, January 
7-71M. 
88. Chicago Defender, March 14,1912, Haywood, Negro Liberation, 
203, and E. U. Essien-Udom, Black Nationalism: The Rise of 
the Black Muslims in the U. S. A., Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 
1966,56. 
89. Murray, Negro Handbook, 191114,134. 
90. New York Times, January 24,19413. 
91. Baltimore Afro-American, January 23,1913. 
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refused to serve overseas were imprisoned in New Orleans for draft 
evasion. 
92 
Other movements included the Ethiopian Women's Work 
Association and the African Nationalist Pioneering Movement. 
93 
Individuals as far away from the East coast as San Diego, California, 
94 
were convicted of charges 'of a subversive nature. ' The F. B. I. 
attempted to relate such beliefs to Japanese agents and propaganda, 
and in some instances this alleged relationship was given credence 
by fellow blacks such as Randolph and Ottley. 
95 Ottley devoted an 
entire chapter of his book, New World A'Coming, to such charges, but 
he failed to point out that indictments for draft evasion were 
generally substituted for those of sedition. 
Rather than the subjects of Japanese espionage agents, it 
seems more likely that, given their ideological backgrounds, the 
defendants were, in the words of the American Civil Liberties Union, 
'the victims of over-zealous race consciousness, while others were 
religious zealots., 
96 
Alternatively, their actions could be, and 
were, described as 'passive resistance to the American war effort 
as a protest at racial discrimination in the United States. r97 
Although these people obviously represent the extreme 
minority of Afro-Americans, the fact remains that a number of 
92. Chicago Defender, November 7,1942; Baltimore Afro- 
American, January 2,1943. 
93. Ottley, New World A'Coming, 333,334. 
94. Chicago Defender, August 23,19111. 
95. Randolph in Chicago Defender, October 3,19112, and Ottley, 
New World A'Coming, 32 -. 
96. Murray, 'The Negro and Civil Liberties', 211. 
97. Chicago Defender, October 3,1942. 
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blacks shared their sympathy for the Japanese. The government 
surveys found that in New York 18 per cent of those interviewed 
thought they would be better treated by the Japanese than by the 
Americans, and in Memphis the proportion was higher. 
98 
Few of 
those asked thought they would be any better off under German rule. 
The interviewers attributed these attitudes to apathy or lack of 
knowledge about the comparative war aims of the Axis and the Allies. 
Just as likely is the fact that the attack by the coloured Japanese 
on white men awakened the racial consciousness of Afro-Americans. 
The best explanation was offered by Richard Wright. when he wrote: 
99 
I've even heard Negroes, in moments of anger and 
bitterness, praise what Japan is doing in China, 
not because they believe in oppression..., but 
because they would suddenly sense how empty their 
lives were when looking at the dark faces of 
Japanese generals in the rotogravure supplements 
of the Sunday newspapers. They would dream of 
what it would be like to live in a country where 
they could forget their color and play a 
responsible role in the vital processes of the 
nation's life. 
The struggle to achieve a responsible place in the life 
of the country was heightened by the war emergency and participation 
in the armed forces was of prime importance. The fight was both 
for equality and proof of equality, for Afro-Americans were 
clearly aware of the relationship between military service and 
citizenship. This connection was openly stated by men like 
98. 
99. 
Office of Facts and Figures, The Negro Looks at the War, 
and Supplement to Survey No. 25, 'Negroes. a Democracy 
at War., 
'How "Bigger" was Born', The Saturday Review of Literature.. 
June 1,1940, included as an introduction to Native Son, 
New York 1966ed. xiv. ---- 
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Calloway, Jones, and Imo, and was inherent in the actions of 
groups like the Mus]±ns. Randolph, the, March on Washington 
Movement, the black press, the NAACP, and even the National Urban 
League, were all aggressively demanding to play a part in the war 
effort. Set-backs and rebuffs encouraged the frustration and 
despair which led to riots: they also confirmed the views of the 
black nationalists. No matter how much they suffered from doubts, 
however, the majority of Afro-Americans experienced a rise in 
expectations during the war. Just as white Americans anticipated 
and hoped for an improvement in their lot, so did Afro-Americans. 
If anything their hopes were greater for they did, after all, have 
more to gain. 
57 
Chapter 3 
Afro-Americans and the Armed Forces, 1910-48 
For Afro-Americans, military participation during World 
War II was crucial to their struggle for equal rights. If they 
could fight as equals then they could expect to be rewarded as 
equals, or at least given the same rights and privileges as other 
American citizens. This logic in itself, impelled Afro-Americans 
to demand equal opportunities within the armed services and their 
argument was further strengthened by the democratic creed which 
was, supposedly, being fought for. As Allied propaganda continually 
emphasised, World War II was a clear-cut struggle between right 
and wrong, democracy and totalitarianism, freedom and subjugation, 
racism and tolerance. Black protest coupled with the need to live 
up to these ideals might itself have produced changes in America's 
military racial practices, but a more powerful and urgent force 
for change was the total nature of the war. As a post-war writer 
remarked, the lesson of total war, so belatedly learned, was that 
we must rigorously apply the principals of economy of means in the 
utilization of all resources for war - human as well as material. 
" 
Together the three forces, protest, the need to live up to 
one's own propaganda, and war, began the break-up of segregation, 
and led in the post-war years to the total integration, of the 
American armed forces. This process, from segregation to 
integration, has been more than adequately dealt with by other 
1. Paul C. Davis, 'The Negro in the Armed Forces, ' Virginia 
Quarterly Review, XXIV, L, 19 8, t99. 
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historians. 2 It will only be necessary for me to recount the 
details here and to give new emphasis. More important to this 
study is the effect of military service on the attitudes of 
soldiers and the implications of their wartime experiences. 
The fight for equal rights in the forces began with 
American mobilization prior to Pearl Harbor. The situation of 
the black soldier in 1910 was little different from that of 1918. 
World War I had served to reinforce racialism and its stereotypes 
rather than test or destroy prejudices, and the feeling still common 
among white soldiers and their officers was that Afro-Americans 
made poor troops. Although slight changes were made in military 
racial policies during the inter war years, old misconceptions 
prevented their becoming practice. 
3 
After the first World War, 
the four black regular Army units had been run down in strength 
(in line with general military policy at that time), and Afro- 
Americans could only enter them as vacancies occurred. The 
result was that by 1939 there were only 3,640 black regular soldiers 
and only five black officers, three of whom were chaplains. 
During the same period, the Navy, which had limited black 
participation to service in the galleys, reduced the numbers 
2. Lee Nichols, Breakthrough on the Color Front, New York, 1954; 
Ulysses S. Lee, The Ein oyment of Negro Troops., U. S. Ariny 
in World War II, Special Stu es, 5, Washington, D. C., 1966; 
Richard J. Stillman, Integration of the Negro in the U. S. 
Armed Forces, New Yor , 
=9* Richard M. Dalfiume, 
Desegregation of the U. S. Armed Forces: Fighting on Two 
Fronts, Columbia, Missouri, 1969. 
3. Lee, The Employment of Negro Troops, 32-38, Dalfiume, 
Desegregation of the US Armed Forces, 22-23. 
4. Lee, The Employment of Negro Troops, 29; Charles C. Moskos, 
The American Enlisted Man: The Rank and File in Today's 
Military, New York , 09. 
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employed even in that capacity. 
5 
On top of this, Afro-Americans 
were excluded entirely from the Marine Corps, the Coastguard, and 
the Army Air Corps. With war imminent, Afro-Americans began to 
demand that greater opportunities in the military establishment be 
opened to them. 
In May 1939, the traditional voices of black protest were 
joined by the newly-formed Committee for Participation of Negroes 
in National Defense led by Rayford W. Logan. Under his leadership, 
the Committee quickly began to play an influential part in the 
campaign for greater black involvement in the forces. On August 14, 
19140, Logan and the representatives of other organizations appeared 
before the House of Representatives' Committee on Military Affairs 
to ask for an increase in the number of black military personnel 
and full utilization of Afro- Americans in all branches of the, armed 
forces 
6 
To achieve their aims, Logan and his Committee, persuaded 
the Republican Representative of New York, Hamilton Fish, to 
introduce an amendment to the Selective Training and Service Bill, 
then- under debate.? When the bill was passed on September 14, 
1940, the amendment was included as section 3(a) which required 
5. Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom, 581; Laurence D. Reddick, 
'The Negro in the Navy in Wor War 11', Journal of Negro 
History, XXXII, April, 1917; John W. Davis, 'The Negro in 
the United States Navy, Marine Corps, and Coastguard', 
Journal of Negro Education, %II, 3, Sumer 1943. 
6. Selective Service System, Special Groups: Special Monograph 
No. 10, Washington, D. C., 1953,1; Lee, The Employment of 
Negro Troops, 72. 
7. Special Groups: Special Monograph No. 10, Ui; Lee, The 
Employment o Negro Troops, Y2- Y3; Breakthrouggh on 
the Color Front, 39. 
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that draftees be selected in an impartial manner, and as section 
b(a)'which stated that there would be no discrimination in either 
the selection or training of men. 
8 
During the debate Southern 
politicians made it clear that they did not expect this to mean 
the end of segregation but any hopes that black people had to the 
contrary were finally crushed by a statement issued from the White 
House in October, 1940. 
The President's release was the result of a meeting he held 
on September 27 with Walter White, executive secretary of the 
NAACP, A. Philip Randolph, of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, 
and T. 'Arnold Hill, adviser on Negro Affairs in the National Youth 
Administration and acting-secretary of the National Urban League. 
9 
At the meeting the black spokesmen made their wishes clear in a 
seven-point programme. They asked that black officers and men be 
assigned to duties according to their abilities; that provision be 
made-for the training of black officers; that Afro-Americans be 
allowed'full participation in all branches of the Army Air Corps; 
that blacks take part in the administration and operation of the 
Selective Service System; that the services of black seamen be 
expanded beyond the level of cooks and messmen; that black women 
be permitted to serve as nurses in the Army and Navy as well as 
in the Red Cross. Most important of all, the black leaders asked 
that 'existing units of the Army and units to be established should 
be required to accept and select officers and enlisted personnel 
8. Special Groups: Special Monograph No. 10,44. 
9. j4emo. on basis of conference, official File 93, box 4. 
Franklin D. Roosevelt Library (hereafter 93: 4, FDRL). 
Details of the meeting are also described in Walter White, 
A Man Called White, New York 1918,186-187. 
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without regard to race. ' 
10 
President Roosevelt agreed to crnsider these points and to 
refer back to the black representatives at a later date. 
However, without further discussion he signed the statement on 
military racial policy released to the press on October 9,1940, which 
accepted only a few of the black proposals. While it promised the 
use of Afro-Americans in the Army 'on the general basis of the 
proportion of the Negro population of the country' and in 'each 
major. branch of the service, combatant as well as non-combatant', 
the statement included important reservations. Increased opportun- 
ities were to be given to blacks to qualify for ccnmissions but 
black officers would only be assigned to all-black units. Moreover, 
the'general policy of segregation was to be maintained as it had 
'been proved satisfactory over a long period of years. ' Changes 
'would produce situations destructive to morale and detrimental to 
the preparation for national defense., 
12 
Afro-Americans reacted 
angrily to the statement, the more so when they heard that White, 
Randolph, and Hill, had not, as was implied by the President's . 
press secretary, Stephen Early, approved. 
13 The general response 
was summed up by the headlines of The Crisis: 'White House Blesses 
10. " The full text was published in The Crisis, November, 1940. 
It is also quoted by Lee, The Employment of Negro Troops, 
74-75. 
11. -White, A Man Called White, 187. 
12. Press release, October 9,1940) 93: 11, FDRL; Lee, The 
Employment of Negro Troops, 75; and Special Groups: 
Special Monograph No. 10,5-46. 
13. White to Early, October 21,1940,93: I&, FDRL; Chicago 
Defender, October 19,19t40; Pittsburgh Courier, October 19, 
1940. 
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Jim Craw. '14 
Government embarrassment was increased by the Republicans 
who made the most of the issue in an effort to capture crucial 
15 
black votes for the forthcoming presidential elections. A 
retraction by Early of his statement involving the black spokesmen 
was insUfficient to repair the damage done and on October 16 
further concessions were made. 
16 Colonel Benjamin 0. Davis, a 
soldier since the Spanish-American War, was promoted to the rank 
of general, the first black general in U. S. history. Plans for the 
formation of black aviation units were announced and more black 
combat groups in the Army were promised. More significant was 
the appointment of William H. Hastie, Dean of Howard University Law 
Schooland a legal representative of the NAACP, as civilian aide to 
the Secretary of War. Colonel Campbell C. Johnson was made Negro 
Adviser to the Director of Selective Service. Roosevelt also 
17 
wrote to White, Randolph, and Hill, and promised that 'further 
developments of policy will be forthcoming to insure that Negroes 
are given fair treatment on a non-discriminatory basis. '18 
Despite these actions, the White House release remained the 
basis of wartime military racial policies and was regarded as a 
14. The Crisis, November 1940. 
15. Republicans had already included a liberal plank in their 
party platform for 1910 and now followed it up with an 
advertising campaign - Baltimore Afro-American, October 12, 
19,1910. Also see White, A ManCa ed White, 187-88. 
16. Early to White, October 25,1940,93: l, FDRL. 
17. Dalfiume, Desegregation of the U. S. Armed Forces, 41-112; 
Lee, The Emp oyment of Negro Troops, 79. The Pittsburgh 
Courier had called for an appointment such as Hastie's on 
September 28,1940. 
18. F. D. R. to White, Hill, and Randolph, October 25,1940) 93: 4, 
FDRL. 
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presidential sanction of segregation. 
19 
That little had really 
changed was revealed at a conference of black newspaper editors 
and publishers called for by Hastie and held in Washington, D. C., 
on December 8,1911, the day after Pearl Harbor. Those present 
were told by Colonel Eugene Householder, of the Adjutant General's 
Office,. that the Army could not take a stand on race relations which 
would antagonize the majority of American people. He went on to 
20 
say, 
The Army is not a sociological laboratory; to be 
effective it must be organized and-trained according 
to the principles which will ensure success. Experiments 
. to meet the wishes and demands of the champions of 
every race and creed for the solution of their problems 
are a danger to efficiency, discipline, and morale, and 
would result in ultimate defeat. 
The Committee for Participation of Negroes in National Defense 
could still feel that blacks were being excluded from the military 
21 
war effort. 
The black newspaper men were not impressed by Householder's 
argument for the maintenance of the status quo. Far from wishing 
either to hinder or impede America's war efforts, they only wanted 
? the opportunity to serve their country to the full measure of 
their capacity and devotion. +22 As such, they would continue 
to fight for equal opportunity of participation in the war and 
19. Lee, The Dnployment of Negro Troops, 76. 
20. Remarks of Col. E. R. Householder at the Conference of Negro 
Newspaper Representatives, Munitions Building, Washington, 
D. C., December 8 194l, OASW, 273, NARG 107. 
21. Pittsburgh Courier, December 14,1940. 
22. Chicago Defender, December 13,1941. See 'Statement of Negro 
War Aims', submitted by Negro Newspaper Publishers Association, 
93: 9 FDRL. 
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oppose any abridgement of the constitutional guarantees which 
gave meaning and substance to their citizenship. 
23 This 
continuing protest and the increasing strains of war were to 
demonstrate that segregation in the forces was compatible with 
neither efficiency nor morale. 
. 
Some progress did follow the furore of 1910: an Army Air 
Corps training base was established at Tuskegee Institute in 
Alabama in 1941 and the all-black 99th Pursuit Squadron flew its 
first combat mission in 1943. A considerable advance was made 
in 1942 when Afro-Americans were accepted for general service in 
both the Navy and the Marine Corps, if still on a segregated basis. 
Black army officers, from the beginning of the training programme, 
were taught with whites in fully integrated camps. Black enlisted 
strength in the Army rose rapidly from 97,725 in November, 19111, 
to L67, -883 in December, 1942.24 However, that number did not 
bring the proportion of black soldiers up to the ratio of blacks 
in the. population, nor were they equally represented in all branches 
of the service. 
25 
Apart from the training of black officers, segregation 
remained intact throughout the forces. Integration on a basis of 
one black to every nine whites in Army units was suggested by a 
plasining group of the Army General Staff in an effort to prevent a 
waste of manpower, but the suggestion was rejected on the usual 
23. Opportunity, %%, I, January 19142; Pittsburgh Courier, 
December 13,1911; and Chicago Defender, Decem ehr 20,19111. 
24. Lee, The Employment of Negro Troops, 88. 
25. Dalfiume, Desegregation of the US Armed Forces, 88. 
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grounds of efficiency. 
26 
The question of the adequate use of 
black manpower, and continued pressure from Afro-Americans, did 
lead to the formation in August 1912 of an Advisory Committee on 
Negro Troop Policies (the McCloy Committee), but that body, at 
least initially, saw little reason to call for change. 
27 Indeed, 
the actions and attitudes of the McCloy Committee contributed to 
the resignation of Hastie, the Civilian Aide to the Secretary of 
War, in January 1913. 
Hastie had threatened to resign before then, but had always 
been 'persuaded to remain in office in the interests of morale. 
28 
The fact that he had not been informed, prior to the event, of the 
formation of the McCloy Committee and had then been excluded from 
its membership, only added to his frustration. This was further 
increased by the obvious disagreements he had with McCloy, the 
Committee chairman, over the importance of the full, unsegregated 
use of black troops. 
29 The final straw was the Air Corps' plan 
to set up a segregated black Air Officer Training School, contrary 
to the practices of all the other services. Again the plan had 
been drawn up without Hastie's knowledge and without any attempt 
being made to consult him. 
30 
His resignation had scene effect: 
26. Dalfiume, Desegregation of the U. S. Armed Forces, 83-8Ii. 
27. Ibidem. 
28. Chicago Defender, January 31,1942, reported that Hastie 
had tried to resign three times by then; see too, Pittsburgh 
Courier, January 31, and October 3,1942. 
29. Dalfiume, Desegregation of the U. S. Armed Forces, 83. 
30. Letter of resignation to Secretary of War, Stimson, January 5, 
1943, OASW, 243, NARG 107. Hastie explained his resignation 
fully in the press, Baltimore Afro-American, Chicago 
Defender, and Pittsburgh Courier, February 6,1943. 
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the plan for the separate training school was dropped and the Air 
Corps generally relaxed its racial restrictions. Moreover, Truman 
Gibson, Hastie's successor, regularly attended meetings of the 
McCloy Committee. 
, The pressure of events brought other changes in Army policy. 
The Army reaped what Lee described as 'a harvest of disorder' in 
1943, as racial violence disrupted life in and around military 
camps in the North and South. 
31 
However, the riots which occurred 
that suiimer were not confined to soldiers, for several major cities 
suffered considerable disorders. The outbreaks of violence within 
the Amy were symptomatic of the general mood of Afro-Americans. 
32 
Basically, the cause of friction was the segregation and 
discrimination in the forces which applied even to on-base 
facilities such as theatres, post-exchanges, and canteens. The 
situation was worsened by the prejudices of white soldiers, officers, 
and military policemen. In the South, Afro-American troops also 
had to suffer the local jim crow laws and were subject to attack 
from members of the local white population. Quite frequently the 
two elements, prejudice within the Anny and amongst civilians, were 
combined in conflicts over bus services between army camps and 
neighbouring towns. The segregation of those services was strictly 
enforced by both military and civil police forces and it was usual 
for blacks to give precedence to whites. Generally, this meant 
that blacks waited until all whites had boarded the vehicle; often 
it meant that they had to stand because white passengers had taken 
all the seats; sometimes it even meant that they missed the bus 
31. Lee, The Employment of Negro Troops, 318-379. 
32. Harvard Sitkoff, 'Racial Militancy and Interracial Violence', 
Journal of American History, LVIII, 3,1971. 
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altogether because it was filled entirely with whites. To refuse 
to accept such local laws led at least to jail, often to a beating- 
up, and occasionally to death. 
33 
This was in spite of the 
assurance given by the Assistant Secretary of War, Patterson, 'that 
the War Department can and will maintain the dignity of the uniform 
and the personnel which wears it., 
34 
Given the discrimination and segregation faced by Afro- 
Americans in the forces, it was not surprising that their morale was 
low. Soldiers wrote to the President, and to black organizations 
and newspapers complaining of their treatment. Not only did these 
letters deal with particular acts of discrimination, but also a 
great many discussed the underlying moral contradiction of segregation 
within the army of a democracy. In a letter to the President, 
urging him to live up to the Allies' war aims, a black soldier 
said that, 
35 
the picture in our country is marred by one of the 
strangest paradoxes in our whole fight against world 
fascism. The very instrument which our government 
had organized and built, the United States Armed 
Forces, to fight for world Democracy, is within itself 
undemocratic. The undemocratic policy of jim-crow and 
segregation is practiced by our Armed Forces against 
its Negro members. 
33. Descriptions of the hardships faced by black soldiers are 
provided in: Jean Byers, AStudy of the Negro in Military 
Service, Dept. of Defense, Washington, D. C., 19 7, mimeographed 
copy in Moorland Collection, Howard University, 64-68; Ruth 
Danenhower Wilson, Jim Crow Joins U: A Study of Ne roes in 
the Armed Forces of the United States, New York, 1944; Charles 
E. Silberman, Crisis in Black and White, London 1965,63-65. 
A fictional, but nonetheless typical , incident is described in John Oliver Killens, And Then We Heard the Thunder, New 
York 1971 edition, 122-37- 
3t. Patterson to Walter White, September 18,1941, OASW 221, NARG 107. 
35. Private Charles F. Wilson to F. D. R., May 9,1944, in OASW 230, 
NARG 107. There are literally hundreds of such letters in 
93: 12 and 93: 9, FDRL; in OASW files 221,230, NARG 107: and in the NAACP files, box 279, Library of Congress. Some letters 
are quoted in Lucille B. Milner, 'Jim Crow in the Army, ' New 
Republic, Vol. 110,11, March 13,1944. 
(oil 
There was of course a tendency for Afro-Americans to see everything 
in a racial context and therefore to take offence at what was quite 
often no more than common military practice. To a certain extent 
their civilian life had conditioned them to expect the worst from 
white authority, but segregation encouraged these feelings because 
it prevented blacks from seeing that white soldiers suffered many, 
if not all, of the same hardships. One black soldier complained 
of being treated like a dog, flaying in the hot sun' with water 
'very scarce. '36 What he failed to point out was that he and his 
comrades were in a desert training centre. 
37 
Although it is clear that black soldiers were subject to 
prejudice and discrimination both in and out of the military 
establishment, not all Afro-Americans did object to their treatment 
in the Army. For many black service men life in the Army, even 
with its racial restrictions, was better than life as a civilian. 
The uniform did give a measure of self-respect and an amount of 
authority. More important, black soldiers were taught skills and 
trades, given a certain degree of education, as well as being fed, 
clothed, and payed. For a good number it was 'the first semblance 
of economic security they had ever known., 
38 
A war department survey found that only one-fifth 'of all 
36. Private John S. Banks to NAACP, July 28,1943, forwarded 
to Truman Gibson, OASW 221, NARG 107. 
37. Gibson to Milton Kotwitz, Special Counsel for NAACP, OASW 
221, NARG 107. 
38. Jessie Parkhurst Guzman, Negro Year Book: A Review of Events Affecting Negro Life, 194- , Tus tegee, Alabama, 1947., 151. 
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Negro soldiers' thought the Army unfair, three-fifths had mixed 
attitudes, and the remaining fifth thought it fair. 
39 
The same 
survey reported that not all Afro-Americans in the Army were opposed 
to segregation either. Forty per cent thought separate post- 
exchanges were a good idea, 48 per cent thought them a poor idea, and 
12 per cent were undecided. Thirty-eight per cent of those 
questioned favoured racially separate units, 36 per cent wanted 
integrated ones, and 26 per cent were undecided. 
40 
It is impossible 
to decide how many of these soldiers were given what they thought to 
be 'safe' answers to the authorities but it seem obvious that black 
opinion was divided. Still, one could hardly agree with the view 
held by the majority of white soldiers, that their black comrades 
were satisfied with their lot. 
41 
As commentators at the time pointed out, the attitude 'of 
the Afro-American was an amalgam. On the one hand he responded 
as an American with patriotism and loyalty in the hope that his 
participation would be rewarded; on the other hand, he resented 
his treatment both in and out of the forces and was inclined to feel 
he had nothing to fight for. 
42 
Thus it was that only 66 per cent 
of blacks, compared with 89 per cent of whites, asked in another 
survey, thought that the war was as much their affair as anybody 
39. War Department, Special Service Division, Research Branch, 
What the Soldier Thinks, No. 2, August 19143,111-15, in War 
Department files, NARG 330. 
40. Ibid., 58-59. 
41. Samuel A. Stouffer, et al, The American Soldier,. Princeton, 
1949, Vol. 1,506. Some indication of how black opinion 
varied with the colour of the interviewer is given in the 
preceding chapter. 
42. P. L. Prattis, 'The Morale of the Negro in the Armed Services 
of the United States', Journal of Negro Education, XII, 1, 
1913, and Stouffer, The American Soldier, 507. 
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else's. Twenty-one per cent felt it was not as much their affair, 
and 13 per cent could not decide. 
43 
Of the same group of soldiers, 
given a choice of questions they would ask the President, 50 per 
cent of the blacks asked about discrimination, 23 per cent about 
the progress and duration of the war, and 13 per cent about 
conditions in the Army. 
44 
The main concern appeared to be how 
the war would affect conditions at home vis-a-vis race relations. 
Yet expectations among the Afro-Americans were higher than among their 
white counter-parts. When asked, 'After the war do you think 
that you yourself will have more than you had before the war? I, 43 
per cent of the blacks said more, 38 per cent said they would have 
just the same, and six per cent said less. The corresponding 
figures for whites were, 19 per cent, 55 per cent, and 19 per cent. 
145 
Such attitudes could change after experience of life in the 
Army. One soldier wrote, 
16 
When inducted I honestly believed that as a 
Negroe [sic7, I comprised an important part 
of the nation and it was my patriotic duty to 
avail myself when my country was in peril. 
My attitude now is really changed. I'm 
indifferent to the whole affair. 
143. Stouffer, The American Soldier, 508. 
41. Stouffer, The American Soldier, 5011. 
145. Stouffer, The American Soldier, 5114. 
46. Private Bert B. Barbero to Truman Gibson, February 13, 
1944, OASW 230, NARG 107. For similar expressions see, Howard Long, 'The Negro in the Army of the United States', 
Journal of Negro Education, XII, 1,1913, and Grant Reynolds, 
'What the Negro Thinks of This War', The Crisis,, September 
1911.. 
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Discrimination and prejudice in the Army led not merely to 
disillusionment but also to an aggressive desire to bring about 
change. The NAACP was sent money as well as angry letters, and 
in 1943 received over $5,000 from servicemen. 
47 
By the end of 
the war donations from soldiers amounted to $25,000 and 15,000 had 
joined the organization. 
48 
While many soldiers spoke of 
returning to demand their rights once the war was over, others 
suggested that if they were to fight and to the for democracy they 
would be as well to start in the U. S. A. 
49 
Rather than quietly 
suffer violence and humiliation, they fought back. 
From the start of the war, there were incidents of fighting 
between-black and white soldiers, blacks and civilians, or blacks 
and policemen. A typical incident was that described in the New 
York Times in April 19112, when three soldiers were killed and five 
others wounded, after an argument between black and white soldiers 
over precedence at a telephone booth. 
50 
Although the War Department 
attempted to play them down, such outbreaks were conspicuous in the 
black press. 
51 
The stories of riots, of blacks destroying segregated 
47. The Crisis, February 1944,51. 
48. The Crisis, October 1944,322, and February 1945,53. 
49. George B. Nesbitt, 'The Negro Soldier Speaks', Opportunity, 
XXII, 3, July-September, 194; Milner, 'Jim Crow in the 
Army'; and letters to the Pittsburgh Courier, August 30, 
1941, November 13 and 20,1943, and Ma-y-19-, -1945. 
5C. New York Times, April 3,1942. 
51. Harvard Sitkoff, 'Racial Militancy and Interracial Violence 
, in the Second World War', Journal of American History, 
LVIII, 3, December 1971; Silberman, Crisis in Black and 
White, 63; Pittsburgh Courier, July 26, August 16,1941; 
'The Pattern of Race Riots Involving Negro Soldiers', Race 
Relations: A Monthly Summary of Events and Trends, II71-2 
August-September 1944. 
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facilities or battling with police officers,. increased dramatically 
during 1943" In June, the Chicago Defender reported four killed 
and 16 wounded in five 'Dixie Clashes' and the Pittsburgh Courier 
suggested that riots were 'sweeping the nation. 152 War Department 
officials were aware of the 'general unrest' among Afro-American 
soldiers and of the fact that 'most Negro soldiers have secreted 
a, mnun; tion ., 
53 
Civilian aide, Gibson, reporting on the disaffection. and 
discontent at Forts Huachuca, Bliss, and Clark, found that local 
Jim crow laws were the main bone of contention and that black troops 
resented being denied the rights and privileges given to others in 
military uniform. While he recommended that the segregation of 
officers? messes and base theatres be discontinued, he felt 
that commanders should withhold furlough passes from those men 
who refused to accept local laws and customs. 
5 
The Negro Troop 
Policy Committee, the McCloy Committee, did suggest that the policy 
of segregation could be reviewed and a 'clear cut policy be formulated 
and made known to ßll. 155 
The Army did, finally, recognise the lack of morale amongst 
black soldiers and made some changes. A manual, 'Leadership and 
521 Chicago Defender, June 19,1943; Pittsburgh Courier, June 26, 
1943. Also see Thomas Sancton, 'The Race Riots', New Republic, 
July 5,1943. 
53. Unheaded Memorandum on black attitudes, OASW 230, NAR. G'107. 
54. Gibscai to Assistant Secretary of War, Patterson, August 23, 
1943, OASW 39, NARG 107. 
55. Memo., J. S. Leonard, Negro Troops Policy Committee, to 
Patterson, December 17,1943s OASW 39, NARG 107. 
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the Negro Soldier , produced in 19 t, offered careful guidance to 
the officers of Afro-American troops, as well as a brief history 
of black military participation in past wars. 
56 
Also in 1914, 
following the example of the enterprising commanding officer of 
Camp Lee in Virginia, it became Army policy to arrange bus services 
between camps and neighbouring towns solely for the use of military 
personnel. The services operated on a basis of first come, first 
served, with no segregation. 
57 
The same year, all on-base 
facilities were ordered to be desegregated, and if there was some 
failure on the part of officers to implement the command, the 
order still marked a distinct change in policy. 
58 
The need 'for morale building information on the stake and 
role of the Negro in the war' was also realised, and in 1943 an 
educational programme first suggested by Hastie was implemented to 
alleviate racial tensions. 
59 
Part of it was the film, 'The Negro 
Soldier', which was previewed by an audience of 139 black and 510 
white soldiers in 1944. The film, which stressed black military 
participation in previous wars as well as in World War II, was 
considered to be very good by the majority of both groups. 
60 
Only 
56. Army Forces Manual, MS, 'Leadership and the Negro Soldier?, 
October 19443 War Department, Planning Survey, NARG 330. 
57. Chicago Defender, June 3,1944; Lee, The Employment of Negro 
Troops, 315--3-27. 
58. Chicago Defender, August 12,1944; Pittsburgh Courier, 
September 2,19T4; Lee, The Employment of Negro Troops, 397. 
59. Military Policy Implications of Report by Research Branch, 
Special Service Division, on 'Attitudes of the Negro Soldier' 
July 31,1913, OASW 230, NARG 107. 
60. 'The Negro Soldier', Signal Corps, 1944, National Archives, 
NA IIIOF-51; War Dept., Morale Services Division, Report 
No. B-102, 'Reactions of Negro and White Soldiers to'the 
film, "The Negro Soldier", War Department, NARG 330. 
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three per cent of the black soldiers felt it was untrue, and only 
four per cent of the whites agreed, for reasons which were much the 
same in content, but utterly different in emphasis. The blacks 
(rightly) thought that the film over-glamourized the treatment 
they received in the Army and their role in it - the whites 
thought that fit exaggerated the importance of the Negro soldier, 
showed too close contact between Negroes and whites, and suggested 
too ideal a picture of Negro treatment by the whites. '61 About 
80 per cent of the whole audience, blacks and whites, thought that 
the film ought to be given a wide showing and, following distribution 
in 19li., it was seen in more than 300 theatres in New York alone. 
62 
Following this success, the Army went on to make several more films 
including the more emotive if less exacts 'Teamwork', which was 
based on the black role in the European offensive. 
63 
The extremely popular Afro-American boxer, Joe Louis, was 
also used to boost black morale. After he had entered the Axny 
in 1912, he spent most of his time touring Army bases and camps 
giving talks and performing exhibition bouts. He also took part 
in the War Department film, 'This is the Army'. For his services 
he was made sergeant and awarded the Legion of Merit in 1945.64 
61. Report No. B-102, 'Reactions of Negro and White Soldiers to 
the film, "The Negro Soldier"'. 
62. Ibid. and Florence Murray, The Negro Handbook, 1916-117, New 
" York 1917,265. 
63. 'Teamwork', Signal Corps, 1916, National Archives, NA 
111-OF-14; Byers, A Study of the Negro in Military Service, 
46; and Peter Noble, The Negro in Films, London 1949,10U. 
614. *Joe Jouis, My Life Story, London 1947,145-74; also see Signal Corps film, 'Teamwork', and film of Louis at air base in England, 1944, Sherman Grinberg Library, No. C-5121. 
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His own attitude to discrimination in the forces was summed up 
when he said, 
65 
I knew that the Navy at that time didn't give our 
boys much of a chance. But I didn't hold that 
against than. I just hoped that some day things 
would be better. 
In 1943 the concentration of black troops in service units 
and the reluctance of the War Department to send black soldiers 
overseas created another crisis. While various war zones suffered 
manpower shortages, 125,000 of the 501,000 Afro-Americans in the 
Army were still stationed in the United States. 
66 
This was due in 
part to objections raised by foreign governments who feared that 
Afro-American troops might cause unrest amongst either local black 
populations or, as in the case of Australia, among the local whites. 
67 
An additional reason was that many overseas commanders refused to 
accept black troops on grounds of morale and efficiency. Abandoning 
altogether the attempt to achieve proportional representation of 
blacks in every branch of the service, the Army began to convert black 
combat units to service units (which were more acceptable to 
objectors) for posting abroad. 
Early in 1911, the black 2nd Cavalry Division, which 
included the 9th and 10th Cavalry, regiments created by Congress 
in 1866, was converted into a service unit after having two years 
of combat training. A former officer of the black 369th Infantry, 
65. 
. 
Louis, My Life Story, t5. 
66. Lee, The IInployment of Negro Troops, 450; Dalfiume, 
Desegregation of the U. S. Armed Forces, 92. 
67. Lee, The Deployment of Negro Troops, 128-29; Dalfiume, 
Desegregation of the U. S. Armed Forces, 92. 
76 
Republican Representative Hamilton Fish, wrote to the Secretary of 
War, Stimson, deploring the failure to use black combat soldiers 
68 
and questioning the authority of this particular conversion. In 
a now infamous reply, Stimson said, 
69 
In converting combat units to service units, the 
War Department's selection of units has been 
based solely on the relative abilities, capabilities, 
and status of training of the personnel in the 
units available for conversion. It so happens 
that a relatively large percentage of the 
Negroes inducted in the Army have fallen within 
the lower educational classifications, and many of 
the Negro units have accordingly been unable to 
master the techniques of modem weapons. 
After struggling to achieve a greater degree of participation, 
Afro-Americans now saw their military role being even further 
reduced and, quite naturally, were furious. They fully agreed 
with Truman Gibson's comment, that Stimson's statement was 'one 
of the most stupid' ever to come from the War Department. 
7° 
The 
Pittsburgh Courier described the Secretary of War as 'a stubborn 
man-determined to continue color discrimination and segregation 
in the Army, war or no war, and demanded his resignation. 
71 
The 
68. Fish to Stimson, February 1, and again on March 31,19442 
OASW 190, NARG 107. 
69. Stimson to Fish, February 19,1944, OASW 190, NARG 107. 
He expressed similar views in a letter to William Hastie, 
March 31,1944, same file. 
70. Gibson to Claude Barnett, March 20,1944, OASW 190 NARG 107. 
-In an earlier letter to Patterson, Gibson had remarked on the 
waste of manpower entailed in keeping black troops at home 
and had sarcastically suggested that some of America's 
Allies could use them, OASW 230, NARG 107. 
71. Pittsburgh Courier March 11 and 18,1914. See also 
Baltimore, Uro-American, March 18. 
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reaction of the black people, black newspapers, and of several 
politicians, forced the Army to make concessions and black troops 
of the 92nd and 93rd Infantry were sent into combat, the former in 
Italy, the latter in the Pacific. 
72 
Paul McNutt, the chairman of the War Manpower Commission 
added his voice to the protests over wasted manpower. In a 
letter to the Secretary of War, Stimson, and the Secretary of the 
Navy, Knox, he pointed out that separate calls for black and white 
registrants and the 'Negro quota' had led to only six per cent of 
the armed forces being black. Moreover, married whites were 
73 
being inducted while many single Afro-Americans were passed over. 
He therefore ordered that men be selected for armed service 
'without regard to race or color. ' The Navy and Marine Corps 
complied with the order and increased the number of blacks in 
their ranks. The Array continued to drag its heels and was helped 
by the general shortage of black manpower which arose as a result 
of the high rejection rates among Afro-Americans eligible for the 
draft because of educational deficiencies. In view of McNutt's 
order and the manpower shortages, the Army was forces to abandon 
its rigid literacy standards and to establish Special Training 
Units to give draftees a basic education. As a result, 
'approximately 136,000 Negro soldiers received literacy training 
during World War II. '74 Another reversal in policy was due 
directly to the test of war, which produced manpower shortages 
72. Dalfiume, Desegregation of the U. S. Armed Forces, 96. 
73. McNutt to Stimson and Knox, February 17,1943,93: 5 FDRL. 
71i.. Byers. ,. A Study of the Negro in Military Service, 37. 
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in the European theatre of operations. 
In December 1944, the Germans launched a last desperate 
offensive in the Ardennes and succeeded in pushing a huge 
salient . into the Allied 
lines. In the ensuing battle of the Bulge, 
the 
. 
American Army found itself critically short of infantry 
replacements and as a result white combat units were undermanned. 
In order to fill the gap, General Eisenhower was persuaded to accept 
volunteers from black service regiments by the Commander of the 
Communications Zone, General John Lee. In his original appeal to 
the black soldiers, Lee proposed complete integration but this 
was altered in order not to contradict War Department policy. 
Instead., black platoons of 40 men were assigned to white companies 
of 200. The main elements of Lee's original call for volunteers 
75 
were retained and some of them were quite remarkable. Non- 
commissioned officers were given the opportunity to accept a 
reduction in rank in order to enjoy 'the privilege of joining our 
veteran-units at the front.? Lee also promised that volunteers 
would be able 'to share the glory of victory' and pointed out that 
76 
this had been one of the black demands throughout the war. 
This document and the response it received from Afro-Americans 
clearly revealed the importance attached to military participation. 
Over. 5,000 blacks, many of them former N. C. O. s, volunteered and the 
Army finally had to set a limit of 2,500. After six weeks of 
intensive training, 37 platoons were attached to white units where 
75. ' Moskos, The American Enlisted Man, 110-111; Lee, The 
Employment of Negro Troops, 669-695. 
76. The full text of the appeal is quoted in Lee, The 
Employment of Negro Troops, 689. 
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they fought throughout 19415 Sadly, these platoons were either 
returned to their former duties or discharged frcaa the Army once 
the war in grope was won. However, their performance and the 
success of the experiment could not be ignored. Not only had 
Afro-Americans proved to be capable soldiers, they had also been 
accepted by their white colleagues. 
77 
The Army's contention, that integration would be detrimental 
to morale, had been supported by various surveys of white opinion 
in the forces. Although some men, like Sergeant Alton Levy, 
might be in favour of integration and object to the Army's 
disciminatory treatment of blacks, they were in the minority. 
78 
A survey of the attitudes of 2,360 men to sharing facilities with 
black troops, taken in 1912, found that the majority favoured 
segregation. 
79 
This was further borne out by polls on the attitudes 
of whites toward the use of Afro-Americans in the Air Force. While 
65 per cent of those questioned were agreeable to the placing of 
blacks in the Air Force, (26 per cent were indifferent, nine per 
cent were opposed to it), all but a few wanted separate facilities 
to be provided. Nor was this prejudice purely sectional: 75 per 
cent of. Northerners and 86 per cent of Southerners wanted segregation 
77. Byers, A Study of the Negro in Military Service, 167-79; 
Lee, The Employment of Negro Troops, 696-702; Arnold Rose, 
'Army Policies Toward Negro Soldiers: A Report on a' 
. 
Success and a Failure', Journal of Social Issues, 111,1,1947 
'8. For his troubles, Levy was courtmartialled, reduced to the 
rank of private, and given four months hard labour; see 
The Nation, September 18 and November 6,1943, and Pittsburgh 
Courier, September 18 and November 20,1943. 
79. War Department, Special Service Division, Research Branch, 
Report 18, 'Attitudes of White Enlisted Men Toward Sharing 
Facilities With Negro Troops', July 30,191L2, War Department, 
Planning Survey 1.7, NARG 330. 
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of the races. 
80 
Iater opinion polls found little change. While 
about two out of five white enlisted men viewed plans for the 
greater-use of black troops favourably, four out of five were 
opposed to the idea of having blacks and whites in the same unit 
even if they did not eat in the same mess or sleep in the same 
barracks. 
81 
The survey of the units to which black platoons were attached, 
although only of the attitudes of white officers and N. C. O. s, 
indicated that experience of integration in wartime could bring 
radical changes in men's feelings. 
82 
over 60 per cent of the 250 
men questioned had viewed integration unfavourably prior to the 
event. After serving with the black soldiers over 70 per cent 
had changed their minds and now favoured the experiment. More 
than 80 per cent thought the black men had performed very well 
in combat, 17 per cent said fairly well, and only one per cent said 
not so well. Equally important was the opinion of the 73 per 
cent of the officers and 60 per cent of the N. C. O. s that the 
black and white soldiers had got along together very well. Seven 
8G. War Department, Special Service Division, Research Branch, 
Report 43, 'Attitudes of Enlisted Men toward Negroes for Air 
Force Duty', November 30,1912, and Report 46, 'What the 
Soldier Thinks', 1913, p. 30, both in War Department 47, 
NARG 330. 
81. War Dept.,. Troop Information and Education Division, Troop 
Attitudes Research Branch, Special memo 21-309C, July 1)4, 
1917, 'Attitudes of Officers and Enlisted Men Toward 
Certain Minority Groups'; Dept. of Army, Office of Chief 
of Staff., Attitude Research Branch, Special memo. 140-309C, April 
1)4,1919, 'Supplementary Report on Attitudes of White 
Enlisted Men Toward Serving with Negro Enlisted Men', both 
in War Dept. 47, NARG 330. 
82.. All the information which follows is from War Dept., Troop 
Information and Education Division, Report B-157, July 3, 
1915, 'Opinions About Negro Infantry Platoons in White 
Companies of 7 Divisions', War Dept. 47, NARG 330. 
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fairly well. (The lesser degree of enthusiasm among N. C. O. s 
was presumably due to their closer contact with the enlisted men. ) 
The survey, also found that those in closest contact with the black 
platoons, serving in the same company or regiment, viewed the 
experiment much more favourable than those with no contact at all. 
While it is impossible to say how permanent such changes 
of attitude were or how the experience had effected soldiers' views 
on race relations in general, the polls of opinion in the mixed 
companies seemed to show that white soldiers found integration 
less objectionable than they might previously have imagined. 
This was undoubtedly due to the fact that the Afro-Americans were 
sharing with them all the hazards of combat: misery likes company. 
Certainly it was not as easy for the Army to maintain segregation 
on grounds of morale or efficiency after the Battle of the Bulge. 
Surprisingly, in view of its policies at the beginning of 
the war, the Navy provided another case in favour of integration. 
Although the Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox, had accepted a 
wider use of black personnel in 1912, he did so reluctantly and 
he remained a firm advocate of segregation. 
83 
However, there 
were individuals within the Navy Department who were committed to 
full and equal utilization of black manpower. The only way this 
could be achieved within a segregated naval force was to crew 
entirely with blacks. In 1944 Navy Department officials 
pe: faded Knox to accept just this and two ships, the U. S. S. 
Mason and the submarine chaser PC 1261, were manned with all-black 
83. Dalfiume, Desegregation of the U. S. Aimed Forces, 53-55. 
82 
complements. 
84 
This policy was carried further when Knox-died in 
19)44 and was replaced by the more liberal James Forrestal. 
Forrestal immediately accepted the programme for integrating the 
crews of 25 auxiliary vessels and later, the integration of the 
whole. auxiliary fleet. 
85 
In 1945 he appointed Lester B. Granger, 
the had of the National Urban League, as adviser on policies 
regarding the use of black sailors. Granger found that his 
opinions were. not only listened to, but acted upon, and in 1947 
all restrictions on naval assignments for Afro-Americans were 
lifted on all ships. The policy of total integration was 
86 
confirmed in 1949. 
While the Navy had the most progressive policy at the end 
of the war, the Air Force began to move along similar lines as soon 
as it became an independent service in September 1947. The new 
Secretary of the Air Force, Stuart Symington, was aware of the waste 
of man-power resulting from segregation and supported employment 
by merit alone. He authorized members of his staff to draw up 
plans for integration which were finalised in 1949.87. 
The Army alone clung to its wartime policies. On October it, 
81j. Nichols, Breakthrough on the Color Front, 54-58; Franklin, 
From Slavery to Freedom Red c,, 566; 'The Negro in the 
U. S. Navy during World War II'. 
85. Nichols, Breakthrough on the Color Front, 58-59; Dalfiume, 
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1945, a board of officers chaired by General Alvan C. Gillem, was 
directed to prepare a broad policy statement on the use of black 
troops. In its report presented in 1946, the Gillem Board 
recognized 'that there is a limit to the amount of manpower 
available inthe nation to form a modern military organization 
capable of prosecuting a major war' and recommended 'that every 
effort be expended to utilize efficiently every qualified available 
individual in a position in the military structire for which he is 
best suited. '88 The report, somewhat optimistically, went onto 
say that the Afro-American was 'a bona fide citizen enjoying the 
privileges conferred by citizenship under the Constitution': as 
such he was obliged to defend his country in time of peril. 
After spelling out the links between citizenship and armed 
service-and acknowledging the Afro-American's equality, the Gillem 
Board did not suggest the end of segregation, at least not in so 
many words. It did, however, rescind the 1910 statement of policy, 
call for greater numbers of black officers and N. C. Os, maintain the 
policy of integrated recreational facilities, and suggested that the 
use of black platoons with larger white units be continued. The 
Board still insisted on a ten per cent quota of blacks in the Army 
although. that had already proved to be an obstacle in the way. of 
full utilization of black manpower. 
The report received a mixed reception from Afro-Americans. 
-e felt that the Army was at least moving in the right direction, 
of'- -"s that the new policies were little more than diluted jim 
88. The full text of the Report, War Department circular No. 121, 
April 27,1916, was quoted by the Chicago Defender, March 9, 
1946. It is summarized in Paul C. Davis, 'The Negro in the 
Armed Forces' , Virginia Quarterly Review, XiIV, 4,1948. 
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However, they all agreed with President Truman's Committee 
on Civil Rights, established in 1946, which said that, 'prejudice 
in any area is an ugly, undemocratic phenomena; in the armed 
services, where all men run the risk of death, it is particularly 
repugnant., 
90 
Truman incorporated the Committee's attack on 
discrimination in the forces in his Civil Rights Message on 
February 2,1918, but faced with an unresponsive Congress and the 
threat of a militant civil disobedience campaign, he was forced to 
take further action. 
9 1 
The civil disobedience campaign was led by the black trade 
unionist, A. Philip Randolph, and a black former army chaplain, 
Grant - Reynolds . Both had fought for the end of segregation in 
the forces during the war, but their appeal to young Afro-Americans 
to resist the draft was much more radical than anything they had 
darre previously. 
92 
Although they were described as extremists and 
were advised that Afro-Americans who refused to serve in the Amy 
sacrificed their right Ito demand the abolition of the evils that 
keep him a second-class citizen', their appeal had some success. 
93 
An NAACP poll among black students found that 71 per cent supported 
89. Baltimore Afro-American, March 9,1946 and Chicago Defender, 
March 23,1976. 
90. President's Committee on Civil Rights, To Secure These 
Rights, Washington, D. C., 1947) 41. 
91. Civil Rights Message, 80th Congress, 2nd Session, House 
Document 516. 
92. 'See previous chapter. 
93. Pittsburgh Courier, April 10,1948; The Crisis, May 1948. 
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the campaign. 
94 
At an angry meeting with Truman in March, Randolph 
told the President that throughout the country he had met blacks 
'not wanting to shoulder a gun to fight for democracy abroad 
unless democracy was obtained at home. 195 
Randolph re-iterated his position clearly and forcefully 
before the Senate Armed Service Committee later the same month. 
When'warned at those hearings that his actions could lead to a 
charge of treason, Randolph replied that he was prepared to accept 
that. He also expected 'country-wide terrorism against Negroes 
who refused to participate in the armed forces' but he felt both 
Mare. the price one had to pay for democracy. 
96 
Although the NAACP 
opposed the civil disobedience campaign, Walter White re-affirmed 
the Association's opposition to discrimination and segregation in 
the forces in a telegram to the Senate Committee. 
97 
Other black 
leaders, including Lester B. Granger, warned that they would no 
longer advise the government on troop policies so long as 
segregation continued. 
98 
This mounting pressure prior to the 1918 presidential 
election persuaded Truman to issue an Executive Order, the third 
relating to civil rights in seven years, which declared that 'there 
shall be equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in 
9).. Murray, The Negro Handbook, 1946-47,206. 
95. New York Times, March 23,19118. 
96.80th Congress, 2nd Session, Senate, Congressional Record, 
Vol. 91., 66,4416-4422; New York Times, April 1,1945; 
Pittsburgh Courier, April 10,1946. 
97. Congressional Record, Vol. 94,66,4421; New York Times, 
August 5,194b. 
98. New York Times, April 27,1918. 
86 
the armed services without regard to race, color, religion, or 
99 
national origin. ' The Order authorized a Committee on Equality 
of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services, (the Fahy 
Committee), to see that this policy was implemented. The civil 
disobedience campaign was then called off. 
100 
The Executive Order has been described as 'an excellent 
political move by Truman to gain Negro votes on Election Day' 
which did not promise integration but an ill-defined generality. 
101 
However, it is clear from the statements made by Truman prior to 
July 26, and from his instructions to the Fatly Committee, that 
he saw no difference between discrimination and segregation and 
intended to end both. 
102 
Moreover, any political gains he made 
amongst Afro-Americans were more than off-set by losses amongst 
Southern Democrats. This latter point became quite evident later 
in the year when the 'Dixiecrats' broke away from the main Democratic 
Party. The States' Rights Party they formed stood for 'the 
segregation of the races and the racial integrity of each 
99. Executive Order 9981, July 26,1948. The full text is 
quoted in the President's Committee on Equality of Treatment 
and Opportunity in the Armed Services, Freedom to Serve, 
Washington, D. C., 1950. 
100. New York Times, July 27,1948; Pittsburgh Courier, August 28, 
19L. 5; The Crisis, September 1948. 
101. Stillman, Integration of the Negro in the U. S. Armed Forces, 
43. 
102. New York Times, May 27,1918; Freedom to Serve; Dalfiume, 
'The Fahy Committee and Desegregation of the Armed Forces 's 
The Historian, XXXI, 1, November 1968; and Monroe Billington, 
'Freedom o Serve: The President's Committee on Equality 
of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Forces, 1949-1950', 
Journal of Negro History, LI, 4, October 1966. 
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race. 
03 
Truman was, of course, re-elected in 1948, bat only 
just. 
Rather than a piece of political opportunism, Truman's 
Executive Order was the culmination of the process which had begun 
in 1910. The second World War had tested American military instit- 
utions and had found them lacking.. Not only had segregation in 
the-forces hampered the full utilization of all available manpower, 
together with open prejudice it had also threatened the morale of 
that ten per cent of the population which was black and had tarnished 
America's democratic pretensions. Changes in policy and practice 
had been brought about as a result of wartime experiences and the 
move towards integration had begun. The Navy and the Air Force 
had both accepted integration in the immediate post-war years, the 
Executive Order made sure that their plans were carried out. 
Although the Axny continued to be reluctant, the presidential 
directive and the Fahy Committee forced it to accept change. Even 
so the final impetus was again supplied by war in 1950 when America 
entered the Korean struggle. 
103. States, Rights Party Platform, quoted in Kirk H. Porter and 
Donald Bruce Johnson, National Party Platforms, London 1966, 468. 
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Chapter t. 
The Impact of World War II on the Economic Situation of the Afro-American 
'The war years, ' wrote Robert C. Weaver in 1946, 'have been 
unique in the Negro's economic history. '1 During that period a 
number of forces combined to bring about greater industrial and 
occupational opportunities than Afro-Americans had previously 
experienced. Black protest and the necessities of war forced 
the federal government to order the full utilization of all 
available manpower and an end to discrimination in employment. 
While such action brought about some economic gains for blacks, 
the greatest force for change was the general expansion of industry 
and the shortage of labour which arose as more men and women 
entered the armed forces. These manpower shortages gradually 
forced white employers and workers to forget their prejudices, 
if only'temporarily, and to accept black employees. By the end 
of the war the quantity and quality of jobs open to Afro-Americans 
had increased dramatically. However, the war emergency did not 
root out all discrimination and there was every indication that the 
blacks would lose the gains they had made once the war had ended. 
When America began to prepare for war in 1940, the situation 
for Afro-Americans in industry, as in the armed services, was 
far from promising. Because of their second-class status in 
society, which meant that they were last hired and first fired, 
1. Negro Labor: A National Problem, New York 19L6,236. 
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black Americans had been hit particularly hard by the Depression. 
This was especially true in the industrial North where many Afro- 
Americans were comparative newcomers. In 1937 the percentage of 
blacks in the North who were unemployed was 38.9 while for whites 
the figure was 18.1. In the South, where the majority of 
blacks still worked on farms, the percentages were 18 and 16 
respectively. 
2 
Even in the South, however, the situation of 
Afro-Americans could be apalling. In Norfolk, Virginia, in 1935, 
80 per cent of the black work force were on relief and in Atlanta, 
Georgia, 65 per cent were in the same position. 
3 
Roosevelt's New Deal, by virtue of its general libertarian 
and humanitarian policies, did help many people irrespective of 
colour. Yet, as Leslie H. Fishel, Jr., pointed out, 'Roosevelt's 
actual commitments to the American Negro were slim., ' Conscious 
of his need of Southern Democratic support, F. D. R. left the plight 
of the Afro-American to the crusading zeal of his wife, Eleanor, 
and to the heads of various government agencies. Men like Harold 
Ickes, the Secretary of the Interior, Will Alexander, head of the 
Farm Security Administration, and Harry Hopkins, of the Works 
2. E. Franklin Frazier, The Negro in the United States, New 
York 1969 edition, 597, and Bic Sterner, The Negro's 
Share: A Study of Income, Consum tion, Housing and Public 
Assistance, New York 1943,39-45.3. 
Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom, t96, and 1 rrdal, An 
American Dilemma., 300. 
It. Fishel, 'The Negro in the New Deal Era', in Bernard Sternshe: p 
ed., The Negro in Depression and War: Prelude to Revolution, 
1930-1945, Chicago 1969,8. 
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Progress Administration, were able to lay special emphasis within 
their own departments on the needs of the Afro-American. They 
also persuaded the President to break with tradition and to 
appoint-a number of black advisers, the 'Black Cabinet'. 
5 
The 
participation in government of Robert C. Weaver, William H. Hastie, 
Mary McCleod Bethune, and many others guaranteed that blacks were 
considered in at least. some of the government policies. It was 
one thing to formulate policies at the federal level but quite 
another to'implement them in local areas where even those agencies 
headed by men sympathetic to Afro-Americans were administered in 
accordance with regiona. 1 racial practices. 
The National Recovery Administration had no sympathetic 
person at its lead nor any adviser on black affairs. Thus it laid 
down no minimum wage codes . 
for domestic workers, an occupational 
area dominated by Afro-Ainericäns. Some officials of the agency 
even applied a dual industrial wage code with one minimum for 
whites and another, lower one, for blacks. In any event, many 
employers discovered that 'the codes could be evaded and ignored 
with impunity., 
6 
The. Agricultural Adjustment Administration also 
ran foul of local racial prejudices, and black farmers, particularly 
in the South, did not receive their fair share of the AAA benefits. 
In the 1930s approximately 192,000 black farmers were 'displaced' 
5. Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom, 530-34; Allan Morrison, 
'The Secret Papers of FDR', in Sternsher, The Negro in 
Depression and War, 66-77; and Samuel Krislov, The Negro in Federal Em loyment: The Quest for Equal opportunity, 
Minneapolis, Minnesota, 19 7,23-24. 
6. Raymond Wolters, Negroes and the Great Depression: The 
Problems of Economic Recovery, Westport, Connecticut, 1970, 
213. 
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but the Farm Security Administration only resettled 1,100.7 Even 
agencies such as the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Civilian 
Conservation Corps, and the National Youth Administration, which 
operated. with a minimum of discrimination, normally conformed to 
local-customs. 8 
If the New Deal had been free of prejudice and discrimination 
it is still unlikely that it could have helped all Afro-Americans, 
for it. had not fully succeeded in easing the plight of whites. 
In January 19140 there were still seven million white, and one million 
black Americans unemployed. 
9 
The large pool of white labour 
meant that in the early mobilization for war, black job applicants 
could be, and were, overlooked. When. manpower shortages did 
arise in areas of concentrated black population, some employers 
still refused to employ them and instead imported white workers 
from other-localities. Because of this, from April to October 1940, 
the rate of unemployment amongst whites dropped from 17.7 to 13.0 
per cent while among blacks it remained static at 22 per cent. 
10 
The proportion of blacks in the ranks of the unemployed rose as 
whites found new work: in Philadelphia in April 191 0,24.8per 
7. Wolters, Negroes and the Great Depression, 78-79. 
8. Franklin,, -From Slavery to Freedom, 
531-39; John A. Salmond, 
'The Civilian Conservation Corps and the Negro', in Sternsher, 
The Negro in Depression and War, 78-93. 
9. Bureau of Employment Security, Social Security Board, 
Employment Security Review, IX, 7, July 1942,4; Florence 
Murray,, The Negro Handbook, 1942, New York 1942,147; 
Lingeman, Don't You Know There's a War On?, 141-42. 
10. Frazier, The Negro in the United States, 606; Social 
Security Agency, Negro Workers and the National Defense 
Program, Washington, D. C., September 1941; President's 
Committee on Fair Employment Practice, Minorities in Defense, 
Washington, D. C., 1941. 
i 
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cent of the total enumployed were black; by April the next year 
this had risen to 29.8 per cent. 
Far from discouraging such trends, the United States 
Employment Service actually encouraged them. Like many other 
government bodies, although it did have a Negro Placement Service 
Unit, the Employment Service had no clear-cut policy with regard to 
blacks. As a result regional offices largely followed local 
racial patterns. Not only did they accept requests from employers 
which specified 'whites only, but often they also classified 
black workers in 'traditional' occupations regardless of the- 
individual's skills or training. 
12 
A young black man, qualified 
as a mechanic, told his wife that there was no point in registering 
for work because they don't hire colored people in factories for 
National Defense. '13 As well as discrimination in the Employment 
Service, discrimination in defence training also helped to reduce 
the opportunities for employment open to blacks. In the 18 
states with separate school systems where blacks made up 22.3 
per cent of the population, only 6.6 per cent of the $6,591, Thl 
allotted for defence training was used in equipping black schools 
and. as late as 1942 only four per cent of those who benefited 
11. Negro Workers and the National Defense Program, 14. 
12. 'Eliminating Employer Discriminatory Hiring Practices', 
Chapter I% of the unpublished and incomplete History of the 
Mobilization of Labor for War Production, prepared by 
William J. Schuck, 19463 Manuscript in War Manpower Commission, 
National Archives Record Group 211,16-20,25-26. 
13. Letter to Eric Seberite, April 1,1941, with regard to his 
radio programmes on labour problems in the national emergency from wife of the man in question, War Manpower Commission, 
NARG 211. 
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from the training programme were black. 
14 
Those jobs which Afro- 
Americans were lucky enough to get were, therefore, largely of the 
unskilled, hot, and heavy variety. From October 1940 to March 1941 
the greatest numbers of Afro-Americans placed in jobs by the 
Deployment Service were in chemical industries, ship-building, and 
iron-and steel works. The smallest number, a mere 68, were found 
work in the aircraft industry. 
15 
The aircraft companies provided a good example of the 
obstacles faced by Afro-Americans at the beginning of the war. 
The industry was a comparatively new one which had not used 
blacks in any great numbers prior to 1940. The work was of the 
type not generally given to Afro-Americans, being clean and light, 
and requiring skilled or semi-skilled labour. The policies of 
the aircraft corporations also limited the possibilities of 
employment for blacks. They were summed up by the head of 
industrial relations of the Vultee Aircraft company when, in 
response to a query from the National Negro Congress, he said, 
16 
I regret to say that it is not the policy of this 
company to employ people other than of the Caucasian 
race. Consequently, we are not in a position to offer 
your people employment at this time. 
14 Memo., John W. Studebaker, Commissioner of Office of 
Education, to Paul V. McNutt, Chairman, War Manpower Commission, 
September 1942, and copy of Fair Employment Practices Committee 
hearings on discrimination in defense training, April 13, 
1942, both in Office of Education, file 40, NARG 12. 
15. Murray, Negro Handbook, 1942,88. 
16. W. Gerard Tuttle to National Negro Congress, August 2,1940, 
in Special Committee of the Senate to Investigate the National 
Defense Program, 876, NARG 46. See too letter from Robert 
C. Weaver to Harry S. Truman, chairman of the Senate 
Committee, June 23,1941, same file, in which he singles. out 
the aircraft industry for discrimination and names Vultee, 
Consolidated Aircraft, Glenn Martin, Boeing, and Douglass. 
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Because of such attitudes, there were only 210 Afro-Americans in 
the entire aircraft industry in 1910 and the Fair Deployment 
Practices Committee found, at its hearings in Los Angeles in 1941, 
that of the 6,000 people employed in California by Vultee Aircraft 
none were black and that, of Douglass Aircraft's 33,000 employees.. 
only ten were Afro-Americans. 
17 
That such discrimination was cannon throughout all industry 
was illustrated by the response to a query sent out to 'hundreds of 
industrialists with large war contracts' by the U. S. Employment 
Service in January 1942. When asked whether they would employ 
Afro-Americans, 51 per cent said they did not and would not and 
only half of the remainder said, without reservation, that they 
would employ them. 
18 
Equally indicative of the discrimination 
faced by blacks was the fact that from September 19110 to September 
1911 blacks comprised only 1.6 per cent of the total of men 
deferred-from armed service because they were 'engaged in 
occupations necessary to the national health, safety, and interest. '19 
The proportion among those deferred because they were engaged in 
national defence work was even smaller - 0.65 per cent. 
Afro-Americans immediately began to fight for entry into 
the war industries. 'The struggle of the Negro for equitable 
17. -FEPC Hearings, Los Angeles, October 20-21,1941, FEPC 408, 
NARG 228; Weaver, Negro Labor, 109-118; Council for 
Democracy, The Negro and Defense: A Test of Democracy, 
New York 19 1,7-10. 
18. Quoted in Earl Brown and George R. Leighton, The Negro 
and the War, Public Affairs Committee, Pamphlet 71 New 
York 192,9, and President's Committee on Fair Employment 
-Practice, First Report, July 1943 - December 1911, Washington, 
D. C., 19457,797 7. 
19. Selective Service System, Selective 
First Report of the Director o Se 
Washington, D. C., 1942,258. 
etive 
in Peace Time: 
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and decent treatment in the national defense program, ' was seen 
20 
as 'another aspect of the race's continuing battle for full manhood. 1 
The NAACP and the National Urban League strove for equality of 
opportunity in both the armed forces and in industry. They were 
joined by organizations such as the Committee on Negro Americans 
in Defense Industries and the Allied Councils for Defense which 
concentrated on discrimination in employment. The Committee for 
the Participation of Negroes in National Defense, led by Rayford 
Logani aimed to 'serve as a medium for co-ordinating the efforts 
21 
of all Negroes and all Negro organizations for national defense. ' 
To that. end it held conferences and meetings, organized local 
branches, and lobbied government departments. It mobilized 
support for a Senate resolution, S. R. 75, introduced by Senator 
Wagner, which would have authorized a Senate committee 'to make a 
full and complete investigation into the participation of Negro 
citizens in all industrial and other phases of the national-defense 
program. '22 Such a committee would have been empowered to recommend 
legislation and other governmental action in order to end discrimination. 
However, a committee to deal specifically with discrimination was 
thought unnecessary by government officials because of the existence 
of the Special Committee of the Senate to Investigate the National 
Defense Program. The problem of racial discrimination was referred 
to that body although its chairman, Harry S. Truman, frankly 
admitted that the committee was overloaded with work and would not 
20. 'For Manhood in National Defense', The Crisis, December 1940. 
21. Appeal in the Pittsburgh Courier, December 14,1940. 
22. S. R. 75, February 13,1911, in Special Senate Committee to 
Investigate the National Defense Program, 1941-t. 8, file 
. 
875., NARG 46. 
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be able to hear witnesses for sane time. 
23 
Nevertheless, the Truman Committee did manage to hold a 
Preliminary Conference on Racial Discrimination on June 25,1941, 
which was attended by several blacks including Mary McCleod 
Bethune, Colonel Campbell C. Johnson, John P. Davis, of the 
National Negro Congress, and'Rayford Logan. 
2 In an angry speech 
Logän. attacked the government for its lack of action and accused 
it of giving Afro-Americans the 'run-around'. On the very same 
day as the conference, President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 
8802'which authorized a Fair Dnployment Practices Committee to see 
that discrimination in defence industries was ended. His order, 
which virtually duplicated Senate Resolution 75, was not so much 
the result of conferences but more of a threat of dramatic 
protest-by A. Philip Randolph. 
Randolph is one of the most interesting and yet most 
i ored f ures of contemporary Afro-American history. Born 
in Florida in 1889 and still alive and active today, he was a 
central figure during World War II when he developed the strategy 
of mass protest which has since become commonplace in the civil 
rights movement. As a young man, he and his co-editor of. The 
23.. Memo. April 30,1941 and July 2,1941, Special Senate 
-Connittee, 875. Also letter Walter White to Senator Thomas, April 29,1941, file 876, and White, A Man Called White, 189. 
24. -Preliminary Conference on Racial Discrimination, June 25, 19141, Special Committee of the Senate, 875, NARG 1.6. 
25. Unfortunately there is as yet no biography or autobiography 
of Randolph. My brief sketch of his career is based on 
articles in Ebony, Vol 13, November 1958, The United Teacher, 
May fit, 1969, encdGlass Horizons, June 1960, as we as 
material supplied by the A. lip Randolph Institute, New 
York. 
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Messenger, Chandler Owen, became known for their socialism and for 
their opposition to participation in World War I. Randolph's 
anti-war speeches led to a brief stay in jail in 1918, and his 
writings earned The Messenger the title of 'the most able and the 
most dangerous of all Negro publications. '26 During the inter-war 
years Randolph devoted himself to trade union organization and 
gained prominence as the leader of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car 
Porters formed in 1925. Not only did he secure recognition of the 
union from the railroads, but in 1936 he also took it into the 
American Federation of Labor as an international union. 
27 
From 
then on he and Milton Webster, the vice-president of the Brotherhood, 
consistently attended the AF of Lis annual conventions where they 
attacked discrimination in both the unions and all other spheres 
of life. Because of his position in the labour movement, he was 
elected', president of the National Negro Congress, an organization 
which hoped to build a black mass movement by working with and 
through trade unions. After four years, Randolph left the Congress 
in 1940 because it had become dominated by the communists, with 
whom he had been feuding since the 1920s. 
28 The following year he 
achieved its aim of a black mass movement in the March on Washington 
26. A. Mitchell Palmer, Attorney General, Radicalism and 
-Sedition among Negroes as Reflected in Their Publications, 
Exhibit 10, Senate Documents, Vol. 12,66th. Congress, 1st 
Session, 1919, Washington, D. C., 1919,172. 
27. Brailsford R. Brazeal, The Brotherhood of Slee ing Car 
Porters: Its Origins and Development, New York an London, 
28. Black Worker, the official organ of the BSCP, May 19)0, 
and Brazea', The Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, 132. 
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Movement which resulted in Executive Order 8802.29 
In January 1911, Randolph called on his fellow Afro- 
Americans to register their 'uncompromising demand for the right 
of Negro People to get their just share of work on all national 
defense work and also to be properly and equitably integrated into 
the armed forces of our country. ' 
30 
Later that month, in an 
article headed 'Defense Rotten', he suggested that 10,000 Afro- 
Americans march on Washington to 'DEMAND THE RIGHT TO WORK AND 
FIGHT FOR OUR COUNTRY. '31 At first there was little favourable 
reaction from other black leaders until it became clear that only 
such. a protest would produce results from the government. In 
March 1941, a conference on Negro Participation in National 
Defense was held in Washington and Walter White wrote to the President 
that 'it was the unanimous opinion of those present' that nothing 
short of presidential action would meet the situation. 
32 
In 
response to his request for a meeting to discuss the subject of 
disci mination, however, white was told by F. D. R. 's secretary that 
the president was too busy and that he should consult Sidney Hillman 
of the Office of Production Management. 
33 Faced with this type of 
rebuff, White, like Logan, felt that blacks were getting the run- 
around and in despair he, Logan, Lester B. Granger, of the Urban 
29. The history of the March on Washington Movement is detailed 
in Herbert Garfinkel, When Negroes March: The March on 
Washington Movement in the Organizational Politics for FFPC, 
Glencoe, Illinois, 19592 reprinted with a preface by Lewis 
M. Killian, New York 1969. Although a good account of the 
MOWM, Garfinkel's work lacks the insights provided by 
government records. 
30. Black Worker, January 1911.. 
31. Pittsburgh Courier, January 25,1941- 
32. White to F. D. R., March 31,19412 93: t, FDRL; and Pittsburgh 
Courier, March 22,1911. 
33. Edwin M. Watson to White, April 8,1941.93: 1 FDRL. A six- 
point programme was submitted to the OPM, Pittsburgh Courier, 
April 12,1941. 
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1 
League, and others, joined Randolph in a national March on Washington 
Movement Committee which called on 10,000 Afro-Americans to 
34 
demonstrate in the capital on July 1st. 
Sidney Hillman did act on receiving the complaints from 
Afro-Americans. On April 11,1911 at the instruction of the 
Office of Production Management, he sent a letter to all holders 
of defence contracts asking for the removal of all bans on the 
employment of 'qualified and competent Negro workers' and pointed 
out that 'every available source of labor capable of producing 
defense material must be tapped in the present emergency., 
35 
At the same time he created the Negro IInployment and Training 
Branch and the Minority Groups Branch in the labor Division of 
the Office of Production Management and, named Robert C. Weaver and 
Will Alexander as their respective heads. 
36 
This did not appease 
the black leaders who insisted on a meeting with Roosevelt and on 
much stronger action. The aim of those in the MOWM was quite 
simply to force the President to issue an executive order abolishing 
discrimination in government, in industry, and in the armed forces, 
by exerting mass pressure. Similar demonstrations had been 
staged before. In World War Ia parade had been led by the NAACP 
3L. 'Call to Negro America', Black Worker, May 1911; Courier, 
May 17,19)4. White exp ained his support in a letter to 
John Temple Graves, quoted by Graves in 'The Southern 
Negro and the War Crisis', Virginia Quarterly Review, XVIII, 
4,1942. 
35. Hillman to all holders of defense contracts, April 11,19)4, 
quoted in FEPC, Minorities in Defense, 11. A similar 
statement was sent to the Office of Education, April 26, 
1914, ordering the end of discrimination in defense training 
programmes, Office of Education, h0, -NARG 12. 
36. Schuck, 'Eliminating Employer Discriminatory. Hiring Practices', 
History of the Mobilization of Labor for War Production, 
War Manpower Commission, NARG 211 4-6. 
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to protest against race riots and discrimination, and in the 
1930s the 'Jobs-for-Negroes' movement had campaigned for the 
37 
employment of blacks in ghetto shops and stores. What was 
unusual about the MOWM was the exclusion of white participants and 
its proposed scale. Randolph made a point of asking sympathetic 
whites not to take part: 
38 
We call not upon our white friends to march with 
us. There are some things Negroes must do 
alone. This is air fight and we must see it 
through. 
He later pointed out, quite rightly, that an all-black movement 
would 'create faith by Negroes in Negroes t, but an additional 
reason was that the exclusion of whites would prevent the 
infiltration of communists. While black communists were not 
barred, the MOWM would have nothing to do with the Party because 
'its policy was rule or ruin. ' 
39 
White this racially exclusive tactic may have cost the 
whole-hearted support of the interracial NAACP and Urban League, 
it did not detract from its mass appeal. 
40 
By the end of May 
the number of marchers called for had risen to 50,000 and Randolph, 
37. Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom, t75,539. 
38. Black Worker, March 19! 1. 
39. Proceedings of MOWM Conference, Detroit, September 26-27, 
1942, in Schomburg Collection, and Charles Radford Lawrence, 
'Negro Organizations in Crisis: Depression, New Deal, 
World War II', unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Columbia 
. University, 
1952,300. 
40. As Garfinkel points out, there was no mention of the MOW 
in either Crisis or Opportunity from January to July, 1941 
even thoug local branches were active in the Movement's 
organization, When Negroes March, 39-h0. 
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as national director, warned President Roosevelt that between .. 
ten and fifty thousand were likely to take part . 
41 
Walter White 
wrote that the proposal to march on Washington 'had fired the 
imagination of the disheartened Negroes throughout the nation', - 
and Randolph was even more enthusiastic. In a letter to Eleanor 
Roosevelt asking her to address the marchers on July 1st, he 
said, 
42 
nothing has arisen in the life of the Negro since 
Emancipation which has gripped their hearts and 
caught their imagination more than the girding of 
our country for national defense without according 
them the recognition and opportunity as citizens, 
consumers, and workers they feel justified in 
expecting. 
The initial reaction of the government was to attempt to 
have the March called off. Roosevelt said that he could 
'imagine nothing that will stir up race hatred and slow up progress 
more than a march of that kid. ' 
43 
At the suggestion of one of 
his secretaries, Stephen Early, he had his wife, Eleanor, and the 
Mayor. of New York, Fiorello Ia Guardia, meet Randolph and White on 
June 13 and ask them not to go through with their demonstration. ' 
The two Afro-Americans not only refused to abandon their campaign, 
but also managed to convince Mrs. Roosevelt that they were in the 
41.. - Pittsburgh Courier, May 31,1911, and Randolph to FDR, 
May 29,1911,93: FDRL. 
142. Randolph to Eleanor Roosevelt, June 3,19141, OASW 215, 
NARG 107. White, A Man Called White, 189. 
143 
. Memo. from FDR, June 7,19141,93: 5 FDRL. 
1414. Memo. Early to FDR, June 6,1941. Details of the meeting 
are in White, A Man Called White, 189-90. 
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right. As a result, she promised to intervene on their behalf 
and to arrange a meeting with the President. The following day a 
statement was released from the White House containing the text 
of a letter, dated June 12, to William Knudsen and Sidney Hillman, 
the co-directors of the Office of Production N, anagement. The 
letter-recognized the extent of discrimination in the defence 
programme and re-affirmed the policy of full utilization of manpower 
5 
as expressed by Hillman in April. It went on to say, 
No nation combatting the increasing threat of 
totalitarianism can afford arbitrarily to exclude 
large segments of its population from its defense 
industries. Even more important is it for us to 
strengthen our unity and morale by refuting at 
home the very theories which we are fighting abroad. 
However, while seeming to agree with the arguments presented by 
Afro-Americans (and the Military Participation Ratio theory), 
Roosevelt left it to employers, workers, and the OPM to see that 
changes were made. The leaders of the HDWM still insisted on a 
meeting with the President and an executive order. 
On June 18, Roosevelt finally acceded to their demands and 
held a meeting with White and Randolph at the White House. Also 
present were the Assistant Secretary of War, Robert P. Patterson, 
the Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox, Hillman, and Knudsen. 
When info need by White that no less than 100,000 people would take 
part. in'the March, Roosevelt asked what he should do. He was 
told that the blacks wanted van unequivocal executive order to 
45. Roosevelt to Hillman and Knudsen, June 12,1911, quoted in 
Minorities in Defense, 1)4. For the black reaction see 
Black Worker, June 1 and Chicago Defender, June 21,19141. 
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effectuate the speediest possible abolition of discrimination in 
war industries and the armed services. 
46 
The President appeared 
to acquiesce to these demands and he got Randolph and-White to 
draft the kind of order they had in mind and leave it with him 
to consider. Knudsen had made his opposition to such an order 
clear at the conference and Patterson and the Under Secretary of 
the Navy, Forrestal, also had strong reservations. They felt 
that an order abolishing racial discrimination in industry would 
arouse, rather than allay, racial prejudice and that it would be 
difficult to implement. 
47 
The black leaders, however, had made it 
obvious that they would not accept anything less. 
48 
Finally, 
Roosevelt issued Executive Order 8802 commanding an end to discrim- 
ination in defence industries on June 25,1941, and the MOW was 
called off. 
Obviously, the Afro-Americans had not achieved all their 
aims. No executive action was taken on discrimination in the 
armed forces, nor, at least not specifically, in defence training, 
in government, and within trade unions. However, Executive Order 
8802 stated national policy to be against 'discrimination in the 
employment of workers in defense industries or Government because 
of race, creed, color, or national origin. ' To that end, it did 
order the end of discrimination in defence training programmes, the 
inclusion of a non-discrimination clause in all defence contracts, 
46. White, A Man Called White, 192. 
47. Memo., Patterson and Forrestal to FDR, June 214,1911, 
93: 5 FDRL. 
48. White, A Man Called White, 193. 
1c4 
and the formation of a Committee on Fair &nployment Practices to 
'receive and investigate complaints of discrimination in violation 
of the provisions of this order' and to 'take appropriate steps to 
redress grievances which it finds valid. ' 
9 
Thus, rather'than 
several orders dealing with discrimination in employment, the 
blacks were given one which seemed all-encompassing. Dalfiume 
has'argued that because several orders were not issued, the 
postponing of the March on Washington marked a victory for 
Roosevelt and that the President had decided from the start on the 
concessions he would make to black demands. 
50 
This seems unfair 
on White and Randolph who refused to accept an emasculated version 
of their draft order and who fought, with a certain amount of 
success, for an order with some power. The blacks were also well 
aware, from their meeting with Roosevelt and his advisers in 1940, 
that action against segregation in the forces was unlikely to be 
taken at that time. Their prime concern in 1911 was to ensure 
black participation in the war industries and as far as Randolph 
was concerned, their main objective had been secured. 
51 
While the results of the MOWM may seem puny to present- 
day writers, in 1911 they were seen as a huge success. Pointing 
out that this was the first executive order relating to civil 
rights since Reconstruction, the Chicago Defender called it 'one 
of the most significant pronouncements that has been made in the 
interests of the Negro for more than a century', and Mrs. Mary 
L9. Executive Order 8802, June 25,1941, Appendix I. 
50. Dalfiume, Desegregation of the U. S. Armed Forces, 117-22. 
51. Black Worker, August 1941. 
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McCleod Bethune said it came 'as a refreshing shower in a thirsty 
land., 
S2 
Coupled with this enthusiasm were reservations. The 
53 
President of the Pittsburgh Courier, Ira Lewis, wrote, 
If this order is made workable and effective, 
the thirteen million Negroes in the United 
States can very well-proclaim it to be an 
Economic Emancipation Proclamation. Litalics min] 
The Crisis pointed out that the Order was not popular with employers 
and unions, and that it was up to Afro-Americans to see that it 
worked. 
54 
When Roosevelt named the members of the Fair Employment 
Practices Committee, the Pittsburgh Courier, although pleased, 
felt that the recommendations of White and Randolph had been 
ignored, and therefore that-the Committee was not truly 
representative. 
55 
Randolph disagreed. Praising the President 
on his appointments he wrote, 'You have gone right down the line 
with the Negroes. '56 Whatever the reservations held by Afro- 
Americans, they were all aware that the threat of mass action had 
brought results. Randolph and the March on Washington Movement 
52. Chicago Defender July 12,1941, and Bethune to FDR, June 26, 
1941,93: FDRL. 
53. Lewis to FDR, June 28,1941,93: 5 FDRL. 
54. The Crisis, August 1941. 
55. Pittsburgh Courier, July 26,1941. The original members of 
FEPC were: Chairman Mark Ethridge, editor of the Louisville 
Courier-Journal; William Green, President of the AFL; 
Philip Murray, President of the CIO; David Sarnoff, 
President of R. C. A.; and two blacks, Earl Dickerson a 
lawyer and Chicago alderman, and Milton Webster, vice- 
president of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters. In 
May 1942, the size of the Committee was increased to seven 
by the addition of Malcolm S. McLean, president of Hampton 
Institute, who replaced Ethridge as chairman. 
56. Telegram, Randolph to FDR, July 22,1911. Earlier. Randolph 
had suggested La Guardia, Wendell Willkie, and Homer-Brawn 
as well as Sarnoff and Webster for membership, Telegram, 
July ]1&, 1914, both in 93: 5 FDRL. 
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symbolized the militancy of blacks during World War II, and 'in 
recognition of the dramatic culmination of his years of effort in 
the mobilization of Negro mass opinion in 1911, ' Randolph was 
awarded the Spingarn medal at the 33rd NAACP convention 
57 
Although the march was postponed, the Movement continued in 
being under Randolph's leadership. It immediately adopted a five 
point programme to continue existing local committees, to collect 
facts and present them to the FEPC, to develop more local 
committees to gain pressure power, to gather information about job 
opportunities for unemployed blacks, and to encourage Afro-Americans 
to apply for jots in industries with defence contracts. 
58 
As the 
war progressed, the militancy of the MOWM declined. Although 
Randolph warned that a march could still take place after the 
transfer of FEPC to the War Manpower Commission under Paul McNutt, 
he had earlier spoken of a 'non-march pressure campaign.? 
59 
It 
has even been suggested that the original threat of a march was in 
fact a bluff and that the black leaders had little or no idea of 
how many people would take part. 
6o 
If this were so, it is 
surprising both that Roosevelt did not call it and that White and 
57. Citation in James Weldon Johnson Collection, Beinecke Library, 
Yale. See also, Garfinkel, When Negroes March, 62. 
58. Chicago Defender, July 26,19141. 
59. Pittsburgh Courier, August 1,1912; Baltimore Afro-American 
September 27,71-97-2,; and Randolph, 'Why Should We March? ', 
Survey Graphic, mI, 11, November 1912. 
60. Dalfiume, Desegregation of the U. S. Armed Forces, 121, and 
Garfinkel, When Negroes March, 60,62. 
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Randolph were so insistent on an Executive Order. 
61 
Moreover, 
three rallies were held in 1942, after America had entered the war, 
which demonstrated something of the Movement's following. On 
July 16,. a crowd estimated at between 15,000 and 25,000 heard a 
number of speakers in Madison Square Gardens, New York. 
62 
Ten 
days later between ten and 20,000 gathered in Chicago and a third 
large meeting was held in St. Louis in August. 
63 
Only once job opportunities for blacks had increased and 
America was fully engaged in total war, did this support fall away. 
When, in 19143, Randolph adopted the plan for a non-violent protest 
campaign-directed at segregation in areas other than the armed 
forces and defence industries, he was accused of using the 'most 
dangerous demagoguery on record. ' 
64 
A Pittsburgh Courier poll in 
1942 had found 53.1 per cent of those asked opposed to a march on 
Washington: in 1913 70.6 per cent were against the civil disobedience 
campaign. gn. Despite this lack of support at the time, there was 
something strangely prophetic when, describing the civil disobedience 
61. - The government was warned by William Hastie that not only 
would a demonstration take place, but also that if the 
responsible leadership' withdrew, the march would be taken 
over by 'more radical elements'. Memo. Hastie to Secretary 
of War Stimson, OASW 215, NARG 107. 
62. Pittsburgh Courier, June 27, 1912; Garfinkel, When Negroes 
March, 95. 
63. Pittsburgh Courier, July 4, 1942; Baltimore Afro-American 
July 4.19)42; and When Negroes March, 98. 
64. Pittsburgh Courier, January 23,19143. 
65. Pittsburgh Courier, October 17,1942, and April 214,19143. 
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campaign, Randolph said, 
66 
It appears that an important part of the future 
strategy and technique of the Negro must be in 
the field of demonstration, both non-violent mass 
activity and disciplined non-violent demonstrations 
-of small Negro and White groups for civil and 
economic justice. 
The. idea for this type of demonstration seems to have originated 
from Bayard Rustin and James. Farmer, two young members of the 
Chicago branch of the MOWM, who spoke in favour of non-violent 
direct action at the 1913 convention. 
67 
Both were founder members 
of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), which sprang from the 
christian-pacifist movement, the Fellowship of Reconciliation, in 
1942. CORE used pickets, boycotts, and sit-ins, to attack 
segregation in drug stores and department stores in a number of 
northern cities during the war but even more successfully during 
the 1960s. 
68 
The MYdM, while espousing such tactics, did not in 
fact use them. Although it lingered on until 1947, the MOWM 
lacked the support, particularly after the 1943 riots, necessary 
for direct action and was besides engaged in divergent activities. 
As well as supporting Winfred Lynn in his legal battle against 
segregation in the forces, the MOWM was active from 1913 onwards 
in the fight to save FEPC, the Committee for which it had been 
66. Chicago Defender, July 3,1943. Equally prophetic were 
-the comparisons Randolph was making between America and 
India, see proceedings of MOWM Conference, Detroit, 
September 26-27,1942, in Schomburg Collection, and Chicago 
Defender January 9,1943. 
67. Baltimore Afro-American, July 10,1943. 
68. Helen Buckler, 'The CORE Way', Survey Graphic, %%XV, 2, 
February 1946; George M. Houser, Erasing the Color Line, 
New York, 1915; August Meier and Elliott Rudwick, 'How 
CORE Began', Social Science Quarterly, Vol. t9, t, March 1969. 
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largely responsible. 
II 
In his history of FEPC, Louis Ruchames wrote, 
69 
Through its achievements, the President's 
Committee proved that under certain conditions 
law - even in the emasculated form of an 
executive order - could alter customs and 
mores, and hasten the elimination of dis- 
crimination in significant sections of 
American industry. 
Unfortunately, Ruchames failed to establish his case for guided 
change of this nature. As he himself admitted, there is no way 
of knowing how many Afro-Americans were employed as a result of 
the Committee's actions. 
70 
While in operation the Committee not 
only suffered constant attack from political opponents but also 
met with defeat at the hands of employers and unions in certain 
crucial areas. Afro-Americans did make great economic gains, but 
these generally occurred after 1912, and were the result of 
growing labour shortages rather than the work of FEPC. 
The Committee had limitations which sprang directly from 
the Executive Order. Most important of course, was the unspoken 
fact that it was a temporary body to be in existence only during 
the war emergency and to deal only with defence industries. The 
Committee described the restrictions this placed on it: 
71 
69. Ruchames, Race, Jobs, and Politics: The Story of FEPC 
New York 1953, )4" Like Garfinkel, Ruchames was unable 
to make use of the many, vital government sources and his 
history suffers accordingly. 
70. Race, Jobs, and Politics, 156. 
71. President's Committee on Fair Employment Practice, FEPC: 
How it Operates, Washington, D. C., 1944,7. 
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FEPC has no power to deal with privately owned 
and operated plants which do not hold Government 
contracts or subcontracts and which are not 
engaged in activities essential to the war effort, 
even though they may be engaged in interstate or 
foreign commerce. 
In those areas where FEPC did have jurisdiction, it had little 
power'to enforce its recommendations but could only hope that 
adverse publicity and persuasion would make a company change its 
hiring policies. When persuasion failed FEPC lacked the final 
authority to back up its ruling. 
72 
Another weakness was the 
Committees size, or rather, the lack of it. The original order 
was amended on July 18,1911 to bring the number of Committee 
members up to six, and again in 1912 to bring it up to seven. 
This small group had a staff not much bigger in size. In its 
first year of operation FEPC had only seven field officers and five 
clerical workers and a budget of $80,000. Even when the personnel 
situation unproved and the budget was increased to $431,609, FEPC 
remained well below the standards of other government departments. 
73 
Because of the limitations of size and budget, the Committee 
operated by holding public hearings in selected major cities. 
The. first of these were held in Los Angeles in October 1911. 
The policies of ten firms, mainly aircraft manufacturers, and 
three unions were examined and the Committee made several recommendations 
72. President's Committee on Fair Employment Practice, Final 
Report, June 28,1916, Washington, D. C., 1947, ix. 
73" 'Important Dates in FEPC History', April 1,19W4, FEPC 1107, 
NARG 228; Ruchames, Race, Jobs, and Politics, 27; and 
Louis C. Kesseluran, The Social Politics of FEPC: A Study 
, 
in Reform Pressure Movements, Chapel Hill, lbrth Carolina, 
1946,23. 
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in order to end discrimination. 
74 
Although no direct connection 
can be made, it is interesting to note that in 1944 Afro-Americans 
made"up six per cent of the total number of aircraft workers 
compared to 0.2 per cent in 1940.75 Later hearings were held 
in Chicago, New York, Birmingham, Washington, Philadelphia, and 
Portland. The pattern of 1941 was invariably repeated, with 
the Committee making recommendations and asking for periodic 
reports from those concerned. 
76 
During the hearings in 
Birmingham, Alabama, Mark Ethridge, the former chairman, reassured 
anxious fellow-Southerners about the Committee's intentions and 
criticized black leaders who regarded Executive Order 8802 as a 
second Emancipation Proclamation. He went on to say, 
77 
There is no power in the world - not even 
in all the mechanized armies of the earth, 
Allied and Axis - which could now force 
the Southern white people to the abandonment 
of the principle of social segregation. 
His attitude was common to the many whites in the South who 
did not'object to the full utilization of black manpower, or 
to the principle of equal pay for blacks, but who did object to 
white and black working side by side on the factory line. 
78 
Any 
74. Hearings, Los Angeles, October 20-21,1941, FEPC 108,. 
NARG 228. 
75. Weaver, Negro Iabor, 118. 
76. Hearings, FEPC 108, NARG 228, War Manpower Commission, 
NARG 211, and OASW 190, NARG 107. 
77. Quoted in Ruchames, Race, Jobs, and Politics, 28-30. 
78. 
. 
Letter, Congressman W. R. Poage of Texas to Fowler W. 
Harper, Deputy Chairman, WMC, January 11,19). 3, WMC, NARG 
211. Other examples are quoted in Kesseluran, The Social 
Politics of FEPC, 167. 
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attempt by the Committee to bring this about led to violent 
reactions in the South and from Southerners in Congress. The 
opposition to FEPC appeared to have been successful when on July 30 
1942, without any prior warning, ftie Committee was transferred by 
President Roosevelt to the War Manpower Commission and placed 
under. -the supervision of Paul V. McNutt. 
At the time, the black response to this move was that 
FEPC was being muzzled as a result of pressure from the South. 
79 
Iater writers have agreed. Ruchames wrote of the transfer that 
? there can be little doubt but that its purpose was to restrict 
the committee's activities. '80 According to President Roosevelt's 
letter, however, the purpose of the transfer was to co-ordinate the 
activities of FEPC with those of the branches of the War Manpower 
Commission and in response to critics he aaid that the intention was 
'to strengthen - not to submerge - the Committee, and to reinvigorate - 
not to repeal - Executive Order 8802.181 The official historian 
of the War Manpower Commission accepted this defence, but pointed 
out that neither greater co-ordination nor strengthening were 
realized. 
82 
The War Manpower Commission consistently ignored 
FEPC over questions of discrimination and failed to refer cases 
to it. There was disagreement and delay over changes in the U. S. 
79. Baltimore Afro-American, August 8,1942; Pittsburgh Courier 
August 15,1942; and Black Worker, September 1942. 
80. Race, Jobs, and Politics, 46. Also see Garfinkel, When 
Negroes March, 102, and Kesselman, The Social Politics of 
FEPC, 19. 
81. Roosevelt to McNutt, July 30,1942 and White House Press 
Release, August 17,1942, WMC, NARG 211. 
82. Schuck, 'Eliminating Fnployer Discriminatory Hiring Practices', 
48, WMC, NARG 211. 
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Deployment Service's policies with regard to filling discriminatory 
applications for labour. It was-not until September 3,19113, 
when discrimination was defined to include the refusal to 
classify workers properly or hire workers of a particular colour 
or race, that the Employment Service changed its practices. 
83 
More condemning was the fact that no hearings were held 
while the FEPC was under McNutt's control. Public hearings on 
discrimination against Mexican-Americans were scheduled to be 
held in El Paso, Texas, during August 1912. They were called 
off at the behest of the State Department for fear that Axis 
agents in South America would use them for propaganda purposes 
and damage relations between Mexico and the U. S. A. 
84 
The 
important hearings on discrimination in the railroad industry 
were postponed on January 11,1943. Although other railroad 
companies were involved, the parties most concerned were members 
of the South Eastern Carriers Conference - all Southern companies. 
It was suggested by blacks that the hearings were cancelled 
because of pressure from big business, railroads, and Southerners 
in Congress and they voiced their fears that once again FEPC was 
83. The iYrmiediate disagreement centred on the text of a USES 
bulletin, C-45, 'Field Instruction on Non-discrimination',, 
which was eventually revised. Schuck, 'Eliminating Employer 
Discriminatory Hiring Practices', 37-40, t18-t. 9, and letters, 
both in WMC, NARG 211. 
8t. Schuck, 'Eliminating Employer Discriminatory Hiring 
Practices', 52, and Kesselman, The Social Politics of FEPC, 
17-18. The situation of the three million Mexican-Americans 
resident in the U. S. A. improved as the war progressed and as 
a result of later FEPC hearings. The importation of 
additional workers from Mexico, by agreement of the two 
countries, enabled the U. S. authorities to see that all 
people of Mexican origin received standard American wages 
and fair treatment, see FEPC 109, NARG 228. 
1]1 
being muzzled. 
85 
McNutt accepted responsibility and took the 
blame, but it appears that he had been directed to postpone the 
railroad hearings by-the President who was then out of the 
country. According to Schuck, it was reasonable for the President 
not to want such major hearings to take place in his absence. 
86 
This rather facile explanation did not satisfy the majority of 
Afro-Americans nor FEPC members McLean, Ethridge, and Sarnoff, 
all of whom resigned. 
87 
Following this debacle, Roosevelt held a conference with 
all those concerned to discuss a revision of the scope and 
power of FEPC on February 19,1943. The principal recommendation, 
that the Committee be reconstituted as an independent agency, was 
accepted. On May 27,1943, by Executive Order 9346, FEPC was 
re-established in the Office of Emergency Management of the 
Executive office and was given powers to conduct hearings, make 
findings, and recommend measures to the War Manpower Commission. 
88 
As was soon to be demonstrated, despite this apparent strengthening 
many of FEPC's weaknesses remained. 
On May 24,1943, a four day riot began after the upgrading 
of 12 black welders at the Alabama Drydock and Shipping Company 
85. Chicago Defender and Pittsburgh Courier, January 23,1913, 
and Blac Wk rker, December 1942. 
86. Schuck, 'Eliminating Employer Discriminatory Hiring 
Practices', 51. This argument was accepted in the Chicago 
Defender, February 26,1913. 
87. Kesselman, The Social Politics of FEPC, 21. 
88. 'Important Dates in FEPC History', April 1, l944, FEPC 407, 
NARG 228, and Schuck, 'Eliminating Dnployer Discriminatory Hiring 
Practices', 311.. As Schuck points out, it is interesting 
to note that McNutt expressed approval at FEPC's departure 
from the War Manpower Commission. 
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yards in Mobile, Alabama. The riot was inspired by the League 
for White Supremacy, a group organized to prevent the end of 
discrimination and segregation in the shipyards. The violence 
ended and workers returned to work only after federal troops were 
called. in. 
89 
The FEPC and WMC then worked out an agreement which 
set aside four slipways where black workers could be employed as 
welders, riggers, caulkers, and riveters. But even in those 
four yards Afro-Americans could not work as electricians, machine 
operators, or pipefitters. While it condoned segregation and 
discrimination, this settlement was a victory when compared with 
the Committee's failure with the railroads later that year. . The 
postponed hearings were finally held in Washington, D. C., on 
September 15,1943. After listening to 93 cases involving 22 
companies and 14 unions, FEPC ordered-an end to all discriminatory 
hiring practices and called for upgrading on an equal basis. Of the 20 
companies and seven unions sent such cease and desist orders, 16 
companies and three unions, all in the South, refused to comply. 
Four unions did not even reply to the request. 
90 
The companies 
argued that, rather than aiding the war effort, to enforce the 
Committeg's directive would, 
91 
89. Baltimore Afro-American and Pittsburgh Courier, June 5,1943; 
Ruchames, Race, Jobs, and Politics, 58; and Harvard Sitkoff, 
'Racial Militancy and Interracial Violence in the Second 
World War', Journal of American History, LVIII, 3,1971,672. 
90. 'Important Dates in FEPC History', FEPC 107, C. L. Golightly, 
'FEPC and the Railroads', May 8,19L5, FEPC 112, NARG 228, 
Ruchames, Race,. Jobs, and Politics, 59-68, and Black Worker, 
September and October 9 3. 
91.. December 13,1913, Golightly, 'FEPC and the Railroads', and Ruchames, Race, Jobs, and Politics, 68. 
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inevitably disrupt their peaceful and co-operative 
relations with their employees, would antagonize 
the travelling and shipping public served by them 
... would result in stoppages of transportation, 
and would most gravely and irreparably impair 
the whole war effort of the country. 
When the Committee referred these cases to President Roosevelt, 
he set up a three-man mediation committee to examine them. In 
February 1914, Roosevelt reported that progress was being made 
but then no more was heard and no action ever taken. 
92 As the 
Committee later remarked, these cases 'proved that persuasion must 
be backed by final authority if conformity with the policy is to 
be realized., 
93 
, 
Clearly, it was not just employers who were involved in 
acts of discrimination against Afro-Americans. Unions were cited 
in several FEPC hearings, other than those on the railroads, for 
either-excluding blacks from membership of a particular union 
and thus denying them employment in 'closed shop' industries, or 
for segregating them in all-black auxiliary unions. 
94 
There 
were also a number of work stoppages when whites struck after the 
employment or upgrading of Afro-Americans even though the 
national union organizations had opposed discrimination in 
principle. 
The many American trade unions were organized under two 
bodies similar to the British TUC, the American Federation of 
92. Golightly, 'FEPC and the R. ailroads'. 
93. President's Committee on Fair JDmployment Practices, Final 
Report, June 28,1916, Washington, D. C., 1917, ix. 
94" See for example, Hearings, Portland, Oregon, November 15-16, 
1943, and Los Angeles, November 19-20,1943, FEPC 408, 
NARG 228. 
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Iabor (AFL) and the Congress of Industrial Organizations (C10), 
which united in 1955 to become the AFL-C1O. 
95 
The AFL, formed 
in 1881, began as a federation of craft unions and had a policy 
of non-discrimination. By the turn of the century, unions which 
excluded blacks altogether or relegated them to separate auxiliaries, 
were admitted to the AFL and such discriminatory practices became 
accepted if not explicit policies. The United Mine Workers Union 
was the only AFL affiliate with a completely egalitarian policy 
and in 1902 its 20,000 Afro-American members accounted for half 
of the blacks in the AFL. 
96 
In 1937 a number of industrial 
unions, led by the Mine Workers, broke away from the AFL to form 
the C10, a federation of industrial rather than craft unions. 
Because it hoped to organize unskilled and semi-skilled workers in 
basic industries, many of whom were black, and because it attracted 
the liberal and left-wing elements within the labour movement, the 
C10 adopted a policy of non-discrimination from the beginning. 
The differences in the racial policies of the AFL and C10 
became more apparent during the war. By agreement with the 
National Defense Advisory Commission the two organizations 
assumed responsibility for removing barriers against Afro-American 
workers in defence industries. 
97 Yet at its conventions in 
95. The history of the Afro-American in the trade union movement 
is dealt with in: Abram L. Harris and Sterling D. Spero, 
The Black Worker, New York 1931; Julius Jacobson, ed., 
The Negro and the American Labor Movement, Garden City, New 
York, 1968; Ray Marshal, The Negro and Organized Labor, 
New York, 1965; Herbert R. Northrup, Organized Labor and the 
Negro, New York 1944. 
96. Marc Karson and Ronald Radosh, 'The American Federation of 
Labor and the Negro Worker, 1894-19491, in Jacobson, ed., 
The Negro and the American Labor Movement, 157. 
97. Schuck, 'Eliminating Employer Discriminatory Hiring Practices', 
6, and President's Committee of Fair Employment Practice, 
Minorities in Defense, 11. 
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154 0,1911, and 1942, the AFL rejected resolutions condemning 
discrimination proposed by A. Philip Randolph. He was told that 
it was unnecessary for the AFL to do so because its opposition to 
discrimination had been stated in the past. Moreover, there was 
no need for such resolutions or the committee on discrimination 
proposed by Randolph until evidence of discrimination within the 
trade union movement was provided. 
98 
Randolph replied to these 
objections in 1943 when he presented details of prejudice amongst 
AFL affiliated unions from a paper written by Herbert Northrup, a 
member of the regional War Labor Board in Detroit and consultant to 
FEPC. Twenty unions within the AFL were listed as either excluding 
blacks altogether or affording them only segregated membership. 
99 
In answer to these charges the President of the AFL, William 
Green, said that as such a small percentage of the AFL's 1Q7 
unions were involved, the situation was obviously improving. He 
hoped that it would continue to do so but did not recommend that 
the convention adopt the resolution abolishing segregated auxiliaries. 
100 
It was not until after the riots of 1943 that the AFL took any stand 
on discrimination and then in the form of a resolution condemning 
prejudice and bigotry in the country as a whole rather than another 
resolution which concentrated on racial practices within the 
Federation itself. 
101 
teewarm resolutions in support of FEPC 
98. Reports of Proceedings, AFL Conventions, New Orleans 1940, 
Seattle 1941, and Toronto 1942. Also Brazeal, The Brother- 
hood of Sleeping Car Porters, 157-68. 
99. Proceedings, AFL Convention, Boston 1913; Herbert R. Northrup, 
. 'Organized Labor and Negro Workers', Journal of Political Economy, LI, 3, June 1943. 
100. Proceedings, AFL Convention, Boston 1 3,442-45. 
101. Proceedings, AFL Convention, New Orleans 1944,557-58. 
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were adopted throughout the war, but only after reference to 
discrimination in unions had been deleted. The AFL felt that to 
incorporate such a phrase would encourage government intervention 
in union affairs. For similar reasons it was opposed to a permanent 
FEPC. 
102. 
While the black press viewed AFL conventions as farces it 
saw the C10 'coming forward as the foremost organization in the 
country to fight for equality of job opportunity for Negroes. '103 
Their optimism had some justification for the C10 maintained its 
pre-war policies and attempted to put them into practice. The 
19I. 1. convention not only condemned discrimination but also 
authorized the formation of a Committee to abolish it within the 
Congress itself. Every year thereafter the C10 re-iterated its 
position and related the issue of racial prejudice to the war: 
104 
Discrimination against workers because of race, 
religion or country of origin is an evil 
characteristic of our fascist enemies. We of 
the democracies are fighting fascism at home 
and abroad by welding all races, all religions 
and all peoples into a united body of warriors for 
democracy. Any discriminatory practices within 
our own ranks, against Negroes or other groups, 
directly aids the enemy by creating division, 
dissension and confusion. Such discrimination 
practiced in employment policies hampers 
production by depriving the nation of the use 
of available skills and manpower. 
102. Brazeal, Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, 168; 
Kesseluran, The Social Politics of FEPC, 14t. 
103. Baltimore Afro-American, November 7,19112, April 1,1944; 
Chicago De ender, September 12,1942, November 25,19l4i. 
101. Proceedings of Constitutional Convention of C10, Boston, 
1942, Resolution , 172. 
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A resolution adopted in 1943 commended FEPC for its work, demanded 
the prosecution of those 'whipping up hatred against minority 
groups, ' and called upon President Roosevelt to end the segregation 
of the armed forces. 
105 
In 1911 , the Committee to Abolish Racial 
Discrimination reported that a total of 85 local C10 anti- 
discrimination ccrmmittees had been formed and that intervention by 
the C10 had led to policy reversals in certain government departments. 
106 
The C10 was also responsible for a case against wage differentials 
based on race by the Southport Petroleum Company in Texas City, 
Texas, brought before the War Labor Board. The War Labor Board 
ruled. that rates of pay based on race or colour were illegal. 
107 
These were all points in the C10's favour but there were 
flaws. The main one was that it was easy to pass resolutions 
at conventions or for the Congress to intercede with the government. 
It was-not as easy for it to impose its wishes on all branches of 
member unions, as indeed the Committee to Abolish Discrimination 
recognized. 
108 
While delegates at the 1942 convention adopted a 
resolution 'urging that employers be compelled to utilize in full 
the services of colored workers, aliens, and women', members of the 
C10 affiliated Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers 
105. Proceedings, Constitutional Convention, C10, Philadelphia, 
l9 3, Resolution 13,267-68. 
106. Proceedin s, Constitutional Convention, C10, Chicago, 
19Z-, 93-4. 
107. Chicago Defender, June 12,1943. 
108. C10, Working and Fighting Together, Washington, D. C., 1943, 
7. Council for Democracy, The Negro in America: How We 
Treat Him and How We Should, New York 1945,10. 
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walked out of the Bethlehem-Fairfield shipyards in Baltimore in 
l 
protest against the admission of two blacks to the welding school. 
ý'ý 
When the union expelled five men for inciting discrimination, there 
was a further protest demonstration. It was the determination of 
the employers, rather than union action which won the day. 
110 
C10 
unions found themselves to be powerless in other disputes. In 
1913,700 workers at the Packard Motor factory in Detroit struck 
after the hiring of four black women and in the conflict at the 
Alabama Drydock and Shipping Company yards in Mobile, the C10 was 
reluctant to stress its anti-discriminatory position for fear of 
losing a forthcoming employee representation election to the AFL. 
ill 
FEPC faced a major crisis when the Cl0 Transport Workers 
Union proved unable to control its members in Philadelphia. Late 
in 1913, FEPC ordered the Philadelphia Transportation Companyand 
the AFL Rapid Transit Enployees Union to desist from discriminatory 
hiring and up-grading practices. The union notified the Committee 
that it could not obey the directive and advised the Transportation 
Company not to comply. 
112 
At the same time the union brought FEPC 
before the House Committee to Investigate Executive Agencies (Smith 
Committee) which was opposed to the Presidential Committee, and 
109. Baltimore Afro-American, November 2]., 1942. 
110. Baltimore Afro-American, November 28,1942. 
111. Chicago Defender, March 27,1943, April 17,1943, and Weaver, 
Negro La orb, 37. 
112. American Council on Race Relations, Negro Platform Workers, 
Chicago 1945,3-17, and Ruchames, Race, Jobs, and Politics, 
100-20. 
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encouraged the Transit Employees to c retinue their defiance. 
113 
However, in March l944, the Transport Workers Union won the right 
to represent both maintenance and platform workers and a change in 
policy was expected. When the War Manpower Commission ruled, in 
July 1944, that all hiring was to be done through the U. S. Employment 
Service without discrimination, the TWU concurred. Following the 
up-grading of eight Afro-Americans the white workers, in defiance 
of their union, employers, FEPC, and the War Manpower Commission, 
went on strike on August 1,1944, and effectively paralysed the 
city. 
114 
On August 3, at the command of President Roosevelt, the 
Army moved into Philadelphia to curb violence and to take over the 
running of the bus and trolley services. Major-general Hayes warned 
the strikers that if they continued to stay away from work their 
draft deferment would immediately be cancelled and they would be 
declared : IA for draft purposes. That threat and the fear that 
they would lose their jobs permanently persuaded the strikers to 
return'to work on August 5.115 FEPC also met with rebuffs from 
transport unions in Los Angeles and Washington but although they 
took some time to settle, those disputes did not require the Army to 
be called in. 
116 
113. 'Important Dates in FEPC History', FEPC 1107, NARG 228, 
American Council on Race Relations, Negro Platform Workers, 9. 
114. Baltimore Afro-American, August 5,194h, and The Crisis, 
September T9_77 
115. Baltimore Afro-American, August 12,1944; The Crisis, 
September ; and film C-5275, 'Army Ends Transport. Strike', 
. 2-7, August 19144, Sherman Grinberg Library. 
116. Negro Platform Workers, 2L, and memo., C. L. Golightly to 
John A. Davis, May 19,1945, 'FEPC and the Capital Transit 
Company of Washington, D. C. ', FEPC 413j, NAR. G 228. 
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, 
There were, of course, instances when FEPC and the unions 
did solve industrial disputes over racial issues. A dispute in 
1912 over seniority rights at the Chrysler plant near Detroit in 
which whites threatened to walk out, ended when the United Automobile 
Workers'union advised the company to fire all strikers. In 
1943 other strikes by car workers were avoided after concerted 
action by the UAW and FEPC. 
117 
In 19t3, and 1944 alone, FEPC 
satisfactorily solved 25 work stoppages involving more than 181,791 
workers. Nine of those stoppages were caused by whites resisting 
the employment or promotion of blacks, and 11 by blacks protesting 
against demotions, or other forms of discrii nation. 
8 
In one 
strike, 500 white workers refused to return to work until the 
caupany agreed to end discrimination against blacks. 
119 
While the union movement figures largely in FEPC's successes 
and failures, it also contributed to the Committee's opposition. 
In 19LiJ, ' trade unions subscribed , 
$11,000 to the National Council 
for a"Pezmanent FEPC, yet the same year the AFL voiced its 
opposition to a permanent agency at its convention and before a 
Senate hearing. 
120 
As Brazeal said, ? their opposition to a 
permanent FEPC is probably based as much on a desire not to admit 
117. Weaver, Negro Labor, 71-2, and Marshall, The Negro and 
Organized Mor, 3 -40 . 
118. 'Statement on Work stoppages', FEPC 1113, NARG 228, and 
President's Committee on Fair Employment Practices, First 
Report, July 1913-December 194,79. 
119.:. Baltimore Afro-American, May 27,1944. 
120. Baltimore Afro-American, March 1L, 1944; Chicago Defender, 
November 4.25$ 1-974-; and Kesselman, The Social Politics of 
FEPC, 1)47-149. 
121 
Negroes to an equitable membership as it is to labor's avowed and 
traditional opposition to restrictive labor legislation. ' 
121 
Even 
the more sympathetic C10 showed signs of division: at the 1913 
convention the resolutions committee voted unanimously against 
support for a permanent agency on fair employment practices; the 
following year the C10 President, Philip Murray urged all member 
unions to back a permanent FEPC. 
122 
The Smith Committee encouraged 
the transport workers in Philadelphia to ignore FEPC directives and 
also challenged the Committee's rulings in the Southern railroad 
cases. Although it finally dropped the matter and failed to issue 
a report on FEPC hearings, the Smith Committee encouraged opponents 
of FEPC. 
123 
The National Council for a Permanent FEPC was formed 
by A. Philip Randolph in 1943 and grew out of the 'Save FEPC' 
campaign which had followed the transfer of the agency to the War 
Manpower Commission. An interracial organization, the Council 
attracted a diverse following but all in vain as opposition to 
FEPC in Congress proved too strong. In l944, an Independent 
Office Appropriation Bill was passed which included a direct 
attack on the Committee. 
124 
An amendment attached to the bill 
by Senator Richard B. Russell of Georgia, forbad the appropriation 
of funds for any agency created by executive order and in operation 
125 for more than one year without the specific consent of Congress. 
121. Brazeal, The Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, 168. 
122. Chicago Defender, November 6,1943, and November 25,1944. 
123. Ruchames, Race, Jobs, and Politics, 81-86. 
1214. Papers and literature of the National Council in the-James 
'Weldon Johnson Collection, Yale University; Garfinkel, 
When Negroes March, 145-147,150-58; and Kesseluran, The 
Social Politics of FEPC, 29-37. 
125. Ruchames, Race, Jobs, and Politics, 87-88. 
125 
In 1946, a Southern filibuster in the Senate prevented the passage 
of a bill of appropriation and FEPC died. 
Despite this gloomy history, it would be ridiculous to deny 
that FEPC had some success. Conspicuous confrontations and defeats 
diverted attention away from the thousands of individual complaints 
successfully dealt with. In the 18 months from July 1943 to 
December 1944,5,803 cases were examined by the Committee. Of 
these 6t& per cent were dismissed for lack of merit while the 
remaining 36 per cent (approximately 1,723) were processed and 
brought to satisfactory conclusions. 
126 Will Alexander, of the 
War Manpower Commission, pointed out too, that the Committee acted 
as a propaganda agency: fit forced people to look, day after day, 
at this problem of the Negro's economic handicaps. 
"27 During 
the war local and state governments followed the federal example. 
In July 1941, the state of Illinois declared it a misdemeanor for 
any war defence contractor to discriminate because of race or 
colour. .A similar 
bill was passed in New York state in September 
1911 and in New Jersey in 1942.128 A number of ordinances and 
bills against discrimination in employment were passed in various 
cities and states in the immediate post-war period. This was all 
to the good, but like FEPC these bodies had only limited powers 
and, therefore, effect. 
126. President's Committee on Fair Employment Practices, First 
Report, July 19113-December 191,2. 
127.. Wilma Dykeman and James Stokely, The Seeds of Southern 
Change: The Life of Will Alexander, Chicago, 1962,277. 
128. Schuck, 'Eliminating Employer Discriminatory Hiring Practices', 
23, and American Council on Race Relations, March 1919, 
. 'Evaluation of State FEPC: Experiences and Forecasts', in James Weldon Johnson Collection, Yale University. 
120 
Most of the gains made by Afro-Americans in employment 
during. the war came after 1942 when labour shortages began to 
effect. hiring practices. In January 1942, only three per cent 
of the employees in defence plants were black: a year later this 
had more than doubled and by 191414, eight per cent of all war 
workers were Afro-Americans. 
129 
More than half of these gains 
were made in areas of acute labour shortages. Faced with such 
facts one has to agree that 'such evidence of greater utilization 
as does exist cannot necessarily be attributed to government 
efforts-but may be attributed to the general appearances of 
stringencies in the supply of labor-1130 
Whatever the exact cause, employment opportunities for 
blacks did increase during the war. From April 1940 to April 
1944, the total number of Afro-Americans in work rose by one 
million: from 4.4 million to 5.3. These figures are, by 
themselves, impressive, but again they obscure the fact that most gains 
were made in the latter half of the war. There was an increase 
in'job opportunities for blacks during 1940 and 1941, notably in 
shipbuilding and iron and steel works, but 'until mid-1912 Negroes 
had not profited from the war boom to the same extent as had 
white workers. 1131 The main reason for this delay was the large 
129. $chuck, 'Eliminating Employer Discriminatory Hiring 
Practices', 61-62; Weaver; Negro Labor, 79; President's 
Committee on Fair Employment Practice, First Report, 90; 
and Myrdal, An American Dilemma, 409. 
130. Schuck, 'Eliminating Employer Discriminatory Hiring Practices', 6C. 
131. President's Committee on Fair Employment Practice, First 
. 
Report, 92; Murray, Negro Handbook, 1946-47,99; and 
National Urban League, 'Changes in the Occupational Status 
of Negroes, 19140-1950', New York 1950, mimeographed, in 
Schomburg Collection. 
127 
number of unemployed whites who took precedence over blacks even 
if it meant importing them from outside areas. The lack of 
training and specific skills at a time when unskilled workers were 
not in great demand, also made it difficult for Afro-Americans to 
enter new occupations. By 19142, the expansion of industry and the 
armed forces had seriously depleted the labour force and all 
available sources of manpower had to be tapped. At the beginning 
of that year three per cent of all persons engaged in war 
production were black: in September, 14.6 per cent were black; in 
January 1943, this had risen to 6.14 per cent; by January 1941, it 
was 7.3 per cent; and in November 1944, it was 8.3 per cent. 
132 
The number of blacks'unemployed dropped from 937,562 in 1940 to 
about 640,000 in 191 2. By 1944 this had fallen to 151,000.133 
This pessimism expressed by various writers early in the war 
vanished with this change in events. Robert C. Weaver referred 
to 1942 as the 'crucial year' and the New York State War Council 
which had described the employment situation of Afro-Americans in 
1942 as'extremely bitter', could, in 1945 boast that there was not 
one war plant in operation in the Empire state which discriminated 
132.. 'War Manpower Commission, 'Utilization of Reserve Workers: 
Recently Reported Placements of Negroes in Skilled 
Occupations', Washington, D. C., March 19441 FEPC 407, NARG 
228, and FEPC, First Report, 90. 
133. Social Security Board, Employment Security Review, 11,7, 
July 1942; Murray, Negro Handbook, 1942) 142; and FEPC, 
First Report, 94. 
128 
against blacks. 
'134 
The Chicago Mayor's Commission on Human 
Relations reported that the employment of blacks in war production 
in Cook and DaPage Counties (Chicago) had risen from 80,3117 in 
1910 to 222,600 in 1915 and that this was 11.7 per cent of the 
135 total work force. By September 1944, the Chicago Defender 
could. record that the employment of Afro-Americans generally was 
at an all-time high. While there were rises throughout all 
136 
sectors-of war production, certain areas witnessed greater 
increases than others. The proportion of blacks among those 
engaged in shipbuilding rose from 5.5 per cent in September 1912 
to 10.2-per cent in March 1944.137 The aircraft industry 
reversed its pre-war employment patterns as 'companies like North 
American, Boeing, and Martin completely altered their policies in 
the face of all-out war, the need to utilize all available 
manpower, government pressure, and obvious morality and decency. 1138 
Among the additional million black workers were 600,000 
women who raised the total of Afro-American women in employment 
131.. Weaver, The Negro Ghetto, New York 1918,80, and New York 
State War Council, Committee on Discrimination in Employment, 
Now Management Can Integrate Negroes in War Industries, 
New York, 1942,3, and The Negro Integrated, New York 1915,2)-i.. 
135. Chicago Mayor's Commission on Human Relations, Race Relations 
in Chicago, Chicago 19! 15,2. 
136. -Chicago Defender, September 9,19l4i.. 
137.. Schuck, rEliminating Employer Discriminatory Hiring 
Practices', 61j.; Weaver, 'Racial Employment Trends in 
National Defense', Phylon, III, 1,1942. 
138.. Herbert R. Northrup, 'The Negro in the Aerospace Industry', 
in Northrup, et al, Negro Employment in Basic Industry: A 
Study of Racial Policies in Six Industries, Philadelphia, 
1970. Also see Weaver, Negro Labor, 109-16. 
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to 2.1 million. 
139 
The pattern of discrimination was such that 
they found work only after white women and black men and as a 
result--made up only four per cent of the seven million women in 
war production in 1944. Even so, the percentage of black women 
remained higher than that of white women in employment and like 
their male counterparts they made substantial gains in certain 
h 
areas of industrial activity. In 1940, in the Detroit-Willow 
Run region, the number of black women in factories was ]11,451: 
in 1944 this had-risen to 46,750.141 The Chrysler Car company, 
in 1940, included no blacks among its female staff: by 1945, it 
employed 18,148.142 An important area of increase was in 
government service, federal, state, county, and municipal, where 
the number of black female staff rose from 60,000 in 1910, to 
200,000 in 1944.143 
The number and status of Afro-Americans of both sexes in 
government work improved measurably during the war. President 
Roosevelt's letter of September 16,1941, to all heads of 
144 department, required that, 
139. * 'Employment - Negro Women', FEPC 408, NARG 228; Kathryn 
Blood, Negro Women War Workers, Women's Bureau, Department 
of Labor, Bulletin 20 5., Washington, D. C., 1915; and 
National Urban League, 'Changes in the Occupational Status 
of Negroes'. 
140. National Urban League, 'A Summary Report of the Industrial 
Relations laboratory: Performance of Negro Workers in Three 
Hundred War Plants', New York, 194h, 4, mimeographed, Howard 
University Library. 
]1 1. Blood, Negro Women War Workers, 7. 
142. Weaver, The Negro Ghetto, 81. 
]J3. Blood, Negro Women War Workers, 19. 
144. Quoted in Schuck, 'Eliminating Employer Discriminatory 
Hiring Practices', 15. 
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all departments and independent establishments in 
the Federal Government make a thorough examination 
of their personnel policies and practices to the 
end they may be able to assure me that in the 
Federal Service the doors of employment are open 
to all. loyal and qualified workers regardless of 
creed, race, or national origin. 
FEPC received and reviewed data on black employment in government 
and found that it had increased in all departments. In 19143, of 
a sample of 1,957,858 federal employees, 12.5 per cent or 246,109, 
were Afro-Americans: in 1941,19.2 per cent of all persons in 
federal departmental service were black. A great proportion 
of these were working in the traditional janitorial and custodial 
positions, but the proportion was much less than it had been before 
the war. One of the best departments, the Office of Price 
Administration, employed 1,250 Afro-Americans in 1915, more than 
146 70 per cent of whom held clerical and administrative positions. 
Another aspect of black participation in the war effort was the 
inclusion of 396 Afro-Americans on local war price and rationing 
boards. 147 With blacks in almost every government department and 
acting as advisers on race in Selective Service, the Office of War 
Information, the Office of the Secretary of War, the Department of 
Labor, the Office of Education, and the Housing Agency, Afro- 
11,5. ''Tables and Summary of Employment of Negroes in the Federal 
Government', December 1913, FEPC 407; 'The Employment of 
Negroes in the Federal Government', March 1943, FEPC 1108, 
NARG 228; and FEPC, First Report, 65. 
146. 'The Employment of Negroes in Federal Government', March 
1943, FEPC 408, NARG 228, and Memorandum, June 23,1945, OPA, 
D-4, NARG 188. 
117" Memo., 'Negro Participation in the Work of OPA', March 13, 191, OPA, D-1i, NARG 188. 
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Americans had sufficient numbers and experience to assert their 
claims and maintain their role in the post-war period. As one 
historian has said, 'the changes in governmental service were 
remarkable, even against the background of changes in American 
society generally. '148 
As in government, the gains made by Afro-Americans in the 
industrial sector of the economy were qualitative as well as 
quantitative. Between 1940 and 1944, the number of Afro-Americans 
employed as skilled craftsmen, foremen, and semi-skilled operatives 
had doubled and by the end of the war black men and women were 
engaged in jobs which few had performed before. 
149 
Indeed, much 
of what-happened in this period was contrary to accepted patterns 
of employment and was significant because of'the departure from 
old, established practices. Even the numbers of blacks employed 
in domestic or personal service declined, but because of a greater 
drop in the number of whites in similar occupations, the proportion 
of Afro-Americans rose. 
150 
The increased opportunities and the 
higher wages in industry encouraged a further decline in the number 
of blacks working on farms and there was a considerable movement 
from the rural to urban areas. In 1940,43.3 per cent of black 
men arid 21.0 per cent of black women were engaged in agriculture: 
118. Krislov, The Negro in Federal Employment, 31. 
1h9. Weaver, Negro Labor, 78; National Urban League, 'Changes 
in the Occupational Status of Negroes, 191&0-1950'; and War 
Manpower Commission, 'Utilization. of Reserve Workers: 
Recently Reported Placements of Negroes in Skilled Occupations', 
FEPC, 407, NARG 228. 
150. Department of Labor, Negroes in the United States: Their 
Employment and Economic Status, Bulletin 1119, Washington, 
D. C., 1952-) 13,45$ and Blood, Negro Women War Workers, 16. 
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four years later the comparable figures were 31.3 and 10.9 per cent. 
151 
The primary motivation behind this movement was the 
possibility of achieving industrial employment with high wages 
during-the war, and as a result of this trend Afro-Americans 
benefited frcan the general rise in real income. Because of 
regional variations in incomes it is hard to give overall statistics. 
However, it seems clear that the earnings of the average black, 
urban worker more than doubled, rising from about $400 to over 
$1,, 000152 Family incomes also increased as wives and husbands, 
sons and daughters, found work. In two housing projects in 
Atlanta, Georgia, it was found that the'average income of the 1,281 
families living there had increased by 65 per cent from 1940 to 
1944, despite the fact that male wage earners had often been 
153 drafted. Many of the increases were due to changes in 
occupation such as in the case-of a black women whose income 
increased from $312 to $2,177 after she had left her job as a 
maid to become a drill operator. Even the earnings of those who 
remained in their pre-war employment increased. The average 
annual, earnings of janitors rose from $709 to $1,245; of truck 
drivers, from $738 to $1,340; and of pullman porters, from $1,103 
to 154 These rises were not limited to the South, for 
151. Murray, Negro Handbook, 191L6-1L7,99, and Department of 
Labor, Negroes in the United States, 143. See Appendix II, 
Table 1. 
152. Department of Labor, Negroes in the United States, 25, 
and Frazier, The Negro in the United States, 61,62C. 
153., 'Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 'Annual 
Family and Occupational Earnings of Residents of Two Negro 
Housing Projects in Atlanta, 1937-441, Monthly Labor Review, 
Vol. 61,6, December 1915. 
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154. Ibid., 1070. 
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in housing projects in the North and West the median annual income 
of black families rose from $867 in 1940 to $1,967 in 1945.155 
This economic progress was not always opposed by whites. 
The New York State War Council found that 'resistance of the 
white worker to the integration of Negro personnel has existed 
largely in the minds of some personnel directorst. 
156 
Just as 
in the Army some white soldiers found the thought of integration 
worse than the actual experience, so too with men on the shop 
floor. In an aircraft factory on the West coast, where 117.83 
per cent of the white workers initially opposed the employment of 
Afro- Americans, after the event there was a progression from 
intolerance through tolerance to friendship and by 1944, objections 
were weak and infrequent. 
157 
Also indicative of some accommodation 
between black and white workers was the increase in black union 
membership during the war as 'even iron clad trade union tradition 
and practice were forced to bend, and at some points to give way.? 
158 
By 1945, the number of Afro-Americans in unions was 1,250,000, 
an increase of'approximately 700,000 over the 1910 figure. 
159 
155. Weaver 'Negro Labor Since 1929', Journal of Negro History, 
XXXV, I, January 1950,29. 
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Many employers found that hiring blacks did not lead to the disasters 
they had expected or that Afro-Americans necesarily proved to be 
poor workers. - The 
National Urban League survey of 300 war plants 
in 120 cities discovered that 288 of the firms had increased the 
number of their black employees. Of these, 215 were satisfied 
with their workers, 50 were fairly satisfied, and only nine said 
that blacks were not as good as whites. Of the 300,253 indicated 
160 
that-they would continue to use Afro-American workers. 
While these facts point to considerable changes in the 
economic status of Afro-Americans during, and largely as a result 
of, the war, there are important reservations. I have already 
shown that there were several incidents involving the opposition 
of white workers to the hiring or upgrading of blacks. Employers 
did still refuse to hire Afro-Americans or resorted to only token 
compliance with Executive Order 8802 by employing a small number 
of, blacks in menial positions. There was still a widespread 
tendency to give blacks only the hot, heavy, and dirty occupations. 
161 
Bearing-in mind the fact that blacks accounted for almost ten per 
cent of the American population, the proportion of Afro-Americans 
in major occupational groups for 191 0,1911! &, and 191 8, reveal the 
limits of wartime advances. 
162 
In 19144, black males accounted for 
160. National Urban League, 'A Summary Report of the Industrial 
Relations Laboratory: Performance of Negro Workers in 
Three Hundred War Plants, ' New York 19W.. See too, Burleigh 
B. Gardener and David G. Moore, Human Relations in Industry, 
Chicago 1950,312. 
161. Schuck, 'Eliminating Employer Discriminatory Hiring Practices', 
63-4; C. L. Golightly; 'Negro Deployment before the War 
and Now', undated, FEPC 109, NARG 228. 
162*. Department of Labor, Negroes in the United States, 15,45. 
See Appendix III, Tabe 2. 
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27.6 per cent of labourers, 21.1 per cent of farm workers and 
foremen, 21.9 per cent of service workers, 75.2 per cent of private 
household workers, and 10.1 per cent of the operatives and kindred 
workers. Although their representation had increased, they still 
comprised only 3.6 per cent of the craftsmen and foremen, 2.8 per 
cent of clerical and sales workers, and 3.3 per cent of professional 
and technical workers. The incomes of Afro-Americans rose during 
the war, but the discrepancy between their wages and incomes and 
those of whites still remained. In 1915, the average money 
income 'of all black families was only half that of white families. 
This was the highest it had ever been: it was also the highest it 
was to reach for some time. 
163 
As one writer pointed out, 'the 
gains of a decade, however striking, cannot seriously turn the tide 
of the seven preceding it., 
164 
Those gains which were made varied from area to area and 
from industry to industry. While the numbers of Afro-Americans 
employed in shipbuilding, or the iron and steel industry, were high, 
the numbers in textiles, electrical machinery, transportation, 
and public utilities were extremely low. 
165 
The numbers of 
Negroes'in the petroleum industry increased substantially in 
163. Department of Labor, Negroes in the United States, 2b-5. 
161. John Hope II, 'The Employment of Negroes in the United States 
by Major Occupation and Status', Journal of Negro Education, 
XXII, 3, Summer 1953,321. 
165. Schuck, 'Eliminating Employer Discriminatory Hiring Practices', 
6L, and Weaver, Negro Labor, 79. 
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all regions, but in the rubber tyre business very little. 
166 
William Schuck gathered a great deal of information which showed 
how conditions varied from region to region. He found that the 
employment of blacks in shipbuilding in Philadelphia, Baltimore, 
Seattle, San Fransisco, Los Angeles, and Galveston was good. In 
Mobile, New Orleans, Beaumont, and Evansville it was poor. 
Similarly, the aircraft companies in Cincinnatti and Detroit 
canpared more favourably with those in New Orleans, Dallas, 
Atlanta, Evansville, and Baltimore. 
167 
Northrup pointed out 
that employment patterns in the automobile industry changed very 
little in the South and West and the greatest changes of all were 
made in Chicago and Detroit. 
168 
But the greatest reservation of 
all was that any progress, no matter how slight, was made with the 
economy in full operation, with industrial expansion, and with a 
high demand for labour. On top of this was the 'disproportionate 
concentration' of Afro-Americans in war industries or government 
war agencies: the sectors of the economy most likely to experience 
166. Carl B. 'King and Howard W. Risher, Jr., 'The Negro in the 
Petroleum Industry?, and Herbert R. Northrup, 'The Negro in 
the Rubber Tyre Industry', both in Northrup, et al, Negro 
Employment in Basic Industry, 410-12,5341-36. 
167. 'Eliminating Employer Discriminatory Hiring Practices', 
68-71. Schuck also compared regional variations in the 
ordnance industry, in non-electrical machinery, electrical 
machinery, iron and steel, rubber, and textiles. His overall 
conclusion was that in the South there was little economic 
progress, qualitatively, for blacks. Weaver, Negro Labor, 
92, agreed with this summary. 
168. Northrup, 'The Negro in the Automobile Industry', in Negro 
Employment in Basic Industry, 63-6t. 
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cutbacks once the war had ended. 
169 
From past experience, most 
Americans expected an economic-recession in the post-war period 
and blacks were well aware that they would., once again, be last 
hired and first fired. Even without a recession, Afro-Americans 
feared that many of them would be displaced by returning white 
servicemen. 
170 
However, the economic gap between black and white 
had been closed and the Afro-American had tasted enough of prosperity 
to whet his appetite for more. It was clear that he would not be 
prepared to 'return to his prewar economic status without a 
constant and loud complaint.! 
171 
169. National Urban League, 'Racial Aspects of Reconversion: A 
Memorandum Prepared for the President of the United States', 
New York, August 27,1915, mimeographed, FEPC 107, NARG 228; 
President's Committee on Fair Employment Practices, Final 
Report, 41; Lloyd H. Bailer, 'The Negro in the Labor Force 
of the United States', Journal of Negro Education, XXII, 3, 
Summer 1953,297. 
170. Council for Democracy, The Negro in America, 12; Northrup, 
Will Negroes Get Jobs Now?, Public Affairs Committee, 
Pamphlet 110, New York, 1915; Walter P. Reuther, 'The 
Negro's Future'., Opportunity, XXIII, IL, Fall 1945. 
171. Weaver, Negro Labor, 245. 
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Chapter 5 
Wartime Migrations and Urban Conflicts The Disruptive Effects of War 
Commenting on the impact of the second World War upon 
race relations, the eminent black sociologist, Charles S. Johnson, 
spoke of the 'profound and sustained social shock, and the 'social 
upheaval of war. ' His description could not have been more apt, 
for, during the 1940s, as a direct result of the American role in 
the world conflict, one of the most important of 'unguided' changes 
took place. Without any encouragement from government or other 
agencies huge numbers of people of both races moved to the locations 
of defence industries. The influx of these newcomers, most of 
them from the South, into areas in the North and West had an effect 
which could only be described as disruptive. State and federal 
bodies, still attempting to cope with the problems of the Depression, 
were incapable of dealing with this added burden. Overcrowding 
in poor homes, racial conflict over housing, employment, and 
recreational facilities, plus the anger of blacks at the continued 
insults they and their men-folk suffered in the armed services, 
raised tempers to fever pitch. As a result there was, in 1943, 
an outbreak of ritt ing and conflict on a scale not to be witnessed 
again until the 1960s. But as well as creating friction between 
the races, urbanization had an influence on the health and education 
of Afro-Americans - generally for. the worse. However, these ill- 
effects were off-set by wartime prosperity, the general rise in 
standards of living, and the realization that the mental and physical 
1. Charles S. Johnson, 'The Impact of the War Upon Negro White 
Relations in the United States', '1917, Johnson Papers, 161, 
Flt, Fisk University. 
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well-being of ten per cent of the population was vital in times 
of emergency. Although the gap between black and white remained, 
it narrowed. It can be argued that this was another of the benefits 
of participation in the war effort. 
The migration of blacks was no new development in American 
history. Following the Civil War some Afro-Americans left the 
South and moved West, to Texas, Kansas, and Oklahoma. In the 
late 1880s, their numbers increased and their direction changed 
from westwards to northwards. This trend continued in the 1890s as 
the ravages of boll weevils and floods exacerbated the poor economic 
status of blacks in the South and as repressive Jim crow laws and 
acts of violence further threatened already reduced civil rights. 
2 
The North became even more attractive with the outbreak of war in 
191)4. Hostilities in Europe and danger in the Atlantic reduced 
the flow of immigration into America at a time when manufacturing, 
particularly of war materials, was increasing. The resultant 
economic opportunities for Afro-Americans turned what had previously 
been a trickle into a flood. Encouraged by friends, advised and 
cajoled by the Chicago Defender, and sought after by labour 
recruiters from Northern industries, blacks rushed towards the 
'Promised Land I" While estimates of one million are certainly 
too high, the number who left the South was considerable, probably 
in the region of 300,000 - 500,000.3 The black populations of 
2. Reynolds Farley, 'The Urbanization of Negroes in the United 
States?, Journal of Social Histo , Vol. I, Spring 1968,251-53; Gilbert Osofsky, Harlem: The Making of a Ghetto, Negro New 
York, 1890-1930, New York and Evanston, 1968,17-24; Fr 
From Slavery to Freedom, 399. 
3. U. S. Dept. of Labor, Division of Negro Economics, Negro 
Migration in 1916-17, Washington, D. C., 1919,11; Emmett J. 
Scott, Negro Migration Durin the War, New York 1920,3; 
T. Lynn Smith., 'The Redistribution of the Negro Population of the United States, 1910-1960, Journal of Negro History, LI, 3, July 1966,158-61. 
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major Northern cities increased dramatically. By 1920, the 
number of Afro-Americans in Detroit was 40,838, a 611.3 per cent 
increase over the 5,741 who had lived there in 1910. The increase 
in the white population over the same period was only 107 per cent. 
In Chicago, where the white population grew by 21 per cent, the 
black population increased by 148.2 per cent. 
t 
The 'great 
migration, as it was called, continued in the post-war years and, 
despite widespread unemployment amongst Afro-Americans in the North, 
into the 1930s if at a slower rate. This movement of Afro-Americans 
led to an increase in their numbers in cities, and a decline in 
their numbers in the South. Even so, in 19410 only 18.6 per cent 
of all blacks were classed as urban dwellers, and 77.1 per cent 
still remained. in former Confederate states. Ten years later, 
the corresponding figures were 62.4 per cent and 68.1 per cent. 
5 
These last bald statistics reveal something of the changes 
which took place during the second World War but they . 
do'not tell 
the whole story. The movement of blacks during the 1940s was 
not merely a repetition of the earlier migration; nor just a 
continuation of the later trends. A major difference was that the 
black migration of the 1.0s was part of a 'general shift in population 
and came only after whites had flocked to the cities. There was 
little need for encouragement from friends or the press, nor was 
there any call for labour agents although some were reported in the 
4. Robert C. Weaver, The Negro Ghetto, New York 1948,26-7. 
5. U. S. Dept. of labor, Negroes in the United States: Their 
Employment and Economic Status, Bulletin 1119, Washington, 
D. C., 1952,3-53 Farley, 'The Urbanization of Negroes in 
the United States t, 245,255. 
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South. 
6 
The departure between 1941 and 191j5 of five and a half 
million people from farms and poor areas to seek work in tc ns and 
? 
cities was encouragement enough. Even though blacks had to wait 
until their white compatriots found employment, the attraction 
was the same for both races: work in the Arsenal of Democracy. 
The location of the major war industries was responsible for the 
second difference between the two migrations. The movement during 
World War II was not simply from South to North. Following the 
routes taken by whites, Afro-Americans went from country to town, to 
small cities as well as large, and to an entirely new region, the 
far West and Pacific coast. No matter where, the places which drew 
the largest numbers were inevitably centres of war production. 
California, with almost half of America's shipbuilding and 
aircraft manufacture taking place within its boundaries, added over 
one million people to its population in three years. Between 1940 
and 1944, more than 500,000 people moved to the San Francisco Bay 
area alone - 1i5,000 of those were black,. 
8 
Although slower to start, 
the black migration soon surpassed that of whites, at least in 
percentage terms. Thus while the white population of San Francisco 
6. Memo. Robert C. Weaver to Robert R. Taylor, Consultant, Defense 
Housing Co-ordinator, June 6,1911, Housing aal Home Finance 
Agency, box 23, NARG 207. (Hereafter HHFA 23, NARG 207). 
Weaver reporting agents from Buffalo, N. Y., recruiting 
black steel moulders in Chatanooga and Nashville, commented 
that 'The bidding by Northern plants had become so open 
that Nashville firms were protesting because their workers 
were being "lured" away. ' 
7. Richard R. Lingeman, Don't You Know There's a War On? The 
American Home Front, 1941-19 , New York 1970,69-7F-' 
8. Lingeman, Don't You Know There's A War On?, 71; Weaver, The 
Negro Ghetto, 3; Dept. of La or, Negroes in the United 
States, 5.. 
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increased by 28.1 per cent between 1940 and 1946, the black 
population grew by the enormous 560.4 per cent, that is, from 
1,846 to 32,001. In Los Angeles, the number of whites increased 
by 17.7 per cent: that of blacks by 108.7 per cent. 
9 
In 1940; 
1.3 per cent of Afro-Americans lived in the West; ten years 
later this figure had more than doubled. 
10 But other areas had 
huge influxes too. In the Detroit Willow Run area, another 
important centre of aircraft production, the number of blacks 
increased by 47.0 per cent while that of whites rose by only 5.2 
per cent. The Afro-American population in Michigan as a whole. 
more than doubled but the white population increased by only. 17 
per cent. 
" 
Between 1940 and 1950, the number of Afro-Americans 
in Washington, D. C., where government was the major war industry, 
increased by almost 50 per cent and that of whites by only 9.2 
per cent. 
12 
la the country as a whole, 'by the end of 191.7,14 
per cent (1.8 million) of all Negroes born on or before April, 1910 
were living in a different state from the one in which they had 
lived in 1910. During this period about ten per cent of all whites 
moved to a different state. t13 
The states which made the largest proportional gain in black 
population were California and Michigan, followed by Oregon, 
9. Weaver, The Negro Ghetto, 8b. Also see Morton Grodzins, The 
Metropolitan Area as a Racial Problem, Pittsburgh 1960,1-2. 
10. Farley, 'The Urbanization of Negroes in the United States', 245. 
11. Florence Murray, ed., Negro Handbook, 
25-26; Jessie Parkhurst Guzman, ed., 
Review of Events Affecting Negro Life 
Alabama, 1947,9. 
New York 1917, 
r Books A 
.6 
Tuskegee, 
12. Constance McIaughlin Green, The Secret City: A History of 
Race Relations in the Nation's Capi a, Princeton, N, J., 7,200. 
13. Dept. of Labor, Negroes in the United States, 5. 
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Washington, Utah, Colorado, Wisconsin, Illinois, and New York. 
Oklahoma, Arkansas, Mississippi, Alabama, and Georgia all suffered 
a decline in their black populations. Afro-Americans who remained 
in the South were moving into urban areas and between 1940 and 
1950 Southern cities gained 750,000 blacks. 
15. The largest increases 
were, however, made elsewhere. Cities such. as San Diego, Los 
Angeles,, San Francisco Salt lake City, Deliver, Milwaukee, ''Pontiac, 
Buffalo, Lochester, and Syracuse had increases in-black population 
16 
of over 100 per cent in the ten years beginning in 1940. In a 
sense,, these figures are misleading for those-cities generally had 
relatively small black populations prior to the war. ' Buffalo, for 
example added only 8,000 to. the 17,691L Afro-Americans-present in 
1910. The number of blacks in Milwaukee in 1940 was only 9,000: 
in 1945 it was still just . 
13,000.17'"-. In cities which already had 
sizeable black communities, the wartime growth did not. appear. as 
great in proportional terms.. However, an additional 2]J., 53Li 
Afro-Americans entered Chicago during the war and 60,000 were" added. 
to-Detroit's numbers - both greater'increases than had occur , 
red 
during World War I. 
18 
It is true,. as Weaver said, that-the impact 
of the migrants was probably greater for the cities 
, 
14. Ibid. 5-7. 
15. Wesley C. Calef and Howard J. Nelson, 'Distribution of-Negro 
Population in, the United States', Geographical Review, Vol. 1i6, 
I, 1956,95; Farley, 'The Urbanization of Negroes', 255. 
Dept. of Labor, Negroes in the United States,. 7. 
17.. Charles Maboio Barresi, 'Residential Invasion and Succession:, 
A Case Study. ', unpublished M. A. thesis, June 1959, S. U. N. Y. 
at Buffalo, 2; Weaver, The Negro Ghetto, 83. 
18. Weaver, The Negro Ghetto, 19, '85-87, and Otis Dudley Duncan 
and Beverly Duncan, The Nero Po ulation of Chicago: A 
Study of Residential Success on, Chicago 1 7, , 21. 
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had small black populations prior to the war than for the bigger 
cities which already had large numbers of Afro-American residents. 
But no matter what their size, the problems were the same for all. 
The most obvious and pressing of problems was where to 
house the newcomers. The Depression had ended a boom in the 
building industry and construction was further curtailed during 
the 1940s as all resources were concentrated in the war effort. 
In the resultant general housing shortage blacks were harder hit 
than whites. Even before the war, in both the North and South, 
the worst housing was that occupied by Afro-Americans, and Southern 
blacks suffered more than others. Homes were often little more 
than overcrowded, unpainted, wooden shacks without toilets and often 
without running water. 
19 
Conditions in the North were little 
better. There Afro-Americans usually inhabited two-storey wooden 
houses or older brick tenements long vacated by whites. In 
either case, they were generally disapidated, overcrowded, and rat- 
infested. In Chicago, 'the core of the black belt was a festering 
slum., 
20 
Afro-Americans were concentrated in these poorer areas for 
a variety of reasons. New arrivals in a city normally sought the 
19. Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and 
Modern Democracy, New York 1944,376-78; Richard Sterner, 
Te Ne ro's Share: A Study of Income Consum tion, Housing 
and Public Assistance, New York 1943,166-703 10-200. 
20. Allan H. Spear, Black Chicago: The Making of a Negro Ghetto, 
1890-1920, Chicago 1967,24. See too, Sterner, op. cit., 
St. Clair Drake and Horace R. Cayton, Black Metropolis: A 
Study of Negro Life in a Northern City, revised ed., New 
York 1970,2 , and Gilbert Osofs , Harlem: The Making of 
a Ghetto" Negro New York 1890-1930, New York and Evanston, 
196d, 135-4d. 
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security and help of friends and relatives already established. 
Once settled, however, their low economic status and the prejudice 
of whites prevented any movement out of the ghetto. It was 
largely following the great migration, during the 1920s, that 
housing for blacks in the North became tightly segregated. As 
21 Robert Weaver, an authority on black` hoüsing, 'wrote, 
the idea of Negro ghettos in northern cities became 
fixed. As years went on, colored Americans were 
identified with segregated areas, and it was often 
assumed that Negroes had never been other than 
relegated to a well-defined area of living. -It. -, was 
also assumed that the Negro ghetto in the North was 
indestructible. 
Attempts to break out of these physical confines were thwarted by 
real estate agents who refused to sell to blacks; by financiers 
who refused to loan money to them; and by restrictive' covenants in 
property deeds which forbad the sale of a particular building to 
those other than of the Caucasian race. 
22 When such methods 
failed whites often resorted to violence, terrorizing Afro-Americans 
out of homes in predominantly white neighbourhoods. As more and 
21. Weaver, The Negro Ghetto, 1. Prior to the war, Weaver had 
been assistant adviser on Negro Affairs in the Department 
of Interior, then a member of the Public Works Administration, 
and later worked in the U. S. Housing Authority. During the 
war he was a member of the War Production Board until 19t3 
when he joined the Negro Manpower Commission. On the 
development of segregated housing, see too, Spear and Osofsky, 
op. cit., and Karl Taeuber and Alma Taeuber, Negroes in 
Cities: Residential Segregation and Neighborhood e, 
Chicago-7967,, 747 
22. Myrdal, An American Dilemma, 622-27; Tom C. Clark and Philip B. Perlman., Pre u ce and Property: An Historic Bri 
Against Racial Covenants, Washington, D. C., 1946j, 11-13; 
and Clement E. Vose, Caucasians Cnlyi The Supreme Court, 
the NAACP and the Restrictive Covenant ases$ Berkeley and 
Los Angeles, 1959) vii. 
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more blacks entered the cities the ghettos became increasingly 
congested and run-down, affecting morals, health, and race 
relations. 
23 
The Depression, which led to widespread federal intervention 
in all walks of life, brought about some relief in housing. The 
near-total collapse in private construction, the breakdown of 
finance, and widespread unemployment enabled the government to 
launch housing programmes. Through the Home Owners' Loan 
Corporation, the Federal Home Loan Banks, and the Federal Housing 
Administration, the government endeavoured to provide credit 
facilities for home-owners in difficulties and for prospective 
house-purchasers. This part of the federal programme had little 
impact on Afro-Americans. Increased credit mainly helped those 
people in the middle and lower-middle income brackets rather than 
the very poor. Secondly, the loans, although' insured by the 
Federal Housing Administration, were still arranged through 
established real estate agents and financiers who for one reason 
or another were reluctant to lend to blacks. Finally, the 
federal authorities accepted and maintained segregation in housing 
and the use of restrictive covenants thus limiting black participation 
from the start. The part of the government programme which did 
help Afro-Americans was that which provided and funded public, 
low-rent, housing. Under the aegis of the Public Works 
Administration, and later the U. S. Housing Authority, black 
participation in this area was considerable. Of the more than 
23. On the effects of segregation in housing see, Myrdal, An 
American Dilemma, 375-76; Clark and Perlman, Prejudice and 
Property, 14-1 E. Franklin Frazier, The Negro in the 
United States, revised ed., New York, 1969,63 -3 . 
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20,000 houses built between 1933 and 1937, about one-third were 
for Afro-American occupancy. 
24 
. While this was an encouraging 
development,, it hardly sId. naned the surfaced and with the onset of 
war, the immediate housing situation of Afro-Americans deteriorated 
rather than improved. 
The need to channel all resources into the war effort 
prevented much in the-way of new building construction, and, to 
'the extent that new housing was constructed, it was reserved for 
essential in-migrant workers in urgent war production areas. '2S 
Because of their late entry into war industry, Afro-American 
participation in the war housing programme was delayed. As a state- 
ment from the Federal Public Housing Authority pointed out, 
additional housing for blacks would come only with the breakdown of 
barriers to employment. 
26 
This proved to be a correct assessment 
of the situation, for the inclusion of Afro-Americans to any great 
degree in priority war housing took place after mid-1912.27 Iack 
of co-ordination and contradictory racial policies among the various 
government housing agencies also served to limit the number of 
21t. Myrdal, An American Dilemma, 350. The Federal housing 
programmes and their app cation to blacks are dealt with 
in An American Dilemma, 318-52; Sterner, The Negro's Share, 
op. .; Weaver, The Negro Ghetto, 69-75; and in Nathan 
Glazer and Davis McEntire, eds., Studies in Housing and 
Minority Groups, Berkeley and I, os Angeles 1960. 
25. Housing and Home Finance Agency, Housing of -the Non-white 
Population: 1940 to 19117, Washington, D. C., 19 46., 1. 
26. Quoted in Baltimore Afro-American, May 23,1942. 
27. 'Negro Share of Priority War-Housing - Private and Public; '- 
as of December 31,194! 41, Office of Principal Housing Analyst, 
May 1,19! 5, HHFA 91, NARG 207, and HHFA, Housing of the 
Non-white Population, op. cit. 
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'defense homes? available to blacks. A statement from the Defense 
Housing Co-ordinator of the Office of Emergency Management, which 
seemed to recognize the needs of war, declared, 
28 
Public interest and the war program demand that 
equitable provision of housing be made for Negro 
defense workers. This statement is to reaffirm 
and make effective this policy. A total war 
demands total participation by all of the people. 
He went on to say that the lack of vacant sites for development 
in black areas should Riot constitute an impediment to the defense 
program through the failure to provide adequate housing for Negro 
war workers., Government officials were called upon to take part 
in interracial and public relations work to prevent and overcome 
any problems that arose. Yet later the same year, a memorandum 
from the Federal Works Agency stated that sites should be selected 
'in accordance with our established racial policy, that is, to avoid 
any disturbance of existing racial patterns for any cities 
affected. '29 Such basic differences of policy were, theoretically, 
ironed out when the National Housing Agency was created, in August 
19412, to oversee the war housing programme. Although it had a 
policy of non-discrimination, the NHA lacked the machinery to put 
its principles into effect. Actions were also limited by the 
traditional economic viewpoints held by private financiers and by 
28. Memo., C. F. Palmer, Office of Emergency Management, Division 
of Defense Housing Co-ordination, to all personnel, January 28, 
191, HHFA 23, NARG 207. 
29. Memo., W. P. Seaver, Assistant Administrator for Development, 
Federal Works Agency, to all Regional Directors, May 9,19141, 
'Defense Housing', OASW 199, NARG 107. 
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local laws, which in some areas forbad integration. 
30 
This variety of forces restricted black participation in 
defence housing throughout the war. In 1941, only 11,600 or 1.4 
per cent of the total number of privately and publicly financed 
homes for war workers were for Afro-Americans although it was said 
that more than 20 million dollars were being spent on homes for 
blacks. 31 By the end of 194,8.6 per cent or 115,389 out of the 
total of 1,336,1)4 privately and publicly financed homes were for 
blacks. These figures obscure the fact that blacks received a 
greater number (and a greater proportion) of the publicly financed 
homes than they did of those privately financed: only four per cent, 
approximately 19,000, of the privately financed homes were for Afro- 
Americans in 194, compared with 16.1 per . cent, 
96,461, of the 
public. 
32 
The better situation in public housing was, in part, 
due to the Federal Public Housing Authority (formerly the U. S. 
Housing Authority) which was active in providing homes for black 
in-migrant workers. It was also due to the 'necessities of war, 
the enlightened policies of some housing authorities, and the 
constant prodding of the racial advisers in the Federal housing 
agencies' which 'yielded a growing number of racially mixed public 
30. Davis McEntire, Residence and Race: Final and Comprehensive 
Report to the Commission on Race and Housin Berkeley an s 
Angeles 1960 , 31 -20, and Weaver, The Negro Ghetto, 141-43. 
31. 'Negro Share of Priority War-Housing - Private and Public', 
op. cit., and Press Release, Office of Emergency Management, 
Division of Defense Housing Co-ordination, October 28, 
1911, 'Defense Housing', OASW 199, NARG 107. 
32. These figures are from 'Negro Share of Priority War Housing', 
and Weaver, The Negro Ghetto, ]i. L, 162. 
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housing projects. '33 While this was all to the good, public 
housing could not keep up with the needs of Afro-Americans or, for 
that matter, of whites. Lack of money, authority, and initiative 
all stood in the way of an adequate housing programme. More 
important for blacks was the'attitude of local white populations 
which was accurately summed up by a government official: 
34 
Local resistance against the use of suitable sites 
to house Negro in-migrants has often been intractable 
and intransigent, with roots so deeply imbedded in 
the mores, customs, or traditions of some communities 
that even the demands of war were insufficient, in many 
instances, to facilitate private or public war housing 
developments to accomodate these essential war workers. 
With such limitations on what little new home building there 
was, the housing conditions of Afro-Americans could not improve. 
Indeed, one survey found that during the war 'conditions of Negro 
housing in Chicago, Detroit, Cleveland, Buffalo, St. Louis, and 
other cities changed on the whole from bad to worse', a view with 
which Weaver agreed. 
35 
There was, it is true, an increase in 
'non-farm home ownership' amongst Afro-Americans in the war years, 
but in 1947 two-thirds of'the black urban population still lived 
in rented property. 
36 
Despite considerable increases in earnings, 
the purchasing power of black Americans was still limited by racial 
33. Weaver, The Negro Ghetto, 180. 
3L. B. T. McGraw, 'Wartime Rnployment, Migration, and Housing of 
Negroes in the United States, 19141-l4ji, HHFA 91, NARG 207. 
35. 'A Crucial Problem in Race Relations - Housing: Negro 
Housing Conditions in Five Cities of the North, 1910-1945', 
Race Relations: A Monthly Summary of Events and Trends, 
IV, , November , 117, and Weaver, The Negro Ghetto, viii. 
36. HHFA, Housing of the Non-white Population, 2. 
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considerations. The prejudices of estate agents and their 
clients, reflected in the increasingly widespread use of restrictive 
covenants, prevented blacks from buying homes in new developments, 
most of which were in the suburbs. Between 1910 and 1950, 
approximately 2,000,000 whites moved out of the central cities 
while 1,300,000 blacks moved in. There was, in short, an intens- 
ification of segregation in housing during this period as a survey 
of 185 cities by asocial scientist confirmed. 
37 
Whatever the 
shortcomings of his findings, and there are several, Cowgill's 
general conclusion that 'residential segregation in these American 
cities did in fact increase during the decade, 191.0-1950,1 is borne 
out by writers at the time. 
38 
The effect of this was to turn 
areas where some blacks lived in 1940, solidly black; to create 
new black areas; and to add to the congestion in existing 
ghettos. Thus while the proportion of the white population 
living in overcrowded dwellings, (i. e., with. more than 1.5 people 
per room), declined from 4.8 per cent in 1940 to 3.6 per cent in 
1950, for blacks, despite their generally improved economic status, 
37. Donald 0. Cowgill, 'Trends in Residential Segregation of Non- 
whites in American Cities, 1940-1950', American Sociological 
Review, XII, 1, February 1956; Weaver, 'Non-white Population 
Movements and Urban Ghettos', Phylon, XX, 3,1959; HHFA, 
Housing of the Non-white Population, 10-13. 
38. Cowgill, 'Trends'in Residential Segregation', 46; Weaver, 
Hemmed In: ABCs of Race Restrictive Housing Covenants, 
American Council on Race Relations, Chicago 1945; and Charles 
Abrams, Race Bias in Housing, New York 1947. Some of the 
limitations of Cowgill's findings are pointed out by Wendell 
Bell, 'Comments on Cowgill's "Trends in Residential Segregation 
of Nonwhites"', American Sociological Review, XXII, April 
1957,221-22. The main criticism is in the size of the areas 
used by Cowgill, and the important conclusion drawn is that 
there was more segregation than Cowgill's figures would have 
us believe. 
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the figures rose from 16.0 per cent to 16.7 per cent. 
39 
This, of course, is a general view of the situation which 
omits variations from one place to another. A brief examination 
of a selection of cities in different areas will give some idea 
of the conditions faced by Afro-Americans. San Francisco and Los 
Angeles were both said to have no 'Negro problem' prior to 1911, 
largely because the number of blacks there up until then was small. 
This situation changed almost overnight as thousands of Afro- 
Americans, most of them from Oklahoma, Arkansas, Texas, and 
Louisiana, moved west. 
40 
The reason for this migration was, 
quite simply, economic. Of 152 black in-migrant families interviewed 
in San Francisco, the majority had come to seek better employment, 
to work in war industries, and to earn more money. A number had 
moved to join husbands in the forces who were stationed in or near 
the city. 
41 
For most of these their wishes for economic improvement 
were fulfilled and in the war boom prosperity the average gross 
monthly wage was $329.32.42 Despite their earnings, however, Afro- 
Americans were restricted in their choice of'accommodation. 
Restrictive covenants in both Los Angeles and San Francisco forced 
blacks into the areas formerly occupied by Japanese. In San 
39. Weaver, 'The Relative Status of the Housing of Negroes in the 
United States', Journal of Negro Education, XIII, 3, Summer 
1953, and Davis McEntire, Residence and Race, 39-40. 
40. Joseph James, 'San Francisco', and Charles Bratt, 'Los 
Angeles', both in Journal of Educational Sociology, XIX, 3, 
November 1945. 
t1. Charles S. Johnson, et. al., The Negro War Worker in San 
Francisco: A Local Self-survey, San Francisco 19 44., 80. 
112. Johnson, The Negro War Worker in San Francisco, 18. 
X53 
Francisco this meant that there were 10,000 people in a district 
previously inhabited by less than 5,000 where 55 per cent of the 
homes were rated as substandard. 
3 
War housing programmes were 
completely inadequate. The black population of Los Angeles had 
increased by over 60,000; almost 30,000 blacks worked in war 
industry; but only 3,825 units of war housing were provided for 
Afro-Americans. The number of defence homes occupied by blacks 
in San Francisco was L, 78L although there had been over 20,000 
black in-migrants to the city 
. 
While the public. housing 
authorities in San Francisco insisted on segregation of the races.. 
those in Los Angeles tried to ease the situation by dispersing 
Afro-American, families throughout their projects. This was also 
true in Seattle and Portland but in all cases white resistance 
limited the success of such ventures. 
5 
The inflow of such huge numbers and the lack of vacant 
accommodation led to overcrowding. The average migrant family of 
five people in San Francisco occupied 3.3 rooms. For some, 
conditions were even worse: one family of ýthree lived,. ate, and 
slept in one poorly furnished room, 'another in a 'substandard 
46 
frame dwelling' without bathroom, toilet, or hot water. Living 
43. James; 'San Francisco', 170; 
_ 
Johnson, The Negro War Worker 
in San Francisco, 20; Clark and Perlman, Prejudice an 
Property', 15. 
44. 'Los Angeles Negro Housing', HHFA 91, NARG 207; Guzman, 
Negro Year Book, 1941-1946,341; Weaver, The Negro Ghetto, 84. 
15. 'Housing for Negro Occupancy in Seattle and Portland', March 21, 
1915, HHFA 91, 'NARG 207; Robert W. O'Brien, 'Seattle', 
Journal of Educational Sociology, äI%, 3, November 1945; 
Weaver, The Negro Ghetto, 156-9., 198. 
46. Johnson, The Negro War Worker in'San Francisco, 24-27. 
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conditions-in Los Angeles were described as 'apalling': in one 
case more than 40 people used a single toilet; the sharing of beds 
by shifts was common - as one person got up to go to work, another 
took his place in the 'hot bed'. 
47 
Similar conditions were recorded 
in Washington, D. C., the nation's capital. There,, a woman journalist 
reported, were the worst slums of. all where (five or six persons to 
48 
a room, occupying at times a single bed, is commonplace. ' Local 
housing authority plans to build homes for Afro-Americans outside 
of the ghetto in Washington were abandoned in the face of white 
opposition. While 55,000 new war homes were built for whites only 
4,000, half of them temporary, were built for blacks. 
49 
Attempts to construct housing projects, in Buffalo, New York, 
were also resisted by the local white populations. 
, 
With Bethlehem 
Steel and Bell Aircraft plants located there, Buffalo was an 
important centre of war industry. It therefore attracted a 
considerable number of black migrants, most of whom found work as 
labour shortages developed. 
5o 
Finding accommodation was not as 
easy. When the Division of Defense Housing of the National Housing 
Agency announced, early in 1941, that it planned to build homes in 
b7. Dorothy W. Baruch, Glass House of Prejudice, New York 1946, 
27-36. 
I8. Agnes E. Meyer, Journey Through Chaos, New York 19 44., 3211. 
149. National Committee on Segregation in the Nation's Capital, 
Segregation in Washington, Chicago 1918,41; Meyer, 
Journey Through Chaos, 330. 
50. Buffalo Courier Express, August 8,19403 November 1,19112, 
February 14, ; Weaver, Negro Labor, 111-12. 
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north Buffalo for some of the black workers, protest was immediate. 
The NHA then suggested alternative sites in neighbouring Cheektowaga 
and Tonawanda, but those projects too were unacceptable to whites. 
51 
Most of this opposition appears to have come from Polish and Irish 
Catholics, often led by their'priests. In an address before the 
Catholic Interracial Council in New York, a representative of the 
Defense Housing Co-ordinator said 'the frequency with which 
Catholic priests have inspired, organized, and led opposition'to 
the Governments efforts to provide housing for Negroes has been 
very disturbing., Buffalo, he went on to say, was 'the outstanding 
example., 
52 
Pressure from Lester Granger of the National Urban 
League and from government officials, persuaded representatives of 
the Catholic church to condemn the discriminatory actions of same of 
its priests and affiliated organizations 
53 
Although the 
opposition to black housing projects then died down, it had'already 
had effect. The Federal and local authorities thereafter insisted 
on segregation in public housing and spent two years trying to 
find sites for projects while units in white areas stood empty'for 
lack of suitable applicants. 
54 
Despite the resultant hardship and 
51. See correspondence in OASW 199, 'Defense Housing', NARG 107, 
and William L. Evans, Race Fear and Housing in a Typical 
American Community, National Ur an League, New York . 
52. Address before C. I. C. by Robert R. Taylor, December 1,1914, 
OASW 199, NARG 107. 
53. Granger to Rev. John A. Duffy, Bishop. of Diocese of Buffalo,. 
October 22,1911; William H. Hastie to Professor T. W. 
Turner, November 2)., 1914; Memo., Hastie to Taylor, 
December 3,1941s all in OASW 199. ' Also letters in BHFA 
23, NARG 207. 
54. Evans, 'Federal Housing Brings Residential Segregation to 
Buffalo', Opportunity, XX, 4, April 1942; Weaver, The Negro 
Ghetto, 95. 
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wastage and the heated criticism of housing officials by the local 
Urban League, the policy of racial separation was adhered to until 
1947 when the State Commission against Discrimination. ordered an 
end to it. 
55 
The Chicago housing departments attacked the problem of war 
lousing for Afro-Americans with crnsiderable vigour, attempting- 
to house blacks outside of the. 'Black Belt. Their efforts were 
staunchly resisted by whites. - The scene of the most intense 
covenant activity, 80 per cent of Chicago was estimated to be 
covered by racially restrictive housing agreements 
56 
When such 
'legal' methods failed to keep blacks out of white areas., violence 
and intimidation were used. Between May 1,1944 and July 20, 
1946, there were 46 cases of arson-bombings. In the face of 
57 
this, public housing was the blacks, only hope, but with an increase 
of over 100,000 in. the number of Afro-Americans-in the city, the 
7,000 war harnes had little effect. For one project of 1,658 units 
opened in January 1911, there were 19,000 applicants. 
58 
By 1945, 
300,000 Afro-Americans were crowded into the South Side, an area 
suitable for a maximum of 225,000. A survey of 69,000 homes in 
three black areas in 1914 found that 26.3. per cent, (15,780),. were - 
55. Weaver, The Negro Ghetto, 207. 
56. Clark and Perlman, Prejudice and Property, ]. 4; Abrams, Race 
Bias in Housing, 12. 
57. Weaver, The N 
Human Relatio: 
1946, Chicago 
ro Ghetto, 95; Chicago Mayor's Commission on 
, Human Relations in Chicago: Report for Year 907-6-1-62K 
58. Mayor's Commission, Race Relations in Chicago: Report for 
1915, Chicago 1915, -2T., Guzman, Negro Year Book, 1941-46, 
373'. 
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overcrowded. 
59 
It was'not surprising then that the Mayor's 
Commission found that 'most of the cases of racial friction... 
60 
have occurred directly in relation to the housing-situation. ' 
Like the migration'of Afro-Americans, interracial violence 
was not new'to America, 'nor was its relation to times of war. 
During the Civil war there had been bloody clashes between blacks 
and whites in New York and Detroit. In 1917, at least 40 Afro- 
Americans were killed in the riot'at East St. Louis: in 1918, 
there were more deaths in Philadelphia; in 1919, there were 
26 race riots in various cities, the largest taking place in 
61 
Chicago. The outbreaks during World War II, however, surpassed 
those of any previous period. There were clashes between servicemen 
of both races, between black soldiers and white policemen or 
civilians, and between black workers and white workers. These 
eruptions reached their peak in 1543 when there were 242 racial 
battles in 47 cities including Beaumont, Los Angeles, 'New York, 
62 
and Detroit. 
Attracted by the huge car factories converted to war production, 
over 500,000 people, more than 50,000 of them black, moved to 
Detroit and neighbouring willow Run during the war. The-black 
59. Avarh-E. Strickland, *Histo of the Chicago Uran League., 
Urbana, Illinois, "19 , 157-8; Mayor's Commission, Race Relations in Chicago, 26. 
60. Race Relations in Chicago, 40. 
61. Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom,., 278,147L, 180-83; Arthur 
I. Waskow, From Race Riot to Sit-int 1919 and the 1960s, New York 19 7. 
62. 'The Pattern of Race Riots Involving Negro Soldiers', Race 
Relations: A Summary of Events and Trends, 1-2, 'August- 
September 1-97U; Harvard Sitkoff, 'Racial Militancy and 
Interracial Violence in the Second World War', Journal of 
American History, LVIII, 3, December 1971; Guzman, *Negro 
Year Boo k, 1941--46, Chpt. X. 
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newcomers found that Detroit had but two areas for Afro-Americans, 
one on the west side and a larger one called Paradise Valley, on 
the east. The Federal Public Housing Authority projects for 
warworkers at Wayne and Willow Run were restricted to whites only, 
and of the total of 44,607 units built in Detroit only 3,070 were 
for blacks. 
63 
With an estimated shortage of 6,000 to 20,000 
dwellings for Afro-Americans, Paradise Valley was, in 1913, no 
paradise at all and an assistant to the U. S. Attorney General was 
to describe the housing situation as 'deplorable'. 
64 
When, in 
1942, the Sojourner Truth Housing Project, a project named after a 
female black abolitionist but built in a white neighbourhood, was 
opened for black tenants, white protests led to its reassignment 
to whites. Pressure from Afro-Americans led to the reversal of 
the order, but did not prevent a mob of whites from gathering to 
block the entry of blacks. Eventually, the Afro-Americans, protected 
by state troopers, gained access to their homes. 
65 
Whites also 
resisted the employment of blacks in Detroit and as late as 1943 
there were still plants which made little or no use of Afro-Americans 
despite the shortages of unskilled production workers. In the 
first six months of that year, three million man-hours were lost due 
63. Weaver, The Negro Ghetto, 86,173. 
6t. 'A Crucial Problem in Race Relations: Negro Housing 
Conditions in Five Cities of the North, 1910-1945', Race 
Relations: A Monthly Summary, L, November 1916; Ear LLouis 
Brown, Why Race Riots? Lessons from Detroit, Public Affairs' 
Pamphlet 7, New York 1944,314-16; Louis E. Martin, 'Detroit', 
Journal of Educational Sociology, ZVII, 5, January 1944; 
Memo. C. E. Rhetts to Attorney General Biddle, July 12,1943, 
93: 12 FDRL. 
65. Bucklin Moon, The High Cost of Prejudice, New York 19! 7, L3-5; Weaver, The Negro Ghetto, 92-94; Walter White and 
Thurgood Marsha, 'What Caused the Detroit Riots', in 
Thomas R. Frazier, ed., Afro-American History: Primary Sources, 
New York 1971,173-81. 
.ý 
159 
to strikes after the up-grading or hiring of blacks in the U. S. 
Rubber company, the Vickers company, Hudson Motors, Packard, and 
several others. 
66 
Much of this race hatred was stirred-up by 
white in-migrants from the South, encouraged by men like the 
Reverend J. Frank Norris, Gerald L. K. Smith, and Father Charles 
Coughlin, who were described, rather accurately, as 'religious 
political demagogues. 167 
With this background of tension, it is not surprising that a 
major riot should have been forecast. After numerous violent 
incidents an editorial in Opportunity warned, 
68 
There is something highly disturbing in the repetition 
of racial clashes in Detroit, something ominous like 
the low rumble of distant thunder before a storm. The 
clouds gather. And the storm will eventually break 
unless the constructive forces of racial amity in Detroit 
take aggressive and positive action to quell those 
irresponsible and vicious elements in the population 
who are intent on fastening the pattern of race relations 
of Mississippi and Florida on that municipality. 
No action was taken, and on the evening of Sunday, June 20, a riot 
began that was to last for three days, ending only after Federal 
troops had been called in. The immediate cause was a confrontation 
between youths of both races on Belle Island which in turn sparked 
66. Brown, Why Race Riots, 19; Joseph D. Keenan, Vice-chairman, 
Labor Production, W. P. B. ), to J. Bron Philipscn, Program 
supervisor, NHA, August 7,1913, HHFA 91, NARG 207. 
67. ' Brown, Why Race Riots, 6-8; Walter White, A Man Called 
White, New York l Tr, 2211-25; Thomas Sancton, 'The Race 
Riots', New Republic, July 5,1913,130. 
68. Opportunity, %%, 5, May 1942. Also see Sitkoff, 'The Detroit 
Race Riot of 1943', Michigan History, LIII, 3,1969,188. 
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off other clashes in the vicinity. By night time, rumours of 
atrocities were circulating amongst both blacks and whites. The 
ccmnonest story was that a black (white) baby had been thrown off a 
bridge, or that a white (black) women had been assaulted. 
69 
The 
truth would have made little difference: the tensions of several 
years exploded. Blacks looted and destroyed white-owned stores, 
whites attacked blacks caught outside the ghetto. The police 
force could or would do nothing. In some instances blacks were 
beaten in the presence of police officers, in others the police 
themselves were actually involved in attacks. 
70 
Despite the obvious 
inability of the forces of law and order to control the situation, 
both the mayor, Edward Jeffries,. and the Governor, Harry F. Kelly, 
hesitated to call in federal troops. It was Tuesday before such 
action was taken and by the time the soldiers arrived there was 
rioting in 19 precincts affecting 75 per cent of the entire city. 
71 
69. Detailed accounts of the riot are provided in Alfred McClung 
Lee and Norman Humphrey, Race Riot, New York 19143; Robert 
Shogan and Tom Craig, The Detroit Race Riot: A Study in 
Violence, New York 1961T. 
70. Of the 25 blacks killed, 17 died at the hands of the police. 
They were severely criticised by Thurgood Marshall, a black 
lawyer and representative of the NAACP, in 'The Gestapo in 
Detroit', The Crisis, August 19143, see too Pittsburgh Courier, 
July 3,1943. 
71. Telegram Kelly to Roosevelt, June 22,1943,93: 12 FDRL; 
Brig. General William E. Guthner to Lt. Col. F. W. Reese, 
Provost Marshal General's Office, August 2,1943, 'Detroit 
riot', War Dept., NARG 389. The delay in calling for 
assistance is dealt with in Sitkoff, 'The Detroit Race Riot', 
191-94, and in White, A Man Called White, 226. 
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After initially dispersing crowds, using bayonets and occasionally 
gas, the troops worked in patrols protecting especially the 
transportation system. 
72 
Gradually, the city returned to order. 
By that time 34 people, 25 black and nine white, were dead, more 
than a thousand injured, and a great deal of damage done. The 
general effect of the riot was 'to retard industrial production, to 
impair the morale of our armed forces, and to injure national unity. '73 
The violence in Detroit caused some alarm among the admin- 
istrators of other municipalities with large black populations. 
The mayor of New York, Fiorello LaGuardia, sent observers to 
Detroit during the riot and held a meeting after it in order to 
prevent a repetition of those events in his own realm. A few 
days later, he wrote to President Roosevelt that, 'so far as 
conditions are concerned, I believe we have done more than any 
other city in the country. 174 He must, therefore, have been 
sorely disappointed when a major disturbance broke out in Harlem on 
Sunday, August 1,19143. During a minor fracas in a somewhat 
72. Military Log , 'Detroit riot', War Dept., NARG 389. The 
efficiency of the Army once called in, was demonstrated by 
the fact that no deaths were recorded after the soldiers' 
arrival and by the gradual return to work on Wednesday 23rd. 
See both Military Log and Guthner to Reese, op. cit., War 
Dept., NARG 389. In fact, the War Department had been 
prepared for such an eventuality for a number of years. A 
plan existed which stated in detail the action to be taken 
in case of domestic disorders. For some reason this was 
known as 'Eaergency Plan White'. See, Acting Sec. of War 
to Roosevelt, August 19,1943,93: 12 FDRL. 
73. Congressman Vito Marcantonio to Roosevelt, June 26,1913, 
93: 12 FDRL. 
74. LaGuardia to Roosevelt, June 27,1913,93: 12 FDRL, and White, 
A Man Called White, 230. 
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disreputable hotel, a 26 year-old black soldier, Robert Bandy, was 
shot and wounded by a white policeman. Immediately, a rumour that 
the soldier had been shot in the back and killed began to circulate 
amongst the black inhabitants. 
75 
Whether or not the soldier was 
alive or dead was really irrelevant: what was important was the 
fact that such a confrontation had taken place. As the poet, 
Langston Hughes, summed it up, 
76 
They didn't kill the soldier, 
A race leader cried. 
Somebody hollered, 
Naw! But they tried! 5talics hi 7 
Unlike the Detroit riot, what resulted. in Harlem was more of an 
implosion than explosion. Although there were a few attacks on 
white people who had mistakenly strayed into the area, most of 
the black rage was directed at white-owned property. After several 
hours of window smashing and general commotion, wholesale looting 
of shops and stores took place as Afro-Americans seized foodstuffs 
and clothing previously sold to them at exorbitant prices. 
77 The 
only white people involved were the police and city administrators 
attempting to restore law and order. As many people pointed out 
75. Baltimore Afro-American and Chicago Defender, August 7,1913; 
New York Times, August 2,1943; and Wei ems, A Man Called 
White, 23 -3 . 
76. 'The Ballad of Margie Polite', in One Way Ticket, New York 
1949,75-78. Margie Polite was one of the principal 
participants in the original scuffle. Also see the editorial 
in The Crisis, September 1943, on the feelings of the riot 
participants . 
77. White, A Man Called White, 235; New York Times, August 3, 
1943. 
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afterwards, the eruption in Harlem was not a race riot in the sense 
that Detroit was. 
78 
It was not necessary for federal troops to be 
called into New York either. Careful use of the police force and 
the assistance of prominent black leaders such as Walter White and 
Roy Wilkins of the NAACP was all that was needed to restore peace. 
Without the battles with whites that had occurred in Detroit, the 
black rage soon burned itself out. Only five people, all black, 
were killed, (compared withthe 34 in Detroit), 500 were injured, and 
another 500 arrested. An estimated five million dollars worth 
of property was damaged. 
79 
Fortunately, this was the last major 
riot of the war years, and in fact, the last of its scale until the 
19608.80 
The question of why these outbreaks should occur when they 
did was one which drew a variety of answers. The New York Times 
pointed out that both riots 'had similar powderkeg backgrounds in 
the rapid growth and overcrowding of Negro districts in recent 
years, charges of discrimination in the Army, Navy and war industry, 
demands for ec. onomic and'social equality, and the rise of Negro 
radical agitators preying on these conditions. '81 The Detroit 
Governor's Committee seized on the last of these points and in its 
report blamed Afro-Americans for starting the initial fight and 
black organizations and newspapers for stirring up the underlying 
78. White, A Man Called White, 238-39; New York Times, August 3, 
1943; Langston Hughes, Fight for Freedom: The Story of the 
NAACP, New York, 1962,97. 
79. New York Times Review, August 8,1943. 
80. Arthur I. Waskow, From Race Riot to Sit-in: 1919 and the 1960s, New York 19 7,220. 
81. New York Times, August 3,1943,10. 
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tensions. 
82 
Afro-Americans, on the other hand, accused racist 
and subversive elements of causing trouble in order to prevent 
progress in civil rights and to weaken America's war effort. 
Walter White referred to the riots prior to that in Harlem as, 
83 
deliberately provoked attacks which are designed 
to hamper war production, destroy or weaken morale, 
and to deny minorities, Negroes in particular, the 
opportunity to participate in the war effort on 
the same basis as other Americans. 
Local and federal government officials rejected such arguments as 
unfounded. 
84 
They did, however, agree on some of the deeper causes 
of unrest, although their solutions to the problem generally 
differed from those of blacks. 
One major contributory factor, as was pointed out by the New 
York Times, was the wartime migrations and resultant overcrowding. 
New York was no different from Detroit in that respect. Although 
the New York Housing Authority had a comparatively liberal policy, 
it could do little to counteract the prejudice that confined 
blacks to Harlem. Even Afro-Americans in the higher income brackets. 
could not escape despite their ability to pay. Newcomers from the 
82. Newspaper reports and the findings of the' Governor ts committee 
are included in the War Dept. files on the riot, NARG 389. 
See too, Sitkoff, 'The Detroit Race Riot', 199-201, and 
Brown, Why Race Riots?, 22-3. 
83. Telegram, White to Roosevelt, June 21,1913; Program of 
Action on Nation-wide Race Riots Adopted by Conference of 
National Organizations, and many other letters blamed 
seditionist activity, all in 93: 12 FDRL. 
84. In a letter to Roosevelt, Attorney-general Biddle declared, 
'There is no evidence of any Axis, or Fascist or Ku Klux 
Klan incitement. In fact there is no evidence of any 
ccncerted action to bring about the riots. ' July 15,1943, 
93: 12 FDRL. See also, Sitkoff, 'The Detroit Race Riot', 204. 
. 165 
South found themselves condemned to live in tenements which were 
'a hundred delta cabins, plus tuberculosis. ' 
85 
A senior official 
of the National Housing Agency singled out the shortage of housing 
as a major cause of racial friction, and the vice-chairman of Labor 
Production in the War Production Board blamed the lack of 'adequate 
expansion in community facilities. '86 These and other similar 
reports led the Attorney General, Biddle, to recommend that the 
President get a report 'on the advisability of putting into effect 
a program for building houses and recreational facilities in 
Detroit, particularly for Negroes, and in other areas where racial 
tensions are largely affected by the lack of housing and recreational 
facilities. ' He also suggested that 'careful c aisideration be 
given to limiting, and in some instances putting an end to, Negro 
migrations into communities which cannot absorb then' A hint of 
pessimism was included with his advice concerning the production of 
'a simple manual to be used by local officials and corps commanders 
to expedite the sending in of troops when necessary. ' 
87 
His 
gloom was probably justified given the impossibility of controlling 
migrations and the already proven failure of federal housing 
agencies to deal with the racial question. Moreover, President 
85. Roi Ottley, Black Odyssey: The Story of the Negro in America, 
London, 1949-, -25-9; Weaver, The Negro Ghetto, 186-87; White, 
A Man Called White, 240; Warren M. Banner, 'New York', 
Journal of Educational Sociology., XVII, 5, January 19141., 
272-79. 
86. Coleman Woodbury, NHA, to Jonathan Daniels, Admin. Assistant 
to the President, August 12,1913, and Joseph D. Keenan, WPB, 
to J. Bron Philipson, Program Supervisor, NHA, August 7, 
1943, both in HHFA 91, NARG 207. 
87. Biddle to Roosevelt, July 15,191 3, following report from 
C. E. Rhetts to Biddle July 12,1943,93: 12 FDRL. 
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Roosevelt was reluctant to take action on civil-rights in general, 
preferring to leave the problem until after the war. In the meantime, 
he was content to let his advisers and local civic committees 
handle racial affairs. 
88 
Racial violence has been shown to be related to population 
changes and conflict over housing, and clearly poor housing and 
overcrowding played a large part in the disturbances in Detroit and 
Harlem. 
89 
But housing was just one of several causes of dissatisfaction 
and friction. While the lot of Afro-Americans could, in general, 
be said to have improved during, and because of, the war, all 
progress met with stubborn opposition. Employment opportunity did 
not come until necessity demanded it, and even then was limited 
by the attitudes of white workers and employers. Blacks in the 
armed services were segregated and discriminated against and reports 
of violence directed at black soldiers appeared in the press with 
alarming frequency. There was still a rise in expectations and 
in militancy amongst Afro-Americans but when their aspirations were 
met by whites determined to maintain the racial status quo the 
result was anger, and bitterness. Given the economic and social 
discrimination, the stories of racial violence elsewhere, and the 
physical restrictions of the ghetto, it is not surprising that a 
88. Jonathan Daniels was one of four aides appointed to deal 
with race relations problems and in preference to Biddle's 
suggestions, Daniels was to correlate all information on 
race relations. What he was to do afterwards is not clear. 
See Daniels to John B. Blandford, July 28,191 3, HHFA 91, 
NARG 207, and letters in 93: 12 FDRL. Also Sitkoff, 'The 
Detroit Race Riot', 201-5. 
89. Allen D. Grimshaw, 'Urban Racial Violence in the United 
States: Changing Ecological Considerations', American 
Journal of Sociology, LXVI, 2, September 1968. 
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black area such as Harlem could be described as a 'cauldron of 
brooding misery and frustration. ' 
90 
Added to the racial tensions 
was the strain of war. The war fulfilled some of the conditirns 
said to be necessary for riots to occur by preventing institutions 
from functioning properly and by delaying the resolution of 
grievances. In short, the war lead to 'the disarrangement or 
distortion of the patterns of social interaction to the extent 
that the happening of major race conflicts was possible. '91 People 
of all races were working long hours, -subject to rationing, 
irritated by shortages of material goods, and, if not subject to 
the draft themselves, likely to have a relative or friend sent off 
to face the perils of armed conflict. Thus the war contributed, 
both directly and indirectly to the 'powderkeg' atmosphere. It 
only took fairly trivial incidents on hot sticky days to provide 
the spark. 
92 
The very violent nature of war may have encouraged rioting: 
it certainly would appear that armed service did, in more than one 
way. In Harlem, but more especially in Detroit, the majority of 
90. White, A Man Called White, 235; Sitkoff, 'Racial Militancy 
and Interracial Violence in the Second World War', Journal 
of American History, LVII, 3, December 1971,671; Carey 
McWilliams, 'What We Did About Racial Minorities', in Jack 
Goodman, ed., While You Were Gone: A Report on Wartime Life 
in the United States, New York 1946,59-90. 
91. Bernard F. Robinson, 'War and Race Conflicts in the United 
States', Phylon, IV, ti, 191.3; Stanley Lieberson and Arnold 
R. Silverman, 'The Precipitants and Underlying Conditions of 
Race Riots', American Sociological Review, X%%, 6, December 
1965. 
92. Sitkoff, 'Racial Militancy and Interracial Violence', 670; 
Brown, Why Race Riots?, 6-16. It is worth bearing in mind 
that bot riots began on hot, humid Sundays, and in Detroit 
it started among crowds in a cramped recreational area. 
It was a situation in which to ers were already frayed. 
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the rioters were young males. The Governor's committee found that 
almost 63 per cent of the participants in the riot were under 31 
years of age while less than 35 per cent were under 21.93 This 
fact led Walter White and Thurgood Marshall to suggest two categories 
of young rioters. 
9b 
The first was made up of those people who 
had been rejected for armed service on physical, mental, or moral 
grounds, or deferred by reason of occupation. Rioting for them 
was a means of demonstrating their masculinity and, that they were as 
physically able as those who had gone into the Army. The second 
category consisted of those facing armed service, or likely to face 
it if the war continued for some time. The riot presented them 
with the chance of a 'final fling' and armed service broke the 
pattern of their lives and destroyed the normal-stabilizing influence 
of continuity. It is interesting to ncte that many of the rioters 
in Los Angeles as well as in Detroit, were men in uniform whose 
pattern of life had already been disrupted. The riots may have been 
an expression of their nervousness about their futures, a reaction 
against the restrictions of military. life, or even a sign of 
resentment at young people who had avoided military service. 
95 
One 
of the participants in the Harlem disturbance was later interviewed. 
96 
93. Details of report in War Dept. files NARG 389. 
91j. White and Marshall, 'What Caused the Detroit Riots? ', 178-79. 
95. See Sitkoff, 'The Detroit Race Riot', 189; Lee and Humphrey, 
Race Riot, passim; Lingeman, Don't You Know There's a War 
On?, 3507 I should point out that there were cases of white 
soldiers protecting blacks in Detroit, see photographs in 
War Dept. file, NARG 389. 
96. Kenneth B. Clark and James Barker, 'The Zoot Effect in 
Personality: A Race Riot Participant', Journal of Abnormal 
and Social Psychology, Vol. 1.0,1915. 
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He was an 18 year-old Afro-American facing induction who had given 
up school in order to have some fun. When the disorder began he 
joined in, looting a number of different shops. Of his future in 
the Army he said, 'If ... I do not like it worth a dam. I'm not a 
spy or a saboteur, but I don't like goin' over there fightin' for 
the white man - so be it. '"' His role in the riot was obviously 
more than a final frolic prior to armed service: it was a conscious 
or unconscious protest against his social isolation, rejection, 
and humiliation by white society. The same was probably true of 
most of those who took part with him. 
97 
The war, then, served to damage race relations to the point 
of violence. By opening up employment opportunities in certain 
areas it encouraged large-scale migrations of people, both black 
and white. Unable to cope even with the increases in white 
population, most towns and cities were unwilling to tackle the 
problems facing Afro-Americans. Old ghettos were added to, new 
ones were formed. In either case, housing was poor and overcrowded 
and the general lack of decent accommodation and other facilities 
added to the many grievances felt at the time. Although generally 
having unpleasant consequences, the growth in the black urban 
population did lead to an increased sense of corm nity and awareness. 
Attacks by whites were met with ccmcerted action and news of racial 
incidents passed quickly through the entire Afro-American populace. 
97. Surprisingly, some black commentators disagreed with this 
view. The Pittsburgh Courier, August, 114,19)13, referred 
to the Harlem riot as 'an orgy of vandalism without reason, 
without excuse and without defense. ' Adam Clayton Powell, 
Sr., called the rioters hoodlums and thieves, in Riots and 
Ruins, New York 1945,149-51. 
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As the war progressed and as more in-migrants entered the cities, 
tensions mounted and points of friction between the races increased. 
With the additional disruption of life by long hours in war 
industries, by rationing and controls, and by armed service, open 
conflict became virtually inevitable. The war may well have 
'pointed up the basic issues in the housing problem of Negroes in 
the North', as Robert Weaver said. 
98 
It did not, however, produce 
much in the way of solutions for that particular problem or for 
the race relations problem in general. 
II 
As Gunnar Myrdal pointed out, 'housing is much more than just, 
shelter': its relation to general health and welfare is of prime 
importance. 99 Inadequate accommodation, low economic status, and 
white prejudice ensured that the health of Afro-Americans prior 
to the war was far below that of the rest of the population. ' 
Measured by any indice, the difference between black and white was 
apalling. Two examples will suffice: in 1939, the number of 
deaths out of 100,000 due to tuberculosis was for whites 37.4y for 
blacks 131.3. The infant mortality rate per 1,000 births for whites 
in 1940 was 0.2: for blacks it was 72.9.100 Given the results 
of migration and urbanization during the war, one might expect a 
further deterioration in this situation. In fact, although the gap 
98. Weaver, The Negro Ghetto, 90. 
99. Myrdal, An American Dilemma, 375-76. 
100. Mary Gover, 'Negro Mortality: Course of Mortality from 
Specific Causes, 1920-19441, public Health Reports, Vol. 63, 
7, February 13,1918,212; Murray, Negro Hand Book, 1946-47,71. 
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between the two races remained, it narrowed as the health of the 
black population continued to improve. 
In many respects, this was a continuation of the long-term 
trends in national health statistics. The greatest progress 
actually occurred before the war, during the 1930s, when federal 
intervention led to an improvement in medical care and facilities 
and in standards of living. That these trends continued, if at a 
slightly slower rate, during the 1940s, was due to several factors. 
Housing in northern ghettos was often superior to that in the rural 
South and usually there was less discrimination in hospitals and by 
doctors in the North. Wartime employment and prosperity, and the 
generally higher standard of living meant that Afro-Americans could 
spend more on hospitalization and on medicines. 
101 The treatment 
of people in the anned services and in defence plants also had 
effect. Even in the South, blacks could afford better foods with 
higher nutritional contents, thus ensuring that their children 
received something approaching the correct balance of vitamins. 
102 
By 1944, the figures for deaths per 100,000 due to tuberculosis had 
dropped to 32.7 for white Americans and 109.7 for Afro-Americans. 
103 
The statistics for infant mortalities also showed an improvement. 
In 193, they had dropped to 37.5 for whites and 61.5 for blacks. 
This was even more remarkable given that the birthrate of both races 
101. Dept. of Labor, Negroes in the United States: Their Employment 
and Economic Status, Bulletin 1119, Washington, D. C., 1952j 
2-3; E. H. Allen, 'Extending Health Horizons Among Negroes', 
Opportunity, XXIV, 1, Jan. -March, 1946. 
102. Dorothy Dickins, 'Food Patterns of White and Negro Families, 
1936-19481, Social Forces, X%VII, ! i, May 191.19. 
103. Gover, 'Negro Mortality', 212; Guzman, Negro Year Book, 
1952,161. 
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rose during this 
104 
In part this was due to the factors 
already mentioned but also to the Emergency Maternity and Infant 
Care Program which provided free care for the wives and newborn 
babies of men in the lower ranks of the armed forces. 
l05 
However, many of the imperfections in medical care for Afro- 
Americans still remained. Once again, the war served to highlight 
some of them. An editorial in the Baltimore Afro-American pointed 
out that fit was not until war demands for manpower weighed our 
young folk in the balance of physical, mental and emotional fitness 
and found so many of them wanting, that many of us recognized 
the 
urgent need for better health and better homes, a view with which 
a researcher for the NAACP heartily agreed. 
106 
The 921,000 black 
registrants for armed service declared IV-F, that is, physically, 
mentally, or morally unfit, was a serious indictment of the 
American social system . 
107 
The number of rejections was such that 
southern politicians actually claimed that whites were being 
discriminated against, 
108 
Even so, little was done to change the 
10L.. Murray, Negro Hand Book 19b6-47,71; Guzman, Negro Year 
Book, 1941-46 , 320-22. See Appendix IV. 
105. Philip F. Williams, 'Maternal Welfare and the Negro', 
Journal of the American Medical Association, Vol. 132, II, 
November 16,1946,611; Murray, Negro Hand Book, 1946-47, y 71. 
106. Baltimore Afro-American, March 31,1915; William Montague 
Cobb, Medical Care and the Plight of the Nero, NAACP, New 
York 194-777. 
107. Jean Byers, A Study of the Negro in Military Service, Dept. 
of Defense, Washington, D. C., 19475 mimeographed copy in 
Moorland Collection, Howard University, ]11-15. It is 
interesting to note here that scme psychiatrists at induction 
stations rejected blacks with strong attitudes on segregation 
and discrimination as mentally unfit for military service, 
Campbell C. Johnson to Col. Rowntree, October 2,1942, 
Selective Service System 220, NARG 147. 
108. Various letters from southern congressmen in Selective Service 
System 220, NARG 147. 
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underlying reasons for this state of affairs. While the general 
ratio of doctors to people in 1945 was 1: 750, there were only 
3,810 black doctors - one to every 3,377 Afro-Americans. In dentistry, 
the ratio was even worse, 1: 8,800.109 There were only two 
all-black medical schools, at Howard University and Meharry Medical 
College, and the number of graduates they produced was pitifully 
small. Once graduated, the students had difficulty finding 
places as interns. By 1948, the number of black patients per 
doctor had actually increased to 3,681.110 The majority of 
Afro-Americans qualified as general practitioners or specialists 
were located in the North where there was greater opportunity. In 
the South, segregation of patients and practitioners led to a 
wasteful duplication of facilities and a lack of hospital treatment 
for blacks. Separate was by no means equal. Despite the higher 
incidence of illness and disease amongst Afro-Americans, the 
proportion of beds per head of population was much lower for them 
than for whites. In Mississippi, for example, there were 0.5 beds 
per 1,000 Afro-Americans compared with 2.3 per 1,000 whites. In 
the entire state of Virginia there was no surgical treatment of 
tuberculosis available to blacks althouth it was one of the main 
causes of mortality amongst that section of the conmiunity. 
lll 
109. Guzman, Negro Year Book, 1941-46,331; Michael M. Davis and 
Hugh H. Smythe, 'Providing Adequate Health Service to Negroes', 
Journal of Negro Education, Vol. 18,1949) 308. 
110. Cobb, Medical Care and the Plight of the Negro, 7,12-13; 
Guzman, Negro Year Book, 1952,1 3. 
111. James Worsham Barksdale, A Comparative Study of Contempora 
White and Negro Standards in Health, Education and Welfare, Charlottesville, Virginia, Phelps-Stokes Fellowship Paper,, 
University of Virginia-E949., 30; Davis and Smythe, 
'Providing Adequate Health Service to Negroes', 308. 
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While the opportunities for black women to obtain training 
as nurses increased as a result of scholarships from the Public 
Health Service, and, in 1913, through the U. S. Cadet Nurse Corps, 
service in the Any Nurse Corps was segregated until 1915. Even 
the Red Cross refused to permit Afro-Americans to assist in its 
civilian first-aid training programme unless they formed segregated 
units on their own initiative. 
112 Blacks did participate in the 
military war effort despite these limitations on their service. As 
a result, they made some gains. Co-operation between the National 
Nursing Council for War Service and the National Association of 
Colored Graduate Nurses helped to break down discrimination in 
nursing schools and, in 1948, the American Nurses Association voted 
individual membership to all black nurses excluded from state 
organizations on racial grounds. After the Arkansas State Nurses 
Association admitted blacks to full membership in 1549 only six other 
state nursing bodies barred Afro-Americans. By 1950, the National 
Association of Colored Graduate Nurses was disbanded because there 
was felt to be nofurther need for a separate association. 
113 
The 
previous year the American Medical Association named an Afro-American, 
Dr. Peter Marshall, as a member of its policy-making body. He was 
the first black to hold such a position in 103 years. 
l14 A greater 
112. Mabel Keaton Staupers, No Time for Prejudice: A Story of the 
Integration of Negroes in Nursing in the United States, New' 
York 1961,97; Kathryn. Blood Negro Women War Workers, Dept. of 
Iabor, Bulletin 205, Washington, D. C., 1945) i; 1rrdal, 
An American Dilemma, 1367. 
113. Staupers, No Time for Prejudice, 63,119; Walter White, 
How Far The Promised Land?, New York 1956,157. 
114. White, How Far the Promised Land?, 157. 
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advance was made with the passing of the Federal Hospital Survey 
and Construction Act in 1946. The Act, which provided federal 
funds for the construction or enlargement of hospitals, prohibited 
discrimination in the use of such monies. It demanded that separate 
facilities for Afro-Americans were to be equal and that the number 
of beds provided for blacks was to be in proportion to their 
representation in the local population 
. 
Although encouraging, these were but small steps towards 
bringing the health of Afro-Americans up to the level of that of 
whites. De jure segregation in the South, de facto in the North, 
led to separation and thus inequality, in all-facilities, housing, 
recreation, and hospitalization. The circle of prejudice and 
discrimination limited the very life of black Americans and in a 
system based primarily on private rather than public health services, 
the gap between the two races would remain as long as Afro-Americans 
were confined to the lowest economic and social strata of society. 
The same was also true of education, another area in which 
Afro-Americans lagged behind whites as a result of discrimination 
and segregation. The educational gap betwen the races was apparent 
in the comparative number of years spent in school, the length of 
school terms, the amount of money spent per pupil, the ratio of 
pupils to teachers, and the differences in teachers' salaries. 
While there were differences in standards between black and white 
throughout the entire country, they were more pronounced in the 18 
southern states which required segregated schools. In those states, 
115. Michael M. Davis, 'What Color is Health? ', Survey Graphic, 
XXXVI, 1, January 1947,85-86; Davis and Smythe, 'Providing 
Adequate Health Service to Negroes', 316. 
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the average length of school terms in 1934-35 was 167 days for whites 
and ]146 days for blacks. The salaries of black school teachers were 
generally half those of their white counterparts, ranging from 235 
dollars per annum in Mississippi to 667 dollars in Texas. 
13-6 
While 
the situation was generally better in the North, de facto segregation 
and ghetto schools ensured that the educational attainments of 
northern blacks, while greater than those of both blacks and whites 
in the South, were lower than those of whites in the same geographic 
area as themselves. There were considerable improvements in the 
education of both races during the 1930s under the auspices of the 
New Deal: the Public Works Administration helped finance a 
considerable number of schools, the Works Progress Administration 
launched a huge adult education programme, and the National Youth 
Administration gave aid to. students. An awareness, of the racial 
problems in education was revealed by the government financed studies 
and by the appointment of blacks to the Office of Education. 
117 Also 
of importance was the NAACP campaign to equalize teachers' salaries 
begun in 1936. By 191i1, it reported considerable success. As 
well as salaries, the length of school terms and the number of black 
pupils also rose in the years immediately prior to the outbreak of 
116. Frazier, The Negro in the United States, 1125-40; Guzman, 
Negro Year Book 1941-46,54-61; Murray, Negro Handbook, 19112, 
109. The 1 states were, Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, 
District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, No. Carolina, Oklahoma, 
So. Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia. 
117. Nyrdal, An American Dilemma, 343-4 4. The studies included, 
Doxey A. Wilkerson, Special Problems of Negro Education, 
Washington, D. -C., 1939; Advisory Committee on Education, The Federal Government and Education, Washington, D. C., 1938; 
U. S. Office of Education, National Survey of the Higher 
Education of Negroes, Wash gton, D. C., 1942. See Myrdal, 
An American Dilemma, 1270-71, and Frazier, The Negro in the 
United States, 465--81. 
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war. 
118 
Even so, the basic faults in the system which kept 
black standards below those of whites remained. 
Just as the war pointed out the inadequacies in housing and . 
health provision for blacks, so too did it focus 'the attention of 
the nation on the educational deficiencies of the Negro. ' 
119 
Again, 
it was rejections for military service which brought the lack of 
educational qualifications among Afro-Americans to the country's 
notice. Between May and September 1914, five times as many black 
as white registrants for Selective Service were rejected. Of these, 
almost one third were due to educational inadequacies. 
120 
The 
statistics also revealed regional variations which reflected the 
differences in school systems. For example, while 0.3 per cent of 
the white registrants and 1.8 per cent of the blacks from New York 
were found ineligible for military service because of their 
inability to read and write, 1.9 per cent of the whites and 15.1 
per cent of the blacks from Mississippi were deferred for the same 
reason. Even after the Army had lowered its standards, the gap 
118. 
the South: From 1619 totne Present, 
1967p 21 -17. 
Frazier, The Negro in the United States, 136-37; Harry S. 
Ashmore, The Negro and the Schools, Chapel Hill, No. Carolina, 
1954,28-29; Virgil A. Clift, et al, Negro Education in 
America: Its Adequacy, Problems and Needs, New York 1962, 
53; Henry Allen Bullock. A History of Negro Education in 
ts, 
119. Frazier, The Negro in the United States, ! Ui. 6; see also, 
Malcom S. MacLean and R. O'Hara Larder, 'Negroes, Education, 
and the War', Educational Record, %XIII, 1, January 1942, for 
comments on the Afro-American as 'a huge and largely untapped 
resource of manpower, brain power, and service power. ' 
120. Director of Selective Service, Selective Service in Wartime: 
Second Report, Washington, D. C., 1943,289. 
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l21 
between North and South, black and white, was much the same. 
Both the American Teachers' Association, an organization of black 
school teachers, and Ambrose Caliver, the Senior Specialist on Negro 
Education in the Office of Education, concluded that these figures 
were indicative of the inequality in educational opportunity and they 
called for change. 
122 
Some southerners argued that the high rejection 
rate amongst blacks was a sign of discrimination against whites and 
expressed concern that as the white male population was depleted 
through Selective Service, white women were endangered by the large 
number of blacks left at home . 
123 
While such complaints may have had some effect, a more 
immediate and serious cause for alarm was the rapidly developing 
manpower shortage in the forces. By 1943, the situation was such 
that the Army could no longer afford to refuse the illiterates and 
slower learners of either race. In June of that year, a special 
training programme to give such inductees a basic education in 
reading and writing was initiated. Approximately 136,000 Afro- 
121. American Teachers' Association, The Black and White of 
Rejections for Military Service: A Study of Rejections for 
Selective Service Registrants By Race, On Account of Educat 
anu rientia. L ueiic3. encies, rlontgomery, A,. LaOaMa, 15044.9 1-0. 
122. American Teachers' Association, The Black and 'White of 
Rejections for Military Service, 50-51; Caliver, Postwar 
Education of Negroes: Educational Implications of Army Data 
and Experiences of Negro Veterans and War Workers, Washington, 
D. C., 1945,44-55, in Office of Education, 40, KARG 12. 
123. Representative Norvell of Arkansas, October 2,1942, Senator 
Overton, Louisiana, August 10,1942, and letter from Edgar 
Hoover, head of F. B. I. to Director of Selective Service, 
Hershey, May 28,1943, all in Selective Service 170, NARG 1117. 
Also see Frazier, The Negro in the United States, 4147. 
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Americans benefitted from this course and their 85.1 per cent success 
rate, compared to 81.7 per cent of whites, was regarded as a 
? shattering blow to racists. 
124 
This programme in particular and 
military service in general provided many blacks with some degree of 
education, if only in technical skills such as vehicle maintenance 
and electrical engineering. 
125 
A greater source of industrial 
education was the Defense Training scheme for war workers. 
Although the role of blacks in defence training was 
discussed from its inception, there was nevertheless, in its early 
days, open discrimination. In the 18 states with separate school 
systems, where Afro-Americans comprized 22.3 per cent of the 
population, as of June 30,1942 only 3,910'or 7.0 per cent had 
taken part in pre-employment courses. Despite non-discrimination 
clauses in the federal laws which appropriated funds for training, 
there was ample evidence that blacks received less than their fair 
share. 
126 
As the war progressed and as shortages forced the 
breakdown in racial barriers, black participation increased. In 
the latter half of 19412, a total of 58,228 Afro-Americans took part 
in pre-employment courses, while another 13,066 took supplementary 
classes. In 19L3, more than 112,000 completed war production, 
trade, professional, and clerical studies. Overthe four year 
1211. Byers, A Study of the Negro in Military Service, 36-38. 
125. Myrdal, An American Dilemma, 149; Caliver, Postwar Education 
of Negroes, 2-7. 
126. Memo., John W. Studebaker, Commissioner, Office of Education, 
to Paul V. McNutt, Chairman, War Manpower Commission, 
September 1912, and Lawrence W. Cramer, executive secretary, 
FEPC, to Studebaker, July 3,1942, both in Office of 
Education 40, NARG 12. 
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period beginning in July 1940,12.4 per cent, or 323,496, 
of all trainees were black and 22,780 had taken engineering, 
scientific, and managerial courses. 
127 
These educational gains 
came about as a direct result of the war: as Robert Weaver remarked, 
'were there no anticipated shortage of skilled workers, there would 
be no current federal program for their training. f128 
The necessities of war had an impact on the very institutions 
of learning. Firstly it stripped the universities and colleges of 
students and then flooded them with military and defence trainees 
who brought with them an influx of federal monies to provide 
equipment and materials for their training. Secondly, there was, 
as the film 'Negro Colleges in Wartime' illustrated, an emphasis on 
war-related skills: electronics, radio engineering, mathematics, 
and the sciences. This raised questions about the place of non- 
related subjects on the college curricula and about the aspirations 
and the future place in society of those who completed such technical 
courses. 
129 
The wartime migrations, while alleviating the pressures 
on the inadequate school facilities in the rural South, added to the 
burdens of urban areas. In the South, wartime prosperity enabled 
127. War Manpower Commission, Utilization of Reserve Workers: 
Recently Reported Placements of Negroes in Skilled Occupations., 
Washington, D. C., 1944, in FEPC 07, NARG 226; Caliver, 
'Office of education Services for Negroes. Education for 
Victory, February 20,1945, in OE h0, NARG 12. 
128. Weaver to Studebaker, July 18,19110, OE h0, NARG 12. 
129. Ashmore, The Negro and the Schools, 48; Frazier, The Negro 
in the United States, 77; 'Negro Colleges in Wartime', 
Office of War Information, 1943, National Archives N. A. 
208-7-PPC; Felton G. Clark, 'Negro Higher Education and 
Some Fundamental Issues Raised by World War II', Journal of 
Negro Education, XI, 3, July 1942; Ambrose Caliver, 'Certain 
Significant Developments in the Education of Negroes During 
the Past Generation; Journal of Negro History, ilXV, 2, 
April 1950. 
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the states to spend more money on all schools and partly as a result 
of this, partly because of the urbanization of blacks, in the 18 
states with segregated schools there was during the war an increase 
in the average length of terms, an increase in the number of black 
teachers, and a 25 per cent increase in their salaries. 
130 
Similar 
developments were taking place elsewhere in America: more black 
children were spending longer in school at all levels, had slightly 
more money spent on them, and were taught by better paid teachers. 
131 
While the developments of the pre-war era were consolidated and 
continued, the gap between black and white still existed. The 
average black teacher's salary in the South was still only 4 per 
cent of that of his white counterpart; the pupil- teacher ratio 
was still 20.7 per cent more than in white schools; the wide 
difference in expenditure per white and per black pupil still 
remained. 
132 
For those already past school age, there was the opportunity 
to study under the G. I. Bill of Rights or the Project for Adult 
Education of Negroes. The latter, launched in 1916, was sponsored 
by the Office of Education with the financial support of the Carnegie 
Corporation of New York. Under the directorship of Ambrose Caliver, 
the Project aimed Ito raise the educational level of the large 
130. 'Statistics of the Education of Negroes, 1945-461, Office 
of Education Statistical Circular, No. 239, March 1948, OE 10, 
NARG 12; Frazier, The Negro in the United States, 447-49. 
131. Guzman, Negro Year Book, 1941-46,71; Dept. of Labor, Negroes 
in the United States, 9-10. 
132. 'Statistics of the Education of Negroes, 1945-46'; Frazier, 
The Negro in the United States, 44 7. 
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numbers of Negroes whom the Selective Service System and the 1940 
census described as functionally illiterate., 
133 
Most writers on 
the subject of education shared the sentiments inherent in that 
statement. They saw the failings in the existing school system 
which the war had revealed and emphasized, and they called for 
improvement in order that America might be better prepared to meet 
any future test. Minorities would benefit from any such improvement. 
Charles H. Thompson, the editor of the Journal of Negro Education, 
134 
summed up this feeling as early as 191i2: 
We cannot afford to repeat the mistakes of the]ast 
war in believing that all of the problems of race 
relations are going to be solved merely because we 
are fighting a war for the preservation of democracy. 
And yet we do have reason to hope for a better post- 
war world. 
This applied as equally to housing and health as to education. The 
war had exposed the inequalities, Afro-Americans had played their 
part in the war effort: they expected their just rewards. 
133. Papers on Project for Adult Education of Negroes and Articles in School Life, October 1946, and November 1948, 
all in OE 1i0, NAND 12. 
1311. 'Negro Higher Education and the War', Journal of Negro Education, XI, 3, July 1912. This entire volume is devoted To- Ngro Education and the war and nearly all of the articles 
concentrate on . that will have to be daze in the future. 
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Chapter 6 
Blacks in Film, Music, and Literature during World War II 
The impact of total war is felt in all areas of life, cultural 
as well as economic, social, and political. This was perhaps more 
true of the countries near to and directly involved in the conflict 
than of those, such as America, which were some distance from it. 
1 
Nonetheless, the war did have a similar effect in the United States: 
films were made, songs sung, and books written about the war which 
revealed the response to the challenge it posed. By and large, 
patriotism and propaganda were the order of the day. 
2 Afro- 
American participation in these cultural activities reflected much 
of this impact of war and while all three avenues are explored in 
this chapter, it really falls naturally into two parts: the first 
dealing with film and the second music and literary writings. 
The reason for this division is simple. The film world was 
essentially a white world and so any changes in the treatment of 
blacks in that media during the war were due to changes in white 
attitudes. In music and literature, on the other hand, Afro- 
Americans had a more independent role and so could express themselves 
1. Angus Calder, The People's War: Britain 1939-45, London 1971, 
413-22,123-31; Arthur Marwick, Britain in the Century of 
Total War: War, Peace and Social Change 1900-1967, London 
299,359-60; Gordon Wright, The Ordeal of Total War, 
1939-1945, New York 1968,251 -62 . 
2. Lewis Gannet, 'Books', and Bosley Crowther, 'The Movies', 
both in Jack Goodman, ed., While You Were Gone: A Report on 
Wartime Life in the United States, New York 1946; Richard R. 
Lingeman, Don't You Know -T -Here's a War On? The American Home 
Front 1911- , New York 1970,175-244. 
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more freely. Thus the songs, stories, and poetry of this time 
dealt with their moods and reactions to the war. 
With one or two exceptions, films prior to 1941 treated 
Afro-Americans in a manner symptomatic of 'their general status in 
society. As one critic wrote, 
Cinema audiences now regard the coloured man as a 
clown, a buffoon, a gangling idiot or a super- 
stitious fool. They despise the negro. Quite 
unconsciously their feeling of contempt for "the 
poor black trash" is fostered and fed by the unfair 
manner in which the negro is portrayed on the screen. 
From 'Birth of a Nation' (1915), 'The Jazz Singer' (1927), through 
to 'Gone With the Wind' (1939), the characterization of the Afro- 
American was designed to demonstrate his inferiority. The failure 
of films made independently by blacks for blacks revealed the 
dominance of white-controlled Hollywood and its concern with the 
white censors and populations of the southern states 
. 
Following 
the outbreak of war, this situation began to improve and in the 
years 1912-t5, 'the Hollywood film industry demonstrated a conscious 
effort to bring a better understanding amongst most races and groups 
in this country and, in a broader field, among the nationalities and 
races allied with us in World War II. 15 
In part, the change in films was directly due to the war. 
3. Georg Noble, 'The Negro in Hollywood', Sight and Sound, 
Spring 1939,711. 
4. Peter Noble, The Negro in Films, London 19149,7-8,148-149, 
71-75; Thomas R. Cripps, 'Movies in the Ghetto, B. P. (Before 
Poitier)', Negro Digest, XVIII, 14, February 1969. 
5. John T. McMann and Louis Kronenberger, 'Motion Pictures, the 
Theatre, and Race Relations', Annals of the American Academy 
of Political and Social Science, Vol. 22, March 1946,1 52. 
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Of its own volition Hollywood produced films to encourage audiences 
in their support of the war. There were the patriotic-propaganda 
type of films based on both'military and civilian life to bolster 
morale, ' and' others, such as 'Strange Incident', a western which stressed 
the ideals of democracy. Of the 1,313 feature films produced between 
1942 and 19W.., '374 were directly w ncerned with some aspect of the 
war. 
6 
The government considered the movies so important as to 
declare the film-making business an essential industry and to create 
a Bureau of Motion Pictures under the Office of War Information to 
see that nothing damaging to the war effort was portrayed on the 
screen. In its information manual the Bureau advised the use of 
Afro-American extras in uniform in crowd scenes in order to 
demonstrate black loyalty and their participation in the war effort. ' 
The Office of Censorship forbad the export of several films showing 
racial discrimination for fear they would tarnish America's image 
abroad.? Government action of this type was, however, limited due 
to opposition within both Hollywood and Congress to such federal 
controls. The Bureau of Motion Pictures was forced'to concern 
itself with regulating the amounts of money spent on film production 
and the'use of manpower and other resources. More important, as 
far as Afro-Americans were concerned, were the pressures brought to 
bear by certain individuals and' organizations, including actors 
themselves. 
6. Dorothy B. Jones, 'The Hollywood War Film: 191.2-1944 ', 
Hollywood Quarterly, I, 1, October 1915. 'Strange Incident', 
20th Century Fox 19432 based on The Ox-Bow Incident, by Walter 
van Tilburg Clark. 
7. Lingeman, Don't You Know There's"A War On?, 191-92,201. 
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Wendell Willkie, the Republican party presidential candidate 
of 19L0, and Walter White, the executive secretary of the NAACP 
were amongst the most active campaigners for better roles. for blacks 
on the screen. The two men spoke out against discrimination and 
poor parts at the Annual Awards of the Motion Picture Academy of 
Arts and Sciences in 1910 and 1942 and also at the Writers' Congress 
in Los Angeles in 19L13. Dalton Trumbo, the screenwriter later 
named in Joseph McCarthy's 'Hollywood Ten', also spoke at the 
latter meeting and criticized the film industry for its failure 
to use blacks in crowd scenes and shots of war production lines, as 
well as its generally poor treatment of Afro-Americans. 
8 
, 
Other 
pressures came from black actors and actresses, such as Paul 
Robeson, Clarence Muse, and Lena Home, who refused to accept 
parts which denigrated the members of their race. 
9 
White actors, 
including Boyer, Bogart, Robinson, Laughton, and Welles, joined 
with Afro-Americans in organizations working for racial unity like 
the Emergency Committee of the Entertainment Industry, the 
International Film and Radio Guild, and the Independent Citizen's 
Committee of the Arts, Sciences, and Professions. 
10 
Also of 
importance were the protests of the Afro-American population as a 
8. Walter White, A Man Called White, New York 1948,200-202; 
Proceedings of the Writers' Congress, Los AngelCs 1913, 
Berkeley and Los Angeles 19,14-lb, 495-501; Pittsburg 
Courier, August 8,1912. 
9. Noble, The Negro in Films, lt7-57. Even Stepin Fetchit, the 
actor who played and gave his name to the. archetypal black 
stereotype was later to complain that he had trouble finding 
work after he had refused to play the old demeaning role any 
longer, New York Times, July 21j., 1968. 
10. Noble, The Negro in Films, 221-22; White, A Man Called White, 
231-32; Leon H. Hardwick, 'Motion Pictures', in Florence 
Murray, ed., The Negro Handbook, 1946-t7, New York 19117,262. 
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whole, but especially of servicemen, which demonstrated 'their 
growing social consciousness. 'll These forces together had some 
obvious and immediate effects. In 1942, Warner Brothers, 20th 
Century Fox, and Metro-Goldwyn-Meyer gave assurances that black 
stars would be given roles more in keeping with their normal place 
in society, -a promise re-iterated by the movie-moguls, David 0. 
Selznick and Darryl F. Zanuck. 
12 
Several films made during and after the war reflected the 
changes that had taken place. A number of motion pictures featured 
Afro-Americans in small but significant parts. Dooley Wilson in 
'Casablanca', Canada Lee in 'Lifeboat', Kenneth Spencer in 'Bataan', 
and Rex Ingrams in 'Sahara', all broke with established stereotypes 
in roles stressing unity and democracy. 'Bataan' and 'Sahara' 
showed black soldiers, one an American G. I., the other a French 
officer, in an extremely favourable fashion, and in one scene in 
'Sahara', the main character, played by Humphrey Bogart, emphasized 
the democratic ideals of the Allies compared with the racism of the 
Axis. 
13 
A film which dealt more obviously with the question of 
racial discrimination was 'In This Our Life' which featured Hattie 
McDaniel and Ernest Anderson in the story of a young Afro-American 
U. Hardwick, ''Negro Stereotypes on the Screen , Hollywood Quarterly, I, 2, January 1946,231. 
12. Noble, The Negro in Films, 216-17; Baltimore Afro-American, 
August 29,1942; Pittsburgh Courier, August 29,19 2. 
13. 'Sahara', Columbia 1943; 'Bataan', EGM-Loews 1913; 'Casablanca', 
Warner Bros., 1912; 'Lifeboat', 20th Century Fox 1944; 
Noble, The Negro in Films, 198; Cripps, 'Movies in the Ghetto, 
B. P. ', 22; George E. Norford, 'The Future in Films', 
Journal of Negro Education, XXVI, 3, July-September, 1948,108. 
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studying to be a lawyer victimized by southern prejudice. 
14 
Not 
so far removed from the old stereotypes were the all-black musicals 
'Cabin in the Sky' and 'Stormy Weather'. Whatever their limitations, 
these films were very popular and did provide opportunities for 
entertainers such as Lena Horne, Ethel Waters, Rex Ingrams, and 
Cab Calloway. 
15 
More important was the spate of 'Negro problem' 
films released in the immediate post-war years. In 1949, four 
motion pictures were produced which clearly showed that Hollywood had 
moved into a new phase, treating Afro-Americans as a social problem: 
'Lost Boundaries', 'Pinky', 'Intruder in the Dust', and 'Home of the 
Brave'. 
16 
In 'Lost Boundaries', the family of a successful doctor 
practising in a New England town, long thought of as white, suffer 
a traumatic period when it is discovered that they have black 
ancestry. Rejected by former friends and neighbours, they face 
the type of discrimination normally experienced by Afro-Americans 
in every-day, life. They are eventually saved from this situation 
by the intervention of a white minister. While the film obviously 
had an important racial message, not one of the main roles was 
played by a black person. Even so, it was banned in Memphis and 
Atlanta because of its potential to provoke violence and law 
14. 'In This Our Life', Warner Bros. 19142; Noble, The Negro 
in Films, 198. 
15. 'Cabin in the Sky', MGM 1942; 'Stormy Weather', Fox 1943; 
Hardwick, 'Negro Stereotypes on the Screen', 236. 
16. Jim Pines, 'Blacks in the Cinema: The Changing Image', 
mimeographed June 1971, Education Department, British Film 
Institute; Thomas R. Cripps, 'The Death of Rastus: Negroes 
in American Films Since 1945', Phylon, XXVII, 3,1967; 
Richard Winnington, 'Negro Films', Sight and Sound, February 
1950. 
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breaking. 
17 
'Pinky' had a similar plot and indeed, a similar 
limitation. This was a story about a young black girl also 'passing' 
as white but, as in 'Lost Boundaries', the title role was played 
by a white person, in this case Jeanne Crain. Ethel Waters played 
the part of the young woman's confidant. After Pinky confesses 
to her black heritage she is raped by white assailants, suffers 
doubts about whether she should marry her white lover, and has to 
fight a court case in order to inherit the plantation left to her. 
Mixed audiences in the South were reported to have wept and applauded 
during the final courtroom scenes in sympathy with the victorious 
heroine. 18 'Intruder in the Dust' received equally favourable 
reactions and, unlike most other films with a racial content, was 
allowed to be shown uncut by the southern censors. 
19 
Based on the 
William Faulkner novel of the same title, the film tells the tale 
of a black farmer in the South, played by Juano Hernandez, falsely 
accused of murdering a white man. He is only saved from lynching 
by the intervention of a white boy whom he had earlier befriended. 
The final film in this group, 'Home of the Brave', starred James 
Edwards as Moss, a black G. I. In a piece of artistic licence 
ignoring the segregation of the armed forces, Moss is sent with 
four white comrades to recconoitre a Japanese-held island. When 
17. V. J. Jerome, The Negro in Hollywood Films, New York 1950, 
29-34; Cripps, 'The Death of Rastus', 270; Peter Noble, 
'Hollywood Thinks Again About the Negro', Picture Post, 
February 11,1950,25. 
18. Jerome, The Negro in Hollywood Films, 214; Winnington, 'Negro 
Films', 27-31; Noble, 'Hollywood Thinks Again About the Negro?, 
214. 
19. Cripps, 'The Death of Rastus', 270; Jerome, The Negro in 
Hollywood Films, 36-7; Ralph Ellison, 'Shadow and Act', The 
Reporter, December 6,1949, included in the collection of 
essays, Shadow and Act, New York 1966 ed., 2611-71. 
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his closest friend in the group calls him, in the heat of the 
moment, 'nigger', Moss wishes him dead; only to be wracked with 
guilt after a Japanese soldier makes the wish come true. Still 
burdened with his sense of sin, Moss returns to base where he is 
cured after extensive treatment by a white psychiatrist. After 
nine profitable weeks in Manhattan, the film opened in Dallas and 
Houston where it was. greeted with good reviews from the critics. 
Far from provoking the race riots it was expected to, 'Home of the 
Brave' scored a box-office success. 
20 
While it is undoubtedly true that these four films made 
'explicit the nature of Hollywood's changed. attitude_toward 
Negroes', they also revealed the new stereotype. 
21 Afro-Americans 
were not treated in these stories as real, complete people, but as 
problems - almost as if they were permanently in the third person. 
Moreover, in each case, salvation came as a result of white actions. 
The Afro-American was still portrayed as the passive victim of 
prejudice and the passive recipient of-white largesse. There were 
serious doubts whether such films, even if they were breaking new 
ground, would continue to be made. Throughout the war, movies 
were still produced which portrayed blacks in unfavourable roles, 
or'"companies 'wrote-outs black characters from scripts to avoid any 
controversy. It was not until the 1950s that film producers and 
directors tackled the problem with any honesty and that Afro- 
Americans emerged on the screen as real people. 
22 While the war, 
20. Time, July 18,1949; Jerome, The Negro in Hollywood Fi]ms, 
1ti -2-73 
21. Ellison, 'Shadow and Act', in Shadow and Act, 267. 
22. Walter White's statement at opening session of Writers' 
Congress, Proceedings, 16; Hardwick, 'Negro Stereotypes on 
the Screen', 23 ; Noble, The Negro in Films, 193; Cripps, 
'The Death of Rastus', 272; George E. Norford, 'The Future 
in Films', Journal of Negro Education, XXVI, 3, July-September 1918,109. 
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with its stress on unity and democracy, and America's new-found 
t -Z position amongst other nations, brought about some improvements, 
the'forces for radical change were not sufficient to produce major 
results in America. Not as directly involved in the war as other 
countries, the American film industry did not react to fascism 
with the same speed or depth that its counterpart in Britain did. 
Racism was not seen as a major war-issue and, besides, was so 
ingrained in America that any great departure from old formulas would 
have-'been far ahead of its time. In this light, such advances 
as were made, were considerable. 
23 
Those changes which were made were the result of the war 
emergency and the mood it engendered. Government intervention 
clearly had little impact on the world of feature films. However, 
several of its agencies did play an important part in producing 
documentary films, again designed to improve morale and further 
the war effort. The most important of these was 'The Negro 
Soldier' made by the War Department in 19W.. Reactions to this 
film have been discussed elsewhere though not the content. 
24 A 
black minister's sermon to his congregation provides the vehicle 
for a film history of black military participation in wars past and 
23. Noble, The Negro in Films, 191-92; McMann and Kronenberger, 
'Motion Pictures, The Theatre, and Race Relations', 151; 
Herbert Margolis, 'The Hollywood Scene: The American Minority 
Problem', The Penguin Film Review, 5,1948,8b. 
24. 'The Negro Soldier', War Dept., 1944, NA 111OF-51, National 
Archives; see 73-5 above. An interesting comparison is 
provided in 'The Black Soldier', C. B. S. Of Black America 
Series, 1968, with its narration by Bill Cosby, in Library 
of Congress. Covering much the same material, this is more 
honest and much more biting than 'The Negro Soldier' - but then it was not made as a government propaganda film in time 
of war. 
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present. On the issues involved in the second World War, the 
minister contrasts Mein Kampf with the American Constitution 
while, for visual comparison, the audience is shown the boxer Max 
Schmeling training in the German paratroops and Joe Louis, his 
old rival, in the U. S. Army. After shots of a member of the 
congregation's son in the Army and various scenes of blacks in 
the forces, the minister again emphasizes what they are defending 
and calls for 'no let up' in their effort. Aptly enough, the 
final credits are backed with the congregation singing 'Onward 
Christian Soldiers'. The film was clearly intended for showing to 
both blacks and whites. On the one hand, it urged continued black 
loyalty and participation while, on the other, demonstrated to 
whites that Afro-Americans had taken part in America's past 
struggles and were still doing so. Coming after the riots and 
violence of 1943, the film was clearly a belated attempt to repair 
morale and bolster unity. To that end, it overlooked numerous 
historical contradictions and completely ignored the discrimination 
and segregation faced by blacks in the forces during the 19L40s. 
Indicative of the success of 'The Negro Soldier' was the 
later, and even more emotive, 'Teamwork' also made by the War 
Department The film opens with actors purporting to be German 
officers who, in the guttural accents and broken English peculiar 
to such parts, discuss how they will divide America by playing 
black against white. Thus, they theorize, they will rob the 
United States of ten per cent of its strength without firing a shot. 
From then on, the film concentrates on the Allied attack on the 
25., 'Teamwork', War Dept., Orientation film 114,19116, NA 111-OF-14, 
National Archives. 
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fortress of Europe and the importance of racial unity to that 
fight. Black service battalions are shown delivering vital 
supplies to the troops at the front on the famous 'Red Ball Express'. 
To scenes of blacks and whites rebuilding airfields, railway 
tracks, and roads, the commentator says, they were busy hating 
Germans, not each other.! A mixture-of real and recreated 
clips show black airmen supporting bombers and downing enemy 
aircraft. Here the comments are about how these men are destroying 
Nazi racial myths. On the ground, black artillery and tank 
regiments are filmed helping the men at the front. In a 
following' sequence, again presumably acted rather than real, an 
Afro-American'soldier under the anxious gaze of a white comrade 
reads a Nazi propaganda sheet which urges him not to fight. The 
black crushes the leaflet and joins the attack. - the German 
strategy had failed. The film closes, after shots of-the 
swastika being destroyed, with black and white soldiers marching 
to 'The Battle of Jericho'. As in 'The Negro Soldier', the 
segregation and discrimination in the forces is played down and 
the existence of racial strife completely ignored. Indeed, 
'Teamwork' exaggerates the degree of unity in the services and 
fails to point out that most blacks served in segregated regiments. 
The shots of blacks and whites. together are in fact misleading. 
The only Afro-American combat troops to serve with whites were the 
few in the specially integrated platoons which fought during the 
Battle of the Bulge and were then disbanded. 
26 However, the film 
did show something of black participation and unwittingly revealed 
26. See above, 78-9,80-1. 
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the supportive, even subordinate, role of Afro-Americans in the Army. 
Also unwittingly, the film provided an extremely strong case in 
favour of integration in the forces. 
More exact, and more interesting from the historianls' 
point of view, is the film, 'Negro Colleges in Wartime', made by 
the Office of War Information in l91.3.27 Only nine minutes long, 
this picture still shows the extent to which black colleges and 
universities were affected by the war. Again the message is'that 
blacks were playing their part. Pointing out that the need for 
trained men and women had led to the mounting of courses geared 
to the war effort, the film moves from Tuskegee, to Prairie View, 
to Howard, and finally ends at Hampton Institute. , The latter, 
we are told, was working on a twenty-four-hour basis to train 
war workers and certainly the range of activities shown taking 
place here and at the other institutions makes this°credible. At 
Tuskegee, men are trained for the airforce while women learn 
automotive and other skills. The black nutritional expert (and 
the inventor of peanut butter), George Washington` Carver, is shown 
at work, adding his expertise to the war effort. Meanwhiile, 
Dr. Charles Drew, the man largely responsible for the use of blood 
plasma in storage banks is filmed teaching classes at Howard University. 
Here too, laboratory experiments on various possible war materials 
are taking place. At Hampton, students are trained as engineers, 
mechanics, chemists, and nurses, and some women are taught to 
operate farm equipment. The institute is also used for Army and 
27. 'Negro Colleges in Wartime', Office of War Information 19! 13, 
NA 208-7-PPC, National Archives. 
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Navy training courses and students in mechanics and vehicle 
maintenance learn their lessons while servicing the lorries from 
nearby military bases. 
This film reveals, much more clearly than the written word 
could, the extent and manner in which black colleges felt the 
effects of the war. Quite obviously, there was an influx of - 
federal money to finance many of these training courses and even 
without such official classes, the emphasis in teaching was put on 
technical and practical skills - that is, those relevant to the 
industrial and military war effort. Many Afro-Americans must 
have learned trades and professions which might otherwise have 
remained closed to them. The film leaves unanswered questions 
about economic discrimination, both during and after the war 
emergency, 'which might prevent such qualified persons from putting 
their knowledge into practice. Like the other films of its type, 
it makes no explicit mention of racial prejudice or segregation 
although the fact that these colleges are all-black is-readily 
apparent. , While Charles Drew is shown working in a field extremely 
vital to the war effort, no reference is made to the segregation 
of blood-from different' races in the Red Cross banks, a-practice 
which drew considerable criticism from Afro-Americans. But 
despite these omissions, 'Negro"Colleges in Wartime' would give 
white Americans a good idea of the contribution blacks were making 
to the Allied cause. 
'Henry Browne, Farmer', a film made by the Department of 
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Agriculture, had a similar moral. 
28 This compared the military 
and civilian contribution to the war of one black family in the 
South. The man, Henry Browne, and his family labour in the fields 
producing valuable food products to supply the troops at the front 
and the workers at home. The film ends with the entire family 
going to town to visit their elder son stationed at the Army camp. 
The final shots are of the young man flying off in his aeroplane 
watched proudly by his parents. The message is obvious. Over 
and above this intended information, we see fairly typical conditions 
for Afro-Americans in the rural South. The farming is very small 
scale; the plough and the wagon are drawn by horses or mules; and 
the farmhouse is a poor wooden structure. Of course, this was 
not the point of the film and it is important to bear in mind that 
this and the others discussed were made during or after 1943, the 
year when race relations in America were at their lowest ebb. 
The four films were designed to improve that situation by showing 
whites that Afro-Americans were loyal and were participating in 
their country's struggle. Black audiences were shown that they 
did have an important role to play and a stake in the war. While 
there were no similar films made by the government prior to 1943, 
there were numerous newsreels with essentially the same type of 
content. Here the visual material is often less important to the 
historian than the camrm entary. 
29 
28. 'Henry Browne, Farmer', Dept. of Agriculture-United Films 
19113, NA 59.53, National Archives. For some reason this 
version is in Spanish but a copy with an English commentary 
is available in the Department of Agriculture, Washington, D. C. 
29. See the collections in the Sherman Grinberg Library and 
Hearst Metrotone, both in New York. 
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One important documentary film made before 1943 and before 
America had even entered the war, was 'One Tenth of Our Nation', 
produced by the American Film Center. 
30 A much more honest film, 
it restores. some balance to the impression made by the later 
government-produced pictures. As well as showing, in great detail, 
the poverty of blacks in the South, 'One Tenth of Our Nation' also 
has a strong social message - the emphasis is on the 'Americanness' 
of blacks and the conditions they have to endure despite it. 
Palatial southern mansions are contrasted with the run-down, two- 
roomed, wooden shack which houses a family of ten. The childrens' 
school is shown and all its inadequacies pointed out. Black people 
are filmed working in the fields and the commentator acknowledges 
that those people get few of the end products. Attention is drawn 
to the lack of health facilities for Afro-Americans and to the 
difficulties which lie in the way of their getting a university 
education. Ending with more views of the school, homes, fields, 
and children, the audience is told that it is here they 'must make 
a start' and that racial differences are, 'not to be solved with 
bombst: 'we must show the world democracy.? Thus, while obviously 
not a result of American participation in the war, this film did 
show the impact of the European crisis and the rise of fascism. 
Something of the importance of these particular films has 
31 been noted in other works. If the better treatment of blacks in 
30. 'One Tenth of Our Nation', American Film Center 1940, in 
film department Museum of Modern Art, New York. 
31. Noble, The Negro in Films, 106-8; Hardwick, 'Motion Pictures', 
in Murray, ed., Negro Handbook, 1946-47,265-66; Ulysses 
S. Lee, The Employment of Negro Troops, U. S. Army in World 
War II, Special Studies 5, Washington, D. C., 1966,387-89. 
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feature films indicated a change in Hollywood's attitudes, the 
government-produced films showed an awareness in the federal 
agencies of the necessity for racial unity and harmony during 
times of war. In addition to improving morale, films illustrating 
black and white fighting the enemies of democracy together 
'inevitably promoted ideals of integration. '32 This long-term 
educational value was not appreciated by the government and the 
films were withdrawn from circulation after the end of the war. 
Again the changes promoted by the war seemed to be short-lived. 
The impact of the war on black 'popular' music, the blues 
and, to a lesser extent, jazz, went much deeper and was more 
permanent. Enforced separation from the white cultural mainstream, 
first by the institution of slavery and then by social convention, 
had enabled blacks to produce a music entirely their own, combining 
both African and American elements in one form. The most obvious 
result of this process of mixture was the gospel song; less 
influenced by European foams and more a purely black phenomena was I 
the blues song with its distinctive twelve-bar construction, 
African-based rhythms, call and response, and, of course, the blue. 
notes. 
33 
First sung in the fields and then by itinerant performers, 
32. William J. Sloan, 'The Documentary Film and the Negro: The 
Evolution of the Integration Film', Journal of the Society of 
Cinematologists, vol. 5,1965,66-69. 
33. For the musical background to the blues see Samuel B. Charters, 
The Country Blues, London 1960; Charles Keil, Urban Blues, 
Chicago an London, '1966; Leroi Jones, Blues People: Negro 
Music in White America, New York 1963 (1970 edition quoted 
in text ; Richard Middleton, Pop Music and the Bluest A 
Study of the-Relationship and Its Si icance, London 1972. ' 
Unlike the blues, jazz had almost from birth been an' 
integrated music listened to and played by both blacks and 
whites. Blacks also contributed to mainstream European 
music: see Eileen Southern, The Music of Black Americans: 
A History, New York 1971. 
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the blues moved into the cities with the migration of Afro- 
Americans at the beginning of the twentieth century. The major 
white record companies, unlike the film industry, recognized a 
potentially valuable market and began to record black blues singers 
in the 1920s on records issued under separate 'race' labels. 
Such records were, almost entirely, bought and listened to by 
Afro-Americans. The relevance of such songs to the historian lies 
in the fact that they 'offered an indication of the hopes and fears 
of black people, sometimes their anger and sometimes their apathy. 
There was in the blues a gauge of the frustration within the 
coloured community.... '34 Thus the blues of the 191i. 0s offer 
some reflection of the feelings and attitudes of Afro-Americans at 
that time. 
While the majority of blues continued to be about sex, unrequited 
love, loneliness, and despair, a few related specifically to the war. 
The black reaction to participation, and its limitations, were 
revealed in 'Defense Blues', 'Training Camp Blues', 'Uncle Sam 
Came and Got Him', 'The Army Blues', and 'War Rationing Papa'. 
Typical was 'Million Lonesome Women', which, with its ironic 
comment on one effect of. armed service, was a variation on a common 
blues theme. 35 Other songs, such as 'Win the War Blues', 'Letter 
to Tojo', 'Pearl Harbor Blues', and 'Are You Ready, attacked the 
Japanese: 36 
3L. Paul Oliver, The Story of the Blues, London 1969,106; 
Jones, Blues People, 120. 
35. Paul Oliver, Blues Fell This Morning, London 1960,8-12; 
Mike Leadbitter and Neil Slaven, Blues Records, January 19113 
to December 1966, London 1968,21,27-)92Y 3 0. 
36. 'Pearl Harbor Blues', quoted in Oliver, Blues Fell This 
Morning, 12. 
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The Japanese is so ungrateful, just like a 
stray dog in the street. 
Well, he bites the hand that feeds him, soon 
as he gets enough to eat. 
and extolled patriotism and heroism; 
37 
When the captain says, "Attack", 
There'll be no turning back. 
Are you ready? 
Are you ready to go? 
Although different in basic style and with a much more biting and 
honest approach, this type of song was not too far removed in 
content from the more sentimental war-songs of whites. However, 
other songs were more to the point, for Afro-Americans wanted to 
know about their future after participationt38 
I helped win sweet victory 
With my little plough and hoe 
Now I want you to tell me brother 
What you gonna do 'bout the old Jim Crow. 
The wartime propaganda had also had effect on black thinking: 
39 
If you ask me, I think democracy is fine 
I mean democracy without the color line. 
Uncle Sam says, "We live the American way, " 
Lets get together and kill Jim Crow today. 
37. 'Are You Beady', quoted in Jones, Blues People, 178. The 
. emphasis was on patriotism in more 'serious' music, too. The League of Composers asked 16 American composers to write 
a piece on a patriotic theme associated with the war. The 
one black musician included, William Grant Still, wrote 'In 
Memoriam: The Colored Soldiers Who Died For Democracy'. 
See Southern, The Music of Black Americans, 459. 
38. 'Black, Brown and White', quoted in William Broonzy and 
Yannick Bruynoghe, Big Bill Blues; William Broonzy's Story, 
London 1955,56-7. 
39. 'Uncle Sam Says', quoted in Marjorie E. Greene, 'Josh White 
Starts Them Listening', Opportunity, X%II, 3, July-September 
194 4., 124. 
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This explicit message was reinforced in 'Baby Remember Me': 
40 
And you can tell the world I'm fighting 
for'what really belongs to me. 
Such lyrics were, by themselves, interesting and informative 
but more significant were the changes in actual musical style which 
came about as a result of the war and related social changes. 
White America reacted musically to the war with bland sing-along 
ballads and songs sung by the crooners, Bing Crosby, Perry Como, 
and Frank Sinatra. Songs such as "White Christmas', the biggest 
seller of the war, were designed to relieve wartime tension and 
anxiety and were completely lacking in excitement, stimulation, or 
emotion. Black Americans, on the other hand, 'had seen fundamental 
changes take place in their lives as they moved from southern rural 
areas to northern urban ghettos. They were eager for more radical 
changes to alter their status as second-class citizens., 
41 
Urbanization, armed service, improved economic status, all served 
to whet black appetites for more change rather than stability. 
Discrimination, segregation, and racial prejudice only made them 
more militant, more demanding. All of this was reflected in their 
music. 
The increased urbanization which resulted from the migration 
of blacks to centres of war production in turn led to an increased 
40. 'Baby Remember Meg, quoted in Oliver, Blues Fell This Morning, 12. 
141. Don Heckman, 'Black Music and White America', in John F. 
Szwed, ed., Black America, New York and London 1970,168; 
Charlie Gillet, The Sound of the City: The Rise of Rock 
and Roll, London 1970,14,135-37; Lingeman, Don't You Know 
There's A War On?, 223. 
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sophistication in black music following a mixture of hitherto 
regional styles. Blues singers from Texas and the South-west 
followed the movement of people to California and to northern cities, 
adding their type of singing to that all ready present. Performers 
such as Joe Turner, Louis Jordan, and T-Bone Walker contributed 
a shouting kind of singing, boogie-woogie rhythms, and all-round 
sophistication to the existing city blues. 
42 
At the same time, 
there was among young Afro-Americans a rejection of the older 'down- 
home' blues and a desire for more aggressive music. Singers also 
had to cope with the crowded city dance-halls and bars. The two 
were made possible by coupling the new, loud, harsh singing with 
increased electrical amplification. The end product, as sung by 
Muddy Waters, Howlin' Wolf, and Sonny Boy Williamson, became known 
as Rhythm and Blues which was later to form the basis of white Rock 
and Noll songs. The phrase, rhythm and blues was actually coined 
during the war as the white record companies lost control of the 
production of 'race records' to small, independent, black companies 
which sprang up in the 40s. To them, the term 'race' record was 
an embarassment and so they resorted to 'ebony', 'sepia', and 
'rhythm and blues', and the latter eventually stuck. 
43 
This, and 
the 'kind of frenzy, and 'extra-local vulgarity' of the music itself, 
was indicative of the 'profound changes in the cultural consciousness 
of Negroes' which had resulted from the war. 
4 2. ' Middleton, Pop Music and the Blues, 98-104. 
43. Oliver, The Story of the Blues, 141; Gillet, The Sound of 
the City, 135-37s 91-104; Southern, The Music of Black 
Amer cans, 1197. 
1414. Jones, Blues People, 171. 
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In jazzy the parallel development at this time was bop or 
bebop. Rejecting the values of whites, middle-class blacks, and 
older musicians, men like Charlie Parker, Thelonius Monk, and 
Dizzy Gillespie, got together to play music with complex rhythms 
and jagged, varied, melodies which was in complete contrast to the 
dominant swinging jazz of the period. For them, even more than 
for the blues singers, this was a conscious act of rebellion and 
defiance, a declaration of their blackness which mirrored the 
aggressive, militant mood of many young Afro-Americans, particularly 
those who had served in the forces. They had no intention of 
accepting the pre-war social conditions nor the music that such 
an environment had produced. 
45 
The outward physical manifestation 
of this rebelliousness was the clothing worn both by musicians and 
their audiences. The zoot suit, as it was called, was described 
later by Malcolm X, who was in his late teens and early twenties 
during the war: 
46 
sky-blue pants thirty inches in the knee and angle- 
narrowed down to twelve inches at the bottom, and a 
long coat that pinched my waist and flared out below 
my knees. 
This was topped with a broad-brimmed hat. With the distinctive 
45. 
-Jones, Blues People, 188-99; A. B. Spellman, 'Revolution in 
Sound', in Ebony, The Black Revolution, Chicago 1970, 
86-7; Heckman, 'Black Music and White America', 168; Frank 
Kofsky, 'The Jazz Tradition: Black Music and its White 
Critics', Journal of Black Studies, 1,4,1971,417-29. 
46. The Autobiography of Malcolm X, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 
1966 ed., 135; Jones, Blues People, 190-91. Also, see 
photograph in Richard Wright, 12 Million Black Voices: A 
Folk History of the Negro in the United States, New York 
19 41., 129. 
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clothing went an equally distinctive language, the hip or hop 
: uigni. ag(- or chicks and cats, of groovy ocent: in swinging 
T'hi:; non-conformity amongst young Afro-Americans seemed contrary to 
the effort among the majority of black people-to achieve integration 
and equality with whites. But it was clearly a sign of anger and 
a declaration of militance. For a black to wear a zoot suit 
meant that he wished to be recognized as a black, a non-conformist 
by virtue of his colour, and to be given equality on those terms. 
It was also the reaction of youth to the new pressures of urban 
society and wartime life. If the zoot suit became a 'popular 
fashion', it did so precisely because of its racial significance. 
48 
Whatever the exact explanation, the musical changes in blues and 
jazz which accompanied the mode of dress were longlasting and remain 
in existence today, if in modified forms. 
Some authorities have claimed that the war had an equally 
deep, if somewhat differently directed, effect on black literature. 
Rather than an emphasis on militant protest and a declaration of 
blackness, there was said to be 'a drastic reduction of the 
racial content, a rise in preoccupation with urban themes and 
subject matter both in the novel and the poem. '49 The explanation 
L&7. Autobiography of Malcolm X, 140; Gillet, The Sound of the Cit , 15-377 The parallels between black teenagers of the. 1940s 
and white teenagers of the late 50s and 60s, both in music 
and in dress are overwhelming. As Richard Middleton has 
pointed out in Pop Music and the Blues, it is significant 
that the post-war rebellion of white children against their 
parents who had served during the war was heralded with black, 
blues-based music. 
48. Kenneth B. Clark and James Barker, 'The Zoot Effect in 
Personality: A Race Riot Participant I2 Journal of Abnormal 
And Social Psychology, Vol. 40,1945. See above, 16d-9. 
49. Richard Wright, White Man, Listenl, New York 1964 ed., 103. 
2O 
for this was that the discontent of the 1930s had been 'siphoned 
off' by the war boom and that as Afro-Americans generally were 
moving towards integration, the black writers felt they should 
point the way by writing 'integrated novels'. 
50 
Another reason 
was given by the black author, James Baldwin: as far as he was 
concerned, the protest novel had already appeared before America 
entered the war with the publication of Richard Wright's Native Son 
in 19140.51 This may be no more than a question of semantics as 
most books by Afro-Americans seem, at least to me, to have some 
element of protest in them. There is plenty of evidence both for 
and against such claims for, whatever else was true, there was a 
considerable number of books with racial themes written by blacks 
and whites during the war years. One commentator said at the time, 
52 
This furious devotion and loud acclaim which now 
attends minority causes in the literary world is 
unprecedented in America. In comparison, the 
famed Negro Renaissance of the twenties is a mere 
whine. This fever seems to be the expected 
complement of a war period, during which minority 
causes become the major area of free speech and 
discussion. 
While this statement may be slightly exaggerated, the large number 
of books by and about blacks can be seen as 'the second period' of 
50. Robert Bone, The Negro Novel in America, New Haven, Conn., 
1966,156-57; Carl Milton Hu es, The Negro Novelist: A 
Discussion of the Writings of American Negro Novelists, 1940- 
1950., New York 1970 ed., 20; Margaret Just Butcher, The 
Negro in American Culture, New York 1956,176-81. 
51. James Baldwin, 'Everybody's Protest Novel' (191L9), 'Many 
Thousands Gone', (1951), both included in Notes of a Native 
Son, London 1965. Also see, 'Alas, Poor Richard' in Nobody 
Knows My Name, London 1965. 
52. Ira DeA Reid, 'The Literature of Race and Culture', Phylon, 
V, ! t, 19W. 
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the Renaissance of the 1920s. 
53 
There was, of course, a long literary tradition amongst 
Afro-Americans, beginning in the eighteenth century with Phil is 
Wheatley and Jupiter Hammon. Later, blacks wrote abolitionist 
tracts, slave narratives, biographies, and novels. 
54 
However, the 
general subordination of Afro-Americans, their poverty, lack of 
education, and rural background, all served to limit such 
endeavours to just a small number. Following the first World War, 
there was suddenly a great increase in the production of literary 
works among blacks. Urbanization, increased prosperity, wider 
educational opportunities, and the post-war mood enabled a circle of 
black writers, -centred at first in Harlem, to reach a wide audience. 
Afro-Americans like Claude McKay, Jean Toomer, Countee Cullen, 
Langston Hughes, and many others were encouraged and joined by whites 
in writing 'Negro' literature. While the number of books and 
articles produced, and the interest they attracted, was more than 
sufficient to justify the term 'Renaissance', they were still the 
work of a small elite of Afro-American intellectuals: only Langston 
Hughes could be said to be writing of and for the common man. 
55 
This 
literary renaissance ended with the economic depression: writers 
found it difficult to secure financial support; publishers found 
53. John Hope Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom) 513-]14. 
54. Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom, 155-56,1109-12. 
55. The literature of the '20s and '30s is dealt with in Nathan 
Irvin Huggins, Harlem Renaissance, New York 1971; Hugh M. 
Gloster, Negro Voices in American Fiction, New York 1965; 
Butcher, The Negro in American Culture; Nick Aaron Ford, 
The Contemporary Negro Novel, Boston, Mass., 1936. On Hughes, 
see, James A. Emanuel, Langston Hughes, New York 1967. 
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it difficult to sell books. Several of the black writrr.; wriil. 
abroad while others sought refuge in the Federal Writers Vro, j('eL. 
The few works which did appear in the 1930s differed from those of 
the previous decade. No longer dependent on white patrons and 
white interest, black writers 'turned more and more to materials 
which genuinely interested them rather than to sensuous and bizarre 
themes which delighted American readers during the boom years., 
56 
There was as much an emphasis on class as on race, and a use of 
characters drawn from real life rather than stereotypes. These 
new trends were best demonstrated in Wright's collection of short 
stories, Uncle Tom's Children, and his novel set in Chicago's 
South Side, Native Son. 
57 
Following America' entry into the war, 
there was a revival in literature about blacks as Afro-Americans and 
whites addressed themselves to the problems of the conflict and the 
issues it raised. 
These various books, essays and poems give an extra dimension 
to the other, more conventional historical sources. As well as 
adding to and confirming the information given in reports, pamphlets, 
articles, and statistics, they provide the background and capture 
attitudes and moods. For example, a number of essays and short 
stories describe Harlem prior to and during the riot of 1943, an 
incident of some size and importance largely ignored elsewhere* 
58 
56. Gloster, Negro Voices in American Fiction, 208. 
57. Richard Wright, Uncle Tom's Children, (originally published 
individually 193 6., '37, '3 New York 1910; Native Son, 
New York 1940. See Robert Bone, Richard Wright, University 
of Minnesota Pamphlets on American Writers, No. 7t1, 
Minneapolis 1969. 
58. See above, 161-63. While there have been two full length 
studies on the Detroit riot, there is none on the one in Harlem. 
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Ralph Ellison, who was later to include a riot in his famous novel 
Invisible Man, wrote an account of his conversation with a black 
women which reveals the trials and tribulations of a typical 
Afro-American family. 
59 
Her husband is dead, her eldest son in 
the Army, and her daughter desperately trying to enter a defence 
training scheme in order to get work. Both her daughter's and 
her nephew's experiences in search of employment lead the woman to 
'dismiss FEPC as 'doing something everywhere but here in New York. ' 
She works herself to supplement the government cheques from her 
son's Army pay - which always arrive late - and spends her time 
worrying whether the boy will survive his stay at Fort Bragg, an Array 
camp in North Carolina. Ellison scans up hers, and every other 
60 
Afro-American's, situation: 
In the very texture of their lives there is confusion, 
war-made confusion. And the problem is to get-around, 
over, under and through this confusion. They do not 
ask for a lighter share of necessary war sacrifices 
than other Americans have to bear. But they do ask 
for equal reasons to believe that their sacrifices are 
worth-while, and they do want to be rid of the heavy 
resentment and bitterness which has been theirs for long 
before the war. 
In a later essay, Ellison depicted Harlem as a 'ruin' of 
'crumbling buildings', 'ill-smelling halls and vermin-invaded 
rooms : 'the scene and symbol of the Negro's perpetual alienation 
in the land of his birth., 
61 
Another black writer to become 
59. 'The Way It Is', originally in New Masses, October 20,1942, 
included in Shadow and Act, 272--U. The riot in Invisible 
Man, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1972 ed., 130-56 is s 6e the'one in 1943, although it could equally well be that 
of 1935. 
60. 'The Way It Is', 280. 
61. 'Harlem is Nowhere', (19148 ), in Shadow and Act, 283. 
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equally famous later, James Baldwin, agreed with this description. 
Deferred from armed service because of poor health, "Baldwin was in 
Harlem in the summer of 1943 to attend his father's funeral. He 
felt and later wrote of the tensions of the tine: 
62' 
All of Harlem, indeed, seemed to be infected by 
waiting. I had never before known it to be so' 
violently still. 
everybody felt a directionless, hopeless bitterness, 
as well as that panic which can scarcely be 
suppressed when one knows that a human being one 
loves is beyond one's reach, and in danger. 
This kind of fear, common to many blacks, was the basis of Ann 
Petry's short story, 'In Darkness and Confusion'. 
63 
A black man, 
anxiously waiting for news of his son in an Anny camp in Georgia, 
finally hears the worst. After refusing to take a Jim crow seat 
on a bus, the young man had been involved in a fight with white 
military policemen. - In the struggle he had taken the gun of one 
of his opponents and wounded him before being shot and wounded 
himself. Courtmartialled, the boy had been sentenced to 20 years 
hard labour. The father later witnesses the incident between 
the black soldier and white policeman at the hotel in Harlem and 
imagining his son in the place of the wounded soldier, his stifled 
anger and sorrow explode. Unconsciously, he encourages the gathering 
crowds to riot as does his wife when she joins him and is told the 
62. 'Notes of a Native Son', Ha er's Magazine, November 1955, 
included in Notes of a Native Son, London 1965 ed., 82, 
84. See too, Fern major Ec , The Furious Passage of James Baldwin, London 1968,94-5. 
63. Ann Petry, In Darkness and Confusion', in Edwin Seaver, ed., 
Cross Section 1947: A Collection of New American Writing, 
New York 7. 
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news. The rumour that a black soldier has been shot dead while 
defending a woman of his race spreads rapidly. The truth is 
ignored and is irrelevant: as Baldwin commented the mass of Afro- 
Americans 'preferred the invention because this invention expressed 
and corroborated their hates and fears so perfectly. ' 
64 
Although 
a fictional story, Petry's account of the actual riot is extremely 
realistic, no doubt drawing from her experiences as a journalist 
on the Amsterdam News and The People's Voice. 
Two full-length novels by Afro-Americans dealt, at least in 
part, with the problems faced by blacks in the defence industries. 
Alexander Saxton's rather unsatisfactory book, Bright Web in the 
Darkness, involved both blacks and whites: the former in the quest 
for employment; the latter as representatives of the unions. 
65 
A 
black woman completes a welding course only to be told there is no 
need for women welders and is refused union clearance. The racial 
troubles in the ship-yards increase and when the union fails to pass 
a no-discrimination resolution, the black workers walk out. In 
answer to a suggestion that they might damage the war effort, the 
Afro-American leader angrily exclaims, 'Don't you talk to me about 
this war! It's a white man's war. I've seen it. '66 There were 
enough real examples of job discrimination and this type of action 
by blacks for the story to be based on fact. The same was also 
true of the plot of If He Hollers Let Him Go which concentrates on 
64. Baldwin, 'Notes of a Native Son', 92. The comments of 
Petry's fictional characters illustrate the way in which the 
truth had become unimportant. 
65" Alexander Saxton, Bright Web in the IDarImess, Berlin 1959. 
66. Bright Web in the Darkness, 263. 
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one black man from the mid-West working in the shipyards of Los 
Angeles. 
67 
This, the first novel by Chester Hirnes, is a much better, if 
angrier and more militant, book than Saxton's and was reviewed 
favourably by the critics. 
68 
The chief character, Bob Jones, is 
from the start portrayed in conflict with his white-dominated 
environment, ' seeing even driving in heavy, rush-hour traffic as a 
racial battle. At home Jones has problems with his girl-friend 
and her middle-class family, at work he is troubled with a white 
foreman, apathetic union officials, and a white woman who is 
openly hostile. She succeeds. first in getting him demoted for 
using bad language then falsely charged with raping her. Jones 
flees after being beaten severely by white workers but is caught 
by the police with a gun in his possession. Although the accusation 
of rape is dropped at the behest of the shipping company, the judge 
persuades Jones to join the Armar rather than be jailed for carrying 
the weapon. Even amid all these adversities, the black man can 
still manage to feel a part of the mainstream. Driving past the 
shipyards and the towering cranes, he says, 
69 
I felt the size of it, the immensity of the production. 
I 
, 
felt the importance of it, the importance of the whole 
war. I'd never given a damn one way or the other about 
the war excepting wanting to keep out of it; and at 
first I wanted the Japanese to win. And now I did; I 
was stirred as I had been when I was a little boy 
watching a parade, seeing the flag go by. I felt included 
in it all; I had never felt included before. It was a 
wonderful feeling. 
67. Chester Hirnes, If He Hollers Let Him Go, Garden City, New York 
1945. See above, 120-23. 
68. Hughes, The Negro Novelist, 206-11. 
69. If He Hollers Let Him Go, 45-6. 
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Later, not surprisingly, he has doubts and wonders, 'what would 
happen-if all the Negroes in America would refuse to serve in the 
armed forces, refuse to work in war production until the Jim Crow 
was abolished. '70- In the end he is pushed into open revolt and 
defeated, losing everything. 
In a short story published in The Crisis, Hirnes wrote of a 
black soldier on leave in Harlem after six months of active service 
in North Africa. 
71 He meets and falls in love with a beautiful 
woman whom he eventually has to leave to return to the war. This 
is certainly not-a 'protest' story in the sense that If He Hollers 
is: the couple could equally as well have been white; the 
feelings described must have-been common to many couples, regardless 
of race. The same is not true of William Gardner Smith's novel 
about blacks in the American Army in Berlin at the end of the war. 
72 
Smith's. theme is that Afro-American G. I. s received better treatment 
from the Germans than from their fellow Americans. Harassment on 
and off base, particularly in respect to relationships with German 
women, forces some of the black soldiers to flee to the Russian zone. 
The moral is obvious: the contradiction c8' discrimination in the 
armies of democracy compared with the acceptance of blacks by the 
former supporters of Hitler. " Again, the book met with considerable 
acclaim although one reviewer thought it lacked 'the psychological 
penetration and daring which could have transformed it from an 
70. If He Hollers Let Him Go, 139. 
71. Chester Himes, 'So Softly Smilingly The Crisis, October 1943. 
His 'Two Soldiers' in The Crisis, January 1943 had a more 
purely racial theme. 
72. William Gardner Smith, The Last of the Conquerors, London 1949. 
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interesting historical document into a great and moving expose of. 
the inconsistencies and dilemmas of exported race prejudice. 173 
Much less impressive was Jigger Whitchet's War,, written ten 
74 
years later by Avery E. Kolb. Whilst also concerned with black 
troops in Europe, this concentrated on humour rather than social 
comment and suffers accordingly.. Both books were surpassed in 
style and content by And Then We Heard The Thunder. 
75 
. The author,. 
John Oliver Killens, had served in the amphibious forces during the 
war and although not published until 1962, his novel was clearly 
based on his own experiences. It, has been considered 'the most 
important novel about the Negro during World War II. 176 The story 
follows a black ainy unit from induction and training at a southern 
base to service in the Pacific. The black soldiers hold widely 
differing views, ranging from the pro-Japanese to the believers in 
the war for democracy. The hero, Solomon Saunders, a moderate, 
initially considers the racists of the South little different from 
Hitler or'Tojo. He has'ambitions to become an officer and do well 
once the war is over and so he is prepared to put up with a certain 
amount of the Arxny's brand of discrimination. However, his 
attitude changes as time wears on. Referred to as 'boys' by their 
73. Alain Locke, 'Dawn Patrol: A Review of the Literature of 
the Negro for 19118', Phylon %, 1,1919, and Hughes, The 
Negro Novelist, 230-32- 
74. Avery E. Kolb, Jigger Whitchetts War, New York 1959. 
75. John Oliver Killens, And Then We Heard The Thunder, New 
York 1962,1971 edition quoted text. 
76. Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom, 516. For a less 
favourable opinion see Charles E. Silberman, Crisis in Black 
and White, London 1965,61-3. 
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commanding officer, abused by military and civil policemen off-base, 
and given the dirtiest jobs to do, the unit eventually ends up in 
Australia. There another clash with white American authority 
leads to an all-out riot in which Saunders takes part declaring.. 
'there is no peace till freedom'?? All of the incidents described 
by Killens are founded on fact, including the final debacle which 
is based on the Brisbane riot. As well as accurate on the gloomier 
side of military race relations, the book is not without humour. 
The sardonic wit of Afro-Americans despite all adversity recurs 
continually: one soldier comments on black military participation, 
'colored people join the service and white folks join the Army. 
78 
Whether or not his comrades agree, the entire group later marches to 
this song: 
79. 
. 
They say this is a white man's war, 
Parlez-vous; 
They say this is a white man's war, 
Parlez-vous; 
They say this is a white man's war, 
Well what the hell are we fighting for? 
Hinky, dinky, parlez-vous - 
None of the works discussed so far could be referred to as 
'integrated? - some were very angry protest novels. However, there 
were a number of books written during and published after the war 
which justified the comments mentioned earlier. Frank Yerby's 
historical romances of the South prior to, during, and after the 
Civil War use characters of all races, but the main ones are 
77. And Then We Heard The Thunder, 1L97. 
78. And Then We Heard The Thunder, 46. 
79. And Then We Heard The Thunder, 68. 
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white. 
8o 
Like Yerby's books, the personae of Willard Motley's 
Knock on Any Door are not black nor was the book advertized with 
any reference to the author's race. 
81 
Ann Petry's first full- 
length novel, The Street, was also classed as 'integrated'. 
According to Butcher, 'the fact that her characters are Negroes is 
only incidental to her theme. ' 
82 
And yet tte book paints a gloomy 
picture of race relations in America, describing the effect of 
segregation, low incomes, and slum environments on black people. 
However, in her second novel, Country Place, -the chief characters 
are white, but the story of a veteran returning from the war to 
find he has been jilted by his wife could have applied to any race 
or class of people. 
83 
Just as Afro-Americans wrote about whites, so they in turn 
wrote about blacks. Prior to the war black subjects had been 
treated sympathetically by a number of white authors including 
William Faulkner and Erskine Caldwell. During the 1940s a 'group 
of militant young liberals began writing increasingly of the 
significance of the war for the Negro minority and the inevitability 
of a revolutionary shift in Southern race relations following the 
war's conclusion. '84 Howard Fast's tale of blacks in the South 
following the Civil War was dedicated to 'the men and women, black 
80. The Foxes of'Harrow, New York 19116, and The Vixens, New York 19-W. 
81. Knock on Any Door, New York 1917. 
82. Butcher, The Negro in American Culture, 176; Petry, The 
Street, Boston, Mass., 1946. 
83. Country Place, Boston, Mass., 1947. 
8t. Butcher, The Negro in American Culture, 176. 
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and white, yellow and brown, who have laid down their lives in the 
struggle against fascism-'85 The moral of the story, about returning 
black soldiers denied their rights, needs no elaboration. More 
directly to the point was Hodding Carters, The Winds of Fear, set 
in a southern town during the 19140x. The white townspeople fear the 
return of 'the unruly Negro': 'Maybe it's the war, maybe not. 
Things are happening too fast for them, things they don't like. #86 
When the sheriff is killed by an Afro-American, a replacement known 
for his violence and dislike of blacks is appointed. He eventually 
shoots a black soldier in uniform for no good reason and the incident 
and its coverage in the national press divides the town into two 
camps: the blacks with white liberal support facing the rascists. 
It is a confrontation guaranteed to lead to more violence. Equally 
pessimistic is James Gould Cozzens' story of racial friction 
between black and white airforce units in Florida. As one of the 
white airmen points out., 
87 
It is very dangerous to deny people their rights. 
It means that, in the long run, you drive them to 
take their rights by force. 
The violence inherent in America's race relations was the 
subject of one of the best-sellers of the war years. Strange Fruit, 
Lillian Smith's powerful novel, was remarkable both because it was 
85. Howard Fast, Freedom Road, London 1946. 
86. Hodding Carter, The Winds of Fear, London 1945,14) 71. 
87. James Gould Cozzens, Guard of Honour, London 1949,337. 
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l" 
ir! tten by a southerner and a woman and also because of the 
reception it received. 
88 
The story is of an interracial love 
affair in a southern town. When the black girl, Nonnie, finds 
that she is pregnant, her white lover Tracy Dean arranges for her to 
marry his house servant. Nonnie's brother regards this as 
another example of white outrage against black womanhood and 
kills Dean. An incensed white mob then takes the falsely accused 
houseboy from the jail and lynches him. This is the 'strange 
fruit, of America's race relations. As one of the more sympathetic 
whites comments, 'We lynch the Negro's soul every day of our lives. 1$9 
As well as being successful as a novel, Strange Fruit was one of 
several works dealing with Afro-Americans produced on the stage. 
Others included Deep are the Roots and Jeb, both about returning 
black servicemen and their re-adjustment to American society. In 
general, there was an increase in the number of theatre productions 
with racial themes and in the use of black actors. In 1940, 
blacks appeared in three Broadway plays, in 1944 in 20, and in 
1916 in 28, and the roles 'indicated a trend toward unprecedented 
liberalism. 1 90 
White liberalism was also revealed in the much quoted poem 
by Witter Bynner, (Defeats. Commenting on the fact that German 
88. Lillian Smith, Strange Fruit, New York 1944; Lingeman, Don't 
You Know There's A War On?, 273; Gannet, 'Books', in Goodman, 
e d.,, MM e You Were Gone, 58. 
89. Strange Fruit, 302. 
90. Mabel Roane, 'The Broadway Theater', in Murray, ed., Negro 
Handbook, 1946-t7,251; John Lovell, Jr., 'Roundup: The 
Negro in the American Theater, 1940-L7', The Crisis, July 
1947; Miles M. Jefferson, 'The Negro on Broadway, 1945-461., 
Phylon, VII, 2,19116. 
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prisoners of war were treated as equals on a train in Texas while 
black soldiers were segregated, and referring back to the Civil War, 
Bynner wrote, 
91 
Whom are we fighting this time, for God's sake? 
Mark well the token of the separate seat. 
It is again ourselves whom we defeat. 
Much less well-known is the wartime poetry of Afro-}Americans, a 
great deal of which, was published in popular magazines and newspapers 
as well as in book form.. Overall, such poems posed the same 
questions asked elsewhere. The worries of the black soldier 
overseas were encapsulated in the 'Draftee's Prayexl: 
92 
Dear Lord, today 
I go to war: 
To fight, to die, 
Tell me what for? 
Dear Lord, I111 fight, 
I do not fear,, 
Germans, or Japs; 
Y7 fears are here. 
America! 
"Land of the Free", 
This is the place, 
That troubles me, 
So while I fight 
Wrong over there, 
See that my folks 
Are treated fair. 
Several of the poems of Owen Dodson were concerned with the issues 
of the war. In one he asks the American soldiers longing for 
peace if their home will be one of peace and equality and racial 
91. Witter Byrner, 'Defeat', in Take Away the Darkness, New York 
1947,12. 
92. 'Draftee's Prayer'., Baltimore Afro-American, January 16,1943. 
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harmony, 93 
Or where a man will trample again 
His neighbor, shake no hands, 
Scorn fellowship, light fires 
Of dark bones and flesh to warm his hands. 
Similar questions were raised about the post-war world by other 
black poets: 
9- 
Where are we to go when this is done? 
Will we slip into old, accustomed ways, 
finding remembered notches one by one? 
and even more explicitly; 
95 
Will we be rid of them when the war is done, 
These myths of nationality and race, 
This haughty dominance of the white face, 
This brag of the self-engendered sons-of-the-son? 
One former black soldier supplied an apt comment on segregation 
in the forces when he wrote that troops in combat, 
96 
were pulverized ... Reduced ... Wiped out - 
made uniform and equal I 
White America was also warned that once the war had ended blacks 
might, instead of joining in singing the national anthem, 'sing 
93. Owen Dodson, 'The Decision', in Powerful Long Ladder, New York 
1947,96. Also see 'Open Letter' an 'Conversation on V', 103,91. 
94. Alfred A. Duckett, 'Sonnet', in Langston Hughes and Area Bontemps, eds., The Poetry of the Negro 1746-1919, Garden 
City, New York, 1951,202. 
95. Allen E. Woodall, 'Questions?, Phylon, V. 4,1914,315. 
96. Ygron O'Higgins, 'Sunset Horn', in The Poetry of the Negro, 175. 
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new words to another tune. t97 
One of the greatest of black poets, and one of the few from 
the Renaissance period still writing during the 1940s, was Langston 
Hughes. His many poems captured all the moods of war. While he 
contributed to the war effort by providing jingles, verses, and 
slogans for the Treasury Department and the War Writers Board, 
Hughes was also well aware of the issues the war raised for black 
people. He pointed out that, 
98 
Freedom's not just 
To be won Over There. 
It means Freedom at home, too - 
Now - right here! 
And commenting on the beating of Roland Hayes the black jazz 
misician in Georgia in 19L2, he wrote, 
99 
Negroes, 
Sweet and docile, 
Meek, humble, and kind. 
Beware the day 
They change their minds! 
Like the blues singers, Hughes dealt with every aspect of black 
life. Typical was 'Restrictive Covenants': 
100 
97. Katie Robinson, 'The Colored Boy', Black Worker, July 1943. 
98. 'How About It Dixie? ', New Masses, Vol. 45,3, October 20, 
19112. See E nanuel, Langston Hughes, 1j0-1. 
99. 'Roland Hayes Beaten', in One Way Ticket, New York 1949,86. 
100. One Way Ticket, 6t. 
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In Chicago 
They've got covenants 
Restricting me - 
Hemmed in 
On the South Side, 
Can't breathe free . 
But the wind blows there. 
reckon e win 
Must care. 
But Hughes could transcend simple racial themes and in reference 
to the war reveal his greatness and his humanity: 
101 
What a grand time was the war! 
Ohl my, my1 
What a grand time was the wart 
MY' my, my! 
In war we had flue, 
Sorry that old war is done! 
What a grand time was the war, 
MY, my l 
Echo: 
Did 
Tomebody 
ie? 
He was a soldier in the army, 
But he doesn't walk like one. 
He walks like his soldiering 
Days are done. 
Son! ... Son! 
In a later, collection published after his death in 1967, Hughes 
devoted an entire section to 'The Face of War'. These apply to 
any war at any time and his 'Peace' provides a final epitaph: 
102 
We passed their graves: 
The dead men there, 
Winners or losers, 
Did not care. 
101. 'World War II' and 'Casualty' in Hughes, Selected Poems, New 
York 1957,255,259. 
102. 'Peace', in Hughes, The Panther and the Lash: Poems of Our 
Times, New York 1971,51-60. 
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In the dark 
They could not see 
Who had gained 
The victory. 
Clearly then, it was true to say that, 'Negro poets of the 
forties addressed themselves to the problem of war, '103 and the 
same could be said of the black authors and musicians. In poem, 
story, and song, Afro-Americans dealt with the question of equal 
military participation and the rewards they hoped it would bring. 
In the main, this meant that their works were still primarily protest, 
angrily denouncing discrimination and segregation in all areas of 
the defence effort. While this was easily seen in content, there 
was apparent too a change in the very form and style of music and 
literature which echoed the militant and aggressive mood of Afro- 
Americans: rhythm and blues and bop was the natural musical 
accompaniment to the March on Washington Movement and even to the 
more extreme groups. (It is interesting to note, for example, 
that a number of black jazz musicians took Muslim names at this 
time. ) 
104 
At the same time, sufficient progress was made during 
the war to encourage some blacks to envisage a time in the not-too- 
distant future when integration and equality tin uld be the norm. 
So much was this so that writers like Petry, Motley, and Yerby 
could write what were later to be described as 'integrated, novels. 
These two radically different developments could take place 
simultaneously: the existence of one did not rule out the other. 
Indeed the two together reflected exactly the black mood, demanding 
103. Butcher, The Negro in American Culture, 138. 
1011. Jones, Blues People, 210. 
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and expectant. The promising economic and social advances were 
coupled with the increased portrayal of blacks on the stage and 
screen and the sympathetic treatment of racial themes by white 
authors. That such efforts could be commercially successful also 
demonstrated the change that had come about during and as a result 
of the war. 
224 
Chapter 7 
Black Expectations and the White Response 
That the majority of Afro-Americans wished to participate in 
the war effort is clear enough. Why they should do so is not 
perhaps so readily apparent. To a certain extent, participation 
was itself a reward bringing an increased prosperity and a sense of 
belonging. However, underlying black demands for greater and 
equal involvement was their desire for complete equality once the 
war had ended. If the Military Participation Ratio theory has any 
validity in this context, it is because it was unconsciously recognized 
by both blacks and whites. Thus, the black campaigns to end 
discrimination and segregation in the armed forces and war industries 
were coupled with claims for equality in society generally. Once 
they had taken part in the war, their position with regard to civil 
rights was strengthened considerably. While white liberals saw 
the logic of the Afro-Americans' reasoning and agreed with it, those 
with more prejudiced racial attitudes disagreed. But their very 
argument, that black involvement in the war effort would encourage 
'uppity niggers' and moves toward social equality, itself recognized 
the importance of participation and the justice of the black point 
of view. Just as blacks were determined to be included in their 
country's struggle, so, for really the same reasons, those whites 
were determined to resist them. The government, meanwhile, was 
intent on preserving nation unity and winning the war. Aware of its 
position as a 'defender of democracy' and of the views of the voters 
at home, it temporized and compromized and so postponed the 
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confrontation until a later date. 
In its simplest form, what the blacks expected was to be 
treated as equals and accorded the same rights and privileges, as 
well as responsibilities, as other Americans. In case there was any 
doubt, a number of organizations spelt out the ways by which this 
would be made possible. The significant feature of these programmes 
was that they were coupled with specific demands for participation 
in the war effort. The leader of the March on Washington Movement, 
the most important of the bodies formed during the period, demanded, 
1 
in the interest of national unity, the abrogation of 
every law which makes a distinction in treatment 
between citizens based on religion, creed, color, or 
national origin. This means an end to Jim Crow in 
education, in housing, in transportation, and in 
every other social, economic, and political privilege; 
and especially we demand, in the capital of the 
nation, an end to all segregation in public places 
and in public institutions. 
The Movement went on to call for the enforcement of existing statutes 
and additional legislation in order to end lynchings and the dis- 
enfranchisement of Afro-Americans, the abolition of all discrimination 
and segregation in the armed forces and government, an end to economic 
discrimination, and black representation in all federal agencies. 
The Chicago Defender's National Negro Defense Program included 
similar points and for similar reasons. 
2 Explaining why it was 
necessary to launch such a scheme at that particular time, the 
1. A. Philip Randolph, 'Why Should We March?, Survey Graphic, 
XXXI, 11, November 1942,4 89. 
2. Chicago Defender, March 28,1942. 
226 
Defender argued that, 
Negroes CAN and MUST profit from the discipline 
that war will impose on all American citizens and 
BEGIN NOW under a planned program to secure all 
of the things which have previously been denied. 
Expanding on its 'Double Vt slogan for 'Victory at Home and Abroad?, 
the Pittsburgh Courier said, 
4 
we would be less than men if, while we are giving 
up our property and sacrificing our lives, we do 
not agitate, contend, and demand those rights 
guaranteed to all free men ... this would be 
neither patriotism nor common sense. 
This was exactly the motivating force which lay behind the widespread 
militancy discussed in earlier chapters. 
If white Americans were not aware of the black demands or had 
ignored them, the belligerence of Afro-Americans and the riots of 
1943 forced them to take notice. In 1944, a book was published 'at 
the request of the Press' entitled not surprisingly, What The Negro 
Wants. 
5 
Edited by the former chairman of the Campaign for 
Participation of Negroes in National Defense, Rayford Logan, the 
book consisted of essays by 1)4 well-known blacks of varying political 
opinions, including W. E. B. DuBois, Mary McLeod Bethune, Roy Wilkins, 
George Schuyler, and Willard Townsend. The degree of unanimity 
amongst these diverse contributors was remarkable. All noted that 
3" Chicago Defender, March 14,19112. 
1ý. Pittsburgh Courier, August 8,1912. See too issues for 
February 7, July-'L. 1,1942. 
5" Rayford W. Logan, ed., What The Negro Wants, Chapel Hill, 
North Carolina, 1944. See Publisher's troduction, ix. 
227 
the war had heightened racial issues and spoke of the 'abnormal? 
and 'unprecedented' changes which were taking place. All, too, 
demanded 'first-class citizenship' for the Afro-American and full 
'economic, political and social equality. ' 
6 
In another collection 
of essays, pointedly called Primer for White Folks, both black and 
white writers commented on the importance of the war to race relations 
and emphasized the paradox of fighting for democracy abroad while 
denying it to minority groups at home. 
7 
That blacks had participated 
in the war effort despite the often considerable limitations imposed 
on their service, was stressed in these and other publications. One 
book of 85 selected short stories from the Baltimore Afro-American's 
war correspondents declared, This Is our War, while the black role 
and achievement was listed in Democracy's Negroes and various year 
books. 
a 
On V-E day, Afro-Americans could justifiably proclaim, 'On 
Land, On Sea, in the Air, We Did Our Part, ' and so strengthen their 
demands for civil rights. 
9 
A number of white Americans agreed that the Afro-American had 
played his part and supported his demands for equality. One writer, 
a white man, suggested that, 
10 
6. What The Negro Wants, 7, lt, 65,71,103,163,193, and if. 
7. Bucklin Moon, ed., Primer for White Folks, New York 19145. 
8. This Is Our War, Baltimore, Ma., 19). 5, see Afro-American, 
March 107 17477 Arthur Purr, Democracy's Negroes, Boston, 
Mass., 1917; Also Florence Murray, e d... The Negro Handbook, 
1946-! i7, New York 1947 and Jessie Parkhurst Guzman, ed., 
TH-e-ITe-gro Year Book, 1941-46, Tuskegee, Alabama, 1947. 
9. Baltimore Afro-American, May 12,1945. 
10. Dennis I. Imbert, The Negro After The War, New Orleans 1943. 
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The common hardship all of us have to go through 
to make America strong for final victory may bring 
the races closer to a better understanding and a 
chance to estimate the merits of the Negro in our 
democratic way of life, and extend to him 
consideration for his well-being as partner in 
our struggle. 
In the simuner of 19I3, prior to the riots of that year, the Chicago 
Defender went so far as to claim that this prediction had become 
fact. The war, it said, had made America become 'a melting pot 
from which all of the progressive forces are emerging, as the country 
became 'unified under the hammer blows of war. '11 This' optimistic 
appraisal of the situation was due in large part to the actions and 
declarations of liberal whites and to the publicity which the Afro- 
American's plight received during the war. Several popular magazines 
devoted entire issues to the question of race relations in the 
United States and the significance it had achieved because of the 
conflict abroad. 
12 
Various books by white authors served a similar 
function on a larger scale. Prominent among them were Gunnar 
Nyrdal's, An American Dilemma, and Lillian Smith's novel, Strange 
Fruit. Later works also stressed the manner in which the war had 
brought questions of prejudice and tolerance to the fore and pleaded 
for unity and understanding. 
13 
Afro-American participation was 
11. Chicago Defender, July 10,1943. 
12. 'The Negro's War', Fortune, XIV, 6, June 1942; 'The Negro: 
His Future in America', New Re ublic, October 18,19143; 
'Color: Unfinished Business of Democracy', Survey Graphic, 
%%%I, 11, November 19142. 
13. An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy, 
New York 19W4; Strange Fruit, New York 19411; W. Stegner 
and the Editors of Loot, One Nation, Boston, 19115; Buell G. 
Gallagher, Color and. Conscience: The Irrepressible Conflict, 
New York 19W; - JOIN-D-. Si vera, The Negro in World War II, 
New York 1916; Carey McWilliams, Brothers Under the Skin, 
Boston, 1943. Works of fiction by white auf ors with essentially 
the same message are discussed above, 215_17. 
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lauded in all of these as well as in the House of Representatives 
where it was noted in 1946 'that Negro heroes in this war achieved 
their proud records under handicaps that did not have to be overcome 
by most of their white fellow citizens. 1 
1' 
The most important and influential supporter of the Afro- 
American's case during the war was undoubtedly Wendell Willkie, the 
Republican Party's presidential candidate of 191i0. He sided with 
the black press in urging 'Fight for Democracy at Home as well as 
Abroad', and argued that, 
15 
the correction of certain injustices can be made under 
the pressures of war which years of peaceful effort 
have failed to bring about, such as, for instance, the 
discrimination against the colored citizen in industry, 
in labor, and in the armed service of the nation. 
Willkie pointed out, in his best-selling book, that America could 
not, in all honesty, fight 'the forces of imperialism abroad and 
maintain any form of imperialism at home': he wanted the United 
States to adopt policies and practices in keeping with Allied 
propaganda and so demonstrate its good faith to India, Africa, and 
China. 
16 
In taking this stance he was, according to Carey McWilliams, 
14. Helen Gahagan Douglas, 'The Negro Soldier: A Partial Record 
of Negro Devotion and Heroism in the Cause of Freedom Gathered 
from the Files of the War and Navy Departments', a copy of 
her speech in the House of Representatives, February 1,1946, 
in Moorland Collection, Howard University. 
15. Baltimore Afro-American, August 15,19112, and resolution to 
the war policy session of the Republican National Committee, 
April 20,19112, quoted in Afro-American, April 25,1942. 
16. Wendell Willkie, One World, London 191L3, ]J48-56. See Donald 
Bruce Johnson, The Republican Party and Wendell Willkie, Urbana, 
III., 1960,287,304; W ter Whitey A Man Called White, New 
York 1918,198-201. 
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reflecting 'a growing interest and concern with racial minorities on 
the part of a large section of the majority. ' This ferment could 
not be written off as 'crisis patriotism. '17 Following his untimely 
death in 1911J4, Willkie was mourned in the black press, as the 'Nation's 
Number One Patriot' and the Afro-American's 'foremost, champion. +18 
Willkie's views were shared by, among others, the well-known 
novelist, Pearl S. Buck. In a widely-publicized letter to the New 
York Times she too attacked American hypocrisy and suggested that 
the government could at least guarantee equal economic opportunity 
to all Americans and see to it 'that colored people in this democracy 
shall not suffer insult because of their color. '19 It is interesting 
to note that these comments were made both after the issue of 
Executive Order 8802 and before America had entered the war. Later 
Buck urged blacks to stand by their white countrymen 'in this 
imperfect democracy' because America was the place where 'the hope 
of democracy is still clearest., 
20 
The paper to which she had 
originally written took a stand on race relations itself and, in 
an editorial headed 'A Minority of Our Own', urged Americans to 
demonstrate their sincerity to their allies: the racial problem had 
to be solved if America was to avoid 'the sinister hypocrisy of 
fighting abroad for what it is not willing to accept at home. 121 
17. Carey McWilliams, 'What We Did About Racial Minorities' in 
Jack Goodman, ed., While You Were Gone: A Report on Wartime 
Life in the United States, New York 1946,95. 
18. Chicago Defender, October 14,1944; Pittsburgh Courier, 
October 7-, -179j4; Baltimore Afro-American, October 14,21,1944. 
19. New York Times, November 15,1941. 
20. 'A Letter to Colored Americans', Opportunity, XX, 3, March 1942. 
21. New York Times, April 3,19L. 2. 
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This concern amongst whites increased following the riots of 1913 
which made evident the deterioration in race relations that had 
occurred despite their pleas. 
A survey of opinions conducted by the Office of War Information 
after the outbreak in Detroit found that people were 'shocked', 
'outraged', 'alarmed', and occasionally, 'shamed'. While the 
correspondents showed an awareness of black discontent, they put 
the cause of the riots down to the 'belligerence' of Afro-Americans 
and the resentment this caused among whites. 
22 Yet there was 
evidence to suggest that white Americans had been unaware of the 
black mood prior to 19L3. In a National Opinion Research Center poll 
taken in 1942,62 per cent of the whites interviewed felt that blacks 
were 'pretty well satisfied with things in this country, ' while 
24 per cent felt that blacks were dissatisfied. By 19144, only 25 
per cent thought that blacks were satisfied, and 514 per cent said the 
opposite, a considerable reversal in attitudes. 
23 
Indicative of 
the panic and fear felt by whites after the riots was the appearance 
of numerous race relations committees and organizations. By the 
summer of 1944 over 200 local, state, and national commissions had 
been established to deal with racial problems. In Chicago alone 
22. Office of War Information, 'Bureau of Special Services, 
Division of Research, Report No. C-12, 'Opinions About 
Inter-Racial Tension', August 25,1943, in OASW 230, NARG 
107. 
23. National Opinion Research Center, June 20,1942 and May 19)44, 
in Hadley Cantril, Public opinion, 1935-19146, Princeton, New 
Jersey 1951,988-89. 
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there were 20 such agencies including one set up by the Mayor. 
24 
Although such bodies could only be to the benefit of the communities 
concerned, their effectiveness was limited. In the first place, 
the vast number of organizations was misleading: in many instances 
the same people were members of more than one committee thus 
duplicating membership and reducing the real number of activists. 
25 
Secondly, the committees were born out of fear of riots. In order 
to prevent further outbreaks they centred their attentions on 
building goodwill and understanding rather than attacking the root 
causes such as poverty, poor housing, and discrimination in 
employment. Typical was the American Council on Race Relations 
founded in 1944 with a six-point programme designed to do little 
more than disseminate information to other bodies, schools, and the 
mass media. 
26 
Of course, the spreading of knowledge was an 
important and valuable function and the very existence of the 
committees demonstrated that civic leaders and authorities had 
recognized their responsibility for the maintenance of good human 
24. Guzman, Negro Year Book, 1941-I. 6,226; American Council on 
Race Relations, Directory of Agencies in Intergroup Relations: 
National Regional, State and Local, 194U-49, Chicago 1949; 
'Programs of Action on the Democratic Front', Race Relations: 
A Monthly Summary of Events and Trends, II, 1-2, August- 
September 1944. 
25. Goodwin Watson, Action for Unity, New York 1917,5. 
26. Baltimore Afro-American, May 13,19W4; Robert C. Weaver, 
'Wither Northern Race Relations Committees? ' Phylon, 
V, 3,1914; A. A. Liveright, 'The Community and Race Relations', 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 
Vol. 244Y March 19 . 
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relations. 
27 
However, public opinion polls taken throughout the 
war did not reveal any comparable enlightenment amongst the mass 
of people. 
Although a survey of 12,622 students in 63 colleges throughout 
the country revealed that 73.6 per cent of them felt that in order 
for America to implement the 'Four Freedoms' in the world as a whole, 
she should take steps to end discrimination against blacks, other 
opinion polls were not as encouraging. 
28 
Surveys of factory 
workers and high school pupils taken in 1942 showed that the majority 
were opposed to working or living with Afro-Americans. 
29 Later 
polls showed that there was considerable confusion in white attitudes. 
In 1944 the majority of interviewees thought blacks were dissatisfied 
with their lot but 60 per cent thought that Afro-Americans were 
treated fairly. Again, 85 per cent felt that there was equal 
opportunity in education while 71 per cent suggested that blacks 
did not have the same chance as whites of finding employment. 
30 
Expectations about the future were decidedly gloomy: most surveys 
showed that whites feared that more jobs for blacks would lead to less 
for whites and that this would cause conflict. 
31 
Perhaps because 
27. Edwin Enbree and Julia Waxman, Investment in People, New York 
1949,176. One committee, the Chicago Mayor's Commission, 
was severely criticized by the Chicago Defender for failing to 
attack discrimination and segregation. According to the 
paper, the commission was just 'a convenient cubbyhole' where 
complaints were filed and forgotten, March 30,1916. 
28. 'War and Race Relations: Student Opinion', The Crisis, September 
1943. 
29. Cantril, public opinion, 1935-1916,177. 
30. NORC polls, may 1944, Cantril, Public Opinion, 1935-1916, 
509-10,988-89. 
31. NORC polls, May 1944, op. cit., and in Pittsburgh Courier, 
August 19, October 28,1944. 
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of such fears, opinion was divided on the question of fair employment 
laws. In a survey in 1915,43 per cent of those interviewed favoured 
a law which would require an employer to hire people regardless of 
race or colour while 4 per cent were opposed to it. More revealing 
were the statistics for particular regions. In the North and mid- 
Atlantic states, 58 per cent favoured such a law compared to only 
30 per cent in the South where the majority opposed it. 
32 
There 
was little in this to suggest that the war had altered the climate 
of opinion in the South and in fact, if anything, racial intolerance 
in that region seemed to increase during the 191L0s. 
The migration of Afro-Americans during both World Wars had 
changed the 'Negro problem' from a purely sectional one into a 
national one. Even so, the South still had the largest black 
population and the long ingrained racial prejudice and intolerance 
remained. The numerous outbreaks of violence directed against 
blacks and the utterances of racial demagogues during the war 
demonstrated that many white southerners were immune to propaganda 
about democracy and the rights of man. The long, drawn-out 
campaigns for equal service in the armed forces and for an effective 
committee on fair employment were fought tooth and nail by southerners. 
Any form of integration in no matter what area of life was to be 
opposed, regardless of the war and America's role in it. In 1944, 
the South Carolina House of Representatives declared, 
33 
32. American Institute of Public Opinion, June 12,1945, Cantril, 477-8. 
33. Quoted in Sterling A. Brown, 'Count Us In', in Logan, ed., What The Negro Wants, 322. 
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We reaffirm our belief in and our allegiance to 
establish white supremacy as now prevailing in 
the South and we solemnly pledge our lives and 
our sacred honor to maintaining it. 
The Senator from Mississippi, James Eastland, was quoted as saying, 
34 
I have no prejudice in my heart; but the white 
race is a superior race and the Negro race is 
an inferior race, and the races must be kept 
separate by law. 
Even more incongruous was the sign on a bus in Charleston, South 
Carolina which read: 
35 
Victory Demands Your Co-operation. 
If the peoples of this country's races do not pull 
together, victory is lost. We, therefore, respect- 
fully direct your attention to the laws and customs 
of the state in regard to segregation. Your 
cooperation in carrying them out will make the war 
shorter and Victory sooner. Avoid friction. Be 
patriotic. White passengers will be seated from 
front to rear; colored passengers from rear to front. 
It would appear. from this that to some people at least, the war 
was to reinforce existing institutions rather than to bring about 
change. 
Yet the war did affect the South: its 'cataclysmic' forces 
had shaken and loosened many traditions. 
36 
Indeed the views just 
311 In Gallagher, Color and Conscience, 1. 
35. See Brown, 'Count Us In', 318. 
36. Charles S. Johnson, 'The Present Status of Race Relations in 
the South', Social Forces, XXIII, 1, October 1944; John Samuel 
Ezell, The South Since 1865j New York 1963,117; Thomas D. 
Clark and Albert D. Kirwan, The South Since Appomattox, New 
York 1967,286. 
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quoted were, in large part, a reaction to a new situation. The 
economic, social, and political advances made by blacks during the 
war and their militant demands for further progress caused widespread 
alarm in the South. Symptomatic of this feeling was the variety 
of rumours which were common throughout the region. Domestic 
servants were supposedly leaving en masse for better paid jobs in 
defence factories, while those that remained in service were said 
to be joining 'Eleanor Clubs' and demanding higher wages as well as 
behaving in an offensive manner. Other tales were of black men 
threatening to take over white women when their husbands joined the 
forces. An equally widespread fear was that black servicemen 
would return to America with ideas above their station. 
37 
The whole 
issue of black military participation highlighted the paradoxical 
position of many southerners. On the one hand they feared that 
Afro-Americans would lay claim to white women if only white men 
were called to serve or equally that the whites would bear the brunt 
of war casualties. On the other hand, they were opposed to the 
equal integrated armed service of blacks because it would recognize 
the Afro-Americans, claims to equal citizenship and destroy the 
principles of white supremacy. Besides, even if they did think 
that blacks were incapable of becoming good soldiers, the prospect of 
37. Howard Washington Odum, ' Race and Rumors of Race: Challenge 
to American Crisis, Chapel Hill, No. Carolina, 1943. Also 
see the manuscript by Odum, 'On Trying to Analyze Southern 
Race Tensions with Special Reference to the War Situation 
and to the Total National Picture', Winter 1913, in Yale 
University Library. The 'Eleanor Clubs' were named after 
Eleanor Roosevelt whom many southerners regarded as being 
responsible for black militancy. Neither Odum nor the 
F. B. I. were able to find such a club: see Joseph P. Lash, 
Eleanor and Franklin: The Story of their Relationship, New 
York 1971,672-4, and letter to F. D. R. complaining of his 
wife's supposed activities, September 1912,93: 7 FDRL. 
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blacks with guns and military training was frightening. 
38 
In the 
event, a solution to their dilemma was forced upon them by the manpower 
shortages which required the full utilization of all sections of the 
community. 
It would be foolish to write-off all southerners as ignorant 
bigots blind to their own lack of logic, just as it would be foolish 
to consider all northerners free of prejudice. There were a 
number of liberal men in the South who were aware that the racial 
beliefs and practices of their neighbours were in complete contradiction 
with America's war aims. Several of these joined with blacks from 
the South in forming the Southern Regional Council in 191411. This 
organization sprang from a number of conferences that took place in 
1942 and 1943 and its objectives were spelt out in the first meeting 
blacks at Durham, North Carolina. 
39 
Recognizing that the war had 
'sharpened the issue of Negro-white relations, particularly in the 
South, the Durham conference called for the abolition of the poll 
tax, the white primary, and other forms of disenfranchisement. It 
also demanded equal, but not necessarily integrated, educational and 
economic opportunities for Afro-Americans; segregation was condemned, 
but for the time being the conference wished only to improve race 
38. Odum, Race and Rumors of Race, 105; Letters in Selective 
Service System files, 170, NARG ]J47 quoted above, 172,178; 
Pittsburgh Courier, September 26,19LUi.. 
39. Ina Corinne Brown, Race Relations in a Democracy, New York 
19119,143-415; Charles S. Johnson, Into the Mainstream: A 
Survey of Best Practices in Race Relations in the South, Chapel 
Hill, No. Carolina, 1947,5-7. 
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relations within the existing framework. 
40 
Other interracial 
committees were formed elsewhere in the South to perform a similar 
function. 
41 
Also influential were the liberal newspaper editors, 
Hodding Carter, Virginius Dabney, John Temple Graves, and Thomas 
Sancton. Following the breakdown of segregation in public transport 
in areas in and around Richmond, Virginia, due to pressure of numbers, 
Dabney, the editor of the Richmond Times-Dispatch, urged the repeal 
of the segregation laws " on the ground that under the stress of 
war conditions these laws no longer work. "' He reported that he 
had received hundreds of letters of support and only a few which 
were unfavourable. 
42 
Also indicative of the liberal sympathies in 
the South was a petition from over 2,000 white 'Citizens of the 
Southern States' to members of congress. The petition urged 
support for the Fair Employment Practices Committee which, it said, 
43 
was, 
an important step forward in translating the 
American ideal of democracy and brotherhood into 
practical working relationships and will contribute 
materially to the economic welfare of the South 
and the nation. 
Even this liberalism, however, was tempered with caution. 
Many southerners sympathetic to the Afro-Americans' cause were 
40. Southern Regional Council, Changing Problems in the New South, 
Atlanta, 1955; The Southern Frontier, III, 11, November 1942, 
IV, 1, January 1943, IV, 8, August 19113. 
10.. Johnson, Into the Mainstream, 12-46. 
l2. 'Virginians Speak on Jim Crow', The Crisis, February 19LiJ. 
43. 'A Petition from Citizens of the Southern States', 1945?, FEPC 
409, NARG 228. 
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alarmed by militant campaigns and they urged the blacks to be 
patient and not push events. John Temple Graves accused northern 
black leaders of going crazy, 'making plain beyond question an 
intent to use the war for settling overnight the whole, long, 
complicated, infinitely delicate racial problem.? They were, he 
said, alienating the little support they had in the South . 
44 
Dabney agreed with this viewpoint. While he attacked the white 
demagogues, Talmadge and Dixon, for fanning the flames of prejudice, 
he was also critical of the intemperance of black organizations and 
newspapers. He warned that ?a group of Negro agitators? and 'a small 
group of white rabble rousers' were pushing the country 'closer and 
closer to an interracial explosion which may make the race riots of 
the First World War and its aftermath seem mild by comparison. ' 
45 
Like Mark Ethridge, the chairman of the Fair Employment Practices 
Committee, these men were prepared to work for equality but at the 
same time defend segregation: reform was to be gradual and within 
the existing social system. 
46 
In the face of violent and sudden 
criticism from the North, the threats of bodies such as the March 
on Washington Movement, and the outbreak of . riots in 1943, the 
liberals tended to side with their more extreme brethren rather than 
the blacks. The same was also true in Congress where the issue of 
race generally united southern senators and representatives in 
44. Graves, 'The Southern Negro and the War Crisis', Virginia 
Quarterly Review, XVIII, Lt, 1942. 
45. Dabney, 'Nearer and Nearer the Precipice , Atlantic, January 1943, also in NAACP 279, Library of Congress. 
46. See Ethridge's statement in Birmingham, Ala., quoted above 
' 111. 
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opposition to the rest of the country. 
47 
As Key repeatedly pointed out in his mammoth study of 
southern politics, the South was not as wholely united nor as 
reactionary as was commonly imagined. Although the region was 
almost entirely Democratic, there were within the party's ranks 
differences ranging from left in Louisiana to right in Virginia. 
The southern congressmen did not always vote en bloc, but when they 
did so in opposition to the representatives from the rest of the 
nation, it was invariably on matters involving race or federal 
intervention in the states. 
48 
Civil rights measures were, of 
course, opposed on both counts. This opposition could not be 
ignored nor overruled because the South was vital to the Democratic 
party and to the President both in getting measures passed in Congress 
and in securing victory in presidential elections. Not only did 
a number of southerners serve as chairmen of important committees 
due to their seniority, but also, after the defeat of many Democrats 
in the North and mid-West in the elections of 1942, the Dixiecrats 
formed the backbone of the party in Congress. 
49 
But if Roosevelt 
and his government had to be careful not to offend the South, they 
47. V. 0. Key, Southern Politics in State and Nation, New York 1949, 
351-2,371-2. 
48. Key, Southern Politics in State and Nation, 315-82. 
49. Richard R. Polenberg, War and Society: The United States 
194, New York 1972,1 7-92. The strength of te southern 
Democrats was such that at the 1914 Party Convention Harry S. 
Truman was nominated as Roosevelt's running-mate instead 
of the more radical Henry Wallace. The platform contained 
an extremely weak civil rights plank widely criticized in the 
black press which accused the party of an appeasement equal to Munich. See Pittsburgh Courier, July 22,194 4., Chicago 
Defender, July 29,1944. 
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also had to pay attention to the Afro-Americans. The number of 
black voters in urban areas, particularly in the North, was 
increasing and becoming of strategic importance. Their support 
had already played an important part in the election of 1910.50 
Caught between these conflicting camps, Roosevelt had also to direct 
America's war effort and in the end, he concentrated on that: 
'Dr New Deal' had given way to 'Dr Win-the War'. 
51 
Roosevelt and his advisers were well aware that the war had 
affected race relations in the United States: their files contained 
hundreds of letters from both blacks and whites about the situation. 
That federal agencies felt it necessary to carry out surveys of 
black and white opinion and to study the Afro-American press was 
52 
an acknowledgement of how important the issue was. It was even 
suggested in 1942 that the editors of the more flamboyant black 
newspapers be indicted for sedition, but that advice was rejected 
by Roosevelt. Instead, meetings were held between black editors 
and the heads of various government departments and in 1944 the 
President himself met members of the Negro Newspaper Publishers 
50. Henry Lee Moon, Balance of Power: The Negro Vote, New York 
1949. 
51. Polenberg, War and Society, 73. 
52. Office of Facts and Figures, The Negro Looks at the War: 
Attitudes of New York Negroes Toward Discrimination against 
Negroes and a Comparison of Negro and oor White Attitudes 
Toward War Related Issues, n. p., 1942, Schomburg Co ection; 
Office of War Information, Supplement to Survey No. 25, 
'Negroes in a Democracy at War', July 1)4 1912, in OASW 226, 
NARG 107; Analysis Branch, News Division, Bureau of Public 
Relations, 'Reports on Trends. in the Negro Press', in OASW 
223, NARG 107. 
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Association. 
53 
As well as the minorities at home, the federal 
; -government had to consider the attitudes of her allies and enemies 
abroad. The credibility of America's war aims was vital in 
securing support in the far East and Africa. As so many commentators 
pointed out, America had to practice at home what she preached 
-abroad. 
Similarly, Axis powers could, and did, make great play 
'on. the poor race relations in the United States. Japanese radio 
,, programmes 
beamed to North and South America dealt with the Ku Klux 
Klan, the riots in Detroit, and the discrimination in the armed 
-forces. 
54 
One way of counteracting such messages and of attempting to 
ease racial tensions, was to produce propaganda of one's own, and 
Roosevelt and his government tended to rely on this rather than 
, 
taking positive action. The Atlantic Charter, signed by Churchill 
and Roosevelt in August 1941, was little more than a public relations 
measure aimed at the non-European countries. (Its effect was 
considerably limited following the British prime minister's later 
qualifications. )55 At home, the Americans produced pamphlets such 
as Report to the Nation which stressed the need for unity in the face 
of total war, but did not mention race relations specifically. 
56 
More to that point was Negroes and the War, a 70-page illustrated 
record of black life written by Chandler Owen for the Office of War 
53. Correspondence in Office of Facts and Figures, L1O, and Office 
of War Information 1050, both NARG 208; Walter White, A Man 
Called White, 207-9; Roi Ottley, New World A'Coming, 2 99; - 
Pittsburgh Courier, February 12,1944. 
54. Extracts from propaganda programmes in OFF, 14.0, NARG 208. 
55. Gordon Wright, The Ordeal of Total War, 205-6. 
56. Office of Facts and Figures,. Report, to the Nation: The 
American Preparation for War, Washington, D. C., 1942. 
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Information. The emphasis was on the gains made and being made 
rather than on the disadvantages faced by Afro-Americans. Hitler's 
writings on race were compared to pronouncements made by Roosevelt 
and the reader was told that no matter how bad things were, they 
would be worse if America lost the war. 
57 
After the riots of 1943, 
the government also produced several films, 'The Negro Soldier', 
'Teamwork', and 'Negro Colleges in Wartime', all of which had the 
same message . 
58 
What the Afro-: Americans wanted, however, was not 
so much propaganda as action but the prejudices of whites, both within 
government and without, made this impossible. 
President Roosevelt was neither willing nor able to act on 
civil rights unless forced to do so. Executive Order 8802 was, 
as I have shown, only issued after a militant campaign by blacks 
which, if it had been allowed to come to fruition in the march on 
Washington, would have been extremely embarrassing. Once America 
had entered the war, the President was even less prepared to 
respond to black demands. By 19412 he could not find the time to 
meet Afro-American leaders to discuss the status of blacks in the 
war emergency and, in reply to a request for a 'commission on race 
and color in the present world struggle, ' he said, 
59 
57. Office of War Information, Negroes and the War, Washington, 
D. C., n. d. 
58. See previous chapter. 
59. F. D. R. to Edwin R. Embree, March 16,19112 in reply to letter 
of February 3, FDRL 93: 5. Also telegram, A. Philip Randolph 
to F. D. R., August 2,19142, and reply, August 6, FDRL 93: 5. 
21.4 
I think we must start winning the war with all 
the brains, wisdom and experience we've got 
before we do much general or specific planning 
for the future. 
Yet, one year later, while asking Congress to approve educational 
benefits for veterans, Roosevelt could declare that, 'the time to 
prepare for peace is at the height of war. ' 
6o 
obviously, it 
depended very much on the popularity of measures in Congress and 
the country as a whole. Even so, Roosevelt did appear to realize 
the importance of black participation and America's race relations 
to the war effort. In his message to the 1942 NAACP convention 
he suggested that they reverse their theme from 'Victory is Vital 
To Minorities' to 'Minorities Are Vital To Victory'. 
61 
The following 
year, in a statement to the annual National Urban League conference, 
he pointed out that the 'integrity of our Nation and our war aims 
is at stake in our attitude towards minority groups at home. ' Racial 
strife, he said, 'destroys national unity at home and renders us 
suspect abroad., 
62 
If the underlying theme of these messages was 
unity and a call to put aside grievances in order that the war 
might be won, Roosevelt was prepared to suggest that participation 
would bring rewards. In a radio message to the nation from the 
White House in October 1944, the President called for the right to 
vote for all citizens 'without tax or artificial restriction of any 
60. Davis R. B. Ross, Preparing For Ulysses: Politics and Veterans 
During World War II, New York and London, 1969,91. 
61. Ottley, New World A'Coming, 320. 
62. Letter of address, September 7,1943, in National Urban League, 
'Victory Through Unity: Annual Conference of the National 
Urban Leaguer, September 28-October 3,1943, in Schomburg 
Collection. 
245 
kind. ' He went on., 
63 
We must be able to present to our returning heroes 
an America which is stronger and more prosperous, 
and more deeply devoted to the ways of democracy, 
than ever before. 
He reinforced that message while writing to the Sixth Congress of 
the Southern Negro Youth Congress in December 19lß. when he wrote that 
"the thousands of young blacks had fought, 
64 
not only to defend America but to advance America. 
They have fought to establish a universal freedom 
under which a new basis of security and prosperity 
can be established for all - regardless of station, 
race or creed. 
Despite these various declarations, Roosevelt remained 
peculiarly insensitive to demands for civil rights legislation. Even 
after the outbreak of riots, a development Roosevelt deplored for 
its damaging effects on the war effort, plans for a government 
investigation and a committee on race relati azs were dropped. In 
place of them a presidential aide, Jonathan Daniels, was appointed 
to correlate information on racial problems and the flow of morale- 
boosting material was increased. Once more, att. ention was not to 
be distracted from the immediate problem of winning the war and the 
prevention of future riots was left to the local community organizations 
which sprang up after the summer of 1913.65 The counsel of patience 
63. Message to the Nation, October 5,1944, in Samuel I. Rosenuran, 
ed., Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt: 
Victory and the Threshold of Peace, 1944-45, New York 1950, 
317-21. 
64. Chicago Defender, December 9,1944. 
65. F. D. R. to Anson Stokes Phelps, July 1,19b3, FDRL 93: 12; 
Harvard Sitkoff, 'Racial Militancy and Interracial Violence in 
the Second World Warf, Journal of American History, LVIII, 
3,1971,675-78. 
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and moderation at a time when blacks were most impatient was even 
put forward by Eleanor Roosevelt, normally an outspoken defender of 
the Afro-Americans' cause. Like her husband, she felt that 
militant civil rights campaigns could only detract from the war 
effort. 
66 
As well as his over-riding concern with winning the war and 
his political pragmatism, there was inherent in the Roosevelt 
philosophy a feeling that special legislation for blacks was 
unnecessary. In all of the New Deal programmes there was not one 
act which was aimed at helping the black community alone. Rather, 
all policies were expected to apply equally to all underprivileged 
groups and it was left to the administrators of particular agencies 
to see that there was no discrimination in the areas of their 
jurisdiction. Where local]aws and customs prevented this policy 
from becoming practice, little was dare to correct the imbalance. 
To do so would have alienated the South, as would have any public 
support from the President for civil rights legislation such as 
an anti-lynching or anti-poll tax bill. 
67 
With the aitbreak of 
war, the support of southerners was even more vital to ensure the 
passage of war measures. Besides, with New Deal policies and 
agencies being abandoned and abolished. Roosevelt was even less 
68 
likely to single out the black community-for favourable action. 
66. Baltimore Afro-American, July 18,19112; Lash, Eleanor and 
Franklin, 673-74. 
67. Leslie H. Fishel, Jr., 'The Negro in the New Deal Era', in 
Bernard Sternsher, ed., The Nero in Depression and War: 
Prelude to Revolution, 1930-1945, Chicago, 1969,7-2b. 
68. Richard Polenburg has argued convincingly in War and Social 
Change: The United States, 191L1-145, that the war put an end 
to reforms and led to the reversal of some New Deal policies, 
73-95. 
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He did still maintain that such domestic measures as were passed 
would apply equally to all Americans, thus negating the need for 
special consideration. For example, when Walter White asked that 
a qualified Afro-American be appointed as assistant administrator 
in the Veterans Bureau, Roosevelt replied that such an appointment 
would not be necessary. Blacks, along with all veterans, were 
provided for in the Serviceman's Readjustment Act the G. I. Bill 
of Rights. 
69 
There was some justification for Roosevelt's approach. Afro- 
Americans had gained with the rest of the population frCm participation 
in the war effort and from wartime policies. Employment had risen, 
better wages were paid, rents and prices were controlled and even 
cut back, housing had been built, and defence training and armed 
service had given blacks skills which they could later use in 
civilian life. However, as the Afro-American spokesmen were well 
aware, those gains had been made under exceptional circumstances 
and had still been limited by the discrimination which Roosevelt was 
unable or unwilling to see. In all areas, housing, health, 
employment, and education, the advances had not been sufficient to 
bring blacks up to white levels and there was still an immense gap 
between the races. Moreover, Afro-Americans, even more than 
whites, suffered from 'depression psychosis' - the fear that the war 
would be followed by mass unemployment. 
70 
In such an eventuality, 
69. White to F. D. R., October 5, F. D. R. to White, October 14, 
19W., FDRL 93: 10. Subsequently, however, meetings were held 
between White and General Hines of the Veterans Administration 
to discuss racial policies, see White to F. D. R., October 23, 
1944, FDRL 93: 10. 
70. Ross, Preparing for Ulysses, 3b-5. 
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blacks would once again be last hired, first fired, the gains they 
had made would be lost, and the gap between black and white would 
widen. 
71 
Such fears were not groundless. Even without discrimination, 
the disproportionate concentration of Afro-Americans in industries 
directly related to the war - shipbuilding, munitions, iron, and 
steel - meant that they would be the first to feel the effects of 
peace. As early as 1944, lay-offs were reported in a number of 
plants in Missouri, Connecticut, Minnesota, and Indiana in which 
black seniority rights were being ignored. 
72 In seven 'war centers' 
studied by the Fair Employment Practices Committee during the period 
of reconversion, all but one showed a heavier loss of jobs by blacks 
than by white workers and by 1918, Afro-Americans in San Francisco 
had dropped back halfway to their pre-war employment status. 
73 Once 
laid-off, black workers were less likely to be re-employed or at 
least not at the levels they had experienced during the war. 
These early post-war developments caused crnsiderable alarm 
among Afro-Americans, particularly about the fate of the returning 
71. For expression of such fears see, Pittsburgh Courier, August 25, 
1915; Chicago Defender, September 9,1944; Baltimore Afro- 
American, August 2, September 1,1915; National Urban 
League, 'Racial Aspects of Reconversion: A Memorandum 
Prepared for the President of the United States', August 27, 
195, in FEPC 117, NARG 228. 
72. Clarence M. Mitchell, Associate Director of Field Operations 
to Malcom Ross, FEPC chairman, March 22,1914, in FEPC 407, 
and Malcom Ross to John A. Davis, 'Significant Facts about 
the Negro in Postwar Employment', July 28,1914, in FEPC 
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black veterans. Of all the blacks, it was the servicemen who were 
most conscious of the part they had played in the war and so most 
likely to have high expectations for change. As Roy Wilkins pointed 
out, 'certain it is that the Negro soldiers are not fighting and 
dying to maintain the status quo for their race. 
74 
Even if the 
majority of black servicemen had performed only noncombatant duties, 
their experiences were still likely to encourage optimistic ideas 
'about their future. Indeed, the soldiers in service of supply 
regiments had perhaps greater reason to be hopeful. Many of those 
in`the engineering, technical, and mechanical units were taught 
skilled and semi-skilled trades which might otherwise have been 
denied them. They would naturally expect to put such expertise to 
good use in civilian life. A man who had gained such qualifications 
would 'not be satisfied, in light of the training which he has 
received and in light of the occupational changes which have occurred 
amongst nonwhites, to return to his former occupational status. '75 
As well as training in the forces, service outside the United 
States had also affected the attitudes of the black soldier. One 
commander of a black supply unit summed this up when he said, 
76 
71i.. Wilkins, 'The Negro Wants Full Equality', in What The Negro 
Wants, 132. Also see Charles S. Johnson, 'The Negro in the 
Postwar World', March 1,1944, in Johnson Papers, box 167, 
F. 27, Fisk University. 
75. Robert C. Weaver, 'The Negro Veteran', Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, 236, March 1945, 
30; National Urgan League, Dept. of Industrial Relations, 
'Occupational Adjustment for Negro Veterans: A Memorandum 
on the Problem of Counselling Negro Veterans'; July 27,19Lil 
in OASW 225, NARG 107. 
76. Quoted in Roi Ottley, Black Odyssey: The Story of the Negro 
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Negroes got a swell education in Europe. They 
went to theaters, heard good music, stayed at 
nice hotels, and even visited the homes of 
people in Europe. They went to museums. They 
saw great art and architecture, and historical 
things, and saw how civilized white people live. 
They did things they could not do at home. Its 
something you can't expose a man to and expect 
him to forget overnight. 
There is evidence in written and filmed records, as well as in 
fictional works, that blacks were well received by the people of a 
great many countries. 
77 
In most of them, Afro-Americans were seen 
as just part of the armies of liberation and treated as heroes. 
In all areas of the world, like other American soldiers, blacks 
had more money than the local inhabitants and a ready supply of 
items considered luxuries such as cigarettes, chocolate, razor 
blades, and nylon stockings. In many places a black face was a 
novelty and racial prejudice unusual and Afro-Americans often found 
that they were treated better by the locals than by their fellow 
Americans. 
In Britain, the importation of discrimination and segregation 
by white G. I. s created considerable problems. Although there were 
blacks in Britain before the war, the number was very small. Some 
West Indians had remained in Britain following their discharge from 
her armed forces after World War I, black seamen still in service 
made their homes in British ports, and a few Africans studied at 
77. 'Fighting 92nd Hailed As Liberators', U. S. Army Signal Corps, 
Sherman Grinberg Library, No. C-5125; William Gardner Smith, 
The Last of The Conquerors, London 1919; Ulysses Lee, The 
Employment of Negro Troo s, Washington, D. C., 1966,623-27; 
John Oliver Killens, And Then We Heard The Thunder, New York 
1963; Angus Calder, The People's War: Britain 1939-45, London 
1971,356-57. 
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British universities. While there was some conflict between blacks 
and whites in those particular areas just after the first World 
War, it was shortlived and of a highly localized nature. 
78 
The 
influx of West Indian technicians, workers, and servicemen after 
1910 was not sufficient to create any major racial problems. 
Besides, those newcomers were viewed as temporary residents who 
were only in the country to help win the war and because they were 
concentrated in a few specific areas most Britons were unaware of 
79 their presence. 
The first black American troops arrived in 1942 and by the 
end of October that year there were 12,0119 Afro-Americans in Britain. 
By May 31,19141, this number had risen to 132,253 and while some 
were stationed in Northern Ireland, most were scattered throughout 
England. 
80 
Initially, both American and British authorities acted 
to discourage segregation and racial conflict. General Eisenhower 
was determined that dissension within the American ranks would not 
be permitted to jeopardize Anglo-American relations. To that end 
78. St. Clair Drake, 'The "Colour Problem" in Britain: A study in 
---- Social Definitions', Sociological Review, vol. 3,1956; 
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for information on black troops in Britain, in OASW 218, 
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an order issued in 1942 declared that, 
81 
The spreading of derogatory statements concerning 
the character of any group of United States troops, 
either white or colored, must be considered as conduct 
prejudicial to good order and military discipline 
and offenders must be promptly punished. In the 
interest of military efficiency, if for no other 
reason, isolated incidents of friction must be 
eliminated. 
A film made by the British Ministry of Information for the U. S. 
Army in order to acquaint G. I. s with English manners and customs 
emphasized the difference in racial attitudes. A black soldier 
from Birmingham, Alabama is shown talking to a white lady from 
Birmingham, England. When the woman invites the soldier to her 
home, the white American narrator warns other Americans not to be 
alarmed or offended by such actions. 
82 
On their part, the British 
attempted to resist any imposition of American racial patterns. 
The Home Office issued a directive to Chief Constables warning them 
that local police forces were not to implement or enforce any form 
of colour bar: segregation could only be enforced at the orders of 
and by American troops. 
83 
That the British considered the racial 
81. Quoted in Lee, The Employment of Negro Troops, 625, and also 
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European Theatre of Operations, North Africa, and the Pacific 
during 19411 as an accredited correspondent for the New York 
Post. He also sent a note of his observations to Roosevelt 
and to the Secretary of War, see OASW 204,221, NARG 107 and 
White papers, Yale University. 
82. 'Welcome to Britain', Ministry of Information 1913, London 
National Film Archives. 
83. Quoted in White, A Rising Wind, 27, and Lee, The Employment of 
Negro Troops, 625. 
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attitudes of their Allies unusual was evidenced in an issue of 
Current Affairs, the fortnightly journal for British servicemen. 
After giving the historical background to the American 'Colour 
Problem'., the article warned the reader against embarassing his 
guests: 
84 
There is no reason why we should adopt the average 
American attitude to- the problem, but we should 
certainly respect that attitude and appreciate the 
reasons for it. 
British soldiers and civilians were urged not to interfere no 
matter how angered or offended by cases of discrimination. It 
was even suggested that attempts to ? breakdown the various forms of 
social regulation accepted by the average American family' would 
be of little purpose and likely to lead to violence, 'especially 
where women are concerned. '85 
Despite this information and the various orders, there was a 
certain amount of fraternization between white Britons and black 
Americans. There were, too, examples of American-style segregation 
and outbreaks of racial violence. By December 17,1943, Truman 
Gibson, the civilian aide to the Secretary of War who had replaced 
Hastie, could record that 'a rigid pattern of racial segregation' 
had appeared in Britain, 'community patterns in that country to the 
contrary notwithstanding. '86 By way of illustration, he enclosed a 
81.. 'The Colour Problem as the American Sees It', Current Affairs, 
December 1942,13. 
85. 'The Colour Problem as the American Sees It', 14. 
86. Truman Gibson to Ass. Secretary of War, December 17,1913, 
OASW 201., NARG 107. 
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list of public houses in Ipswich, eight of which were used 
exclusively by Afro-Americans. Publicans and dancehall owners 
sometimes gave way to demands from white Americans to exclude 
blacks from their premises and women in branches of the British 
forces were told to refrain 'from associating in public with Negroes. 
87 
However, the British people often sided with the black Americans 
against their white comrades. Sympathetic bar-owners hung signs 
declaring, 'This Place For the Exclusive Use of Englishmen And 
American Negro Soldiers' and 'Only blacks served here. '88 It was 
even said that the British preferred black Americans to whites 
because they were less brash, more careful, and reserved and the 
problem of 'Brown Babies', the illegitimate children of Afro- 
Americans and English women, certainly suggests that some blacks 
were successful in making friends. 
89 
As black newspapers reporting 
the situation in the United Kingdom pointed out, the British press 
and public were often offended by American attempts to introduce 
segregation and defended the Afro-Americans. In one clash between 
white American paratroopers and blacks of a quartermasters regiment 
in Bristol in 19L4, it was found that British civilians had encouraged 
the Afro-Americans in their actions. One of the black soldiers was 
87. Richmond, Colour Prejudice in Britain, 88-90; White, A Rising 
Wind, 30. 
88. White, A Rising Wind, 11; K. L. Little, Negroes in Britain: 
A Study of Rac ations in English Society, London l9 7,240. 
89. Little, Negroes in Britain, 2110; St. Clair Drake, 'The'Colour 
Problem" in Britain', 207. There were estimated to be some 
2,000 'brown babies'. 
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shot and killed after stabbing a military policeman. In other 
areas, the British took a more active part and joined in the fighting. 
90 
Walter White concluded from his visit to England in 19144 that many 
of the Afro-Americans there gained 'their first experience in being 
treated as normal human beings and friends by white people. 191 
The treatment Afro-Americans received from whites outside the 
U. S. A. contrasted very sharply with the treatment they received at 
home and from their fellow Americans in the forces. Insofar as it 
emphasized that they were an equal part of the armies of democracy 
and respected as such by Europeans, it was bound to influence their 
attitudes towards American society. Coupled with the expertise they 
had gained as a result of military training, these experiences were 
certain to heighten expectations about their future and the militancy 
, with which they would pursue their demands. As one 
black soldier 
wrote from 'somewhere on Okinawa', 
92 
90. A report of the Bristol clash from the Provost Marshall to 
the Deputy Theater Commander, July 20,1944.9 is in OASW 
201., NARG 107. See too, Chicago Defender, July 3, September 25, 
October 23,1913, April 1, April 29,1944, and Edwin Embree, 
Brown Americans: The Story of a Tenth of the Nation, New York 
155. 
91. Whitey A Rising Wind, 21. Another important effect of 
service overseas was that it enabled blacks from different 
countries to meet and discuss their common problems. The 
impact of this is extremely difficult to gauge. At least 
one black African, later active against the power in control 
of his country, noted the influence of his meeting with a 
black G. I. in Burma in 1913, see Waruhiu Itote, 'Mau Mau' 
General, Nairobi, 1967,11-13. It is fair to suppose that 
Afro-Americans too gained additional insight from this type 
of encounter. 
92. Pittsburgh Courier, May 19,1915. Also see White, A Rising 
Wind, 144. 
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Our people are not coming back with the idea of 
just taking up where they left off. ' We are going 
to have the things that are rightfully due us or 
else, which is a very large order, but we have proven 
beyond all things that we are people and not just 
the servants of the whiteman. 
What the black soldier would want, said the National Urban league, 
were 'jobs, opportunities to complete their education, a chance to 
go into business, and the privilege of sharing completely in the 
future development and prosperity of the nation. º93 This, of 
course, was the wish of every American, black or white, but provision 
on the scale described by the National Urban League was only made 
for those who had been in the armed forces. 
The Serviceman's Readjustment Act, or G. I. Bill of Rights 
as it became known, is possibly the major example of reward for 
military participation in modern society. The only comparable 
legislation passed for American civilians (although it applied to 
all no matter what their role had been in the war effort) was the 
Employment Act of 1916 which made explicit the government's 
responsibility for full employment and instituted a Council of 
Economic Advisers to assist in the formulation of economic policies. 
This was the nearest Congress came to enacting Roosevelt's Economic 
Bill of Rights which had declared that every individual was entitled 
to employment, fair wages, decent housing, and a good education. 
9b 
93. N. U. L., Dept. of Industrial Relations, 'Occupational 
Adjustment for Negro Veterans', 1; FEPC, Final Report, 
June 28,1916, Washington, D. C., 1917,86. 
94. Polenburg, War and Society, 9b-5; Henry Steele Coin ager, 
Documents of American History, New York, 7th ed., 1962, 483-85., -514-16. The Economic Bill of Rights was perhaps 
the equivalent of the British Beveridge Report, itself a 
good example of wartime planning. 
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The G. I. Bill not only recognized these riglits but also enabled 
war veterans to obtain them. The former soldiers could claim a 20 
dollar-a-week re-adjustment allowance, loans for home purchase 
or improvement, loans to buy farms or businesses, and educational 
grants of up to 500 dollars for tuition plus 65 dollars per month 
subsistence allowance for the single man. 
95 
By the 1950s several 
million veterans had availed themselves'of these benefits. 
Unfortunately there is no record in the Veterans Administration of 
the number of Afro-Americans who profited in this way. However, it 
is clear from information concerning the plans of black soldiers 
that many intended to make use of the G. I. Bill to improve their lot 
in life. 
Among black enlisted men 43.5 per cent hoped to return to 
school, college, or university for part- or full-time study. 
Another indication of the black soldiers' expectations was the fact 
that only one-fifth intended to return to their old jobs and employers 
and only a third planned even to return to the same type of work. 
96 
The Afro-American veterans not only hoped to find new and better 
jobs, but were also prepared to move in order to do so. Only 65.7 
per cent, compared to the 82 per cent of white soldiers, said that 
they would return to their fonner homes. Most of those planning to 
95. The history and details of the G. I. Bill are dealt with in 
Ross, Preparing For Ulysses, 90-121. See tooNAACP, Veterans 
Handbook, New York., n. d, 
96. War Dept. Report, B-133, 'Postwar Educational Plans of 
Soldiers', March 14,1915, in Selective Service System, Special 
Groups: Special Monograph 10, Washington, D. C., 1953, 
174-5; Ambrose Caliver, 'Post-war Educational Implications 
of Array Data and Experiences of Negro Veterans and War Workers', Office of -Education, 1945, in OE ISO, NARG 12; Robert C. Weaver, 
'Negro Veterans Return', Race Relations, III, 1-2,1945. 
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move were going to leave the South and, following the patterns of 
wartime migration, head for the North and the far West. Indeed, 
by 1917 score 75,000 black veterans were reported to have left the 
South. 
97 
Many of these migrants were going to join families and 
relatives already in the new regions. However, a great proportion 
of the departures were undoubtedly due to the repressive and limiting 
atmosphere of the South which prevented the use of newly-acquired 
skills and training. Sadly, the black veteran was to find that 
similar problems faced him no matter where he went. 
The various different provisions of the Bill of Rights were 
dependant on factors largely outside of federal control. To receive 
an educational grant, a soldier had to be accepted by one of the 
colleges approved by individual states. For blacks this raised 
immediate obstacles. The 112 black colleges were already over-crowded 
and segregation in the South, prejudice elsewhere, limited the number 
of alternatives available. By 1947, some 20,000 black veterans 
had managed to enter college but another 15,000 had been unable to 
secure places. Of those accepted, 70 per cent went to black 
institutions. 
98 
In order to obtain loans whether for homes, farms, 
or business, the black soldier had to satisfy the lending agency, 
government or private, of his suitability and the likelihood of the 
project being a safe investment. In the area of housing, restrictive 
97. War Dept. Report, B-128, 'Postwar Migration Plans of Soldiers', 
191114., in Special Monograph, 170-1; Weaver, 'Negro Veterans 
Return'; Charles G. Bolte and Louis Harris, Our Negro Veterans, 
New York Public Affaixs Committee Pamphlet, 12d,, New York 
19)7, t. 
98. Weaver, 'Negro Veterans Return', 14-15; Bolte and Harris, Our 
Negro Veterans, 18. 
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practices and the prejudices of builders and agents meant that there 
were too few new homes and too little of the existing supply 
available to Afro-Americans. Houses in the old, deteriorating 
neighbourhoods were unlikely to qualify for grants. 
99 Low incomes 
presented yet another problem in securing loans and purchasing a 
house. No matter that the provisions of the G. I. Bill or the expect- 
ations of the soldiers, blacks were faced with the same patterns of 
prejudice as had prevailed before the war. The number of Afro- 
Americans employed by either the Veterans Administration or the U. S. 
1hployment Service was very small, particularly in the offices in the 
South. Information was therefore often denied the black veterans 
or the jobs offered were of the menial and unskilled variety.. In 
one survey of 50 cities, the movement of blacks into peacetime 
employment was found to be lagging'far behind that of white veterans: 
in the state of Arkansas 95 per cent of the placements made by the 
U. S. E. S. for Afro-Americans were in service or unskilled jobs. 
100 
There was even discrimination in the redistribution centres provided 
for returning servicemen. In reply to complaints about the 
inadequate and segregated facilities for black soldiers, the Secretary 
of War, Stimson, said that they were 'essentially? equivalent to the 
99. Weaver 'Negro Veterans 15-16; B. T. McGraw, 'Minority 
Group Participation in the Veterans Emergency Housing Program', 
February 19,1946, HHFA 91, NARG 207. 
100. National Urban League, Dept. of Industrial Relations, 
'Adjustment of Negro Veterans: A Report of Negro Veterans 
in 50 Cities', 1946, in War Manpower Commission, NARG 211; 
American Council on Race Relations, 'Survey of Community 
Veteran Information Centers', March 29,1916, in Schomburg 
Collection; Bolte and Harris, Our Negro Veterans, 11; 
Howard Johnson, 'The Negro Veteran Fights for Freedom', 
Political Affairs, Vol. 26, may 1947,1129-31. 
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centres for whites. Afro-Americans, he said, were more able to rest, 
: relax, and readjust in the 'congenial' atmosphere in black areas 
-and all-black centres. 
101 
Given such widespread discrimination it 
is not at all remarkable that blacks accounted for 25 per cent of 
re-enlistments in the first year after'the war. For some at least, 
Array life was better than civilian life. 
102 
Re-entry into armed service offered not only greater economic 
security but also more personal safety than civilian life for, with 
the'end of the war, there was a rising tide of violence directed at 
Afro-Americans and black veterans in particular. In 1946 it 
appeared that the 'Red Summer, of 1919 was to be repeated. In 
February, rioting whites in Columbia, Tennessee, killed two blacks 
and wounded ten others. The following August more than 50 Afro- 
Americans were injured in a riot in Athens, Alabama and there were 
smaller disturbances in Philadelphia and Chicago. 
103 
Even more 
horrifying were the bloody murders of two black men, one of them a 
veteran, and their wives in Walton County, Georgia in July 1916. 
Shortly afterwards, in Taylor County, Georgia, another veteran was 
101. Telegrams and letters concerning the Hotels Theresa and Pershing 
in New York and Chicago, and Stimson's comments to F. D. R.,, 
September 20,19hLi, in FDRL 93: 12. 
102. Charles G. Bolte, 'He Fought For Freedom', Survey Graphic, 
. LLXVI, 1, January 1947,117. 
103. Baltimore Afro-American, March 9, August 17,1916; . New York 
Times, December 11,19 6; Langston Hughes, Fight for Freedom: 
T ivory of the NAACP, New York 1962,102-1t; Arvarh E. 
Strickland, History of the Chicago Urban League, Urbana, Ill., 
1966,159-60. 
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shot to death for voting in the local elections. 
104 
Throughout the 
South returning black servicemen were involved in incidents on 
buses and trains and many of them suffered injuries at the hands of 
either police or transport officials. One of the worst, and also 
the most publicized, examples of this sort of brutality occurred 
when Isaac Woodard was beaten in a town in South Carolina. Woodard, 
on his way home after three years in the Army, was arrested for being 
drunk and disorderly at the request of a white bus driver. The 
black soldier, who did not drink, protested and as a result was hit 
about the face. His eyes were damaged to the extent that he was 
permanently blinded. 
105 
This and the other incidents caused 
widespread revulsion and in response a National Emergency Committee 
Against Mob Violence was formed in August 1946. One of the Committee's 
first acts was to arrange a meeting with the President in order to 
put their case. 
106 
By 1946, the man in the White House was Harry S. Truman, the 
Vice President who had succeeded to office following Roosevelt's 
death on April 12,1945. Despite the fact that most of them had 
101.. Baltimore Afro-American, June 22, August 3,1946; Hughes, 
Fight for Freedom, 112-13; Maceo Snipes, the soldier who 
voted, was just one of a number of blacks who tried to 
exercise their political rights. In Atlanta, several 
hundred veterans met to work for their share of democracy 
and in Birmingham, Alabama, 100 black veterans marched on 
the courthouse to register their votes: the majority were 
rejected on the grounds that they could not understand or 
interpret the constitution, Chicago Defender, February 2, 
1946, and Pittsburgh Courier, December 8,19 5. 
105. White, A Man Called White, 325-27; Baltimore Afro-American, 
June 22, August 3,1946. 
106. White, A Man Called White, 329-30; William C. Berman, The 
Politics of Civil Rights in the Truman Administration, 
Columbus, io, 1970,50. 
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opposed his re-election in 19Lii., Roosevelt's passing was mourned 
in the Afro-American newspapers, because the New Deal had been to 
the benefit of all underprivileged groups, and because in a general 
humanitarian way Roosevelt had sympathized with the black cause. 
The newspapers were doubtful whether Truman would continue in that 
vein: he was from a southern state, Missouri, and had been chosen 
as Vice President in order to appease the South. 
107 
Truman's 
record on civil rights issues as a senator was not outstanding in 
one way or the other. Rather, his position had been that of a 
liberal southerner, a defender of equality of opportunity and of 
segregation. 
108 
Yet as President he was to take actions on the 
Afro-Americans' behalf which far surpassed those of his predecessor 
in office and which, moreover, threatened to jeopardize southern 
support of the Democratic Party. In his first year in office he 
gave strong verbal support for a permanent Fair Employment Practices 
Committee, appointed a black lawyer to the U. S. Customs Court, and 
nominated William H. Hastie for the Governorship cf the Virgin Islands. 
In July 1946 he instructed the Justice Department to investigate 
the murders in Georgia and in September he met the members of the 
Committee Against Mob Violence. According to Walter White, the 
-chief spokesman at that 'meeting, Truman was shocked by the details 
of the violence which he heard. As a result, he promised to institute 
a-committee by executive order to investigate violations of civil 
107. Berman, The Politics of Civil Rights, 17-19; Pittsburgh 
Courier, July 22,19442 Apr' 2,5; Baltimore Afro- 
American, April 21,1945. 
108. Berman, The Politics of Civil Rights, 8-17; Richard M. 
Dalfiume, Desegregation of the U. S. Armed Forces: Fighting on Two Fronts, 1939-19 3, Columbia, Missouri, 19693 134-37. 
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rights and make recommendations "b09 Such a Committee was formed in 
December 1946. 
The reasons for the delay between the meeting in September 
and the announcement in December are not clear. It may be that the 
President. withheld his statement until after the November congressional 
elections for fear of losing the votes of Democrats. If so the 
decision had little effect: the Republicans scored widespread 
victories. The President's advisers reacted to the electoral defeats 
by urging on him a liberal pro grarrmie, including civil rights, and 
Truman concurred. 
110 
OnDecember 5,19b6, by Executive Order 9808, 
he set up a committee to study, report, and recommend 'effective 
means and procedures for the protection of the civil rights of the 
people of the United States. ' 
ill In speeches to Congress in January 
and February of 1947, Truman again referred to the need for civil 
rights action and called for FEPC legislation. 
2 Later that year 
he gave an address to an NAACP meeting before the Lincoln Memorial 
which was broadcast on the national radio networks. He demanded 
action on race relations, stressing America's role in world affairs: 
'Our national government must show the way. 1113 America's 
109. White, A Man Called White 330-31; Pittsburgh Courier, 
September 2,19 ; Berman, The Politics of Civil Rights., 
5o-51. 
110. Berman, The Politics of Civil Rights, 53-56. 
111. Executive Order 9808, President's Committee on Civil Rights, 
To Secure These Rights, Washington, D. C., 1947, vii; New 
York Times, December 5,1916. 
112. State of the Union Message, January 6,19117, Economic Message, 
January By 1917, in Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. 
Truman, 1947, Washington, D. C., 1962., 31-32. 
113. July 5,1947) Paramount News, National Archive Film Library, 
NA 200 PN 6.89; White, A Man Called White, 3t7-t9. 
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vulnerability on the racial issue became more apparent when delegates 
of, the U. S. 3, R. tabled a petition, presented to the United Nations by 
the NAACP, at the U. N. Commission on Human Rights. Although the 
motion was denied, the attempt brought publicity the United States 
could ill-afford. 
114 
Further pressure was exerted on the President 
with the publication in October 1947 of the Report of the Committee 
on Civil Rights. 
In a comprehensive document covering every, aspect of black 
life, the Committee spelt out four essaitial rights due to all Americans: 
the right to safety and security of the person; the right to citizen- 
ship and itsprivileges, including armed service and voting; the 
right to freedom of conscience and expression; and the right to 
equality of opportunity. The black claims concerning the importance 
of. military participation were accepted and reiterated. 'Any attempt 
, 
to'curb the right to fight in its defense' said the Committee, 'can 
only lead the citizen to question the worth of the society in which 
he lives. ' Further on, the report said, 
115 
Underlying the theory of compulsory wartime 
military service in a democratic state is the 
principle that every citizen, regardless of 
his station in life, must assist in the defense 
of the nation when its security is threatened. 
Iii'order that this be achieved, the Committee recommended the end to 
all discrimination and segregation in the armed forces. The general 
114. 'Our Civil Rights Become a World Issue', New York Times 
Magazine, January 11,1918; Berman, The Politics of civil 
Rights, 65-66; Dalfiume, Desegregation of the U. S. Armed 
Forces, 139. 
3-15. To Secure These Rights, 8,40-41,162. 
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separation of the races was also attacked. Segregation was 
described as 'the cornerstone cf the elaborate structure of 
discrimination' and separate facilities were said to be 'far from 
equal. '116 The Committee called for the elimination of discrimination 
and segregation from American life by means of fair employment and 
fair education laws, the ending of segregation in public and private 
health facilities, the outlawing of restrictive covenants, anti- 
lynching laws, and guarantees of Afro-American voting rights. 
117 
As well as legislation, the Committee wanted the civil rights section 
of the Justice Department reorganized and strengthened, the formation 
of a civil rights unit in the F. B. I., and permanent federal and 
state commissions on civil rights. 
118 
on February 2,1948, 
President Truman included many of these recommendations in his Civil 
Rights Message to Congress. He emphasized that 'the world position 
of the United States in the world today makes it especially urgent 
that we adopt these measures to secure for all our people their 
essential rights., 
119 
It has been suggested that Truman's stand on civil rights and 
this speech in particular., was merely a political manoeuvre to win 
black votes away from the Progressive and Republican Parties prior 
to the 1948 presidential elections. 
120 
If this were so, then Truman 
116. To Secure These Rights, 63-65,81-82. 
117. To Secure These Rights, 139-73. 
118. To Secure These Rights, 151-59. 
119. Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1948,125-26. 
120. Berman, The Politics of Civil Rights, 80-82,238-40. For a 
. more realistic appraisal, see D iume, Desegregation of the U. S. Armed Farces , 139-40, and Harry S. Truman, Memoirs : Years of Trial and Hope, 1946-1953, London 1956,191- . 
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had taken a brave gamble for the southern Democrats, predictably, 
reacted violently, some even threatening to bolt the party. At 
the convention in July 1918, the Administration supported a general 
civil rights plank on the lines of that of 1944 in order to mollify 
the South. This was accepted by the platform committee but over- 
thrown in favour of a more liberal and specific plank in a floor vote. 
Several southern delegations then walked out of the convention and 
th ortly afterwards the States Rights Party with Strom Thurmond of 
South Carolina as its presidential candidate was formed. 
121 
Yet in 
face of this open opposition Truman issued two more Executive Orders 
later in July 194.8; one to set up a Fair Fnployment Board within 
the Civil Service Commission, the other to bring equality of treatment 
and opportunity in the armed forces. 
122 Although he played down 
the civil rights issue in his whistle-stop campaign, Truman did 
visit black areas and he became the first President to speak in 
Harlem. As a result of his speeches and actions, Afro-Americans 
contributed to his remarkable upset victory over the Republican 
candidate, Thomas Dewey. An estimated 69 per cent of all black 
voters in 27 major cities across the country backed Truman, while 
in the South, the Dixiecrats carried only four states and 22 per 
121. New York Times, July 111., 15,1948; Pittsburgh Courier, July 
2L, 19 ; Key, Southern Politics, 329-38; Berman, The 
.. 
Politics of Civi Rights., 106-112; Kirk H. Porter and Donald 
. Johnson, Nation Party Platforms, 1811.0-196lß, London 1966, 1467=68. 
122. Pittsburgh Courier, July 31,1948; New York Times, July 27, 
19148; Also see above, 84-86, for black campaign against 
segregation in the forces. 
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cent of the entire southern vote. 
123 
However, the southern Democrats 
in coalition with conservative Republicans, did block the legislation 
on lynching, poll taxes, FEPC, and civil rights which Truman submitted 
early in 1949. After 1950, the position of the South was further 
strengthened as southern congressmen held a majority of the Democratic 
seats in the House and only lacked one seat to have a majority in the 
Senate. Coupled with this was the increasing fear of communism, 
the McCarran Internal Security Bill, and the rise of Joseph 
McCarthy, all of which created fan atmosphere when anyone who believed 
in equal rights for Negroes must ipso facto be a t'CommunistII. 112I 
It was not to be until 1957 that any of the Truman proposals 
became legislation, and then only in a general and rather unsatisfactory 
Civil Rights Bill. 
This is not to detract from Truman's achievemeats. He was 
the first President to publicly discuss the issue of race relations 
and demand civil rights legislation. His Executive Orders, the 
report of the Committee on Civil Rights, and the desegregation of 
the armed forces marked a shift from federal support of segregation 
to support for equality and integration: instead of following public 
opinion, the government attempted to lead it. If the administration 
had little success in the legislative area, it was more fortunate 
in the judiciary and particularly in the Supreme Court. During the 
New Deal and the second World War, there was a marked change in 
123. Berman, The Politics of Civil Rights, 1214-32; Clark and 
Kirwan, The South Since Appomattox, 295; Donald S. Strong, 
'Durable Republicanism in the South', in Allan P. Sindler, 
ed., Change in the Contemporary South, Durham, North Carolina, 
1963,176. 
121. Walter White, How Far the Promised Land?, New York 1956, 
208; Berman, The Politics of Civil Rights, 179-80. 
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opinion within the Supreme Court and as a result several important 
important decisions were made. In cases during and after the war, 
the Court ruled against segregation in interstate transport and 
against segregated educational facilities. Segregated schools 
were also attacked by the President's Commission on Higher 
Education in its report of 1948.125 Encouraged by Truman, the 
Attorney General, Tom Clark, prepared amicus curiae briefs against 
restrictive housing covenants and in 1948) the Supreme Court ruled 
that such covenants were not enforceable in law. The Federal Housing 
Authority thereafter refused to insure mortgages on property with 
restrictive covenants in the deeds. 
126 Also of some benefit to 
Afro-Americans in the field of housing was the 19419 Housing Act, 
the aim of which was to provide 'a decent home and a suitable living 
environment for every American family. ' By furnishing federal 
funds for local authorities, the act launched a direct attack on poor 
housing. However, it was still up to the individual cities and 
towns to embark on programmes of slum clearance; the government 
provided financial aid, but not the initiative. Of the 205,706 
dwelling units built under the act's provisions, 55,826 or 27.1 
per cent were for black families. 
127 
125. President's Commission on Higher Education, Higher Education 
for American Democracy, New York 1918,34-39-; John T. 
Hu e, 'The Desegregation of the University of Oklahoma', 
Journal of Negro History, LVII, 4,1972; Monroe Berger, 
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126. Tom C. Clark and Philip B. Perlman, Prejudice and Property: 
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Afro-Americans were also affected by the amendments to the 
Fair Iabor Standards Act which raised minimum wages in 1949 and 
again in 1950. Although they were still concentrated in the lowest- 
paid jobs and suffered a higher rate of unemployment than whites, 
blacks were still better off economically than they had been before 
the war because of the generally high levels of employment. The 
losses incurred in the early post-war lay-offs did not continue and 
nowhere did Afro-Americans drop back to the levels of the 19305.128 
With this continued prosperity there were other signs that the Afro- 
American was gaining recognition as an equal citizen under law. In 
a series of Supreme Court actions the white primary which had excluded 
blacks from the local Democratic Party conventions in the South was 
declared unconstitutional. Partly as a result of this, and partly 
because of the increased political and social consciousness of blacks, 
the number of registered black voters in the South increased throughout 
the 140s. Afro-Americans were still subjected to harassment at the 
polling stations by the Ku Klux Klan but less so after that 
organization had joined the Communist Party on the Attorney General's 
list of subversive movements. 
129 
It is clear from this that not all the black expectations had 
been met either during or after the war. Indeed it would have been 
128. 'Postwar Trends in Negro Employment', Monthly Labor Review, 
65,6,194.7; National Urban League, IC anges in the Occupational 
Status of Negroes, 1940-1950', New York 1950, in Schomburg 
Collection. 
129.0. Douglas Weeks, 'The White Primary, 1944-191.8', and Donald 
S. Strong, 'The Rise of Negro Voting in Texas', both in 
American Political Science Review, XLII, 3,1918; 'Race 
and Suffrage Today', in New South, Changing Patterns in the 
New South, 12-15; Joseph P. Frank, 'Legal Developments 
in Race Relations, 19115-1962', in Sindler, Change in the 
Contemporary South, 67-81; Davis M. Chalmers, Hooded 
Americanism: The First Century of the Ku Klux Klar 1865-1965, 
New York 1965,323-27. 
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remarkable if they had been. It would take considerably more than 
America's involvement in the war, and a longer period, to change the 
attitudes and mores of the majority of whites. However, there were 
signs of progress. In the executive and judicial branches of the 
federal government there was a change from grudging acquiescence to 
black demands, to open support for them. Liberal white opinion 
was also outspoken in the black man's defence. This change was due 
to the new role in international affairs which the war had forced 
on the United States and to the constant campaign of blacks themselves. 
Neither world opinion nor black voters could not be ignored: America 
was forced to practice what she preached. While such prcg ress 
continued, black expectations remained high. When those hopes 
were crushed with the widening of the economic gap between the 
races and the outbreak of open opposition to social and political 
reform in the 1950s and 1960s, the second trevolutioni in American 
race relations began. As Lerone Bennett Jr. pointed oiit, the seeds 
of that revolt had been sown during the second World War. 
130 
130. Bennett, Confrontation: Black and White, Baltimore, Maryland, 
1965,168; also see Richard M. Dalfiume, The tTForgotten? T 
Years of the Negro Revolution', Journal of American History, 
LV, 1, June 1968. 
I 
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Chapter 8 
The Postwar Years: World War II in Perspective 
Several writers have recently commented on the impact of the 
second World War on America and her black population. Richard 
Polenberg, for instance, says that, 'World War II radically altered 
the character of American society and challenged its most durable 
values? and that by 'disrupting traditional patterns of racial 
behavior the war broke down many barriers to equality. '1 However, 
while this is undoubtedly true, Polenberg and other commentators 
close their studies with the end of the war and we are left to 
conclude that the conflict had few, if any, long-term consequences. 
In fact, the importance of the war to Afro-Americans can only be 
seen in the context of later events. Black participation in the 
military and industrial war effort had brought economic, social, 
and political gains which Afro-Americans were determined to hold on 
to and improve. America's new-found position in the community of 
nations, her role in the Cold War and later involvement in Korea, 
all themselves direct results of World War II, made it possible for 
blacks to maintain the advances they had wcn. Unfortunately, when 
those pressures were removed, the progress, particularly in the 
economic sphere, halted and the promises of the Truman years were 
1. Polenberg, War and Society: The United States, 1941-1945, 
New York 1972, , 100; Richard R. Lingeman, Don't You Know There's A War On? The American Home Front, 179-1-1945- 
,, 
New 
York 1970; Harvard Sit o f, 'Racial Militancy and Interracial 
Violence in the Second World Wart, Journal of American History, 
LVIII, 3, December 1971. Richard M. Dalfiume, Desegregation 
of the U. S. Armed Forces: Fighting on Two Fronts 1939: -1-935- CO Columbia, Missouri, , 105-31,, 
does attempt to put the war in the context of later developments, but only in a limited way. 
272 
unfulfilled. As a result, black expectations were crushed and 
frustrated and the militancy of the 1940s returned with a vengeance. 
If, there was a 'Negro Revolt' in the late 1950s and early 1960s, it 
was precisely because America could not, or would not, continue 
during times of peace the progress made in war. 
-- While the actual achievements of the Truman administration 
were slim, they were still sufficient to encourage and, to a certain 
extent, satisfy black Americans. The President's uncompromising 
stance on civil rights, the desegregation of the armed forces, the 
Supreme Court decisions, and above all, a fairly high rate of 
employment, all served to convince Afro-Americans that the progress 
made during the second World War would continue. American involve- 
ment in the Korean war from 1950 to 1953 further bolstered hopes: 
'once again ... armed conflict and national danger brought the Negro 
advancement toward his goal of full citizenship. '2 However, because 
of the limited nature of the conflict, the racial issue did not 
reach the prominence it had in the earlier war. Truman refused to 
use the opportunity to establish another Fair Employment Practices 
Committee but instead ordered the inclusion of non-discrimination 
clauses in defence contracts. Although the order was neither very 
strong nor by itself very effective, unemployment amongst blacks 
which had been rising before 1950, dropped by half. Indicative of 
the economic progress between 191.9 and 1953 was the rise in black 
trade union membership from 1,500,000 to 2,100,000. As in the 
1940s, the demands of war and 'unguided, change succeeded where 
2. Walter White, How Far the Promised Land?, New York 1956,96. 
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government action failed. 
3 
Advances also continued to be made in 
areas other than employment: the number of black voters registered 
in the South rose from 750,000 in 1918 to 1,300,000 in 1952; more 
blacks bought their own homes and went to colleges; in Wath ington, 
D. C., the attack on segregation began to produce results -4 In 
three separate cases in 1950, the Supreme Court undermined the legal 
basis of segregation and, equally important, public opinion surveys 
revealed that white opposition to integration in housing, transportation, 
and education continued to decrease through the 1940s and into the 
1950s. Even in the South the number of whites who favoured 
integration was growing. 
5 
The progress, or promise of progress, in 
civil rights was such that black leaders urged Truman to run for 
re-election in 1952. Though Truman refused to stand for a second 
term for fear of splitting his party, black allegiance to the 
Democrats remained strong. Afro-Americans, unlike the majority of 
3. White, How Far the Promised Iand?, 117-20; William C. Berman, 
The Politics of Civil Rights in the Truman Administration, 
Columbus, Ohio, 1970, l b5; Herbert R. Northrup, 'Recent 
Unemployment Rates of Negroes, 1918-19691, in Northrup, 
Negro Employment in Basic Industry: A Study of Racial Policies 
in Six Industries, Philadelphia, 1970,23. 
4. White, How Far the Promised Land?, 82,117-20,157-58; U. S. 
Information Service, The People Take The Lead: Civil Rights, 
1948-1956, Washington, D. C., 19.56; Lerone Bennett Jr., 
Confrontation: Black and T, hite, Baltimore 1965,170; 
Constance McIaughlin Green, The Secret City: A History of Race 
Relations in the Nation's Capital, Princeton, New Jersey, 
1967,274-300. 
5., H. H. Hyman and P. B. Sheatsley, 'Attitudes on Desegregation', 
Scientific American, 195,6, December 1956,36-1i0; Mildred 
A. Schwartz, Trends in White Attitudes Toward Negroes, Report 
119, National Opinion Research Center, Chicago 1967; Monroe 
Berger, Equality by Statute, New York 1952,72-109; Jack 
Greenberg, Race Relations and American. Law, New York 1959, 
Lt, 113-14; M. M. Chambers, The Colleges and the Courts 
1916-50= Judicial Decisions Regarding Higher Education in the 
United States, New York 1952. 
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their white countrymen, voted overwhelmingly for Adlai Stevenson and 
his running mate from Alabama rather than the victorious Republican 
candidate, Dwight D. Eisenhower. 
6, 
Eisenhower's election in 1952 marked the end of one era in 
civil rights and the beginning of another. The strong executive 
leadership on issues of race relations was gone and in its stead 
was a policy of 'dynamic conservatism' which was more conservative 
than dynamic. It was unfortunate for America, and for Afro- 
Americans, that this development should coincide with a period of 
reaction and crisis. In 1951 the Supreme Court followed up its 
earlier decisions and concluded a series of cases presented by the 
NAACP when it ruled that segregation in public schools was 
unconstitutional. The following year, it ordered that the integration 
of schools be carried out 'with all deliberate speed., The response 
of the white South was immediate and overwhelming. The Ku Klux 
Klan re-emerged and White Citizens Councils were formed; the Supreme 
Court was denounced by 100 southern senators and representatives who 
. urged massive resistance; and mobs 
in towns in Texas, Tennessee, 
Kentucky, and Alabama gathered to prevent the entry of black children 
into formerly all-white schools.? In 1957 President Eisenhower was 
forced to intervene in the conflict when the Governor of Arkansas, 
Orval Faubus, used the local National Guard to keep nine black students 
out of Little Rock Central High School. Faced with this challenge 
to the federal laws and courts, Eisenhower took control of the 
6. Berman, The Politics of Civil Ri hts, 196,230-31; John Hope 
Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom, 613. 
7. Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom, 61)-19; Hodding Carter, 
The South Strikes Back, New York 1959. 
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National Guard and sent federal troops to escort the black children 
into the school. His action ended open defiance of the Supreme 
Court but his own ambivalence and caution on the entire issue in 
fact served to encourage southern resistance. Fourteen years 
after the initial court order, not a single school in South Carolina, 
8 
Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, or Louisiana had been integrated. 
While white Americans prepared to resist-any attack on the 
racial status quo, blacks prepared to launch a direct assault. 
In Montgomery, Alabama, in 1555, Afro-Americans began a boycott of 
the segregated bus services which lasted almost a year and which 
brought national prominence to Martin Luther King. In the following 
years there were similar campaigns in other cities in the South and 
sit-in demonstrations against segregation in restaurants and lunch- 
counters throughout the entire country. The early 1960s witnessed 
'Freedom Rides' through the South, campaigns against de facto 
segregation in the North, and a massive March on Washington in 
1963 attended by over 250,000 people. Appropriately enough, one of 
the'spokesmen at that gathering was A. Philip Randolph, the leader of 
the'March on Washington Movement of the 191i0s. By 1960, the militant 
methods advocated by Randolph and the members of the Congress on 
Racial Equality twenty years earlier had become widely accepted. 
There had indeed been a revolution in civil rights. 
9 
8. Bennett, Confrontation: Black and White, 189-90; Franklin, 
From Slavery o Freedom, 619-20; i iam Miller, A New History 
of the United States, London, 1970,116-17. 
9. ' Anthony Lewis, The Second American Revolution: A Firsthand 
Account of the Struggle for Civil Rights, London 1966, - xiq ; 
Bennett, Before the Mayflower: A History of Black America, 
Chicago 1969,311-324,21-33. There are many other accounts 
of this 'Negro Revolt': like Lewis's they begin with the 
Montgomery bus boycott. 
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The reasons for this dramatic change are complex, but their 
roots lie in 'the deepening mood of despair and disillusionment that 
gripped the American Negro after World War II. 110 The Afro-Americans 
were divided between the older generation of optimists who emphasized 
the progress made since the war, and the younger group of pessimists 
who replied that the progress was too slow. 
11 
The latter, with 
some justification, pointed out that the advances of the earlier 
years were more apparent than real and were anyway being gradually 
eroded. The Civil Rights Acts of 1957 and 1960 were too little, too 
late. They dealt almost entirely with the voting rights of blacks 
in the South and did little to mollify the young Afro-Americans who 
pointed to the continued widespread segregation, in both North and 
South, of housing, schools, and recreational facilities. The slow 
rate of progress in those areas was made even more galling by the 
rapid developments in Africa where 36 former colonies gained their 
independence between 1957 and 1965. The black writer, James Baldwin, 
was quoted as saying, 'At the rate things are going, all of Africa 
will be free before we can get a lousy cup of coffee. '12 Such 
fears were borne out by the violent reaction of whites in the South 
to integration and to the peaceful demonstrations. To counter such 
violence Afro-American veterans of World War II and Korea formed a 
10. Louis Lomax, The Negro Revolt, London 1963,81. 
11. Carleton Mabee, 'The Crisis in Negro Leadership', Antioch 
Review, XXIV, Fall 196); W. Haywood Burns, The Voices of 
Negro Protest in America, New York and London 19F33,30-32. 
12. In Lomax, The Negro Revolt, 77; see too, Rupert IInerson and 
Martin Kilson, 'The American Dilemma in a Changing World: The 
Rise of Africa 'and the Negro American', Daedalus, 94,4, 
Fall 1965. 
, ', 
ý. 
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para-military organization, the Deacons for Defense, and Robert F. 
Williams, another veteran of the second World War, was dismissed 
from the NAACP in North Carolina in 1959 for advocating armed 
self-defence. In both cases, the blacks acknowledged that their 
military experiences had had an important effect on their attitudes. 
13 
As well as being alarmed by, and responding to, the set-backs 
faced in the South in the attack on legal segregation, the more 
militant Afro-Americans argued that the campaign had drawn attention 
away from the spread of de facto segregation in the North. The 
migrations which had accelerated during the 1911.0s had continued at a 
high rate in the post-war years. In 1950) the proportion of the 
black population still in the South was 68 per cent: by 1964 it 
had dropped to 54.4 per cent and 73.2 per cent of the total black 
population lived in urban areas. 
14 
This movement and urbanization 
led to increased separation of the races as the newcomers added to 
and expanded the existing ghettos in cities in the North and far 
West. In 212 metropolitan areas in 1960,78 per cent of blacks 
lived in the blighted city centres while 52 per cent of the whites 
lived in the suburbs. Where there was urban renewal and slum 
clearance it actually led to a reduction of the number of homes 
available to Afro-Americans and to greater over-crowding. 
Rebuilding was never able to keep up with the clearances and blacks 
13. August Meier and Elliott M. Rudwick, From Plantation to Ghetto: 
An Interpretive History of American Negroes, New Yor 1 966., 
2 -51; Charles C. Mos os, Jr., The American Enlisted Man: 
The Rank and File in Today's Military, New York 1970,131. 
]J . Reynolds Farley, 'The Urbanization of Negroes in the United 
States', Journal of Social History, Volume 1, Spring 1968. 
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had limited access to housing in areas outside of the ghetto. 
15 
While poor housing affected schooling and-employment opportunities, 
their concentration in the low-paid jobs or the ranks of the unemployed 
made-it impossible for most blacks to consider house purchase and 
limited their choice to low-rent homes of an inferior quality. 
Indeed, the deteriorating economic situation of the Afro-Americans 
was one of the chief causes of anger and pessimism amongst the young 
blacks. The progress which followed World War II continued until 
-the end of the Korean War when it slowed almost to a halt. Afro- 
Americans were hit particularly hard in the recessions of 1953-55 
and 1957-60: the unemployment rate amongst blacks rose from 4.5 
per cent in 1953 to 9.9 per cent in 1954; in 1958 it reached 12.6 
per cent and thereafter was consistently over ten per cent and always 
more than double the rate of unemployment amongst whites. 
16 The 
gap between the races in income levels and occupational status, which 
had been slowly. closing up to about 1952, began to widen and the 
gains of the earlier years began to disappear. In 1947,17.7 per 
cent of all the families with incomes below 3,000 dollars were black, 
but by 1960 this proportion had risen to 20.8 per cent and, as one 
commentator said, although 'the majority of the poverty-stricken 
15. Charles Abrams, The City is the Frontier, New York 1965, 
5L-71; Karl and Alma Taeuber, Negroes in Cities: Residential 
Segregation and Neighborhood Change, Chicago 1-9-66-,. Robin 
M. Williams, Jr., Strangers Next Door: Ethnic Relations in 
American Communities, Engelwood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1964-- 
16. Northrup, 'Recent Unemployment Rates of Negroes'; Harry A. 
Ploski and Ernest Kaiser, The Negro Almanac, New York 1971, 107-20. 
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are, not Negro, the majority of Negroes are poverty-stricken. 
"? 
Given this situation, it is not surprising that many Afro- 
Americans gave up in despair and joined separatist-nationalist 
movements such as the Nation of Islam or Black Muslims. This 
organization, in existence since the 1930s, attracted public attention 
in the years after the Korean War because of its dramatic growth. 
18 
Other young Afro-Americans, however, responded in an entirely 
different fashion and sought to enter the one occupation in which 
there was equality - the armed forces. The process of desegregation 
begun after World War II had been concluded during, and largely 
19 because of, the Korean War. As Charles Moskos has written, 
A tragic irony in our country is that many Negro 
youths, by seeking to enter the armed forces, are 
saying that it is even worth the risk of being 
killed in order to have a chance to learn a trade, 
to make it in a small way, to get away from a 
dead-end existence, and to join the only institution 
in this society that seems really to be racially 
integrated. 
Even more ironic, given the events of the 191i0s, was the shift in 
black attitudes toward armed service. During World War II, the 
majority of Afro-Americans had attempted to make black military 
17. Louis A Ferman, ed., Poverty in America: A Book of Readings, 
Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1965., xix; Michael Harrington, The 
Other America: Poverty in the United States, New York 1962, 
72-77-; Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census, Trends in 
the Income of Families and Persons in the, United States: 
1947-1960, Technical Paper , Washington, D. C., 1963,7,18-23. 
18. E. U. Essien-Udom, Black Nationalism: The Rise of the Black 
Muslims in the U. S. A., Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1966 ed., 
3- . 
19. Dalfiume, Desegregation of the U. S. Armed Forces, 201-17. 
20. Moskos 'The Negro and the Draft', in Roger W. Little, ed., Selective Service and American Society, New York 1969,161. 
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participation more equitable in the hope that this would improve 
opportunities in the rest of society. Only a minority, as I have 
shown, had questioned the basic legitimacy of black involvement in 
armed forces altogether. Twenty years later, the situation in the 
forces, and black views about it, had completely changed. 
Whereas in World War II Afro-Americans had been largely 
limited to service in labour and engineering regiments, in Vietnam 
they accounted for 9.8 per cent of the military strength, 20 per 
cent of the combat forces, and 14.1 per cent of those killed in 
action. 
21 
Now, Afro-Americans argued, the forces were too integrated 
and, besides, the black soldiers were fighting and dying for little 
visible reward. The Muslims were joined in their opposition to 
black military participation by a number of other organizations, 
including the Black Panthers, and even more moderate spokesmen 
a- . 
questioned the black man's role in the Army in Vietnam. Many blacks 
agreed with Floyd McKissick, Stokely Carmichael, and later, Martin 
Luther King, all of whom pointed out publicly that it was contradictory 
to fight for freedom in Asia while it was denied at home. 
22 
Such 
attitudes were, and still are, widespread among the black soldiers 
themselves. One survey found that not only did the majority of 
21. Despite these figures, there was still discrimination: in the 
Army blacks comprised 13.1 per cent of enlisted mai, but only 
3.5 per cent of the officers, Gene Grove, 'The Army and the Negro', 
New York Times Magazine, July 24,1966; Leo Bogart, ed., 
Social Research and the Desegregation of the U. S. Army, 
. ,_.. `Chicago 1969,1-2. 
22.. American Broadcasting Companies, 'The Vietnam War: Black 
and White', Scope part 63,1967, Library of Congress, FBA 
5852, includesfiilmed interviews with McKissick, Carmichael, 
people in Harlem, and soldiers in Vietnam. See too, King, 
Chaos or Community, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1969, ed., 41, 
67-883-1-M. 
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Afro-American G. I. s feel they had no business in South-east Asia, 
but also that most of them werd prepared, If nooem. ary, to tako up 
arms in order to secure their rights at home. The writer 
concluded, 
23 
A significant number of veterans are sure to 
continue to believe that America owes the black 
soldier a debt for his service in Vietnam and 
for his suffering at home. In Vietnam, this 
young black is coming increasingly to believe 
that if America does not meet this demand peace- 
fully, he will use the means he has learned in 
the paddies and the jungles - violence. 
The wheel had turned full circle and the fears held by some whites 
throughout America's history had been realized: to train, arm, and 
commit Afro-Americans to combat without recognizing such service 
with equal citizenship had led to the threat of armed insurrection. 
It still remains to be seen whether such an eventuality can be 
forestalled. 
f' 
In conclusion, we have to ask how the second World War 
relates to the later period and what effect, if any, the war had m 
the Afro-Americans status. A sociologist has written) 
24 
It is clear enough that poverty and unemployment 
by themselves are not enough to account for 
social protest and militant action. We have known 
for some time that organized and sustained protest 
is most likely not when the economic position of a 
population is-continuously low and oppressive but 
rather when conditions have been improving, especially 
if advancement is abruptly blocked or reversed. 
23. Wallace Terry, 'Bringing the War Home', Black Scholar, 
November 1970. 
24. Robin M. Williams, Jr., 'Social Change and Social Conflict: 
Race Relations in the United States, 1944-19641, Sociological 
inquiry, mv, 1,1965,17. 
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This was true of the revolutions in France and in Russia: it was 
also true of the 'Negro Revolt'. The second World War and its 
aftermath provided that crucial period of progress before reaction. 
Participation in the war-effort, while it did not close the gap 
between the races, did bring Afro-Americans increased employment 
and eccnomic security which lasted into the 1950s. Equally 
important, the war fostered a growth in political and social 
consciousness amongst blacks. The campaigns for greater involvement 
in the military and industrial effort, the migrations and resultant 
urbanization of the black population, and the issues of the war, all 
pushed the American racial question to the fore 'in a disturbing 
and challenging manner unequalled since the days of Reconstruction-' 
25 
The expressions in black literature and song, the increased 
circulation of black newspapers, the growth in civil rights 
organizations, and the formation of the March on Washington 
Movement indicated that Afro-Americans were aware of this new situation 
and were prepared to take advantage of it. By threatening mass 
demonstrations during the war and use of their now decisive voting 
power after it, they were able to secure executive actions on their 
behalf which marked a definite change. It was surely no coincidence 
that the first President since Lincoln to take a stand openly 
sympathetic to the Afro-Americans, and at the risk of dividing his 
own party, should do so in the immediate aftermath of war. This 
was both a reward for military participation and a response to new 
political circumstance. 
25. Maurice It. Davie, Negroes in American Society, New York 1949, 
3]. 4. 
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However, not all the effects of the war were to the Afro- 
American's benefit. The increased urbanization intensified problems 
of housing, health, and education and those problems grew as 
conditions in the ghettos deteriorated under the added strains of 
post-war migrations. Nor were the forces of war sufficient to 
break down the racial barriers or to overcome white prejudice. 
Truman's actions and the progress made during the 1940s raised 
black expectations but at the same time revealed the extent of white 
opposition to change. That opposition was able to prevent any 
legislation being passed until the 1950s and then to limit the 
consequences of that legislation when eventually enacted. Coupled 
with the economic recessions which practically destroyed the gains 
of a quarter of a century, this intransigence on the part of whites 
was sufficient to frustrate and anger Afro-Americans. They, 
however, had learned from the experiences of the second World War. 
The Ghandian tactics of non-violent demonstrations, of sit-ins, and 
of civil disobedience espoused by the March on Washington Movement 
and put into practice by the Congress of Racial Equality during the 
1940s, became commonplace during the 1960s. When whites reacted to 
such protests with increasing violence, blacks became mm e militant 
and resorted to armed resistance and retaliation. It was only with 
this growing conflict that strong executive and legislative action 
was taken in the area of civil rights and human welfare. The 
tragedy was that it took the threat of an other war, this time a 
race war within America, to bring abtat the long overdue attack on 
poverty and prejudice. 
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Appendix I 
Executive Order 8802, June 25,1941. 
WHEREAS it is the policy of the United States to encourage 
full participation in the national defense program by all citizens 
of the United States, regardless of race, creed, color, or national 
origin, in the firm belief that the democratic way of life within 
the Nation can be defended successfully only with the help and 
support of all groups within its borders; and 
WHEREAS there is evidence that available and needed workers 
have been barred from employment in industries engaged in defense 
production solely because of consideration of race, creed, color, 
or nationäl origin, to the detriment of the workers' morale and 
national unity: 
Now, SORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me by 
the Constitution and the statutes, and as a prerequisite to the 
successful conduct of our national defense production effort, I 
do hereby reaf£i. rm the policy of the United States that there shall 
be no discrimination in the employment of workers in defense 
industries or Government because of race, creed, color, or 
national origin, and I do hereby declare that it is the duty of 
employers and of labor organizations, in furtherance of said 
policy and of this order, to provide for the full and equitable 
participation of all workers in defense industries, without 
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discrimination because of race, creed, color, or national origin; 
And it is hereby ordered as follows: 
1. All departments and agencies of the Government of the United 
States m ncerned with vocational and training programs for defense 
production shall take special measures appropriate to assure that 
such programs are administered without discrimination because of 
race, creed, color, or national origin; 
2. All contracting agencies of the Government of the United 
States shall include in all defense contracts hereafter negotiated 
by them a provision obligating the contractor not to discriminate 
against workers because of race, creed, color, or national origin; 
3. There is established in the Office of Production Management 
a Committee on Fair Employment Practice, which shall m nsist of a 
chairman and four other members to be appointed by the President. 
The chairman and members of the Committee shall serve as such 
without compensation but shall be entitled to actual and necessary 
transportation, subsistence, and other expenses incidental to 
performance of their duties. The Committee shall receive and 
investigate complaints of discrimination in violation of the 
provisions of this order and shall take appropriate steps to redress 
grievances which it finds to be valid. The Committee shall also 
recommend to the several departments and agencies of the Government 
of, the United States and to the President all measures which may be 
deemed by it necessary or proper to effectuate the provisions of this 
order. 
Signed, 
" Franklin D. Roosevelt. 
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Note on Executive Order 8802 
The original order was amended on July 18,1911 to increase 
the membership of FEPC to a chairman and five members. On May 25, 
19142, 
-. 
by- Executive Order 9111, it was further amended to bring 
the number of members, excluding the chairman, to seven. When 
the Committee was re-established after its brief sojourn in the 
War Manpower Commission by Executive Order 9316 on May 27,19143, 
it consisted of a chairman and not more than six members. 
-, ', While the Order specified discrimination ? because of race, 
creed, 
-'color, 
or national origin', it was issued as a result of 
black protest and was aimed chiefly at racial discrimination. 
However,, FEPC did consider the situation of Mexican-Americans, 
Japanese Americans, and Jews as well as that of Afro-Americans. 
" It is most important in the light of this thesis., to note 
the emphasis on the necessities of war. The Order is not issued 
to halt infringements on Afro-Americans' constitutional liberties 
but to 'encourage full participation in the national defense program' 
and ensure that 'the democratic way of life within the Nation can 
be defended successfully. ' Discrimination, in such a context, was 
described as detrimental to 'the workers' morale and national unity. ' 
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Appendix II 
Table I 
The percentage distribution of black men and women by major industry 
group for selected years, 1940-52. 
194 0 19144 194 8 1950 1952 
Total employed men. 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Agriculture 43.3 31.3 22.4 21.6 19.2 
Nonagriculture 56.7 68.7 77.6 75.4 80.8 
Mining 1.8 4.1 6.1 2.4 2.7 
Construction 4.8 3.7 6.7 7.3 8.8 
Manufacturing 16.1 23.6 211.0 21.5 26.4 
Transportation, communication 6.7 10.0 9.6 7.3 7.5 and, public utilities. 
Trade, finance 11.7 12.3 13.6 17.3 16.2 
Domestic and personal service 8.3 6.0 7.6 7.7 7.2 
professional services 2.9 3.2 4.2 4.4 4.4 
Government 1.7 3.9 4.2 5.0 4.9 
Business repair services, 2.7 1.9 2.6 2.5 2.7 
amusement, recreation 
Total employed women 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Agriculture 21.0 10.9 8.7 8.7 6.2 
Nonagriculture 79.0 89.1 91.3 91.3 93.8 
Mining 0.05 0.05 0.1 0.05 0.05 
Construction 0.1 0.05 0.2 0.1 0.05 
Manufacturing 3.0 13.0 8.9 7.9 7.0 
Transportation, communication, 0.2 1.1 0.5 0.6 0.8 
etc. 
Trade, finance 4.5 11.4 1.. 1 11.1 12.9 
Domestic and personal service 64.6 52.7 55.7 57.6 55.2 
professional services 5.7 7.3 9.4 10.1 13.8 
Government 0.6 3.1 1.8 2.5 3.5 
Business repair, etc. 0.4 0.5 0.8 1.0 0.7 
Department of Labor, Negroes in the United States: Their Employment 
and Economic Status, Washington, D. C., 19 2,3. 
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Appendix III 
Table 2 
The proportion of blacks to whites in each major occupational group, 
for selected years, 1910-52. 
1940 1944 1948 1950 1952 
Employed black males 8.6 9.8 8.4 8.3 8.9 
Professional, technical, 2.8 3.3 2.6 2.6 2.5 
and kindred workers 
Managers, 'officials, 1.1 2.1 1.8 1.9 1.6 
and proprietors 
Clerical, sales, and 1.3 2.8 2.3 2.8 3.1 kindred workers 
Craftsmen, foremen, 2.6 3.6 3.7 3.9 4.0 
and kindred workers 
Operatives and 
kindred workers 
5.9 10.1 10.1 8.5 10.4 
private household 60.2 75.2 53.7 51.3 31.6 
workers 
Service workers 16.5 21.9 20.7 21.1 21.7 
Farmers and farm managers 12.4 11.0 9.8 10.5 10.7 
Farm labourers and foremen 21.0 21.1 15.8 19.8 16.2 
Labourers, except farm 21.0 27.6 23.6 21.4 26.9 
and mine 
inployed black females 13.8 12.9 11.8 12.0 11.4 
professional, technical, 4.5 5.7 5.4 5.2 7.0 
and kindred workers 
Managers, officials, 2.6 4'8 2.4 2.7 3.1 
and proprietors 
Clerical, sales, and 0.7 1.4 2.3 1.9 2.2 kindred workers 
Craftsmen, foremen, and 2.2 5.2 5.4 2.2 4.9 kindred workers 
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Table 2 (continued) 
1940 1944 1948 1950 1952 
Operatives'and kindred 4.7 8.3 8.2 7.8 6.8 
workers 
-private-household workers 16.6 60.9 
52.4 53.9 53.9 
Service workers 12.7 23.9 20.0 19.1 20.0 
Farmers and farm managers 30.4 23.8 21.9 20.2 214.1 
Farm labourers and foremen 62.0 21.4 15.9 19.2 14.3 
Labourers, except farm 13.2 35.6 24.4 112.6 7.8 
and mine. 
Department of Labor, Negroes in the United States, Their Employment 
and Economic Status, Washington, D. C., 1952, . 
These tables taken together do, I think, reveal something of 
the Afro-American's economic progress during the war and its 
limitations. From table I, it is apparent that the numbers of black 
males and females in domestic or personal service declined. But 
because there was a decline in the number of whites in this form of 
employment, proportionately black representation increased. In 
agriculture the reverse was true. The number of black farmers and 
farm labourers declined rapidly and so did the proportion of blacks 
to whites. Apart from farming, gains were made in all forms of 
employment. However, the greatest progress appears to have been in 
blue, rather than white, collar jobs. Black representation in 
professional, clerical, or managerial posts was still far below 
their proportion in the population or in the work force. Moreover, 
in practically each occupational group blacks suffered a reverse 
after the war or, at least, the rate of progress slowed down. The 
expectations of the 1940s were not fulfilled in the 1950s. 
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ý.. Appendix IV 
Certain Health Statistics for Afro-Americans 
Mortality from selected causes, adjusted for age, per 100,000 population 
table I Tuberculosis 
Black White 
1920 273.7 104.9 
1925 230.5 75.3 
1930 199.7 60.5 
1931 198.8 56.5 
1932 180.5 52.0 
1933 164.0 49.0 
1934 154.8 47.3 
1935 150.9 145.7 
1936 157.7 145.5 
1937 150.8 113.6 
1938 142.3 39.1 
1939 134.3 37.14 
1940 133.1 36.1 
-1941 128.5 34.7 1942 123.4 33.5 
1943 116.6 33.3 
1914 109.7 32.7 
4 
Table 2 Diseases of the Heart 
Black White 
1920 245.8 199.8 
1925 310.1 219.6 
1930 337.1 244.8 
1931 310.3 2L. 1.7 
_1932 298.2 251.9 
1933 297.4 252.4 
193) . 315.1 261.1 1935 307.0 263.2 
, 1936 335.8 280.1 ` `1937 331.2 278.2 
---1938 327.3 271.2 
1939 306.0 277.1 
1940 330.3 288.1 
1911 326.3 280.6 
1912 316.5 281.2 
193 326.9 297.8 
19 320.2 295.5 
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Appendix IV (continued) 
Table 3 Pneumonia, all forms 
Black White 
1935 140.3 77.8 
1936 169.2 86.9 
-1937 158.1 78.7 
1938 127.0 61.9 
1939 106.5 514.3 
1910 99.7 49.9 
1941 85.5 41.9 
1942 80.0 41.1 
1913 91.3 46.5 
1944 82.3 11.5 
Table 4 Syphilis, all forms 
Black White 
1935 61.3 11.2 
1936 64.5 u. 6 
1937 65.8 11.1 
1938 66.1 11.0 
1939 62.5 10.3 
1940 61.6 9.7 
1941 54.2 9.0 
1942 18.5 8.2 
1913 15.8 8.1 
1914 43.1 7.4 
Table 5 Life expectancy at birth, males 
Black White 
1930-39 50.06 60.62 
1939-41 52.26 62.81 
1942 54.28 63.65 
1943 54.66 63.16 
1944 55.30 63.55 
Table 6 Infant mortality per 1000 births, 
1940 and 1943 
Black White 
1940 72.9 43.2 
1913 61.5 37.5 
Tables from: Mary Gover, 'Negro Mortality: Course of Mortality from 
Specific Causes, 1920-1944'j Public Health Reports, Vol. 63,7, 
February 13,1948; Jessie P. Guzman, Negro Year Book: A Review of 
Events Affecting Negro Life, 1941-46, Tus egee, Alabama, 19 7,323; 
. Florence Murray, Negro Hand Book, 
-1--9-46-47.9 New York 19117,71. 
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Note on Appendix IV 
These tables are included to show that, statistically, the 
7-r 
health of Afro-Americans continued to improve during the war years. 
But while the rate of improvement was greater for blacks than for 
whites, (because there was more room for improvement), the huge gap 
between the races remained. Although the distance between them 
was closing a projection based on the figures here shows that the 
number of. deaths among Afro-Americans due to T. B. would not meet with 
that of whites until 1959 or 1960. Similar predictions could be 
made based on the other tables, with one exception, that of mortalities. 
due to, diseases of the heart. In this category, the racial distinctions 
were not; so pronounced and rather than falling, the number of deaths 
due to this cause seemed to be rising among both races. Why this 
should, be is not readily apparent. It may have been because more 
deaths were recognized as being due to heart disorders. It may 
also have been a symptom of generally rising standards. Diseases 
of.. the heart seem to increase as people live, eat, and drink better 
and work in the more sedentary white-collar occupations. If this 
were so, these figures would, on the face of it, indicate that blacks 
were better off than whites. Of course this was not so, and the 
higher death rate was due to poorer medical care and hospitalization. 
Notice that the deaths due to syphilis among blacks had been increasing 
up until 1940 but declined from then on. This could well have been 
due to the provision of prophylactics to men in the armed services 
and to the medical care given to servicemen unfortunate enough to 
catch the disease. 
293 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
1.,: ", 
-Manuscript 
Collections 
Fair Employment Practices Committee, National Archives, Record Group 
228.1= (Contains records of FEPC hearings, papers and reports on 
economic developments, and a collection of relevant pamphlets and 
articles. ) 
Housing and Home Finance Agency, National Archives, Record Group 
207. (Has a great deal of material on defence housing and on 
employment. ) 
Charles Spurgeon Johnson Collection, Fisk University. (Includes two 
important unpublished essays by Johnson on the impact of the war on 
the Afro-American and race relations). 
James-Weldon Johnson Collection, Beinecke Library Yale University. 
(Useful mainly for newspaper clippings and papers on FEPC and Randolph 
but also has correspondence with various black writers. ) 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Library 
of Congress. (The records for the post-1939 period have yet to be 
processed and catalogued and the previous arrangement of material 
has been disturbed, making it impossible to trace important files. 
Material quoted in text, on soldiers attitudes, was found at random. ) 
Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, National Archives, Record 
Group 107. (Contains files and records on every aspect of black 
life, housing, employment, and of course, service in the Army. 
Also letters from black soldiers and civilians, and the responses of 
military officials. ) 
Office of Education, National Archives, Record Group 12. (Information 
relevant purely to education, largely the papers and records of the 
Indefatigable Ambrose Caliver. ) 
Office of Facts and Figures, later Office of War Information, National 
Archives, Record Group 208. (Records of plans to be used to 
mobilize the black population and boost black morale, revealing the 
-importance race relations had achieved as a result of the war 
emergency. ) 
Office of Price Administration, National Archives, Record Group 188. 
, (Details of rationing and price controls as they affected Afro- 
Americans, and also details of the employment of blacks within the 
OPA itself. ) 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt Papers, Hyde Park, New York. (Files 
containing a wealth of material on race relations, correspondence to Roosevelt from blacks and from white federal officials and the President's replies to them. ) 
Schomburg Collection, Harlem Branch New York Public Library. (Files 
of unpublished material on the Lynn Committee and the National Citizens' Committee for Winfred Iynn, Veterans, Education, and the March on Washington Movement. ) 
294 
Selective Service System, National Archives, Record Group 147. 
(Surprisingly, very little on Selective Service and Afro-Americans 
but some interesting correspondence from white southerners concerning 
the 'favourable' consideration blacks were thought to be getting in 
the draft. ) 
Special Committee of the Senate to Investigate the National Defense 
Program, 1941-48, (Truman Corrmiittee), National Archives, Record Group 
146. --(Includes correspondence from individuals and organizations 
concerning discrimination in industry and details of the campaign 
for an anti-discrimination bill, Senate Resolution 75. ) 
War Department, National Archives, Record Groups 389,330. (Contain 
reports and surveys on the attitudes of black and white soldiers 
toward integration and the Arty records of the Detroit riot of 1943. ) 
War Manpower Commission, National Archives, Record Group 211. 
(Information on the employment situation and discrimination in 
industry. Also includes an extremely valuable unpublished (and 
incomplete) 'History of the Mobilization of Labor for War Production 
During World War III with a lengthy chapter on discrimination. ) 
Walter White Papers, in James Weldon Johnson Collection, Yale 
University. (Although these are largely the papers and letters 
relating to the post-war period, they do reveal the close relationship 
White had with the Roosevelts, particularly Eleanor. There is also 
some correspondence with the President concerning White's tour of 
the overseas military bases. ) 
2. Other Unpublished Materials 
American Council on Race Relations, 'Survey of Community Veteran 
Information Centers', 1946, in Schomburg Collection. 
American Council on Race Relations, 'Evaluation of State FEPC: 
Experiences and Forecasts', 1949, in Yale University Library. 
Byers, Jean, 'A Study of the Negro in Military Service, Department 
of Defense, Washington, D. C., 191.7, in Moorland-Spingarn Collection, 
Howard University. 
Fisk University, Social Science Institute, 'Racial Attitudes: 
Interviews Revealing Attitudes of Northern and Southern White 
Persons, of a Wide Range of Occupational and Educational Levels, 
Toward Negroes', Nashville, Tennessee, 1916. 
March. on Washington Movement, 'Proceedings of Conference Held in 
Detroit, September 26-27,1942', 1942, in Schomburg Collection. 
National Urban League, 'Changes in the Occupational Status of Negroes, 
1940-1950', New York 1950, in Schomburg Collection. 
295 
National Urban League, 'A Summary Report of the Industrial Relations 
: laboratory: Performance of Negro Workers in Three Hundred War 
Plants', New York 1944, in Moorland-Spingarn Collection. 
Odum, ` Howard Washington, 'On Trying to Analyze Southern Race Tensions 
with Special Reference to the War Situation and to the Total National 
Picture', 1943, in Yale University Library. 
Office of Facts and Figures, 'The Negro Looks At The War: Attitudes 
Iof New York Negroes Toward Discrimination Against Negroes and a 
. 
Comparison of Negro and Poor White Attitudes Toward War Related 
Issues', 1942 in Schomburg Collection. 
Wirth, Louis, 'The Effect of War on American Minorities: A Research 
Memorandum', New York 1943, in Schomburg Collection. 
3. ", Government Publications 
Advisory Committee on Education, The Federal Government and Education, 
Washington, D. C., 1938. 
Blood, -Kathryn) Negro Women War Workers, Department of Iabor, Women's 
Bureau, Bulletin 20, Washington, D. C., 1945. 
Bureau of Employment Security, Employment Security Review, IX, 7, 
July 19). 2. 
Caliver, Ambrose, Postwar Education of Negroes: Educational Impli- 
cations of Any Data and Experiences of Negro Veterans and War 
worxers, urri. ce or Eaucation, Washington, 1). U., iYLL. 
Congressional Record, Vol. 94, No. 66,80th Congress, Second Session, 
Senate, April 12,1948. 
Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Negroes in the United 
States 1920-1932, Washington, D. C., 1935. OF 
Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Trends in the Income of 
Families and Persons in the United States 1947 to 1960, Technical 
Paper , Washington, D. C., 1967. 
Department of Labor, Negroes in the United States: Their Employment 
and Economic Status, Bulletin 1119, Washington, D. C., 1952. 
Department of Labor, 'Annual family and occupational earnings of 
residents of two Negro housing projects in Atlanta, 1937-1944', 
Monthly Labor Review, Vol. 61, No. 6, December 1945. 
. Department of Labor, 'Postwar Trends in Negro Employment', Monthly Labor Review, Vol. 65, No. 6, December 19147. 
Department of Labor, 'Postwar Status of Negro Workers in San Francisco', 
Monthly Labor Review, Vol. 70, No. 6, June 1950. 
296 
Department of ILabor, 'A Century of Change: Negroes in the U. S. 
Economy, 1860-19601, Monthly Labor Review, Vol. 85, No. 12, December 
1962. 
Department of Labor, Division of Negro Economics, Negro Migrations 
in 1916-17, Washington, D. C., 1919. 
Federal Security Agency, Social Security Board, Negroes and the 
National Defense Program, Washington, D. C., September 1941. 
Housing and Home Finance Agency, Negro Share of Priority War Housin - 
Private'and Public as of December 31, , Office of Principal 
9 vvaoaaiaºrmvva+j L. v. 
Housing and Home Finance Agency, Housing of the Non-white Population, 
1940 to 1947, Washington, D. C., 1946. 
Housing and Home Finance Agency, Housing of the Non-white Population, 
1940 to 1950, Washington, D. C., 2. 
Lee, -, Ulysses G., The Employment of Negro Troops, U. S. Army in World 
War II, Special Studies 5, Washington, D. C., 1966. 
National Resources Planning Board, Report for 1942, Part I: Post-war 
. Plan and Program, Washington, D. C., 1943. 
Office of Education, National Survey of the Higher Education of 
Negroes, Washington, D. C., 1942. 
Office-of Facts and Figures, Report to the Nation: The American 
Preparation For War, Washington, D. C., 1942. 
Office of War Information, Negroes and the War, Washington, D. C., 
n. d. 
Palmer, A. Mitchell, Radicalism and Sedition Among the Negroes as 
Reflected in their Publications, Exhibit No. 10, Senate Documents, 
Vol. 2,66th Congress, ist Session, 1919, Washington, D. C., 1919. 
President's Commission on Higher Education, Higher Education For 
American Democracy, New York 1948. 
President's Committee on Civil Rights, To Secure These Rights, 
. 
Washington, D. C., 19117. 
.,, 
President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the 
Armed Services, Freedom to Serve, Washington, D. C., 1950. 
President's Committee on Fair Employment Practice, Minorities in 
Defense, Washington, D. C., 19111. 
President's Committee on Fair Employment Practice, FEPC: How it Operates, Washington, D. C., 191i14. 
297 
president's Committee on Fair Employment Practice, First Report: 
July 1943 - December 19l4i, Washington, D. C., 1945. 
president's Committee on Fair Employment Practice, Final Report: 
June' 28,1946, Washington, D. C., 1947. 
public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1915 1916 
195b., Washington, D. C., 1961,1962. 
Selective Service System, Selective Service in Peace Time: First 
Report of the Director of Selective Service, 1940-41Y Washington, 
r. n 'fn. n 
. v. j 
Selective Service System, Selective Service in Wartime: Second Report 
... 1941-42, j Washington, D. C., 1943. 
Selective Service System, Selective Services as the Tide of War 
Turns: Third Report ... 3- , Washington, D. C., 1945. 
Selective Service System, Selective Service and Victory: Fourth 
Report ... . Washington, D. C., l9. 
Selective Service System, Special Groups: Special Monograph No. 10, 
Volume 11, Washington, D. C., 1953. 
U. S., -Information Service, The Peo le Take The Lead: A Record of 
Progress in Civil Rights, 19 to 1956, Washington, D. C., 1956. 
War Manpower Conmlission, Man Power: One Tenth of a Nation, Washington, 
D. C. n. d. 
Wilkerson, Doxey A., Special Problems of Negro Education, Washington, 
D. C. ", _1939. 
4 Newspapers, Magazines, and Journals 
Baltimore Afro-American, 1942-1946. 
Black Worker: The Official Organ of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car 
porters, 19 0- . 
Chicago Defender, 1917-20,1941-46. 
Congress Vue, (National Negro Congress), 1943-416. 
The Crisis (NAACP), 1918-20,19110-48. 
Journal of Negro Education, 1941-46. 
New York Times, 191.11-50. 
opportunity: Journal of Negro Life, (NUL), 1941-1946. 
298 
Pittsburgh Courier, 190-1918. 
Fhylon Quarterly: A Review of Race and Culture, 1941-5O. 
Race Relations: A Monthly Summary of Events and Trends, 19LL3-L7. 
The Southern Frontier, (Commission on Interracial Co-operation), 
1941-45. 
5. Other Contemporary Published Materials 
A. Pamphlets; Reports, and Papers 
Abrams, Charles, Race Bias in Housing, New York 1947" 
American Council on Race Relations, Negro Platform Workers, Chicago 
19145.. 
American Council on Race Relations, Directory of Agencies in Inter rou 
Relations: National, Regional, State and Local, 194b-49i Chicago 19 
American Federation of Labor, Proceedings of Annual Conventions, New 
Orleans 1910, Seattle 1911, Toronto 19423 Boston 19 3, New Orleans 
1944. - 
American Teachers Association, The Black and White of Rejections for 
Military Service, Montgomery, Alabama., 
Barksdale, James Worsham, A Comparative Study 
of-Contem orary White and Negro Standards in health, Education, and 
e fare, C arlottesvi e, Virginia, Phelps-Stokes Fellowship Paper 
V 6iºua, 1747 " 
-Bolte, Charles G., and Louis Harris, Our Negro Veterans, New York 
"; Public Affairs Committee Pamphlet 128, New York 1947. 
Brown, Earl Louis, Why Race Riots? Lessons from Detroit, New York 
Public, Affairs Committee Pamphlet 87, New York 1944. 
Brown, Earl Louis, and George R. Leighton, The Negro and the War, New 
York Public Affairs Committee Pamphlet 71, New York 1942. 
Chicago Commission on Race Relations, The Negro in Chicago: A Study 
of Race Relations and a Race Riot, Chicago 1923. 
Chicago Mayor's Commission on Human Relations, Race Relations in 
Chicago : Report for 19115, Chicago 1945. 
Chicago Mayor's Commission on Human Relations, Human Relations in 
Chicagos Report for 19116, Chicago 1946. 
Chicago Mayor's Committee on Race Relations, Negroes in Chicago, 
Chicago 1944. 
299 
Cobb, William Montague, Medical Care and the Plight of the Negro, 
NAACP, New York 1947. 
Cobb, William Montague, Progress and Portents for the Negro in 
Me_ e, NAACP, New York 194b. 
Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, Toward Greater Freedom: 
Problems of War and Peace, New York 1942. 
Congress of Industrial Organizations, Proceedings of Annual 
Constitutional Conventions, Boston 19 2, Phi ade pia , Chicago 
1944. 
Congress of Industrial Organizations: Committee to Abolish Racial 
Discrimination, Working and Fighting Together, Washington, D. C., 
1943. 
Council for Democracy, The Negro and Defense: A Test of Democracy, 
New York 19141. 
Council for Democracy, The Negro in America: How We Treat Him and 
How We Should, New York 1945. 
DeAngelis, Gabriel, Nobody Knows...., Committee Against Jim Crow in 
Military Service and Training, New York 1949. 
Douglas, Helen Gahagan, The Negro Soldier: A Partial Record of 
Negro Devotion and Heroism in the Cause of Freedom, Gathered from 
the Files of the War and Navy Departments, Washington, D. C., 1946. 
Evans, William L., Race Fear and Housing In aT ical American 
Community, National Urban League, New York 1946. 
Ford, James W., The War and the Negro People, New York 1942. 
Hewes, Laurence I, Jr., and William Y. Bell, Intergroup Relations in 
San Diego: Some Aspects of Community Life in San Diego Which 
Imbert, Dennis I., The Negro After the War, New Orleans 1943 
International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural 
Implement Workers of America, To Unite... Regardless, Detroit, n. d. 
Johnson, Charles S., et al., The Negro War Worker in San Francisco: 
A Local Self-Survey, San Francisco 1944. 
Johnson, J. R., Why Negroes Should Oppose the War, New York 1939 (? ). 
MacDonald, Dwight and Nancy MacDonald, The War's Greatest Scandal: 
The Story of Jim Crow in Unifoxen, MOWM, New York n. d. 
Houser, Gecrge M., Erasing the Color Line, New York 1945. 
300 
McWilliams, Carey, Race Discrimination - And the Law, National 
Federation for Constitutional Liberties, n. p., n. d. 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Veterans 
Handbook, New York n. d. 
National Committee on Segregation in the Nation's Capital, Segregation 
in Washington, Chicago 19148. 
National Negro Congress, Negro Workers After the War, New York 1915. 
National Urban League, Victory Through Unity: Annual Conference, 
September 28 - October 3,1943, Chicago 1943. 
National Urban League, Racial Conflict: A Home Front Danger: 
_ Lessons of the Detroit Riot, New York 1W. 
New York State War Council, Committee on Discrimination in Employment, 
How Management Can Integrate Negroes in War Industries, New York 19142. 
New York State War Council, Committee on Discrimination in Employment, 
The Negro Integrated, New York 1915. 
New-York State Commission Against Discrimination, The State of the 
Community, New York 1949. 
Northrup, Herbert R., Will Negroes Get Jobs Now?, New York Public 
Affairs Committee Pamphlet 110, New York 1945. 
Perry, Pettis, The Negro's Stake in This War, San Francisco 1942. 
Randolph, A. Philip, and Norman Thomas, Victory's Victims: The Negro's 
Future, New York 19143. 
Rosenwald Fund, Directory of Agencies in Race Relations: National, 
State, and Local, Chicago-1-3975. 
Saunders, John and Albert Parker, The Struggle For Negro Equality, 
New York 19143. 
Maxwell, Stewart, The Negro in America, New York Public Affairs 
, Committee Pamphlet 95, New York 1944. 
Weaver, Robert C., Hemmed In: ABCs of Race Restrictive Housing 
'Covenants, Chicago 1945. 
Weckler, J. E., and Theo E. Hall, The Police and Minority Groups: A 
Program to Prevent Disorder and to Improve Relations between Different 
Racial Religions and National Groups, Chicago 1944. 
Williams, John Henry, A Negro Looks At War, New York 1940. 
Wilson, Ruth Danenhower, Jim Crow Joins U: A Study of Negroes in the 
Armed Forces of the United States, New York 1944. 
301 
Wright, Richard R., What the Negro Needs: A Post-war Plan to 
Integrate the Negro's Activities and Build Toward Full Social and 
Economical Security, New York 194- (? ). 
B. Books 
Baruch, Dorothy W., Glass House of Prejudice, New York 1916. 
Bontemps, Arna and Jack Conroy, They Seek a City, Garden City, New 
York' 19.5. 
Brameld, Theodore, Minority Problems in the Public Schools: A St 
. `of Administrative Policies and Practices in Seven School Systems 
0 
Brazeal, Brailsford R., The Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters 
its Origin and Development, New York and London 194b. 
Brown. Ina Corinne, Race Relations in a Democracy, New York 19L19. 
Chase, Stuart, For This We Fought: Guide Dines to America's Future 
as Reported to the Twentieth Century Fund, New York 1946. 
Clark, Evans, editor, Wartime Facts and Postwar Problems: A Study 
and Discussion Manual, Twentieth Century Fund, New York 1943. 
Clark,, Tom C., and Philip B. Perlman, Prejudice and Property: An 
Historic Brief Against Racial Covenants, Washington, D. C., 194d. 
Conrad, Earl, Jim Crow America, New York 1947. 
Davie, Maurice R., Negroes in American Society, New York 1919. 
Drake, St. Clair and Horace R. Cayton, Black Metropolis: A Study of Negro Life in Northern City, New York 1944. 
Embree, Edwin R., and Julia Waxman, Investment in the People. - The 
Story of the Julius Rosenwald Fund, New York 1949. 
Embree, Edwin R., Thirteen Against the Odds, New York 19)41. 
Embree, Edwin R., Brown Americans: The Story of a Tenth of the Nation, New York 1944. 
Ford, Nick Aaron, The Contemporary Negro Novel: A Study in Race 
Relations, Boston, -1936. 
; Purr, Arthur, Democracy's Negroes, Boston 19Ii. 7. 
Gallagher, Buell G., Color and Conscience: The Irrepressible Conflict, 
New York and London 1946. 
Gardner, Burleigh B., Human Relations in Industry, Chicago 1946. 
302 
Gloster, Hugh M., Negro Voices in American Fiction, New York 1948. 
Goodman, Jack, editor, While You Were Gone: A Report on Wartime Life 
in the United States, New York 1946. 
Grodzins, Morton, Americans Betrayed: Politics and the Japanese 
Evacuation, Chicago 1949. 
Guzman, Jessie Parkhurst, editor, Negro Year Book: A Review of Events 
Affecting Negro Life, 1941-46, Tuskegee, Alabama 15V7. 
Guzman, Jessie Parkhurst, editor, Negro Year Book 1952: A Review 
of Events Affecting Negro Life, New York 1952. 
Halsey, Margaret, Some of My Best Friends, Sydney 191.6. 
Harris, Abram L., and Sterling D. Spero, The Black Worker, New York 
1931. 
Haywood, Harry, Negro Liberation, New York 1918. 
Heywood, Chester D., Negro Combat Troops in the World War: The Story 
of'the 371st Infantry, New York 1928. 
Johnson, Charles S., Patterns of Negro Segregation, London 1944. 
Johnson, Charles S., and associates, Into the Mainstream: A Survey 
of Best Practices in Race Relations in the South, Chapel Hill, North 
Carolina 1947. 
Kesseluran, Louis Coleridge, The Social Politics of FEPC: A Study 
in Reform Pressure Movements, Chapel Hill, North Carolina 194b. 
Key, V. O., Jr., Southern Politics in State and Nation, New York 1949. 
Konvitz, Milton R., The Constitution and Civil Rights, New York 1947. 
Lee, Alfred McClung and Norman Humphrey, Race Riot, New York 19143. 
Little, Arthur W., From Harlem to the Rhine: The Story of New York's 
Colored Volunteers, New York 1936. 
Little, K. L., Negroes in Britain: A Study of Race Relations in 
English Society, London 1947. 
Logan, Rayford W., editor, What the Negro Wants, Chapel Hill, North 
Carolina 1944. 
Logan, Rayford W., The Negro and the Post-war World -A Primer, Washington, D. C., 1-90. 
Logan, Spencer, A Negro's Faith in America, New York 1916. 
Long, Herman H., and Charles S. Johnson, People Vs Property: Race 
Restrictive Covenants in Housing, Nashville, Tennessee 1947. 
303 
McWilliams, Carey, Brothers Under the Skin, Boston 1943. 
Merrill, Francis E., Social Problems in the Home Front: A Study of 
-Wartime Influence, New York and London 19 . 
Meyer, Agnes E., Journey Through Chaos, New York 191i4. 
Moon, Bucklin, editor, Primer for White Folks, New York 1915. 
M6on, 'Bucklin, The High Cost of Prejudice, New York 1917. 
Moon, Henry Lee, Balance of Power: The Negro Vote, New York 1949. 
Murray, Florence, editor, The Negro Handbook; 1942) New York 1942. 
Murray, Florence, editor, The Negro Handbook; 19Li1i., New York 1944. 
Murray, Florence, editor, The Negro Handbook; 1916-47, New York 19L. 7. 
Myrdal, Gunnar, An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern 
Democracy, New York 1944. 
Noble, Peter, The Negro in Films, London 1949. 
Northrup, Herbert R., Organized Labor and the Negro, New York and London 
19L . 
Odum, Howard Washington, Race and Rumors of Race: Challenge to 
American Crisis, Chapel Hill, North Carolina 
Ogburn, William Fielding, editor, American Society in Wartime, Chicago 
l943. 
Ottley, Roi, New World A'Coming, New York 19L3. 
Ottley, Roi, Black Odyssey: The Story of the Negro in America, 
London 1919. 
Parker, Albert, Negroes in the Post-war World, New York 1944. 
Porter, James A., Modern Negro Art, New York 19113. 
Powell, Adam Clayton, Sr., Riots and Ruins, New York 19115. 
Powell, Adam Clayton, Jr., Marching Blacks: An Interpretive 
History of the Rise of the Black Common Man, New York 1945. 
Proceedings of the Writers Congress Los Angeles 1913, Berkeley and 
Los Angeles 19 
Rose, Arnold M., The Negro's Morale: Group Identification and 
Protest, Minnesota 1949. 
Sandburg, Carl, The Chicago Race Riots, July 1919, New York 1919. 
3OL 
Schermerhorn, 'R. A., These Our People, Boston 1949. 
Schoenfeld, Seymour J., The Negro in the Armed Forces: His Value 
and Status - Past, Present and Potentia , Washington, D. C., 194 . 
Scott, Emmett J., Negro Migrations During the War, New York 1920. 
Seaver, Edwin, editor, Cross Section 1917: A Collection of New 
American Writing, New York 1947. 
Silvera, John D., The Negro in World War II, New York 1946. 
Sprigle, Ray, In the Land of Jim Crow, New York 1949. 
Stegner, W., and editors of Look, One Nation, Boston 1945. 
Sterner, - Richard, The Negro's Share: A Study of Income Consumption, 
Housing and Public Assistance, New York 1943. 
Stouffer, Samuel A., et al., The American Soldier, Princeton 19149. 
Thorp, Margaret Farrand, America at the Movies, London 1946. 
Watkins, Sylvestre C., editor, Anthology of American Negro Literature, 
New York 1944. 
Watson, Goodwin, Action for Unity, New York 19117. 
Watson, Goodwin, editor, Civilian Morale, New York 1942. 
. 
Weaver, Robert C., Negro Labor: A National Problem, New York 1916. 
Weaver, Robert C., The Negro Ghetto, New York 1918. 
White, Walter Francis, A Rising Wind, Garden City, New York 19145. 
Willkie, Wendell L., One World, London 19143. 
Wright, Richard, Twelve Million Black Voices: A Folk History of the 
Negro in the United States of America, Londan 1947. 
C. " Articles 
Banner, Warren M., 'New York', Journal of Educational Sociology, 
XVII, 5, January 19W. t . 
Bolte, Charles G., 'He Fought For Freedom', Survey Graphic, XXM, 1, 
January 1917. 
Bond, Horace Mann, 'Should the Negro Care Who Wins the War? ', Annals 
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 223, 
September 19 2. 
305 
Bratty Charles, 'Los-Angeles', Journal of Educational Sociology, XIX, 
3, ' November 1945. 
Brown,; Earl, 'American Negroes and the War', Harpers, April 1912. 
Brown, '-'Earl, 'The Negro Vote 1914: A Forecast', Harpers, July 19LJ1.. 
Buckler, Helen, 'The CORE Way', Survey Graphic, XXXV, 2, February 1916. 
Cayton, Horace R., 'The Negro's Challenge', The Nation, July 3,1943. 
Cayton, Horace R., 'Fighting for White Folks? ', The Nation, September 
-265,1942. 
Clark, Kenneth B., and James Barker, 'The Zoot Effect in Personality: 
A Race Riot Participant', Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 
vol. 45,1945. 
Current Affairs, December 19142, 'The Colour Problem as the American 
Sees It'. 
Dabney, Virginius, 'Nearer and Nearer the Precipice', Atlantic, 
January 1913. 
Davis, Michael M., 'What Color is Health? ', Survey Graphic, XX%VI, 
2, January 1947. 
Davis, Paul C., 'The Negro in the Armed Forces', Virginia Quarterly 
Review, XXIV, lt, 19118. 
Davis, Ralph N., 'The Negro Newspapers and the War', Sociology and 
-Social Research, XXVII, May-June 1943. 
Dickinn, Dorothy, 'Food Patterns of White and Negro Families, 1936- 
1948', Social Forces, XXVII, May 1949. 
Ford, Nick Aaron, 'What Negroes Are Fighting For', Vital Speeches, 
IX, 8, February 1,1943. 
Fortune, XXV, June 1942, 'The Negro's War', (entire issue). 
Frazier, E. Franklin, 'Ethnic and Minority Groups in Wartime with 
Special Reference to the Negro', American Journal of Sociology, 
XLVII, 3, November 1942. 
Gover, Mary, 'Negro Mortality: Course of Mortality from Specific 
Causes, 1920-1914', Public Health Reports, Vol. 63,7, February 13, 
19148. 
Granger, Lester B., 'Racial Democracy - The Navy Way', Common Ground, 
Winter 1947. 
Graves, John Temple, 'The Southern Negro and the War Crisis', 
Virginia Quarterly Review, XVIII, 14, Autumn 1942. 
306 
Hall, E. T., Jr., 'Race Prejudice and Negro-White Relations in the 
Anny', American Journal of Sociology, LII, 5, March 1917. 
Hardwick Leon H., 'Negro Stereotypes on the Screen', Hollywood 
Quarterly, I, 2, January 1916. 
Hastie, 'William H., 'The Negro in the Army Today', Annals of 
American Academy of Political and Sodal Science, Vol. 22 , September 
1942. 
Haynes, George Edmund, 'Effects of War Conditions on Negro Labor', 
Proceedings of Academy of Political Science, Vol. 8, February 1919. 
James, Joseph, 'San Francisco', Journal of Educational Sociology, 
XIX, 3, November 1915. 
Johnson, Charles S., 'The Negro', American Journal of Sociology, 
Vol. la, 6, May 19112. 
Johnson, Charles S., 'The Present Status of Race Relations in the 
South', Social Farces, XXIII, 1,1914. 
Johnson, Charles S., 'Social Changes and Their Effects on Race Relations 
in the South', Social Forces, XXIII, 3,1945. 
Johnson, Howard, 'The Negro Veteran Fights for Freedom', Political 
Affairs, Vol. 26, May 1914.7. 
Jones, Dorothy B., 'The Hollywood War Film: 1912-1944', Hollywood 
Quarterly, I, 1, October 19lß. 
Jones, Lester M., 'The Editorial Policy of the Negro Newspapers of 
1917-18 as compared with that of 1941-421, Journal of Negro History, 
XXIX, 1, January 1944. 
Liveright, A. A., 'The Community and Race Relations', Annals of 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 2, March 
1946. 
MacDonald, Dwight, 'The Novel Case of Winfred IZnn', The Nation, 
February 20,1QL3. 
MacLean, Malcom S., and R. O'Hara Lanier, 'Negroes, Education, and the 
War', Educational Record, XXIII, 1, January 1912. 
McMann, John T., and Louis Kronenberger, 'Motion Pictures, the Theatre, 
and Race Relations', Annals of American Academy of Political and 
Social Science, Vol. 224, March 1946. 
Margolis, Herbert, 'The Hollywood Scene: The American Minority Problem', 
Penguin Film Review, 5,1948" 
Martin, Louis, E., 'Detroit', Journal of Educational Sociology, 
XVII, 5, January 1944. 
307 
Milner, Lucille B., 'Jim Crow in the Army', New Republic, Vol. 110, 
11, March 1944. 
Murray, 'Florence, 'The Negro and Civil Liberties During World War II', 
Social Forces, XXIV, 2, December 1945. 
New Republic, October 18,1913, 'The Negro: His Future in America', 
entire issue). 
Noble, Georg, 'The Negro in Hollywood', Sight and Sound, Spring 1939. 
Northrup, Herbert R., 'Organized Labor and Negro Workers', Journal of 
Political Economy, LI, 3, June 1943. 
Northrup, Herbert R., 'In the Unions', Survey Graphic, XXXVI, 1, 
January 1914.7. 
O'Brien, Robert W., 'Seattle', Journal of Educational Sociology, 
XIX, 3, November 1915. 
Powell, Adam Clayton, 'Is This A "White Man's War"? ', Common Sense, 
XI, 41 April 191 2. 
Randolph, A. Philip, 'Why Should We March? ', Survey Graphic, XXXI, 
11.9" November 1942. 
Reddick, Laurence D., editor, 'The Negro in the North During Wartime', 
Journal of Educational Sociology, XVII, 5,1944. 
Reddick, Laurence D., editor, 'Race Relations on the Pacific Coast', 
Journal of Educational Sociology, XIX, 3,1945- 
Reddick, Laurence D., 'The Negro in the U. S. Navy in World War II', 
Journal of Negro History, XXXII, April 19117. 
Reed, `Bernice Anita, 'Accomodation Between Negro and White Dnployers 
in a West Coast Aircraft Industry, 1942-441, Social Forces, XXVI, 1, 
October 1947. 
Rose, Arnold M., 'Array Policies Toward Negro Soldiers: A Report on a 
Success and a Failure', Journal of Social Issues, III, 4, Fall 19147. 
Sancton, Thomas, 'The Race Riots', New Republic, July 5,1943" 
Sancton, Thomas, 'Something's Happened to the Negro', New Republic, 
February 8,1943. 
Social Service Review, XVIII, 3, September 1944, 'The Winfred Lynn 
Case Again: Segregation In The Armed Farces'. 
Survey Graphic, XXXI, 11, November 1912, 'Color: Unfinished Business 
of Democracy, (entire issue). 
Survey Graphic, xyI, 1, January 1917, 'Segregation', (entire issue). 
308 
Weaver, Robert C., 'The Negro Veteran', Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 238, March 1945. 
Williams, Philip F., 'Maternal Welfare and the Negro', Journal of the 
American Medical Association, Vol. 132,11, November 1,1946. 
Wirth,. Louis, 'Morale and Minority Groups', American Journal of 
Sociology, Vol. 47,3, November 1941. 
6. Film Material 
'Army Ends Segregation: Korea', Hearst`Metrotone News 1951, Hearst 
Metrotone Library. 
'The Black Soldier', C. B. S. 'of America Series' 1968, Library of 
Congress. 
'Brown Bomber on Tour Overseas', Hearst Metrotone News 1944, Hearst 
Metrotone. 
'Fighting Liberators Hailed', Newsreel 1944, Sherman Grinberg. 
'Negro Colleges in Wartime', office cf War Information 1943) National 
Archives. 
'The Negro Soldier', War Department 1945, National Archives. 
'Negro Troops in Clarks Army Rout Nazis in Italian Front', Hearst 
Metrotone News 1944, Hearst Metrotone. 
'One Tenth of Our Nation', American Film Center 1940, Museum of Modern 
Art. ' 
'Team Work', War Department 1946, National Archives. 
'The Twentieth Century: Integration in the Military', C. B. S. 1966, 
Library of Congress. 
'Truman Urges New Action on Civil Rights', Paramount News 19147, 
National Archives. 
The Vietnam War: Black and White', A. B. C., 'Scope' part 63,1967, 
Library of Congress. 
?. Autobiographies and Reminiscences 
There is a remarkable, and disappointing, lack of published 
, recollections by the black civil rights leaders of the 1940s. I have 
309 
referred to the memoirs of other Afro-American personalities, but 
in general have not found them very useful. However, the very 
fact that few of these considered the war worth mentioning is 
relevant, presenting as it does a form of negative evidence. 
Anderson, Marian, My Lord, What A Morning, London 1957. (The 
black opera singer gives few details o er career after 1939, but 
does refer to the war's 'impetus to change. ') 
Broonzy, William, and Yan. nick Bruynoghe, Big Bill Blues: William 
Broonzy's Story, London 1955. (Has no mention of the war, but does 
include some Broonzy's songs. ) 
Davis, Sammy, Jr., and Jane and Burt Boyar, Yes I Can, London 1965. 
(Includes some interesting recollections of his own experiences in 
the Army in the immediate post-war years. ) 
Gregory, Dick, with Robert Lipsyte, Nigger: An Autobiography, 
London 1965. (Valuable for its descriptions of childhood in an 
impoverished black family during the 1930s and 1940s. ) 
Horne, Lena, and Richard Schickel, Lena, London 1966. (The black 
singer describes her wartime performances and the discrimination against 
black soldiers which she saw while touring Army camps. ) 
Louis, Joe, My Life Story, London 19117. (The black boxing champion 
who became a soldier during the war writes about his experiences 
and his attitudes. ) 
Malcolm X, Autobiography of Malcolm X, New York 1965. (The late 
Black Muslim spokesman was in his late-teens, early-twenties during 
the war and he gives superb descriptions of the life-styles of young 
blacks at that time. ) 
Schuyler, George S., Black and Conservative: Autobiography of George 
S. Schuyler, New Rochelle, New York 9 (The well-known Uourna is writes little of the war years: the importance of the 
19140s, as he remembers them, was the rise of Communism and his attack 
on it. ) 
Tarry, Ellen, The Third Door: The Autobiography of an American Negro 
Woman, London 1956. (Tarry, a black catholic school teacher, 
worked in the U S. O. during the war and she comments on the angry mood 
of black servicemen and civilians. ) 
Waters, Ethel, His Eye is on the Sparrow: An Autobiography, London 
1951. (The black actress's only comment on the war is that the 
tax-man took a large slice of her income as a result of the 1942 
Revenue Act. ) 
310 
White, Walter, A Man Called White: The Autobiography of Walter White, 
New York 1948. (The executive secretary of the NAACP during the 
war, White was one of the most important of black leaders. His 
detailed memoirs are extremely useful, and seem to be accurate. 
) 
Wright, Richard, Black Boy: A Record of Childhood and Youth, New York 
1915. (The black author's recollections of boyhood in the South 
in. the 1920s and 30s is important to this study for the acclaim it 
received on publication. ) 
8. 'Novels and Poetry 
Bynner, Witter, Take Away the Darkness, New York 1947, (Poetry). 
Carter, Hodding, The Winds of Fear, London 1945, (fiction). 
Cozzens, James Gould, Guard of Honour, London 1949) (fiction). 
Dodson, Owen, Powerful Long Ladder, New York l547, (Poetry). 
Ellison, Ralph, Invisible Man, New York 1952, (fiction). 
Fast, Howard, Freedom Road, London 191.5, (fiction). 
Himes, Chester, If He Hollers Let Hirn Go, Garden City, New York 1945) 
(fiction). 
Hughes, Langston, Fields of Wonder, New York 1947, (poetry). 
Hughes, Iangston, One Way Ticket, New York 1919, (poetry). 
. Hughes, Langston, Selected Poems, New York 1957. (poetry). 
Hughes, Langston, The Panther and the Lash: Poems of Our Times, New 
York 1971, (poetry . 
Hughes, Langston and A'na Bontemps, eds., The Poetry of the Nero 
19L6-19 9, Garden City, New York 1951, (poetry . 
-Killens, John Oliver, And Then We Heard The Thunder, London 1964, 
(fiction). 
Kolb, Avery E., Jigger Witchet's War, New York 1959, (fiction). 
. 
Motley, Willard, Knock On Any Door, New York 1917, (fiction). 
Petry, Ann, The Street, Boston 1946, (fiction). 
Petry, Ann, Country Place, Boston 19Ii. 7, (fiction). 
Saxton, Alexander, Bright Web in the Darkness, Berlin 1959, (fiction). 
311 
-Smith, Lillian, Strange Fruit, New York 
1944, (fiction). 
Smith, William Gardner, The. Last of the Conquerors, London 191L9, 
(fiction). 
Williams, John, Captain Blackman, New York 1972, (fiction). 
Wright, Richard, Uncle Tom's Children, New York 1940, (fiction). 
Wright, Richard, Native Son, New York 1910, (fiction). 
Yerby, ' Frank, The Foxes of Harrow, New York 1946, (fiction). 
Yerby, Frank, The Vixens, New York 1918, (fiction). 
9" Secondary Sources 
A. Books 
Abrams, Charles, The City id the Frontier, New York 1965. 
Andreski, Stanislav, Military Organization and Society, London 1954. 
Aptheker, Herbert, A Documentary History of the Negro People in the 
United States, New York 1951. 
'Ashmore, Harry S., The Negro and the Schools, Chapel Hill, North 
Carolina 1954. 
Baldwin, James, Notes of A Native Son, London 1965 edition. 
Baldwin, James, Nobody Knows Nay Name, London 1969 edition. 
Banton, Michael, White and Coloured: The Behaviour of British People 
Towards Coloured Izrmiigrants, London 1959. 
Bardolph, Richard, The Negro Vanguard, New York 1959" 
Becker, Gary S., The Economics of Discrimination, Chicago 1957. 
Bennett, Lerone, Jr., Before the Mayflower: A History of the Negro in 
America, 1619-1961, Chicago 1964. 
Bennett, Lerone, Jr., Confrontation: Black and White, Baltimore 1965. 
Berger, Monroe, Equality by Statute: Legal Controls Over Group 
Discrimination, New York 1952. 
Berman, William C., The Politics of Civil Rights in the Truman 
Administration, Colum us, Ohio 1970. 
312 
Bloch, Herman D., The Circle of Discrimination: An Economic and 
Social Study of the Black Man in New York, New York and London 1969. 
Bogart, Leo, editor, Social Research and the Desegregation cf the 
U. S. Army, Chicago 19; 9. 
Bone, Robert, The Negro Novel in America, New Haven, Connecticut, 
1966. 
Bone, Robert, Richard Wright, Minneapolis, Minn., 1969. 
Bullock, Henry Allen, A History aP Negro Education in the South: 
From 1619 to the Present, Cambridge, Mass., 1967. 
Burma, John H., editor, Mexican-Americans in the United States: A 
Reader, Cambridge, Mass., 1970. 
Burns, W. Haywood, The Voices of Negro Protest in America, London and 
New York 1963. 
Butcher, Margaret Just, The Negro in American Culture, New York 1956. 
Calder, Angus, The People's War: Britain 1939-45, London 1971. 
Cantril, Hadley, Public opinion, 1935-19b6, Princeton, New Jersey 
1951. 
Carter, Hodding, The South Strikes Back, New York 1959. 
Chalmers, David M., Hooded Americanism: The First Century of the Ku 
Klux Klan, 186-1965, New York 1965. 
Chambers, M. M., The Colleges and the Courts 1946-50: Judicial 
Decisions Regarding Higher Education in the United States, New York 
11 nun 
Charters, Samuel B., The Country Blues, London 1960. 
Clark, Thomas D., and Albert D. Kirwan, The South Since Appomattox: 
A"Century of Regional Change, New York 1967. 
Clift, Virgil A., and Archibald W. Anderson, and H. Gordon Hullfish, 
Negro Education in America: Its Adequacy, Problems, and Needs, New 
York 1962. 
Commager, Henry Steele, Documents of American History, New York, 
7th edition, 1962. 
Cornish, Dudley, The Sable Arm: Negro Troops in the Union Army, 
1861-1865, New York 1956. 
Cronon, Edmund David, Black Moses: The Story of Marcus Garvey and the 
Universal Negro Improvement Association, Madison and London 1966. 
313 
Dalfiume, Richard M., Desegregation of the U. S. Armed Forces: 
Fighting on Two Fronts, 1939-1-973y Columbia, Missouri, 1969. 
Davies, Richard 0., Housing Reform During the Truman Administration, 
Columbia, Missouri, 1966. 
Dillon, Mary Earhart, Wendell Willkie 1892-1944, Philadelphia and 
New York 1952. 
Duncan, Otis Dudley, and Beverly Duncan, The Negro Population of 
Chicago: A Study of Residential Succession, Chicago 1957. 
Dykeman, Wilma, and James Stokely, Seeds of Southern Change: The 
Life of Will Alexander, Chicago 19 2. 
Eckman, Fern Marja, The Furious Passage of James Baldwin, London 1968. 
Ellison, Ralph, Shadow and Act, New York 1961. 
E uanuel, James A., Langston Hughes, New York 1967. 
Essien-Udom, E. U., Black Nationalism: The Rise of the Black Muslims 
in the U. S. A., Harmondsworth, Middlesex 196b. 
Ezell, John Samuel, The South Since 1865, New York 1963. 
Faulkner, Harold Underwood, American Economic History, New York, 
8th edition, 1966. 
Ferman, Louis, A., The Negro and Equal Dn loyment Opportunities: A 
Review of Management Experiences in Twenty Companies, New York 1968. 
Ferman, Louis A., Joyce L. Kornbluh, and Alan Haber, Poverty in 
America: A Book of Readings, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1 5. 
Franklin, John Hope, From Slavery to Freedom: A History of Negro 
Americans, New York, 3rd edition, 19-6-9. 
Frazier, Thomas R., editor, Afro-American History: Primary Sources, 
New York 1971. 
Garfinkel, Herbert, When Negroes March: The March on Washington 
Movement in the Organizational Politics of FEPC, Glencoe, Illinois 
3 ascw tuna 1707. 
Gillet, Charlie, The Sound of the City: The Rise of Rock and Roll, 
'London 1970. 
Glazer, Nathan and Davis McEntire, editors, Studies in Housing and 
Minority Groups, Berkeley and Los Angeles 176T. - 
Goldman, Eric F., The Crucial Decade: America 19L5-1955, New York 
1956. 
Green, Constance McLaughlin, The Secret City: A History of Race 
, 
Relations in the Nation's Capital, Princeton, New Jersey, 19677. 
314 
Greenberg, Jack, Race Relations and American Law, New York 1959. 
Grodzins, Morton, The Metropolitan Area as a Racial Problem, 
Pittsburgh 1960. 
Harrington, Michael, The Other America: Poverty in the United States, 
New York 1962. 
Henri, Florette, with Richard Stillman, Bitter Victory: A History of 
Black Soldiers in World War I, Garden City, New York 1970. 
Higginscm, Thomas Wentworth, Army Life in a Black Regiment, (1870), 
New York 1969 edition. 
Hill, Herbert, editor, Anger and Beyond: The Negro Writer in the 
United States, New York 1966. 
Huggins, Nathan Irvin, Harlem Renaissance, New York 1971. 
Hughes, Carl Milton, The Ne 
of Amar-i can ATcorn TTntrnl i ý+ 
Novelist: A Discussion of the Wri 
. 
940-1950., New York, 1970 edition. 
Hughes, Langston, Fight For Freedom: The Story of the NAACP, New 
York 1962. 
Isaacs, Harold R., The New World of Negro Americans, London 1964. 
Itote, Waruhui, 'Mau Mau' General, Nairobi 1967. 
Jacobson, Julius, editor, The Negro and the American Labor Movement, 
Garden City, New York 196 . 
Jerome, V. J., The Negro in Hollywood Films, New York 1950. 
Johnson, Donald Bruce, The Republican Party and Wendell Willkie, Urbana, 
Illinois, 1960. 
Jones, Leroi, Blues People: Negro Music in White America, London 
1965. 
Keil, Charles, Urban Blues, Chicago and London 1966. 
King, Martin Luther, Chaos or Community?, Harmondsworth, Middlesex 
edition 1969. 
Kitano, Harry H. L., Japanese Americans, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 
1969. 
Krislov, Samuel, The Negro in Federal Employment: The Quest for Equal 
-Deployment, Minneapolis, 1967. 
Lash, Joseph p., Eleanor and Franklin: The Story of their Relationship, 
New York 1971. 
Leadbitter, Mike, and Neil Slaven, Blues Records, January 1943 to 
December 1966, London 1968. 
315 
Lewis, Anthony, The Second American Revolution: A first-hand Account 
of the Struggle for Civil Rights, London 1966. 
Lincoln, C. Eric, The Black Muslims in America, Boston 1969. 
Lingeman, Richard R., Don't You Know There's A War On? The American 
Home Front, 1941-1945-, New - York 1970. 
Little, Roger W., editor, Selective Service and American Society, 
New York 1969. 
Lomax, Louis E., The Negro Revolt, London 1963. 
McEntire, Davis, Residence and Race: Final and Comprehensive Report 
to the Commission on Race and Housing, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1960. 
Mandelbaum, David G., Soldier Groups and Negro Soldiers, London 1952. 
Marshall, Ray, The Negro and Organized Labor, New York 1965. 
Marwick, Arthur, Britain in the Century of Total War: War, Peace and 
Social Change, London 1966. 
Middleton, Richard, Pop Music and the Blues: A Study of the Relationship 
and its Significance, London 1972. 
Miller, William, A New History of the United States, London 1970. 
Milward, Alan S., The Economic Effects of the World Wars on Britain, 
London 1970. 
Moskos, Charles C., Jr., The American Enlisted Man: The Rank and File 
in Today's Military, New Yor 970. 
Nichols, Lee, Breakthrough on the Color Front, New York 1951. 
Nolan, William A., Communism versus the Negro, Chicago 1951. 
Norgren, Paul H., and Samuel E. Hill, Toward Fair Employment, New 
York and London 1961. 
Northrup, Herbert R., et al, Negro Employment in Basic Industry: A 
Study of Racial Practices in Six Industries, Philadelphia 1970. 
Oliver, Paul, Blues Fell This Morning, London 1960. 
Oliver, Paul, The Story of the Blues, London 1969. 
Osofsky, Gilbert, Harlem: The Making of a Ghetto, Negro New York 
1890-1930, New York and Evanston 1968. 
Ploski, Harold A., and Roscoe C. Brown Jr., Negro Almanac, New York 
1967. 
316 
Polenberg, Richard, editor, America at War: The Home Front 19111-1915, 
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1968. 
Polenberg, Richard, War and Society: The United States, 1911-194, 
New York 1972. 
Porter, Kirk H., and Donald Bruce Johnson, National Party Platforms 
1840-1964, London 1966. 
Quarles, Benjamin, The Negro in the American Revolution, Chapel Hill, 
North Carolina, 19 . 
Record, Wilson, The Negro and the Communist Party, Chapel Hill, North 
Carolina, 1951. 
Record, Wilson, Race and Radicalism: The NAACP and the Communist 
Party in Conflict, New York 19 
Reitzes, Dietrich C., Negroes and Medicine, Cambridge, Mass., 1958. 
Richmond, Anthony H., Colour Prejudice in Britain: A Study of West 
Indian Workers in Liverpool, 1941-1951, London 19 . 
Rosenmau, Samuel I, editor, Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. 
Roosevelt: Victory and the Threshold of Peace, 19 -, New York 1950. 
Ross, Davis R. B., Preparing for Ulysses : Politics and Veterans 
During World War II, New York and London 1969. 
Ruchames, Louis, Race, Jobs, and Politics: The Story of FEPC, New York and London 1969. 
Schwartz, Mildred A., Trends in White Attitudes Toward Negroes, Chicago 1967. 
Servin, Manuel P., editor, The Mexican-Americans: An Awakening 
Minority, Beverly Hills, California 1970. 
Shogan, Robert, and Tom Craig, The Detroit Race Riot: A Study in 
Violence, New York 1964. 
Silberman, Charles E., Crisis in Black and White, London 1965. 
Sindler, Allan p., editor, Change in the Contemporary South, Durham, 
North Carolina, 1963. 
Southern, Eileen, The Music of Black Americans: A History, New York 
1971. 
Southern Regional Council, Changing Problems in the New South, Atlanta 
1955. 
Spangler, Earl, The Negro in Minnesota, Minneapolis 1961. 
317 
Spear, Allan H., Black Chicago: The Making of a Negro Ghetto 
1890-1920, Chicago 1967. 
Staupers, Mabel Keaton, No Time for Prejudice: A Story of Integration 
of Negroes in Nursing in the United States, New York 1961. 
Steiner, Stan, La Raza: The Mexican-Americans, New York and London 
1969. 
Sternsher, Bernard, editor, The Negro in Depression and War: Prelude 
to Revolution, 1930-1915, Chicago 1969. 
Stillman, Richard J., Integration of the Negro in the U. S. Armed 
Forces, New York 1968. 
Strickland, Avarh E., History of the Chicago Urban League, Urbana, 
Illinois, and London 1966. 
Szed, John F., editor, Black America, New York and London 1970. 
Taeuber, Karl E., and Alma F. Taeuber, Negroes in Cities: Residential 
Segregation and Neighborhood Change, Chicago 19 
Titmuss, Richard M., Essays on 'The Welfare State', London 1958. 
Truman, Harry S., The Memoirs of Harry S. Truman, Two volumes, London 1955,1956. 
Vose, Clement E., Caucasians Only: The Supreme Court the NAACP, 
and the Restrictive Covenant Cases, Berkeley and Los Angeles 1959. 
Walzer, Michael, Obligations: Essays on Disobedience, War, and 
Citizenship, New York 1970. 
Waskow, Arthur I., From Race Riot to Sit-In: 1919 and the 1960s, 
New York 1967. 
White, Walter, How Far the Promised Land? New York 1956. 
Williams, Robin M., Jr., Strangers Next Door: Ethnic Relations in 
American Communities, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1964. 
Wish, Harvey, Contemporary America: The National Scene Since 1900, 
New York, 3rd edition 1955. 
Wolters, Raymond, Negroes and the Great Depression: The Problem of Economic Recovery, Westport, Connecticut 1970. 
Wright, Gordon, The Ordeal of Total War 1939-1915, New York 1968. 
Wright, Richard, White Man, Listen! New York 1957. 
318 
B. Articles 
Abrams, Philip, 'The Failure of Social Reform 1918-1920', Past and 
Present, 24, April 1963. 
Bailer, Lloyd H., 'The Negro in the Labor Force of the United States', 
Journal of Negro Education, XXII, 3,1953. 
Billington, Monroe, 'Freedom to Serve: The President's Corm ittee on 
Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Forces, 19b9- 
1950', Journal of Negro History, LI, ! i, October 1966. 
Calef, Wesley C., and Howard J. Nelson, 'Distribution of Negroes in 
the United States', Geographical Review, Vol. 46,1,1956. 
Cowgill, Donald 0., 'Trends in Residential Segregation of Non-whites 
in American Cities, 191.. 0-50', American Sociological Review, XXI, 1, 
February 1956. 
Cripps, Thomas R., 'The Death of Rastus: Negroes in American Films 
Since 19145', Phylon, XXVIII, 3,1967. 
Cripps, Thomas R., 'Movies in the Ghetto, B. P. (Before Poitier)', 
Negro Digest, XVIII, i, February 1969. 
Dalfiume, Richard M., 'The Fahy Committee and Desegregation of the 
Armed Forces', The Historian, XXXI, 1, November 1968. 
Dalfiume, Richard M., 'The "Forgotten" Years of the Negro Revolution', 
Journal of American History, LV, 1, June 1968. 
Drake, St. Clair, 'The "Colour Problem" in Britain: A Study in Social 
Definitions', Sociological Review, 3,1956. 
Emerson, Rupert, and Martin Kilson, 'The American Dilemma in a 
Changing World: The Rise of Africa and the Negro American', 
Daedalus, Fall 1965. 
Farley, Reynolds, 'The Urbanization of Negroes in the United States', 
Journal of Social History, Vol. 1, Spring 1968. 
Hyman, H. H., and P. B. Sheatsley, 'Attitudes on Desegregation', 
Scientific American, Vol. 195,6, December 1956. 
Kofsky, Frank, 'The Jazz Tradition: Black Music and its White Critics', 
Journal of Black Studies, I, 4,1971. 
Lieberson, Stanley, and Arnold R. Silverman, 'The Precipitants and 
Underlying Conditions of Race Riots', American Sociological Review, 
Xää, 6, December 1965. 
Mabee, Carleton, 'The Crisis in Negro Leadership', Antioch Review, 
XXIV, Fall, 1961. 
Meier, August, and Elliott Rudwick, 'How CORE Began', Social Science 
Quarterly, Vol. 49, ! t, March 1969. 
319 
Moskos, Charles C., 'Racial Integration in the Amed Forces', 
American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 72,2, September 1966. 
Noble, Peter, 'Hollywood Thinks Again About the Negro', Picture Post, 
February 11,1950. 
Scheiber, Jane Lang, and Harry N. Scheiber, 'The Wilson Administration 
and the Wartime Mobilization of Black Americans, 1917-18', Labor 
History, X, 3,1969. 
Sitkoff, Harvard, 'The Detroit Race Riot of 1913', Michigan History, 
LIII, 3,1969. 
Sitkoff, Harvard, 'Racial Militancy and Interracial Violence in the 
Second World War', Journal of American History, LVIII, 3, December 
1971. 
Smith, T. Lynn., 'The Redistribution of the Negro Population of the 
United States, 1910-1960', Journal of Negro History, LI, 3, July 1966. 
Terry, Wallace, 'Bringing the War Home', Black Scholar, November 1970. 
Tuttle, William M., Jr., 'Views of a Negro During the "Red Summer" 
of 1919', Journal of Negro History, Vol. 51,1966. 
Weaver, Robert C., 'Negro Labor Since 1929', Journal of Negro History, 
XXXV, 1, January 1950. 
Weaver, Robert C., 'The Relative-Status=of the Housing of Negroes in 
the United States', Journal of Negro Education, XXII, 3, Summer 1953. 
Weaver, Robert C., 'Non-white Population Movements and Urban Ghettos', 
Phylon, XX, 3,1959. 
Williams, Robin M., Jr., 'Social Change and Social Conflict: Race 
Relations in the United States', Sociological Inquiry, X%XV, 1,1965. 
Winnington, Richard, 'Negro Films', Sight and Sound, February 1950. 
Wynn, Neil A., 'The Impact of the Second World War on the American 
Negro', Journal of Contemporary History, VI, 2,1971. 
Wynn, Neil A., 'Black Attitudes Toward Participation in the American 
War Effort, 1941-1945', Afro-American Studies, III, 1, June 1972. 
C. Unpublished Theses and Essays 
Barresi, Charles Maboio, 'Residential Invasion and Succession: A 
Case Study', M. A. thesis, S. U. N. Y. at Buffalo 1959. 
Lawrence, Charles Radford, 'Negro Organizations in Crisis: Depression, 
New Deal, World War II', F'h. D. dissertation, Columbia University 1952. 
Pines, Jim, 'Blacks in the Cinema: The Changing Image', Education 
Department, British Film Institute, June 1971. 
